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Abstract 
 
Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while 
the means are rationalist is the main argument of this dissertation. I make use of the English 
Schools three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism in analyzing the speeches of 
Iranian statesmen to identify the ways in which the dynamics of the three traditions have 
evolved since 1997 and what it means for interpreting the developments of Iran’s foreign policy 
ventures. I utilize both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis in examining the 
speeches of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the presidents since 1997. The 
quantitative method employs a customized software generating figures that represent the 
recurrence of realist, rationalist and revolutionist terminologies in all the documents 
downloaded from the official websites of the Iranian statesmen as well as the United Nations 
and select news agencies and affiliates. The quantitative phase of the analysis, meanwhile, 
carefully examined selected statements of the supreme leader and the presidents uncovering the 
foreign policy argumentations and justifications, which were studied alongside foreign policy 
actions and classified under the three traditions. The findings suggest that Iran’s foreign policy 
is the same as in the other states of international society – it is consistent and dynamic. It is 
simultaneously realist, rationalist and revolutionist with each tradition serving a specific 
purpose, which cannot be disentangled from the other two. 
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1 Introduction and Related Literature Review 
 
1.1 Central Thesis 
Iran’s association with terms such as ‘rogue state, pariah state or axis of evil’ had ascribed 
negative attributes to the country, which extends to the way Iran conducts its foreign affairs. 
This complicates international relations with Tehran as the political elites are regarded with 
heavy scepticism and their foreign policy as highly questionable. Suspicion regarding Iran’s 
real intent on having a functioning nuclear program is a case in point. Iranian leaders have 
persistently claimed it is solely for peaceful purposes. ‘Due to the important fatwa of its leader 
and its defence doctrine, [Iran] has never had the intention of producing a nuclear weapon’ and 
yet mistrust has prevailed.1 I developed this research within this context of ambiguity 
surrounding Iranian foreign policy, wherein I answer the question: How can we explain the 
dynamics of Iran’s foreign policy? 
I argue that Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist 
vision while the means are rationalist. Iranian statesmen, like most statesmen in the world, 
shape their policies within the institutional and normative parameters of the modern 
international society of sovereign states adhering to the traditions of realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism. Iranian statesmen participating in international affairs utilize the institutions of 
international society and follow normative guidelines on how to effectively conduct themselves 
in pursuing their foreign policy objectives. These objectives are simultaneously realist, 
rationalist and revolutionist in nature showing the complexity and dynamism of Iran’s foreign 
policy. Iran’s foreign policy results from the interplay and balancing of the ‘traditions of 
thought’ of the international society by the Iranian statesmen, proving it is similar to foreign 
policies of all the other countries in the world. My analysis of Iran’s foreign policy relies on a 
different and multi-faceted approach as compared to most research on the topic while at the 
same time supporting the conclusion of most studies on Iranian foreign policy. I show that 
Iran’s foreign policy is consistent by providing a different understanding of it using the English 
School approach. Furthermore, I use both the quantitative and qualitative methods, taking into 
                                                 
1 Hassan Rouhani, “Address by Mr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the General Debate of the 
General Assembly of the UN (2015),” United Nations, accessed December 17, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/70/pv.13 
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account both foreign policy discourses and actions, while weaving together the realist, 
rationalist and revolutionist traditions in Iran’s foreign policy, making this research unique. 
Iran’s foreign policy and its relationship with the ‘traditions of thought’ and the institutions of 
the contemporary international society is at the centre of the following dissertation.2 The 
reflection of the three traditions of international society – realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism – and the classic institutions of the English School – are argued to be present 
within the discursive structure of the political elites in Iran, demonstrated by an analysis of the 
statements of the supreme leader and presidents aimed at international audiences as well as in 
Iran’s foreign policy actions. 
The English School puts forward the three concepts of realism, rationalism and revolutionism 
as the central traditions of the international society, which shape the interactions of states with 
one another. Such interactions are facilitated by the core institutions of diplomacy, international 
law, balance of power, great power management and war.3 These concepts provide useful 
analytical instruments to understand and explain the underlying reasons of Iran’s seemingly 
inconsistent foreign policy. Central to this study is how the three ‘traditions of thought’ have 
operated within the Iranian foreign policy apparatus through the institutions and discourses, 
thereby creating a framework wherein Iran’s foreign policy manoeuvres are executed. 
The time frame for this dissertation stretches from Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005) until the 
first term of the Rouhani government (2013-2017), focusing on Iran’s political elites’ view of 
the West, particularly the United States, and the ramifications of this on Iranian foreign policy. 
Khatami was the first reformist president elected in Iran who introduced the ‘dialogue among 
civilizations,’ signifying Iran’s initial step to engage with the Western world. He opened 
avenues where Iran could define itself against an international order where the nuclear program 
served as Iran’s token to negotiate with the international community. The most dynamic 
interplay of realism, rationalism and revolutionism at work within the Iranian foreign policy is 
demonstrated within the two decades chosen for this research.  
                                                 
2 I borrow the term ‘tradition of thought’ from N. J. Rengger, International relations, political theory, and the 
problem of order: Beyond international relations theory?, The new international relations (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2000). There are alternative terminologies that can be applied to ‘traditions of thought’ such as 
‘international political culture’ or ‘schools of thought’ in international society, however, for the purposes of 
simplicity, I shall remain with the term ‘traditions of thought’. 
3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) 
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1.2 Historical Background 
My research begins in the year 1997 for it represents a dramatic change in Iran’s foreign policy 
strategy. Former president Khatami was elected to the presidency on a platform of reform where 
advocated cooperation, dialogue and diplomacy in dealing with Iran’s international affairs. 
Within this period, the Iranian government presented itself to be ready to engage with the 
international society, making it a crucial year in Iran’s foreign policy. Due to Khatami’s 
moderate stance and diplomatic gestures, a rapprochement with the United States seemed 
possible. His approach was so effective that by March 2000, the former Secretary of State 
Madelaine Albright issued an official apology to Iran for its involvement in the 1953 coup 
ousting the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who nationalized 
Iran’s oil to the dismay of the West. 2001 was designated the year of the Dialogue Among 
Civilizations, an initiative put forward by Khatami at the start of his presidency. Hopes were 
hight but, ironically, tragedy struck the United States as terrorists attacked the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It shook the international community and 
prompted Washington to militarily intervene in Afghanistan beginning the ‘war on terror’. A 
few months later, in his State of the Union Address, President Bush dubs Iran as a member of 
the ‘Axis of Evil’ together with Iraq and North Korea, effectively undermining the efforts of 
the Khatami administration to reconcile with the Washington. 
Tensions increased as Iran’s nuclear program was exposed in 2002 while the unilateral military 
intervention of the United States in Iraq the following year intensified Iran’s state insecurity 
with talks of regime change increased Tehran’s threat perception. Towards the end of his 
presidency, Khatami’s government faced many difficulties both outside and inside Iran to by 
the time Ahmadinejad was elected, Khatami’s ‘Dialogue’ was reduced to a voiceless notion. 
Iran wanted access to nuclear energy prompting Iranian leaders to demand their country’s rights 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). With Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach, the United States and its allies were 
convinced Iran was after nuclear a weapons program and Tehran must be stopped. Years of 
negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program resulted in a deadlock with devastating sanctions being 
imposed on the Islamic Republic for its persistence in enriching uranium within the country. 
Ahmadinejad simply had an unconscious talent for escalating conflicts at home and abroad. 
With the 2009 Green Revolution in Iran and the Arab Uprisings which followed a year later, 
instability within the country and the region mounted having profound consequences for the 
political landscape. 
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Optimism on Iran only returned to the international community with the election of another 
moderate figure into Iran’s presidency, Hassan Rouhani. Dialogue was once again favoured in 
Iran’s foreign policy, with diplomacy and cooperation being the backbone of the Rouhani 
government’s approach to its international affairs. He ended the deadlock and resumed talks on 
Iran’s nuclear program, filling every opportunity with positive gestures in hopes of 
reciprocation. The United States, China, Russia, France, United Kingdom and Germany (P5+1) 
did not miss the window of opportunity and negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. The 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) became Rouhani’s legacy proving Iran’s 
capacity be rationalist by resolving conflicts peacefully. However, beneath the friendly smiles 
of President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Iran’s realist dimension surfaced 
describing the country as a power in the region. Such a move in combination with the 
revolutionist Islamic vision of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, shows the multi-
dimensional constitution of Iran’s foreign policy. This simultaneous co-existence and interplay 
of realism, rationalism and revolutionism is the focus of my research. For now, let us turn to 
the literature on the topic. 
1.3 Perspectives on Iran’s Foreign Policy 
Iran’s foreign policy has been subject of much attention especially since the nuclear program 
was disclosed in 2002. There is a significant amount of studies focusing on this topic as is 
discussed below, but in terms of the complexities of Iran’s foreign policy using a multilateral 
approach there is limited research. More needs to be done to establish a holistic analysis taking 
into consideration all aspects of foreign policy. Due to the lack of holistic analysis of Iran’s 
foreign policy, the word ‘schizophrenic’ has been associated with it as attempts to understand 
how Iran’s actions fall out of the mainstream discussions on the topic.4  
A multi-faceted approach to analysing Iran’s foreign policy, which this study is based on, is 
important for two reasons. The first is about the practical relevance. In analysing multiple 
avenues and dimensions shaping Iran’s foreign policy, a better and more accurate understanding 
of Iran’s foreign policy is drawn. This can help policy-makers and their advisers to make 
suitable decisions about their interactions with Iran mitigating misunderstandings resulting 
from a single interpretation of Iran’s foreign policy. The three traditions of thought and their 
                                                 
4 Ehtesami stated, there is a: “…schizophrenia that the state seems to manifest in so many other areas” in a 
lecture at the LSE: Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iranian foreign policy after the election of Hassan Rouhani” 
(Wolfson Theatre, LSE, London, November 27, 2013), accessed February 7, 2015, http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=2150 
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interplay explains the dynamics of Iran’s foreign policy. It is vital that these three traditions and 
their relationship with each other are taken into consideration before dealing with Iran. 
Scholarly relevance is the second important aspect of using a multi-faceted approach. Few 
studies are made using multiple methods and even fewer present multiple interpretations of 
Iran’s foreign policy in one study. Using such an approach, scholarly bias is minimized and a 
holistic picture of Iran’s foreign policy is painted integrating several themes in one study. I have 
divided the related literature into two recurrent themes prominent in the study of Iranian foreign 
policy. The first and more dominant theme is fundamentally identity-based advancing the 
argument of Iran’s foreign policy being understood through a study of Iranian identity 
consequently binding policy-making to the domestic dimension. The second theme is 
concerned with interest-based arguments asserting the primacy of geopolitics in Iranian foreign 
policy. The following sections will discuss these themes. 
1.3.1 Identity-based Perspectives 
Scholars such as Moshirzadeh and Holliday have bound Iran’s foreign policy to Iranian identity 
crucially drawing on nationalism and fusing it with state identity.5 Iranian foreign policy has 
then become a domestic concern and hence the role of Iranian identity matters.6 Therefore, to 
comprehend Iranian foreign policy, one must understand the formation of this national identity. 
Ansari argues Iran’s national identity is ‘both modern in conception and ancient in lineage’, 
meaning there is a distinct ‘Iranianness’ in the country’s foreign policy, which conflates both 
old and new ideas.7  At times, however, leaders pursue contradictory identities instead of ‘the 
articulated state identity’.8 For instance, although it has become a part of the Islamic Republic’s 
identity to articulate their animosity towards the United States through the Friday prayer’s 
weekly chants of “death to America”, there are times when the decision-makers are more 
temperate to their American counterparts. The “death to America’” chants stopped for a while 
after September 11 and Iranians were even lighting candles. In 2013, the warmth in the speech 
of President Rouhani after the historic phone call with President Obama proves this point. 
Hence, as we can see articulations of state identity have its limitations when it comes to Iran’s 
                                                 
5 Shabnam J. Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance (Farnham, Surrey, England, Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2011), 7–8 
6 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the 
Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 4, [Italics in original]. 
7 Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, Cambridge Middle East studies 40 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 230 
8 Brenda Shaffer, ed., The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy, BCSIA studies in international security 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006), 4; 220 
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foreign policy although despite these limitations, Iranian national identity is central to the 
country’s foreign policy configuration.9 Shabnam Holliday contends that Iranian identity is 
dichotomous, necessitating two distinct political systems: Islamiyat and Iraniyat.10 
Islamiyat refers to ‘being Islamic’ and it has its roots in the Islamic religion introduced by the 
Arab invaders in the 7th century A.D..11 It is important to note that Iran adopted Shi’ism, a 
variant of Islam, instead of the dominant Sunnism practiced by the majority of Muslims. This 
is the type of identity propagated by the clerical leadership allowing Islamic codes to govern 
both domestic and foreign policies.12 Shi’a Islam is dominated by the Twelver Imam doctrine. 
In this doctrine, there are twelve divinely ordained Imams of Islam, starting from Ali, the cousin 
and son-in-law of prophet Mohammad and ending with Mahdi. Mahdi, the last Imam or the 
Vali Al-Asr [Governor of the Epoch] is believed to have gone into occultation and will return 
together with Jesus Christ. The Twelver Imam doctrine governed the period following the 
Islamic revolution through Khomeinism, where instead of focusing on the interests of Iran as a 
nation-state, Iranian foreign policy rested on Khomeini’s interpretation of the Twelver Shi’ite 
Islam.13 Khomeini aimed at exporting the ideology of the Islamic revolution much to the 
disappointment of the states in the region leaving Iran to be ‘an isolated pariah’.14 But with the 
progress of time, modified versions of Iran’s Shi’ite ideology have been utilized to attain certain 
foreign policy goals.15 This demonstrates a ‘spiritual pragmatism’ existing in Iran’s foreign 
policy.16 Along these lines, Fürtig and Sick discuss Iran’s aspirations under a distinct form of 
Islamic universalism where the export of the revolution in the immediate aftermath of the 
Islamic Revolution was a priority.17 They argue that although the sentiment has changed and 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Holliday, Defining Iran, 7–8 
11 Ibid., 23 
12 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Domestic ideational sources of Iran's foreign policy,” Iranian Review of Foreign 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (2010): 168–69, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www.isrjournals.ir/en/iran-foreign-
policy/28-domestic-ideational-sources-of-irans-foreign-policy.html 
13 John L. Esposito and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran at the Crossroads, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 214 
14 Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3 
15 Moshirzadeh, “Domestic ideational sources of Iran's foreign policy” 
16 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Independence Without Freedom: Iran's Foreign Policy (University of Virginia Press, 
2013) 
17 Henner Fürtig, “Universalist counter-projections: Iranian postrevolutionary foreign policy and globalisation,” in 
Ansari, Politics of Modern Iran; Gary Sick, “Iran’s foreign policy: A revolution in transition,” in Ansari, Politics 
of Modern Iran, 4; Gary Sick, “Iran’s foreign policy: A revolution in transition,” in Ansari, Politics of Modern 
Iran, 4 
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Iran has abandoned active exportation of the revolution in favour of more nationalist and 
accommodationist policies, there are traces of this project remaining in Iranian foreign policy.18 
Generally, Iranian Shi’ism involves principles such as ‘opposition to foreign hegemony and 
arrogance as well as support for Muslims and the oppressed’, which has successfully penetrated 
aspects of Iranian foreign policy.19 This has its roots in the Islamic tradition of resistance against 
any tyranny and fighting for justice. ‘Struggling against oppression and defending the 
oppressed,’ as well as following the ‘principle of prohibiting dominance (ghaede nafy-e sabil)’ 
are ‘important religious duties’ according to Moshirzadeh.20 This is exemplified by Iran’s non-
yielding confrontation with the United States amidst threats and sanctions.21 Nia supports this 
argument and contends that Iranian foreign policy is operated by such ‘revolutionary values 
and ideological perspective’ rather ‘than the logic of nation state’.22 Iranian foreign policy is 
based on ideological objectives stemming from a transnational ideological responsibility.23 
Tehran publicizes a transnational ideological responsibility through its anti-Zionist campaign 
and support of the Palestinians and Islamic resistance movements.24 These undertakings 
highlight the government’s Islamic identity. Moshirzadeh presents this Islamic identity in the 
context of the nuclear policy and its development over the past decade. She argues the 
uncompromising aspect of Iran’s nuclear policy could be traced to an identity constituted of 
three central discourses—independence, justice and resistance associated with historical 
narratives shaped by the discourses within the society.25 The three discourses justify Iran’s 
actions in the eyes of the people and the decision-makers.  
Islamiyat in an actor-specific approach is highlighted in the work of Sajadpour. He suggests 
Khamenei direct influence on Iran’s foreign policy since he has been the supreme leader since 
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the death of Khomeini.26 Khamenei’s Islamic vision has dominated both domestic and foreign 
policies and this is evident in his rhetorical successes over the changing Presidents of different 
orientations.27 Some instances include his resistance of Rafsanjani’s efforts ‘to reach a modus 
vivendi’ with the United States, his opposition to Khatami’s democratic reforms as well as 
disputing Ahmadinejad’s desire to confront Washington.28 Since in power, Khamenei has 
consistently reinforced Khomeini’s virtues of the revolution in his speeches—‘justice, 
independence, self-sufficiency and Islam’—accurately reflecting the objectives of Iran’s 
domestic and foreign policy.29 Such coherence in domestic and foreign policy issues has been 
a result of the constant evolution of the ideological deployment of Iran’s Islamic identity.30 
‘Priority is accorded to man’s pursuit of justice, in the sense of achieving a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and power, and to the admonition of oppression’.31 These values have 
made Khomeini’s fight against the Shah very attractive to the masses, which still serve the same 
purpose regardless of the president in office.  
Iraniyat, on the other hand, ‘means being Iranian’ and it is essentially a pre-Islamic concept.32 
It is an identity predominant during the Shah’s rule and was closely knit to an Iranian 
traditionalism prior to the arrival of Islam in the country.33 This identity has continued its subtle 
existence in Iranian politics.34  The interpretation and practice of Iraniyat is not very distinct 
from Islamiyat since both have been intertwined and influenced each other and Iranian national 
identity is always in a state of constant change.35 Depending on the conditions, Iraniyat 
resurfaces at certain points in time having a stronger influence on politics. On the one hand, 
Ramazani argues it is rooted in an ‘independence seeking’ and a ‘culture of resistance against 
foreign forces’.36 On the other hand, Moshirzadeh asserts it is the numerous ‘encounters with 
and experience of the West’ along with diverse other factors significantly shaping Iran’s 
discourse of identity, which have repercussions on the country’s foreign policy.37 
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Although domestically appealing and coherent to the values of the revolution, Shireen Hunter 
believes persistence on the revolutionary values has been an impediment for Iran in conducting 
itself in international affairs.38 She calls this Iran’s ‘ideological baggage’, enabling Tehran to 
maintain its animosity towards Israel as well as inhibiting open negotiations with the U.S. ‘in 
accordance with the rules of international diplomacy’.39 
In his most recent work, R.K. Ramazani presents a blueprint of Iranian political culture using 
detailed historical analysis. Iranian political culture is for him divided into three: pre-Islamic, 
Islamic and Modern.40 He identified them to be products of various eras of Iran’s long history 
dating back to the 6th century BC containing particular aspects still being practiced in Iranian 
foreign policy.41 Furthermore, he explains the key drivers of Iran’s foreign policy ‘by trying to 
place them in the deeper context of…Iran’s “diplomatic culture”’.42 By diplomatic culture he 
means ‘those values, norms, mores, institutions, modes of thinking, and ways of acting that 
have developed over centuries, have survived change, and continue to shape Iran’s foreign 
policy making’.43 They are identity, independence, power, authoritarianism, factionalism, 
environment, democracy and instruments such as subversion, soft power, hard power and 
procrastination.44 
These identity-based arguments drawn from the literature discussed above have been 
compelling as they attempt to pin down Iran’s behaviour to the country’s identity, which explain 
certain ambiguities of Iran’s foreign policy to an extent. However, the study of identity largely 
remains within the realm of the domestic and further research needs to be undertaken to 
demonstrate the concrete effects of such identities on foreign policy-making in Iran. Apart from 
this, certain limitations surface as identity alone is unable to address the full spectrum of 
complexity of Iran’s foreign policy as elements such as domestic economy, national security 
and geopolitical factors cannot be systematically ignored. The sudden shift in policies from the 
Ahmadinejad government to Rouhani’s government regarding the nuclear program, for 
instance, illustrates the limitations of identity being the foundation of foreign policies. 
Ahmadinejad anchored the nuclear issue to Iranian identity justifying the government’s 
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unwillingness to negotiate uranium enrichment despite sanctions. If Iranian identity is indeed 
unyielding, then it cannot account for the sudden change of tone towards the West as well as 
the preparedness to negotiate about the nuclear program once Rouhani took office. In this 
particular example, one could consider an alternative having more to do with economics. The 
costly effects in the form of sanctions could have eventually opened a bargaining space, which 
was less a product of their national identity than a matter of material and financial concern.45 
This vindicates the notion of countries regulating policies completely contradicting ‘their 
formal cultural identification, dictates and consequent state ideology’.46  
 
1.3.2 Interest-based Perspectives 
Another prevailing argument in the literature is related to geopolitics. Realists justify their 
classification of Iranian foreign policy by taking into consideration the geopolitical factors 
surrounding the country. Iran’s disposition presents a ‘strategic nightmare’ as it is situated ‘in 
a war-infested region’, surrounded by antagonistic neighbours, faced with anti-Shi’a 
movements and kept in a long-standing ‘face-off’ with Washington.47 In addition, Iran ‘lacks 
Great Power alliances’, which they have attempted to strengthen in the past decade by fostering 
relations with other powerful global players.48 Ahmadinejad government’s ‘Look to the East’ 
policy has especially aimed at forming strategic partnerships with China and Russia through 
regional and economic cooperation.49  
Due to the drastic change in the regional structure of the Middle East after 9/11 the United 
States has been able to establish their presence on Iran’s doorstep.50 With the American military 
intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian foreign policy became ‘governed by the dictates 
of realpolitik’.51 After 2003, religious identification became an instrument of manipulation in 
order to build security alliances with the Shi’a factions across the region.52 The controversial 
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‘Shi’a Crescent’ in the media refers to this ideological sectarian block against Sunni Islam.53 
Kemp and Nasr, on the other hand, have explored the implications of the war on Iraq and 
concluded the fall of Saddam has led to a significant change of the regional landscape in the 
Middle East. Kemp insists Iran’s need for a nuclear bomb is a ‘result of complex ideological 
and geopolitical circumstances’.54 In ‘The Shia Revival’, Nasr argues that the Shi’ite 
communities have been able to establish fresh ‘cultural, economic and political ties across the 
Middle East’—the most compelling being the relationship of Iran and Iraq.55 This is supported 
by Slavin claiming Iran’s plans for Iraq involves creating a ‘zone of influence and a buffer 
against U.S. attack’.56 Moreover, the strategy of Tehran of turning Iraq into a friend facilitates 
the creation of a ‘political block,’ which ‘can weaken the traditional security system of the 
region…essentially centred in the interest of outside powers and not Iran’.57 Apart from power 
politics, the Shi’ite communities ‘have access to around 30 percent of the world’s oil 
reserves’.58 The amount of literature focusing on the alliance of Iran and Iraq is plentiful and 
quite compelling, especially when it is linked to the nuclear program and oil. With the 
developments in the Middle East since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring, the 
arguments may well prove Iran’s greater ‘Shi’ite’ agenda for the region. 
Iranian foreign policy, can also be viewed as a defensive move towards ‘relative security based 
on compliance and agreement as well as alliance and coalition’ to minimize the threats 
emanating from its immediate borders.59 It has to expand its influence in the region in order to 
survive and maintain a favourable environment for its revolutionary principles.60 To achieve 
this goal of securing its survival, Iran has ‘exploited all instruments at its disposal such as 
Islamism and the Islamic-worldism, Shi’ism, Third-worldism, nationalism, geopolitics, even 
Holocaust denial and so on in different conditions’ demonstrating an opportunistic behaviour 
in foreign policy.61 But in the perspective of Razavi and Juneau, Iran ‘remains a “normal” 
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country’ when examined from a realist angle.62 For them, ‘the maximization of its perceived 
national interests’ and ‘traditional element of power and security’ are the main operators of 
Iranian foreign policy.63 Similarly, Ehteshami says Iran ‘has always been a “rational actor” in 
a classic realist mold’ conducting its foreign policy accordingly.64 He explains that Iran has 
been historically paranoid of foreign intervention and independence as a sovereign state has 
been a widely-accepted goal by the political elites. 65 At the same time, the quest for supremacy 
has been ingrained in Iran’s national aspirations in the region.66 
In contrast, Hunter suggests Iranian foreign policy has been unrealistic and naïve, emanating 
from failing ‘to appreciate dimensions of systemic change’ in the post-Soviet environment.67 
The combination of an unrealistic foreign policy and Tehran’s inability to yield its ‘ideological 
baggage’ has sabotaged their own security ‘by encouraging key players to destabilize it’.68 
Anoush Ehtesami shares Hunter’s view of Iran still being in the process of comprehending the 
post-Soviet systemic changes.69 However, as mentioned earlier, he claims the Islamic Republic 
to be a rational and realist actor, which ‘has much to do with Tehran’s calculations about its 
standing’ as it plays a ‘more assertive role expected of a regional middle power in the Middle 
East’.70 
Apart from external geopolitical factors, internal actors are claimed to play a role in Iranian 
foreign policy.71 Farhi and Lotfian contend that internal political actors determine Iranian 
foreign policy.72 They neatly divide these internal political actors into the Islamic idealists, 
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regional power balancers and global power balancers, wherein the latter two are composed by 
the majority of policy-makers.73 On the one hand, the Islamic idealist’s classification Farhi and 
Lotfian provided falls into the constructivist category as it stresses the significance of the 
Islamic identity. On the other hand, the regional power balancers and the global power 
balancers, are confined to a purely realist framework. Security and survival are the top priority 
of the two groups urging the country to form regional and international alliances to balance 
threats and increase their material capabilities.74 Fathollah-Nejad shares a similar stance. He 
stresses the foreign policy of Iran to be ‘characterized by realism and a policy of détente’.75 The 
defensive realists have gained power in Iran through the election of President Hassan Rouhani 
in 2013, which is comparable to the foreign policy of the Rafsanjani administration—‘détente 
and rapprochement with the West’ and ‘neighbouring Arab States’.76 They believe Iran’s 
foreign policy—specifically towards the West—has the potential to be a win-win situation and 
not to be strictly bound to a ‘zero-sum game’.77 
Hunter, however, advances the idea of Iranian foreign policy driven by a strong incentive to 
collaborate with China and Russia in order to deflect Western imposed economic and political 
sanctions.78 Fostering relations with Beijing and Moscow then becomes a priority of the 
government to acquire certain economic advantages.79 This ‘Look to the East’ policy has proven 
to be a fruitful alliance for all three countries.80 Economic benefits aside, Iran further 
instrumentalizes the policy to balance the American threat.81 The Iranian political elites have 
‘forsaken’ attempts to restore a functional network with the West as their efforts have usually 
been shattered, especially since the revelation of its nuclear program in 2002.82 ‘Look to the 
East’ policies are primarily promoted by internal interest-groups linking the government and 
Iranian economy, thus penetrating foreign policy.83 For instance, the Association of Militant 
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Clergy, not only supports the ‘look to the East policy,’ they also encourage forming alliances 
‘with independent governments to take advantage of the conflict between major powers’.84 
Motallefeh, another influential group, on the other hand, reject the ‘restoration of law and order 
in the economy, foreign policy and internal affairs’ as ‘the rule of law would jeopardize the 
extensive privileges that they enjoy’. 85 Interest-based arguments as discussed in this section 
places power, security and maximization of material gains as the foundations of Iranian foreign 
policy.  
1.3.3 The Holistic Perspective Approach 
The interest-based arguments mostly emphasize national interest and the role of power while 
marginalizing ‘ideational and institutional factors, such as the role of key agents’ identities and 
interests’.86 The identity-based arguments, in contrast, underscore ‘ideational dynamics’ to be 
the key unlocking policy-making behaviour, ignoring ‘the fact that often ideas are used to serve 
purposes determined by power calculations’.87 Each of the approaches write out the obscure 
facts irrelevant to their view making a thorough examination less possible. Thus, a complete 
picture of foreign policy with all its dimensions and edges are usually left to the imagination 
which does not fit the reality of foreign policy governed by dynamism.  
There are two problems in categorizing Iran’s foreign policy into either interest-based or 
identity-based. First, it results in one-sidedness and fails to capture the complexities of the 
debates as well as multiple engagements within foreign policy playing a crucial role in analysis. 
The literature tends to minimize these complexities by assigning them to a single paradigm or 
to a single theory. As such, there is a ‘monopolistic claim of truth for’ one’s ‘own world view’ 
as well as ‘teleological biases’.88 Instead of supplementing each camps weakness, they have 
successfully established themselves to be each other’s binary opponent for uncovering the truth 
about Iranian foreign policy. Thus, a comprehensive explanation of Iranian foreign policy can 
never be achieved. Second, both interest-based and ideological-based accounts focus on the 
‘ends of action: “rational”, individualistic, arbitrary preferences or “irrational”, consensual, 
cultural values’.89 Consequently, they deliberately ignore ‘the normative context of the process 
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by which interests are defined’, playing a crucial role in foreign policy making.90 These actions 
are based on ideas and norms instilled in the psyche of the decision-makers, forming the 
foundation of their behaviour. Ideas, norms and institutions constitute the larger structural 
machinery wherein policy-makers operate. The structural machinery—the institutions of 
international society—and its corresponding ‘traditions of thought’ are normally overlooked by 
most of the literature despite its significance for analysis. To address the limitations of the 
literature, a holistic theoretical framework is needed to integrate the two perspectives and 
provide a pluralistic approach effectively explaining policies. In his book, the International 
Politics of the Persian Gulf, Adib-Moghaddam discusses certain elements of the international 
society and its operationalization in the Gulf region. However, he does not expound on Iran’s 
role as a sovereign state operating within the parameters of the institutions of the contemporary 
international society, which is a feature of this dissertation. 
The English School approach appropriates itself in filling this gap as it can combine both 
perspectives. It can ensure the integration of ‘essential liberal concerns with a respect for a fair 
amount of realist prudence’ as well as ‘locate structural pressures in specific historical 
contexts’.91 It can conveniently occupy the middle ground and step outside the competitive 
game of paradigms to ‘cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach’.92 Moreover, as Dunne 
had observed, the English School avoids ‘the conflictual ‘either/or’ choices of realism versus 
idealism and explaining versus understanding by offering an approach that combines agency 
and structure, theory and history, and morality and power’.93 Secondly, through the English 
school, I can focus on the ‘normative context’ of Iranian foreign policy making. An examination 
of the institutions where statesmen operate, yet another feature of the English School, can 
facilitate the identification of the traditions the statesmen employed in Iran’s foreign policy. 
Knowing how the traditions, institutions and the respective discourses attached to them are 
connected through the English School perspective allows us to fully map the framework in 
which Iran’s foreign policy is outlined. Using a different theoretical approach gives us a fresh 
and holistic perspective on a seemingly polarized debate on Iran’s foreign policy. The issue of 
ambiguities then goes beyond the either-or dichotomy as all perspectives can be encompassed 
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into one theory. Iran’s foreign policy is thus interpreted as not solely a matter of identity or 
interest but both. 
At a more practical level, the contribution of this research is seen in the actual application the 
English School as a theoretical framework. Much of the research on the English School remains 
at the theoretical level and this study is an attempt to give the English School a more practical 
expression making it more relevant to real-world issues. Iran’s foreign policy in this sense 
becomes an example where the English School as a theoretical and analytical framework is 
applied. The English School has highly relevant concepts easily traced in the discourses of the 
world’s political elites as well as reflected in their actions making it ideal in analysing any 
country’s foreign policy. Translating this theoretical approach to the practice of foreign policy 
can be made visible through the statements of statesmen of any country. To this end, I have 
created a database of keywords and concepts relating to the three traditions embedded in a 
personalised text mining software to analyse speeches turning the theory into a tool of analysing 
foreign policy. While being able to extract quantitative data from speeches through the concepts 
of the English School seems notable, it is nothing new as it resembles text analysis software 
already available in the market. But it is an approach trying to connect existing theoretical 
concepts in International Relations to practical usage. In addition, the qualitative analysis of 
foreign policy statements seeks to unveil the linkages and relationships of the theoretical 
concepts of the English School with the practical discourses the statesmen use to justify their 
foreign policy. I further link the argumentations in the speeches with Iran’s foreign policy 
actions making it a holistic attempt to explain Iran’s foreign policy. 
I want to provide a different yet familiar explanation of Iran’s foreign policy. I make use of the 
English School and its core concepts arguing realism, rationalism and revolutionism exist in a 
dynamic interplay in Iran’s foreign policy as reflected in the speeches and actions of Iran’s 
statesmen. In terms of familiarity, it supports some arguments in the literature regarding Iran’s 
foreign policy, incorporating them into this study’s explanation of Iran’s foreign policy. The 
use of both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis allows my research to stand out in 
comparison to many studies on the subject. I make a survey of thousands of speeches using the 
personalised software while a certain number of speeches is selected for a closer reading. I use 
both results in analysing Iran’s foreign policy while presenting my results in a theoretically 
different way from most of the related literature. The English School theory integrates most of 
what has been said about Iran’s foreign policy under one framework providing the much-needed 
interpretation of the complexities and dynamism of foreign policy. Moreover, in terms of levels 
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of analysis, I make use of both texts and actions, providing solid support for my argument. In 
many ways, despite its difference in using an all-encompassing and multi-faceted approach, my 
research strengthens and supports most of the studies already done on the topic weaving them 
all together in one complicated web called Iran’s foreign policy. Let us keep in mind the core 
argument of this thesis is: Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with 
a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist. 
The dissertation is organized as follows:  
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework of this research introducing the English School 
theory elaborating on the three traditions – realism, rationalism and revolutionism – as well as 
the five classical institutions of diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great power 
management and war.  
Chapter three is about the methodology of this study, describing the quantitative and the 
qualitative phases of the analysis.  
Chapter four presents the results of the quantitative analysis derived from running all the 
collected speeches online on a personalised software. Graphs show the existence and 
development of the three traditions in the statements of Iran’s political leaders. 
Chapter five, six, seven and eight detail the foreign policy discourses of Khamenei, Khatami 
Ahmadinejad and Rouhani respectively resulting from the qualitative analysis of selected 
speeches. Each chapter details the argumentations used by each political figure and its 
relationship with the three traditions and the five institutions of the English School. 
Chapter eight connects the foreign policy discourse of Iranian statesmen and their foreign policy 
actions organized in the prism of the three traditions. 
Chapter nine is the concluding chapter, which reviews the main findings and deliberates 
potential avenues for future research. 
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2 Theoretical Framework  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Iranian foreign policy is generally considered to be 
inconsistent due to the differences in Tehran’s political manoeuvres such as how the nuclear 
issue has been negotiated. At times, Iran’s political elites were vocal against talks with the 
United States but they simultaneously exhibited a reluctant submission to dealing with 
Washington. To understand this phenomenon within Iranian foreign policy, I have made use of 
the English School as a theoretical framework to provide an explanation of the ambiguities 
surrounding the subject. This approach helps us understand the inconsistencies of Iranian 
foreign policy. For instance, despite Ahmadinejad’s harsh rhetoric against the United States, 
rationalism existed in his statements at the United Nations (UN) indicating the window of 
diplomacy was not dead. This accounts for the rounds of negotiation talks regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program during the period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency – an impossible move if only 
his harsh rhetoric is considered. 
Most literature on the topic of Iranian foreign policy has been divided between two opposite 
poles. One side considers Iranian foreign policy to be a product of pure realism or rationalism 
based on interest while the other end of the spectrum perceives it to be a product of identity.94 
Only a handful of studies have approached Iranian foreign policy as a multi-layered product, 
often taking into consideration various perspectives of international relations theory such as the 
works of Hunter and Ramazani. Great intellectual benefits have been reaped from the works of 
these great scholars effectively insipiring this research. Along the same lines, I apply a holistic 
and all-encompassing theory in analysing Iran’s foreign policy to reveal its dynamics. I want to 
demonstrate Iran’s capability of being realist, rational and revolutionist simultaneously. 
Rationality here means adherence to the rationalist tradition of the English School, meaning  it 
follows the prescriptive behaviour of the rationalist institutions such as diplomacy, balance of 
power, international law, great power management and war, that have evolved in the 
international society of modern sovereign nation-states to facilitate order and peace. It is this 
simultaneous interplay of the three traditions within Iranian foreign policy, which tends to be 
misinterpreted as inconsistencies and ambiguities. 
This chapter discusses the English School as the theoretical framework of the research 
ultimately guiding the conception of the analytical approach of this study. The chapter begins 
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with an introduction to the English School approach and the three traditions—realism, 
rationalism and revolutionism. It details the relevance of the ‘traditions of thought’ in the study 
of international affairs as well as its affinity to Iran. The next part discusses the concept of 
contemporary international society and the relationship between norms and institutions of this 
society. A brief explanation of the basic norm of sovereignty and the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination attached to it follows. Then an introduction of the core 
institutions of diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great power management and 
war is discussed. In the final section of this chapter, I elaborate on the five institutions and their 
relevance to analysing Iranian foreign policy. 
2.1 The English School Approach 
Three key concepts are crucial in using the English School approach: international system, 
international society and world society, are parallel to Wight’s three traditions of Realism, 
Rationalism and Revolutionism.95 Realism refers to the Hobbesian system of anarchy and sees 
the state as the actor striving to survive in the given conditions of such a structure; however, he 
refers to Machiavelli in terms of state actions. It emphasizes ‘military power and competition, 
the primacy of the state, the role of great powers and the interstate function of wars’.96 In this 
‘tradition of thought’, the state is considered the primary actor on a world stage affected by 
systemic power configurations and the main goal is to survive. Rationalism, on the other hand, 
is seen through a Grotian institutionalist perspective and mainly emphasizes the ‘creation and 
maintenance of shared norms’.97 This tradition posits ‘that interstate competition and the 
incidence of war are mitigated, in some instances at least, by the acceptance of shared values, 
of a formal, legal, and informal, ‘institutional’ character, where institutional refers not to what 
are normally regarded as established organizations, but rather regular, normative, legal and 
shared principles’.98 Examples include international legal conventions and economic 
agreements providing a framework for interaction taking into consideration common norms and 
principles binding states together. The core of an international society is found in the 
significance of these shared norms and institutions facilitating the interaction of states. 
Revolutionism, conversely, is viewed through Kantianism where individuals and their morals 
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play a significant role, which has the capacity to transcend the state system.99 World religions 
can be classified under this ‘tradition of thought’ especially when considering their missionary 
character. They call for the establishment of world society and the removal of state barriers to 
unite humanity into one equal organism.  
I elaborate more on these three traditions in the following sections of this chapter to give the 
reader a clear interpretation of the concepts used in this research. I contend that the three 
traditions together provide a holistic theoretical framework for analysing foreign policy and 
with an all-encompassing model, we can explain how Iran shapes its foreign policy agenda. 
Other advantages of the English School are its pluralist methodology as well as its historicist 
and constructivist approaches giving it attractive features to be used for analysis.100 The 
profound utility of combining ‘recognition of the self-interest and structurally intrinsic 
competitiveness, which is present in the international system, with an insistence on the other 
factors, be they customary, legal or ideological, which mitigate and to some degree shape such 
relations’ is yet another point to be considered as a strength of the English School.101 
In its classical version, the English school theory is conceptualized here as ‘a set of ideas which 
fill the minds of people as they think about and/or participate in world politics.102 These ideas 
can ‘be found in the minds and language of those who play the game of states’. 103 They guide 
the politician’s rhetoric and actions with regard to other states and they help shape policies and 
relations. Hence, the ideas stemming from the three traditions of the English School are 
manifested in the political rhetoric and messages of statesmen. Wight drew his ‘three categories 
of international thought…from writings by international lawyers, political philosophers, 
diplomats and statesmen’.104 For this reason, the people who ‘think and act on behalf of the 
state and its institutions’ play a significant role in this approach.105 Access to their 
understanding of the world is gained through an analysis of their language and their 
justifications. Furthermore, the context where the ‘actors take decisions’ must be elaborated in 
order to understand ‘their’ world for us to comprehend ‘values are often irreconcilable, and 
                                                 
99 Buzan, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR,” 476 
100 Ibid., 472 
101 Halliday, “The Middle East and Conceptions of ‘International Society’,” 3 
102 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalisation, Cambridge studies in international relations 95 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 24 
103 Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 18 
104 Buzan, From International to World Society?, 24 
105 Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 
2nd ed (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 133 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
30 
 
terrible choices have to be made’ in terms of foreign policy.106 As Wight articulates: ‘Statesmen 
act under various pressures, and appeal with varying degrees of sincerity to various 
principles’.107 The three traditions set out ‘the primary positions that are always in some sense 
in play in discussions about foreign policy and international relations’.108 It is important to note 
though that the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism as conceptualized by 
Wight are ‘not like three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity’.109 Rather, ‘they are 
streams, with edges and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to 
their own river bed. They both influence and cross-fertilize one another, and they change, 
although without…losing their inner identity’.110 They demonstrate an intricate interplay of 
many ideas existing at the same time. 
The focus of this dissertation rests on the rationalist concept of the English School, namely, the 
international society. However, as the three traditions are in constant interplay, by working with 
the idea of an international society heavily based on a rationalist ‘tradition of thought’, an 
engagement with the other two traditions of realism and revolutionism cannot be negated. The 
implications of such will be apparent as the chapter progresses when discussing the institutions 
of international society. The analysis proper of this dissertation demonstrates how these 
institutions are affected by the other traditions. For instance, when dealing with the institution 
of diplomacy of the international society, despite the legal and normative framework 
accompanying it, the realist and revolutionist ‘traditions of thought’ are nevertheless expressed 
in the statements made by the political elites involved in the process of diplomacy, 
demonstrating the interplay of the three traditions. This means the structure where the states 
operate adhere to the normative framework of rationalist ‘tradition of thought’ while not 
completely diminishing the capacity of the two other traditions to influence the ideas, beliefs 
and behaviour of statesmen. The most basic premise is that the three traditions of international 
relations have existed for enough time for all the modern nation-states to be influenced by them 
through the course of historical experiences each country has been subject to. The following 
section will elaborate more on the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism. 
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2.2 The Three Traditions 
There are three ‘traditions of thought’ prevalent in politics since the dawn of human history. 
Wight contends that at any given point, three competing positions in international relations—
realism, rationalism and revolutionism—continuously and perpetually coexist as demonstrated 
through an interplay with each other.111 As mentioned earlier, realism deals with the classic 
anarchic structure of the international system, rationalism has to do with the establishment (and 
maintenance) of norms and institutions while revolutionism showcases the cosmopolitanist 
transcendence of the state system.112  
Since the three ‘traditions of thought’ are historically situated, the narratives of realism, 
rationalism and revolutionism can be traced in the present international political affairs of any 
country in the international society. I agree with the scholars of the English School in that 
rationalism in international society, with its established rules and shared norms, has become 
dominant in the past decades thus exerting its influential narrative in the normative framework 
of international affairs. This has enabled the states of the international society to operate within 
a normative framework rooted in the rationalist tradition, which effectively guides their 
interaction. Diplomacy and international law are only two of the many institutions guiding 
states’ behaviour anchored within the rationalist tradition as I discuss in the next sections of 
this chapter. Despite being heavily influenced by the rationalist tradition, nevertheless, these 
institutions are never devoid of realist and revolutionist influences. Each of the three traditions 
project patterns of thought embodying ‘a description of the nature of international politics and 
a set of prescriptions about international conduct’.113 Thus, although states operate within the 
normative framework of a rationalist international society manifested through the institutions, 
the statesmen’s beliefs, thoughts and actions cannot be completely devoid of the realist and 
rationalist ‘traditions of thought’.  
I argue that the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism constitute the ideas of 
Iranian political elites, and consequently their actions, in the realm of international relations. 
Like other political elites from other countries, Iranian statesmen subscribe to all three in 
conducting themselves in international society accounting for their seemingly inconsistent 
foreign policies. The political rhetoric of the statesmen regarding their international affairs 
demonstrates the very existence of these three traditions and the respective institutions of 
                                                 
111 Barry Buzan, “The English School as a research program: An overview, and a proposal for reconvening,” 
(unpublished manuscript, 1999), 4 
112 Buzan, “The English School as a research program,” 4; Wight, International Theory 
113 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 26 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
32 
 
international society. Mention has already been made earlier about these traditions being sets 
of ideas within the minds of statesmen as they ‘play the game of states’ and these concepts used 
in the English School were drawn from the written work of those involved in policy-making.114 
I explain the intricacies and how I extract the vital components needed for this research from 
the speeches of these political elites in the methodology chapter. The following section 
elaborates on the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism, in exactly this order.  
2.2.1 The Realist Tradition  
Perhaps the most popular ‘tradition of thought’ in international affairs belongs to realism as 
countless studies have explained state relations using this approach since the time of 
Thucydides. A constant state of war in international relations wherein conflict between states 
inevitably becomes part of international life, resembling a zero-sum game, comprises the realist 
doctrine.115 The logic of anarchy and self-help as well as the elements of power politics and 
warfare are the basic principles of international relations according to this tradition.116 In such 
a hostile anarchical international setting, a state must relentlessly pursue its own survival and 
in doing so can undertake political manoeuvres harming other states in the system. Domination 
over one or more states ensures the prosperity as well as the survival of the state and so there is 
a constant struggle among states to achieve this status. Wight and Bull both provided 
comprehensive accounts of the realist tradition, including their foundation as well as 
prescriptions of conduct, as they relate to the theoretical concepts of the English School. 
Biology is argued by Wight to be one of the utmost foundations of the realist thought as its 
existence is embedded in nature and thus is part of being human. Unsurprisingly, this originates 
from Darwin’s work ‘The Origin of Species’ and his ‘survival of the fittest’ thesis deluging to 
international relations as ‘the struggle for existence’.117 Survival is a primitive instinct of every 
human being, and all other living beings on this planet, so it has most likely been part of state 
affairs much longer than the conceptualization of the modern nation-state. Despite the 
hardships, surviving in a world of anarchy is nearly universal as all wars in history have been 
fought in one way or another to survive and prosper favouring the strong to dominate the weak 
if not eliminated altogether. The very goal of survival shapes the way the state behaves in the 
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international system and Bull sketched a prescription of state conduct in international affairs 
using the realist ‘tradition of thought’:  
‘The Hobbesian prescription for international conduct is that the state is free to pursue 
its goals in relation to other states without moral or legal restrictions of any kind. Ideas 
of morality and law, on this view, are valid only in the context of a society, but 
international life is beyond the bounds of any society. If any moral or legal goals are to 
be pursued in international politics these can only be the moral or legal goals of the state 
itself. Either it is held (as by Machiavelli) that the state conducts foreign policy in a kind 
of moral and legal vacuum, or it is held (as by Hegel and his successors) that moral 
behaviour for the state in foreign policy lies in its own self-assertion. The only rules or 
principles which, for those in the Hobbesian tradition, may be said to limit or 
circumscribe the behavior of states in their relations with one another are rules of 
prudence or expediency. Thus, agreements may be kept if it is expedient to keep them, 
but may be broken if it is not’.118 
 
In his Leviathan, Hobbes has explicitly characterized mankind as greedy for power. ‘I put for a 
general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death’.119 Such a ravenous desire for power has inevitably undesirable 
consequences as competition becomes fierce. Hobbes explains: ‘Competition of riches, honour, 
command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one 
competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other’.120 Thus, 
the state of nature is unforgivingly harsh and chaotic where survival means attaining more 
power than the others. This view of man in the realist perspective extends to the nature of the 
state. States should be greedy for power if it intends to survive in the international system. 
Survival, independence and self-sufficiency constitute the main goals of the state based on the 
realist tradition, discounting any restrictions based on values and morality. Such a self-oriented 
state should be empowered to pursue interests to sustain its very existence including the pursuit 
of expedient actions at the international level.  
In antiquity, most systems were fundamentally based on the realist tradition allowing works of 
Thucydides to be written as they describe the dynamics of an anarchical system where war 
determines the order of the day. Realism is arguably one of the oldest theories of international 
relations as war has constituted most of the history of mankind driven by their empires’ 
relentless pursuit of power. From the Persians, Greeks and the Romans, countless cases can be 
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drawn where realism prevailed as the defining tradition of international politics albeit it can be 
argued the settings were distinguishably different from contemporary era. The desire for power 
and the use of war to attain it has nevertheless remained a constant factor throughout history. 
Take Western imperialism as an example, which maximized the power of a handful of states in 
the system at the expense of exploiting the resources of the rest of the world with staunch 
disregard for the morality, giving rise to institutions such as slavery and colonialism. Wealth in 
most parts of the globe was plundered and inhumane treatment and killing of people from 
indigenous communities was standard practice leading to the eradication of indigenous 
civilizations. Although slavery has been abolished and the imperialist order has somewhat been 
replaced, the realist tradition prevails as a vital component of state-policy, especially the 
remaining world powers at the core of the international society of modern nation-states. The 
core-periphery model of international society with powerful nation-states constituting the core 
has been an idea circulating in the English School. For the weaker, peripheral members, 
survival, independence and self-sufficiency is more restricted to the material capacity remaining 
to them after calculating the influence of the more powerful states in the system. Survival for 
the weak means withstanding threats to existence to promulgate resilience ensuring the state 
remains intact.  
The Western influx of modernity introduced both the concept of the nation state and power 
politics in the international system. Iran’s experiences under British, Russian and American 
domination galvanized Iranian leaders to think and act in accordance with realism in certain 
areas of their foreign policy. The Iran-Iraq war had also impacted Iran’s realist foreign policy 
as it undermined the very existence of the Islamic Republic from its inception. Thus, the realist 
quest for survival and security is etched in Iran’s foreign policy. The nuclear policy, for 
instance, demonstrates vestiges of realism as Iranian leaders justify their nuclear program to be 
a matter of self-sufficiency in an ever more precarious world relying heavily on energy. 
However, due to the pre-eminence of rationalism and the institutional and legal constraints 
accompanying it, the realist fervour of Iran’s nuclear program has been slightly mitigated. Iran’s 
actions in Syria as well as Iraq are also indicative of the realist tradition, although political elites 
in Tehran are cautious to mention their exact influence on these two states. Most of the 
statements of Iranian statesmen typically include a reference to realism but not as part of 
defining their actions but rather pointing to the domination of the West over the Middle East, 
particularly citing the military intervention in the region. Realism has become part of the 
vocabulary of the Iranian elites when speaking to an international audience even though they 
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merely refer to it as a force to be reckoned with proving their knowledge of this tradition. 
Knowing is a step towards understanding and acting, which is why we see Iran’s foreign policy 
actions to be in sync with the realist tradition despite the elites avoiding to directly associate 
Iran with this tradition. 
2.2.2 The Rationalist Tradition 
The rationalist ‘tradition of thought’ occupies the middle ground between the realist and 
revolutionist traditions. It is an attempt of the English School to provide an alternative to the 
realist-constructivist divide in the study of international relations. Rationalism is a departure 
from realism in the sense that states are more inclined to cooperate instead of competing to 
achieve their interests. It could also be related to power but is dependent on the common goals. 
Bull argues it has an inherently internationalist approach to international relations and 
‘describes international politics in terms of a society of states or international society’.121 
Struggles between sovereign states are acknowledged by the rationalist tradition but it contends 
their conflicts are restricted ‘by common rules and institutions’.122 Rules and institutions 
resulting from patterns of interactions of states in the system become accepted by the 
international society providing a blueprint for their relations. Limited conflict among states of 
the international society is expected but the main goal of each state beyond survival and having 
common rules and institutions is to allow an order to be formed where all states can more or 
less benefit from adhering to these rules and institutions. International activity means ‘trade—
or more generally, economic and social intercourse between one country and another’.123 
Exchanges, whether for the economy or the society of the states, are deemed the usual type of 
relationships among the states of international society, which are secured by common rules and 
institutions. Each member-state of this modern international society is engaged in trade and 
their states’ economic security is a vital component of their foreign policy. Trade and economics 
are essential features of the rationalist tradition as it is the stepping stone for a state to engage 
with other states in international society. It is usually in the interest of a state to have economic 
ties with another state due to the mutual benefit it brings in the form of prosperity. Such mutual 
interests prompt states to cooperate and in the course of time, the cooperation stretches to more 
than trade and economics. States are deemed to be attuned to the rationalist tradition when 
looking at their trade relations since they are normally executed through negotiations. It is here 
where the institution of diplomacy plays a role, a point I discuss later in this chapter. To ensure 
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international activity, such as trade, is efficient and happens with minimal friction, certain rules 
and patters are normally followed by states. 
For every state action in international society, there is a corresponding rule attached to a certain 
type of conduct and institution. Institution here is distinct from regimes such as the United 
Nations Organization and is based on patterns of interaction as I explain below in the section 
on institutions. Bull elaborates on the conduct of rationalists: 
‘The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states, in their dealings 
with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. As 
against the view of the Hobbesians, states in the Grotian view are bound not only by 
rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law. But, as 
against the view of the universalists, what these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow 
of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind, but 
rather acceptance of the requirements.124  
Now let us turn to Wight’s description of rationalist. He argues that rationalists emphasize the 
rationality of mankind (and thereby, states) and ‘concentrate on, and believe in the value of, the 
element of international intercourse in a condition predominantly of international anarchy’.125 
Anarchy is still accepted as an environment at the international level, but the goals of states are 
to maintain an order instead of creating conflict for successful economic and social exchange 
to operate ultimately benefitting the state. More is to be gained by each state through 
cooperation with the other states in the system and such a cooperation is based on reason. 
Reason, for the rationalist, is the very ‘source of knowledge in itself, superior to and 
independent of sense perceptions’.126 Wight points out ‘the element of reason contained in the 
conception of natural law’ is vital in the rationalist tradition allowing for state behaviour, which 
defies the realist tradition.127 This combines a belief in two factors: the first is in the ‘cosmic, 
moral constitution, appropriate to all created things including mankind; a system of eternal and 
immutable principles radiating from a source transcending earthly power (either God or 
nature)’.128 Second, ‘it is also a belief that man and woman has some inherent correspondence 
with this law, some inherent response to it, because of his or her possessing a rational faculty’.129 
Thus, ‘reason is a reflection of the divine light in us: ‘Ratio est radius divini luminis’’.130 Such 
reason led mankind and states to develop patterns leading to norms and institutions aimed at 
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guiding the interaction of states in international society. Since norms and institutions constitute 
the definition of international society, I discuss them separately below.  
The order created after the Second World War reflects this tradition as sovereign nation-states 
formed the contemporary international society. Codes of conduct as well as norms of proper 
behaviour in dealing with other sovereign nation-states were enshrined in international 
agreements such as international law and diplomatic practice, which have become predominant 
in international politics. As such, the invasion of one country by another can be highly 
condemned. Adib-Moghaddam gives an example: ‘By advocating regime change in Iran and 
realizing that goal in Iraq without a decisive international mandate to legitimate these actions, 
the Bush administration negated one of the principal foundations of international political 
culture – that legitimacy requires international recognition or multilateral consent’.131 This 
action provoked opposition from Russia, China and France and was heavily criticized by the 
international community.132 In the context of Iran, traces of rationalism have been paramount 
to the eventual engagement of Tehran with the international community to negotiate the nuclear 
program. The negotiations were part of every presidential era since the Khatami administration 
and rationalism surfaced in most of the statements of the presidents and although it was limited 
in the Ahmadinejad presidency, it nevertheless existed. The limitation of rationalism can be 
attributed to the overwhelming influence of the revolutionist tradition dominating Iranian 
foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad period and this was reflected in their actions with the 
nuclear negotiations ending in a deadlock by 2010. 
2.2.3 The Revolutionist Tradition 
Revolutionism is based on the fundamental inclination of mankind to behave morally and 
follow virtues. Interestingly, although famous for coining the term ‘survival of the fittest’, 
Charles Darwin has also discussed the lenience of mankind to follow virtue instead of instinct. 
In his book, The Descent of Man, he says: ‘Looking to future generations, there is no cause to 
fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow 
stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle between our higher 
and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant’.133 
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Focus is given the individual instead of the state and it is not a self-centered interest. The 
revolutionist ‘tradition of thought’ holds there is a community of all mankind instead of a 
community of states tending towards a universalist cosmopolitan approach to international 
affairs. States are then dissolved and become of little or no use as such system is transcended 
by something greater than itself and individuals are directly linked to the whole system instead 
of being a member of a specific state. Loyalty to other human beings supersedes allegiance to 
any nation-state in the revolutionist tradition and one of the most significant goals of this 
approach is to unite all humanity under one banner of moral ideology according to Bull. 
Interests of all human beings become one and the same and international politics is a ‘purely 
cooperative or non-zero-sum game’.134 It is only through working together and uniting where 
mankind should co-exist and transform the world order into a system benefitting the entire 
humanity although the path to it is not easy as there are those who will oppose such a system. 
International activity is turned into a ‘horizontal conflict of ideology that cuts across the 
boundaries of states and divides human society into two camps - the trustees of the immanent 
community of mankind and those who stand in its way, those who are of the true faith and the 
heretics, the liberators and the oppressed’.135 International morality entails an imperative of 
replacing the system of states with a cosmopolitan society, this means overthrowing the state 
system all together.136 These features of the revolutionist state behaviour can be found on Table 
1 on page 42, featuring the uniqueness of each of the three traditions. 
Immanuel Kant was one of the main proponents of this cosmopolitanism and, as such, the 
English School’s revolutionist tradition has been made synonymous with the term 
‘Kantianism’. His conception of cosmopolitanism had legal, moral and theological dimensions. 
However, it is the theological dimension of cosmopolitanism Iran has most been engaged with 
in the speeches of the political elites as the term is closely knitted with the Islamic discourses 
evident in Ahmadinejad’s statements. The theological dimension of cosmopolitanism in Kant’s 
work involves the ‘Kingdom of God’ based on morals, which can be “undertaken by human 
beings only through religion”, and needs to be “represented in the visible form of a church”.137 
Cavallar notes: 
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Kant hopes that gradually the true religious faith, natural religion or the pure faith of moral 
reason will spread across the globe; he sees his own century as an epoch in the process of 
Enlightenment when at least in Christianity ‘the seed’ of this faith is growing unhindered, so 
that the ‘invisible Kingdom of God on earth’ is continuously approximated, finally 
encompassing and uniting ‘all human beings’.138  
This can be interpreted as Kant’s “realization of the cosmopolitan society’ wherein charity, 
reliability and love of honour will extend to ‘nations in their external relations towards one 
another”.139 Kleingeld observes that Kant’s ‘idea of a cosmopolitan community is to inspire a 
‘moral disposition of brotherly love’’.140 Establishing a community of all mankind in the 
revolutionist tradition is the highest moral endeavour in international affairs as interests of all 
human beings are considered one and the same. Rules of coexistence, then, and ‘social 
intercourse among states should be ignored if the imperatives of this higher morality require 
it’.141 Revolutionism was precisely defined to be embodied by ‘those who believe so 
passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society, that they identify 
themselves with it, and therefore they both claim to speak in the name of unity, and experience 
and overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim of their international policies’.142 
‘For them, the whole of international society transcends its parts…and their international theory 
and policy has a missionary’ attribute.143 Such a ‘tradition of thought’ promoting a 
transcendence of the state system in favour of the unity of all mankind on the basis of moral 
values has always been present in human history. 
Excellent examples include ‘the religious Revolutionists of the sixteenth to seventeenth 
centuries; the French Revolutionists, especially the Jacobins; and the totalitarian Revolutionists 
of the twentieth century’.144 Taking these into account, one can draw similar characteristics in 
Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution as it was likewise composed of religious dimensions as well as 
elements of the French revolution.145 Particularly following the Arab Uprisings that began in 
Tunisia in 2010, such comparisons must be studied carefully as it is seen as an unprecedented 
                                                 
138 Georg Cavallar, “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant's philosophy,” Ethics and Global Politics, no. 5 (2012): 105, 
accessed July 19, 2016 
139 Immanuel Kant, Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, The Cambridge 
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2001), 307 
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142 Wight, International Theory, 8 
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145 Scholars such as Varzi (2011) compare the French Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. See R. Varzi, 
“Iran's French Revolution: Religion, philosophy, and crowds,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
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Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
40 
 
movement affecting the entire Islamic world much like the spread of the enlightenment in 
Europe. The Christian and Protestant revolutionaries of the 16th and 17th centuries believed in 
their ‘rights or duties both of intervening in other states, and of liberating the adherents of one’s 
own faction who are under the rule of other faction’, that is ever present in Iranian affairs for 
instance in support of Shi’ite factions in the region.146 ‘Theocracy in practice is the rule of those 
who claim to speak ‘in the name of God’’, which is an ‘assertion of exclusive 
representativeness’ is ‘a constant feature of Revolutionist doctrine’ according to Wight.147 This 
very characteristic is embodied by the Islamic Republic since its conception in 1979. The 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, although Shi’ite in conception, was not seen in Iran as a Shi’ite 
Revolution spreading Sh’iism. Rather, it has promoted the ‘bringing together’ of Muslims – for 
the Iranians at least – despite all the suspicion surrounding it. Taken on its own, theological 
cosmopolitanism based on Kant can be traced in Iran after the Islamic Revolution since religion, 
in the form of Islam, has conquered the political system infiltrating all aspects of life as well as 
appointing God as the ultimate sovereign. The Revolution delegitimized non-religious forms of 
governance within the country and as such democracy can only be realised through Islam – an 
Islamic democracy. Thus, guiding principles both in politics and in the society, are largely based 
on Islam, as reflected by constant reference to Koranic scriptures in most of the speeches of all 
political figures in the Islamic Republic. 
Christianity as a religion informed Kant’s conception of a theological cosmopolitanism 
enabling the idea of such a cosmopolitanism to be applicable to Islam and, for the purposes of 
this research, Iran. The universalist view of man and the ‘Kingdom of God’ in the Kantian 
cosmopolitanist tradition is perhaps best reflected by Khomeini’s concept of Touhid or 
monotheism, which he propagated during Iran’s Islamic Revolution particularly exporting the 
revolution in attempts to unify mankind or at least the Muslim world. Khomeini’s vision of 
uniting mankind through Touhid can be equated with the revolutionist tradition based on Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism, likewise aimed at uniting humanity into one organism through religion. 
Along these lines, ‘world citizen’ becomes synonymous with the term the Ummah, the 
community of the faithful or the community of the people for as long as monotheism is 
concerned.148 As such, these two words form part of the keywords of revolutionism are used 
                                                 
146 Wight, International Theory, 9 
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148 In some cases, though, Ummah is equated with the term Islamic Community, entailing that the revolutionist 
vision of world society is seen through an Islamic perspective as the discourses of Khamenei suggest. 
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for the analysis chapter.149 Terminologies in Islam referring to the revolutionist tradition are 
drawn from the combined works of three scholars of Islam in Iran, namely, Suroosh Irfani, 
Najibullah Lafraei and Vanessa Martin as their works represent a comprehensive account of the 
Islamic tradition as it is applicable to Iran.150 Irfani traces the origins of Islamic thought as well 
as events influencing the Iranian revolution, Lafraei discusses the revolutionary ideologies of 
the most influential religious and political figures who shaped the Islamic Republic, Imam 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, Engineer Mehdi 
Bazargan, Dr. Ali Shariati, Abul-Hasan Bani-Sadr as well as provides an overview of Koranic 
values while Martin elaborates on Khomeini’s political philosophy drawing on both Western 
and Islamic ideas. This collection of scholarly literature generates a blueprint for revolutionist 
concepts utilized in Iran since its establishment in 1979 providing us with a set of keywords 
that can be integrated in the revolutionist tradition with the concepts given by Wight, Bull and 
Buzan. For instance, the word Jihad, referring to a fight related to militancy is discussed by 
Lafraei, is quite relevant to the kind of battle between faithful and heretics. It is a significant 
keyword I added to the list for analysing the speeches of Iranian statesmen. Thus, the 
revolutionist tradition could be made applicable to the case of Iran as religion being the 
foundation of this framework gives us the concepts relevant in examining the political discourse 
of the Iranian leaders bearing in mind Iran is an Islamic Republic established on religious 
premises. 
2.2.4 The Three Traditions Together 
This section elaborates on the three concepts of realism, revolutionism and rationalism, which 
I argue are all present in Iranian foreign policy. To summarize the differences among the three 
traditions, I have put together Bull and Wight’s arguments on the table below. Certain 
prescriptive principles, behaviours are promoted by the three traditions conceptualizing the 
elements of interaction among states, simultaneously forming the basic logic of states being 
free to choose from and follow accordingly in pursuit of their interest. On the table below you 
                                                 
149 Keywords for realism, rationalism and revolutionism are taken from the works of Bull and Wight and is used 
for the analysis of statements of Iranian officials. However, for the revolutionist tradition, I had to involve the 
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Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran, International library of Iranian studies 13 
(London, New York, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009); Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: 
Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, New ed (London, New York, New York: I.B. Tauris; In U.S. 
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can see the distinctive principles and behaviours of the three traditions forming the logic of 
which the statesmen form their decisions. 
Traditions of IR Principles 
International 
Relations 
International activity International conduct 
Realist 
Prudence or expediency 
to secure survival 
State of war, pure 
conflict 
War 
Freedom to pursue 
goals without moral or 
legal restrictions 
Rationalist 
Both rules of prudence 
and expediency and 
imperatives of morality 
and law 
International 
Society of 
Sovereign States 
Trade; economic and 
social intercourse 
Legal restrictions / 
Law 
Revolutionist 
Imperatives of morality, 
international morality 
Universal 
community of 
mankind 
(cosmopolitan 
society) 
Ideological conflict 
between 
 two camps of 
faithful/heretics; 
liberators/oppressed 
Moral restrictions 
Table 1. Summary of the Three Traditions based on Wight and Bull 
 
These three ‘traditions of thought’ are involved in an intricate interplay within the policy-
making sphere and can influence the actions of statesmen, making the actors take certain 
decisions. I first pinpoint the traditions within the foreign policy discourse of the statesmen and 
identify the main arguments associated with realism, rationalism and revolutionism. The three 
traditions in the foreign policy discourse of each political figure show how intertwined the 
traditions are with each other and with the main arguments. This gives us a hint of the arguments 
and justifications Iranian statesmen use to decide and act upon a policy issue. The foreign policy 
discourses are ‘speech acts’ in themselves, meaning they represent an action simply by being 
uttered by the political leaders. To further verify these ‘speech acts’, I connect the 
argumentations of Iranian statesmen with their actual foreign policy action, meaning the 
country’s international activity as carried out by the officials of the Islamic Republic. By doing 
so, I exhibit how the three traditions, which coexist in the discourses of the statesmen, shape 
their decisions and actions as based on the logic of the traditions. To understand the relationship 
of the three traditions with each other, I have created this graph below to visualize it. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
43 
 
 
Graph 1. Visulatization of the three traditions 
 
The three traditions are seen here to be part of a cycle with realism as it’s starting point, 
progressing towards rationalism and then revolutionism, which eventually reverts to realism 
where the cycle begins again. However, it is not a solid linear process where realism completely 
turns into rationalism and rationalism to revolutionism. Rather, the three traditions are liquid 
points of concentration in the circle, like different currents flowing in a river. This means all 
three traditions can exist simultaneously anywhere in the circle but they are more concentrated 
in certain areas and they influence each other. Realism is more concentrated at the beginning, 
rationalism is more concentrated in the middle while revolutionism is more concentrated at the 
end and, given the right conditions, flows into realism once again. 
Realism is a good starting point for two reasons. First, it reflects the state of nature. In 
international relations, this means survival of the fittest, the Machiavellian or Hobbesian way, 
as explained earlier. Second, it is the oldest tradition among the three and had been practiced 
since the dawn of the history of mankind. Raison d’état is the most common foundation of a 
state’s foreign policy and without it, the state won’t survive in the international system. Thus, 
all states have this element in their foreign politics. Mention has already been made that all 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
44 
 
three traditions exist in a country’s foreign policy, thus justifying the realist element as well as 
the rationalist and revolutionist ones. To mitigate war and maintain order, rationalism has 
become widespread practice especially following the Second World War with norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention being upheld for as long as states can help it. The five classic 
institutions, particularly diplomacy and international law, have entered the mainstream of 
international affairs standardizing the ways of doing foreign policy. Revolutionism serves as a 
vision for states encouraging a different order compared to rationalism connecting mankind and 
nations instead of states changing the rules of the games of international affairs into a more 
ethical and moral one serving the individual. 
From realism to rationalism 
Realism begins with the relationship of a state, or empire, with power. The more power a state 
has, the higher its chances to survive. Survival is the most fundamental objective of the state 
and since survival rests on power, then power must be acquired at all costs. There are many 
ways of acquiring power and with many states in the system, it is inevitable to interact with 
most of the states. To survive, states are in constant conflict with each other in the system due 
to the desire for power. But sometimes, survival strategies force states to cooperate when 
common interests are at stake (patterns of interactions develop) giving way to a certain set of 
institutions or ‘standard practices’ as Keohane calls it. As mentioned earlier, realism favours 
go-it-alone state policies where individual states fight for survival in the anarchical international 
system. Each state pursues its own interests with little or no regard for the interests of other 
states, making immorality permissible in pursuit of the state’s goals. Since states interact with 
each other due to their interests, such as security, certain patterns develop and common interests 
surface. For instance, as the adage goes, ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and states start 
to interact more closely. State interaction normally leads to patterns of reciprocity, giving rise 
to the fundamental norms sovereignty and non-intervention, providing the foundation for the 
establishment of ‘standard practices’ or, as the English School calls it, institutions of 
international society. Thus, the realist current yields to the rationalist tradition. 
From rationalism to revolutionism 
The institutions are meant to provide a certain order among the sovereign nation-states of 
international society. The classic institutions of diplomacy, international law, balance of power, 
great power management and war, regulate and facilitate the relationship of the many states in 
the system. As order becomes more common through the institutions, the question of justice 
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and the function of states emerge in the pluralist-solidarist debate of the English School. Buzan 
defines them as follows: 
‘Pluralism represents the communitarian disposition towards a state-centric mode of 
association in which sovereignty and non-intervention serve to contain and sustain 
cultural and political diversity. It is in this general sense status quo orientated and 
concerned mainly about maintaining interstate order. As a rule, pluralists, following 
Bull, will argue that, although a deeply unjust system cannot be stable, order is in 
important ways a prior condition for justice.’151 
‘Solidarism represents the disposition either to transcend the states-system with some 
other mode of association or to develop it beyond a logic of coexistence to one of 
cooperation on shared projects. In principle solidarism could represent a wide range of 
possibilities (Buzan 2004: 121, 190–200), but in practice within the English School it 
has been linked mainly to liberal cosmopolitan perspectives and to concerns about 
justice. Solidarists typically emphasize that order without justice is undesirable and 
ultimately unsustainable.’152 
The pluralist-solidarist debate is very complex and deserves a whole dissertation on its own to 
give it justice. However, for the purposes of this research, knowing the basic definition of the 
terms pluralism and solidarism is useful in understanding how the rationalist tradition could 
progress towards revolutionism. As justice becomes increasingly significant in the international 
society, the idea of an arrangement weakening the role of states or dissolving it altogether in 
favour of uniting mankind as individuals within one large world society becomes apparent. It 
is at this boundary where the rationalist current is overtaken by the revolutionist tradition. 
From revolutionism to realism 
Ideally, international society progresses towards the vision of a revolutionist world society 
supporting an order based on the unity of mankind with the individual, instead of the state, as 
the centre of all affairs. Morality becomes law and ethical cosmopolitanism is the norm as Kant 
envisioned this happily-ever-after scenario – the ultimate utopia of mankind. Irresistible as it is 
and despite efforts to achieve such an order, with the European Union being the best example 
by far, it remains an unattainable vision. The reality is, pursuing such a vision is a double-edged 
sword, as the Iran case shows. Such a vision can be distorted in favour of the realist traditions 
with claims of morality being propagated while killings are made in the name of God. The 
institution of war plays a key role in this transition. In the revolutionist tradition, a missionary 
war is waged against the infidels. The cause is noble, to defend morality and the human utopia. 
But once the missionary war gets out of hand, as most wars do to establish a victor, power 
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becomes tempting to those who wage the war. Thus, victory and triumph can either maintain 
the utopian revolutionist state or it can slip into the establishment of an empire by those greedy 
for power, restarting the cycle of realism, rationalism and revolutionism once again. 
To chart the utterances of the statesmen in greater detail, I elaborate on the other aspects of the 
English School facilitating the analysis proper by providing properties and structures within the 
three traditions which Iran’s foreign policy operates with. This is the focus of the next section. 
2.3 The Contemporary International Society: Norms and Institutions 
Another key argument of the English School apart from the three traditions mentioned in the 
previous section is the existence of an international society. In this study, the international 
society is perceived as the community of actors playing the game of international relations. It 
is a social entity materialized in the form of norms and institutions. By thinking in the way of 
international rules and institutions, actors have a framework they can draw upon to make a 
foreign policy decision relevant to their state. This makes the ‘practice’ of foreign policy guided 
by the parameters set by the international society. The actors are the political elites within each 
nation-state of international society and they ideally interact with each other within the confines 
of these norms and institutions, typically anchored in the rationalist tradition. These norms and 
institutions bring about an order to maintain peace enabling states, through their respective 
actors, to engage in social as well as economic exchanges to benefit their respective states as 
well as the entire international society. Such an arrangement is quite new in relation to the 
history of mankind on this planet as it was established after the Second World War. This 
contemporary international society has evolved from the Westphalian states system in Europe, 
which integrated elements from previous states systems that historically stretches to the ancient 
times.153 In the book, ‘The Expansion of International Society’, Bull and Watson, provide a 
detailed account of this historical development.154 At different times, different systems 
prevailed but the end of the Second World War ushered in an era wherein powerful states within 
the system promoted peace and thus regarded all nation-states to be part of an international 
society. According to Hedley Bull, ‘a society of states (or international society) exists when a 
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in 
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
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with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’.155 This has been the central 
feature of the post-World War II world and ‘today everybody is an insider of international 
society…and all member states have rights of juridically equal sovereignty no matter how 
unequal they may be in other respects’.156 This implies Iran is a member of the contemporary 
international society of sovereign states. 
Jackson provides an accurate definition of international society evolving as a reaction to the 
increasing interaction among states:   
‘international society is an institutional response to the fact that the earth's population is 
divided among separate territory-based political communities which are deemed to 
express the will of local populations to an independent political existence and to conduct 
their domestic affairs according to their own norms and values. Because those political 
communities exist side by side and even cheek by jowl, their leaders are obliged to 
arrange a normative framework of some kind for conducting their relations—if they 
wish to deal with each other in an orderly way as fellow human beings’.157  
The fundamental structure upholding international society is constituted by two norms, namely, 
sovereignty of a state with defined territorial boundaries and non-intervention. The standard 
feature of the contemporary international society preserved from its European origins, is that 
the society of states ‘recognize each other’s sovereignty, engage in diplomatic relations with 
one another and uphold international law’.158 The acknowledgement nation-states being distinct 
from one another yet have the same entitlement to sovereignty and principles suggests the 
international society is pluralist. Buzan refers to this pluralist constitution as a thin ‘body of 
positive law’ or ‘a lower degree of shared norms, rules and institutions’ as opposed to the 
solidarist conception of international society, which has a higher degree of shared norms, rules 
and institutions or a thick ‘body of positive law’.159 A key aspect of international society 
therefore is the existence of fundamental norms wherein sovereignty is the most fundamental – 
each state is sovereign in its own right entailing the fundamental norm of non-intervention. At 
this point, I shall elaborate on the conceptualization of norms and institutions as well as their 
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relationship with one another and how they are associated with the broader context of this 
dissertation.  
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by norms and institutions of international 
society as there is enormous ambiguity surrounding these two concepts. The term norm is 
generally understood to mean a ‘standard of proper or acceptable behaviour’160. For Jackson, 
norms have two dimensions: sociological and legal.161 The sociological element is ‘conceived 
to be a pattern of behaviour’ while the legal dimension defines a norm as ‘a standard of conduct 
by which to judge the correctness, rightness or wrongness, the goodness or badness, of human 
activity’.162 In the literature on international society, however, the term norm tends to be used 
to refer to basic norms or procedural norms, focusing on the legal aspect of the term. ‘It is a 
legal or moral obligation or requirement or expectation, a standard of human conduct’.163 It is 
this definition guiding this research as norms are considered the basic principles of interaction. 
Norms are the building blocks of international society, without it, nothing larger could be 
established and operationalized. Norms are powerful as they represent shared understandings 
among groups of individuals. Simply put, norms are the rules of conduct facilitating our social 
interaction with each other and with the world around us. The existence of sovereignty and non-
intervention as fundamental norms of international society has been legally fortified by their 
explicit status in the United Nations Charter. These norms are not enshrined as a law but are 
nevertheless generally accepted by all members of the international society and it acts as the 
foundation wherein all institutions are based upon particularly in the rationalist tradition 
wherein order in pursuit of maintaining peace is the goal of the international society thereby 
encouraging states to follow the norms. Below is a graph visualizing how norms and institutions 
are regarded in this research. 
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161 Jackson, The Global Covenant, 108 
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Graph 2. Visualization of the relationship between norms and institutions of international society. 
 
When states adhere to these fundamental norms of international society, it inherently means the 
states are knowledgeable of it and therefore enact it. Through this adherence to norms such as 
sovereignty, certain institutions emerge since once norms are adapted over a prolonged period 
of time, patterns of interactions develop. Being the bedrock of all interactions, norms provide 
the basis for the creation of institutions. If states follow the norm, eventually certain practices 
on how to interact among each other within international society emerge, effectively turning 
these regular and consistent practices into institutions.  Institutions are referred to here as ‘those 
practices which have the greatest time-space extension within’ societies sharing the procedural 
norms.164 It is a form of engagement and interaction among states with shared norms and values 
or what Keohane calls ‘fundamental practices’.165 This engagement among nation-states is 
governed by a normative framework consisting of a set of rules, effectively regulating 
behaviour and facilitating interaction. The English School refers to institutions ‘as constitutive 
of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and purpose of 
any such society’.166  Such institutions ‘have structural properties in the sense that relationships 
are stabilized across time and space’.167 Hence, norms and institutions are ‘historically situated’ 
and ‘arise in the evolving historical context of the modern sovereign state’.168 By historically 
situated, I mean it was established, developed and has existed in history and its 
conceptualizations, functions and relationships stabilized across time and space. Through the 
attainment of such stability, institutions have managed to provide a social structure facilitating 
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these interactions of states sharing common procedural norms and understand the value of such 
norms. 
Bull provides a very articulate description of institutions, which will be applied to this research 
as his definition captures it perfectly:  
‘By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative 
machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of 
common goals. These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying 
out the political functions of international society, or serve as a surrogate central 
authority in the international system. They are rather an expression of the element of 
collaboration among states in discharging their political functions - and at the same time 
a means of sustaining this collaboration. These institutions serve to symbolise the 
existence of an international society that is more than the sum of its members, to give 
substance and permanence to their collaboration in carrying out the political functions 
of international society, and to moderate their tendency to lose sight of common 
interests.’169 
The common interests Bull mentions refer to the rights of each state to sovereignty, non-
intervention and is discussed below. 
In this section I elaborated on the concept of international society as a community of states 
sharing common norms and institutions. Norms were defined to be the shared values forming 
the building blocks where institutions have evolved. Institutions were distinguished to be 
‘fundamental practices’ that are historically situated and provide a social structure facilitating 
interaction among states. The next part discusses the foundational norms of international 
society—sovereignty and non-intervention—as well as the five institutions of diplomacy, 
international law, balance of power, great power management and war.  
2.3.1 Sovereignty  
This section of the research focuses on the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention as 
fundamental norms and how they are applied in the broader context of international society. 
Both norms as properties of Iran as a state will also be elaborated and the implications of such 
is discussed towards the end. 
Before we proceed, it is important to define the concept of sovereignty in order to understand 
its function as a norm in the contemporary international society.170 According to Hinsley, 
sovereignty is ‘the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political 
                                                 
169 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 71 
170 Buzan refers to sovereignty as core primary institution while Bull refers to it as the ‘basic rule of co-
existence’ but for the purposes of clarity and consistency, I shall remain with Jackson’s definition of sovereignty 
as a procedural norm. 
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community…and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’.171 The Charter of the 
United Nations mentions ‘sovereign equality’ meaning each state is eligible to the same legal 
rights as all the other member states of international society. Member states in themselves are 
thus portrayed as being sovereign, capable of running themselves and being able to claim rights 
at the international level. Jackson says this ‘most important procedural norm’ of sovereignty ‘is 
clearly expressed by Article 2 of the UN charter’.172 Article 2(4) states: ‘All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state’.173 Hence, sovereignty inherently becomes a 
property of each independent state underpinning the foundation of an international society. This 
makes it the most fundamental norm regulating all international affairs and stressing on the 
equality of states as being sovereign regardless of actual capabilities of the state. Refraining 
from the use of force implies respect for other sovereign states as well as the principle of mutual 
recognition must be practiced when interacting with another state. This indicates that the role 
of sovereignty is vital to all the other institutions, thus demonstrating a regulative function. 
Sovereignty serves to ‘contain and sustain cultural and political diversity’.174 It essentially 
constitutes the state and is the most fundamental property of international society defining 
international affairs.175 Sovereignty has been ‘a structural property shared among most regional 
states and reinforced by international society’.176 Without the acceptance of sovereignty, the 
other institutions cannot retain their operative capacity. From this angle, the state cannot exist 
in international society without having sovereignty, making the fundamental norm of 
sovereignty an essential property of the state, permitting it to be a unit capable of interacting 
with other states.  
Sovereignty in this manner has been a subject of interest in Iran for more than a century. In 
Farsi, one of the translations of the word sovereignty means ‘kingship’ (padeshahi), indicating 
the notion of sovereignty rests on the authority of the king.177 This conceptualization may well 
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have its roots from the first encounter of Persian kings with the sovereign monarchs ruling 
Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century. The Qajar kings of the time, were not oblivious to 
the progressive developments on the European continent as diplomatic envoys constantly 
reported back their experiences abroad. An international society was developing within Europe 
at the time changing the international system and this society of states was accompanied by 
protocols unfamiliar to those outside it. As a non-European, an official visit to Europe provided 
the Persian kings to ‘present themselves on the same level as the European monarchs’, 
prompting them to include such a journey into their agenda.178 ‘Their involvement with the 
rituals and ceremonials of a state visit gave expression to the monarchs’ dynastic legitimacy 
and their country’s national sovereignty’.179 Such ‘visits offered non-European rulers a way of 
integrating themselves and their countries into a system of international relations that was 
dominated by the European powers’.180 Membership to the international society developing in 
Europe during the Qajar era was not a restricted one as it accommodated ‘few independent non-
European sovereigns’, and in order to be ‘recognized as equal and legitimate’ member of the 
‘family of civilized nations’, Persian kings visited Europe in an attempt to ‘demonstrate 
sovereignty and consolidate Persia’s global position’.181 It can be said the presence of the Qajar 
kings in European royal courts laid the foundations of the Iranian nation’s right to sovereignty 
at a time when European society was about to expand. The notion of sovereignty as kingship in 
Iran, however, has ceased to exist in reality as the concept of sovereignty has evolved to mean 
‘the right to rule’ (hagh-e hakemiat), which is more relevant when looking at Iran after the 1979 
revolution. It can be argued, nonetheless, that the political system replacing the Shah (king) is 
not very different from the previous one with the introduction of the concept of supreme 
leadership (Vali-e faqih). 
2.3.2 Non-intervention  
For the fundamental norms to function, states must generally mutually recognize and respect 
one another as sovereign states as it is essential for their coexistence in the contemporary 
international society.182 After all, as already mentioned, sovereignty is the basis of all 
interactions within the international society. This highly important norm of sovereignty is 
normally accompanied by the norm of non-intervention. Together, they both constitute the 
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fundamental logic of relations among states in the international society.183 The norm of non-
intervention is a vital factor in the constitution of the contemporary international society and 
maintaining order and peace after the Second World War. Although there is a tremendous 
debate about the parameters of non-intervention, I discuss it here briefly as it applies to the case 
of Iran without diverting to these issues. A useful way to define non-intervention is by looking 
at the meaning of the concept of intervention. According to Vincent, intervention is: 
‘…the activity undertaken by a state, group within a state, a group of states or an 
international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another 
state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority 
structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a 
conventional pattern of international relations.’184 
This simply implies that non-intervention is opposite to the meaning of intervention. Vincent 
explains:  
‘If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that the other states have a duty to 
respect that right by, among other things, refraining from intervention in its domestic 
affairs. The principle of non-intervention identifies the right of states to sovereignty as 
a standard in international society and makes explicit the respect required for it in 
abstention from intervention.’185  
Once again, this norm is expressed in the Charter of the United Nations according to Jackson.186 
Article 2(7) declares: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state’.187 Although the Charter does not explicitly mention that the member states are to practice 
non-intervention in their affairs with other states, the intention to enshrine the norm of non-
intervention indicates the international society must somehow share a degree of commitment to 
this shared principle. 
Historically, however, the United States have directly intervened in Iranian internal affairs such 
as in 1953 when a coup (Operation Ajax) was organized to oust Prime Minister Mossadegh 
following the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). From then on until the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been subject to heavy Western attempts to interfere into 
its internal affairs. Such bitter encounters with Great Britain and the United States in the first 
half of the twentieth century remains fresh in the memories of the statesmen, encouraging them 
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to reiterate the principle of non-intervention in their rhetoric, especially following the harsh 
labelling of Iran by the Bush administration. The former transgression of the United States in 
the affairs of Iran as a sovereign state had clearly become one of the issues affecting Iranian 
foreign policy as the procedural norm of non-intervention was violated. 
Ideally, when sovereign states uphold the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, the threat 
posited by other states becomes thwarted contributing to the sense of security of each state 
within the international society despite the absence of a central authority to enforce the 
principles.188 ‘Small states do not interact with international society with the constant fear that 
they will be annihilated by more powerful actors. If this relative security would not be there, 
small states would not constitute a considerable part of the international system’.189 The 
fundamental norms mentioned here do not provide a prescription of abiding and protecting 
these norms, rather, the activities of protecting these norms involve significant collaboration 
among states ‘in what may be called the institutions of international society: the balance of 
power, international law, diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of great powers, and 
war’.190  
In sum, sovereignty and non-intervention are the fundamental norms the international society 
is contingent upon as they facilitate the co-existence of states and the concepts of sovereignty, 
non-intervention are the building blocks of the institutions of international society.  
2.4 Institutions of International Society and the Three Traditions 
Institutions as ‘fundamental practices’ is the focus of this section, how they are related with the 
three traditions and how Iran has been engaged with them. I first elaborate on the choice of 
approach and then move on to describe the five classic institutions of international society as 
well as Iran’s engagement with them in the past.  
Let us recall the definition of institutions. It is the historically situated habits and practices, or 
fundamental practices, providing a structural framework of interaction and collaboration among 
states within international society.191 These institutions, together with the fundamental norms, 
‘carry out positive functions or roles in relation to international order’ meaning they ‘are part 
of the efficient causation of international order, that they are among the necessary and sufficient 
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conditions of its occurrence’.192 In short, institutions provide a certain international order among 
the states of international society. The most influential form of this international order, as 
manifested in the institutions of international society of sovereign nation-states, is rationalist in 
conception but nonetheless affected by realist and revolutionist traditions.  
Bull defines international order as ‘a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains 
those goals of the society of states’.193 He believes the members of the modern international 
society of sovereign nation-states to have common goals. First is the ‘goal of preservation of 
the system and society of states itself. Whatever the divisions among them, modern states have 
been united in the belief that they are the principal actors in world politics and the chief bearers 
of rights and duties within it’.194 The second goal corresponds to the maintenance of 
independence or external sovereignty of every state.195 Third ‘is the goal of peace’ albeit not in 
the way of ‘establishing universal and permanent peace’ but rather ‘the maintenance of peace 
in the sense of the absence of war among member states of international society as the normal 
condition of their relationship, to be breached only in special circumstances and according to 
principles that are generally accepted’.196 The last goal concerns the limiting of violence 
resulting in ‘death or bodily harm’ as well as ‘the keeping of promises and the stabilization of 
possession by rules of property’.197 
Institutions are profoundly influenced by the three traditions of realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism. The three traditions constitute the ideas of statesmen while the institutions serve 
as the stage wherein the statesmen play their role according to the tradition they are following. 
The nature of each institution differs depending on tradition they are at. In the rationalist 
tradition, the institutions are fully present with rules pertaining to rationalism. However, in the 
realist and the revolutionist traditions, the institutions change or are completely dissolved 
altogether. To be clear, institutions are perceived in this research as stretching in a continuum 
from the realist end to the revolutionist end with all five classic institutions only being fully 
intact in the middle wherein the rationalist tradition lies. I explain this below and provided a 
table in section 2.5.198 
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In the affairs of two states, for instance, one might be playing realist diplomacy while another 
rationalist diplomacy but both are within the institution of diplomacy. The political discourses 
of the statesmen show the tradition they adhere to, affecting their language. The meaning of the 
statements could thus be deciphered to be dominated by one of the three traditions or that there 
are two competing traditions based on the repetition of words and phrases. The three traditions 
operate like currents within every institution meaning the nature of the institutions for the 
statesmen may change depending on the gravity of the tradition within the institution. Hence, 
the potential for realist diplomacy, rationalist diplomacy and revolutionist diplomacy can occur 
at different points in time during a given issue. In Iranian foreign policy, the dominance of the 
rationalist tradition in the institution of diplomacy can be demonstrated by negotiations with an 
outcome related to signing agreements such as the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear program 
negotiations in July 2015.  
I elaborate on the framework of the classic institutions of the English School as presented by 
Bull since they represent the standard institutions of the international society promoting clarity 
within the context of Iranian foreign policy analysis. I chose to work with the Bullean approach 
for two reasons. First, the classic institutions of Bull—balance of power (BOP), diplomacy, 
international law (IL), great power management (GPM) and war—have preceded the 
institutions introduced in the literature by other scholars of the English School such as Buzan. 
Thus, there are more comprehensive accounts and the documentation regarding the utility of 
the classic institutions while the remaining institutions remain subject to debates potentially 
complicating this study. Second, as they are classic institutions, I can employ the descriptions 
of Bull (2000) and Wight (1990) to further establish these institutions to the extent of their 
utilization as analytical tools in examining Iranian foreign policy.  
It is important to consider that these institutions of international society were not inventions 
suddenly surfacing after the Second World War. Diplomacy, international law, balance of 
power, great power management and war had been features of the international system prior to 
the advent of the contemporary international society of sovereign states. In different periods 
and in various regions of the world, the institutions had operated and facilitated relations among 
countries but perhaps due to the disparate contexts, they might not have been anchored in the 
rationalist tradition as other traditions may have been more dominant in any given time frame. 
The five classic institutions have become highly influenced by the rationalist tradition since the 
Second World War as the fundamental norms of sovereignty and non-intervention were 
introduced in the Charter of the United Nations and relations among states started having a legal 
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dimension based on a set of international agreements. Let us now turn our attention to the five 
institutions of international society as described by Bull and Wight discussed below. 
2.4.1 Diplomacy 
The word diplomacy literally means ‘the conduct of relations between sovereign states through 
the medium of officials based at home or abroad, the latter being either members of their state’s 
diplomatic service or temporary diplomats’.199 Another definition of diplomacy refers to a 
practical skill applied conducting diplomacy.200 Bull’s definition is very similar to the former 
two, he defines diplomacy as the ‘conduct of relations between states and other entities with 
standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means’.201 He emphasizes the  
peaceful aspect of diplomacy, which is of particular interest in this study. Diplomacy as an act 
is ‘the conduct of international relations by persons who are official agents; hence the 
importance in diplomacy of letters of credence or other tokens of representative or symbolic 
status’.202 Diplomacy has several functions in maintaining the international order due to its 
peaceful nature. First, it ‘facilitates communication between the political leaders of states—and 
other entities in world politics’.203 Second, it negotiates agreements among states and other 
political communities.204  Third, it allows ‘the gathering of intelligence or information about 
foreign countries’.205 Fourth, it minimizes the ‘effects of friction in international relations’.206 
Finally, it ‘fulfils the function of symbolizing the existence of the society of states’.207 
Diplomacy, in the contemporary sense is predominantly influenced by the rationalist tradition 
of international affairs. The function of diplomacy as a rationalist institution is to maintain order 
through peaceful means entailing that solving conflicts through the logic of rationalism is 
possible. However, both the realist and revolutionist traditions have not been absent in this 
rationalist-oriented institution. Wight distinguishes three types of diplomacy based on the 
traditions, providing a description of their operational capacity in international affairs. 
For Wight, the protocol of diplomacy in the Realist tradition has four key features: 
1. ‘Flux or change (adapt, forestall, facilitate and control) 
2. Fear and greed 
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3. Negotiation from strength 
4. The technique of bargaining’.208  
 
Yet ‘when stripped off the niceties of protocol, diplomacy is seen to proceed by coercion and 
bribery, by stick and carrot and these pressures and bribes can be economic, political or 
military’.209 The grip the United States had on King Hussein and the previous Shah of Iran are 
two good examples illustrating this point.210 Three strategic propositions arise from the 
protocol: 
1. ‘Improve your position and increase your strength as the opportunity offers 
2. Brinkmanship. The belief that threats of the final coercion are not out of place. Taking 
the calculated risk of war is often necessary 
3. Firmness through fatalism. One who is confident of negotiating from a preponderance 
of strength, and who is prepared to face war, acquires a fatalistic freedom from fear’.211 
A realist diplomacy necessitates the use of power and coercion to obtain favour and dominance 
about an issue, which is an application of realist concepts of international politics. Military 
threats in order to get a state to follow another state, for instance, falls into this category of 
realist diplomacy as material power becomes the ultimate tool for coercion. 
A rationalist diplomacy, on the other hand, is based on the use of peaceful negotiations based 
on mutual respect as well as agreements between or among sovereign states. Upon the 
establishment of the modern international society of sovereign states, this type of diplomacy 
has become standard practice in dealing with conflicts. The aim is to bring both parties to the 
table and negotiate their terms peacefully to come up with an agreement securing mutual 
compliance and responsibility. It is not without difficulties and the realist tradition among 
statesmen usually surface to disrupt the peaceful processes the rationalist diplomatic conduct 
insists on. But, more often than not, diplomatic outcomes present peaceful solutions to many of 
the problems plaguing the international society today. The rationalist type of diplomacy expects 
two conditions to be met to consider diplomatic negotiations a success: 
1. ‘Material or physical’ condition allowing the parties to deal on ‘equal terms’ 
2. Moral condition, ‘the possibility for the parties of mutual confidence’.212 
 
Such conditions allow for parties to a conflict to deal on a basis of mutual respect of sovereign 
states, one without diminishing a party in favour the other, which in turn provides a sense of 
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security for all those involved. The moral aspect of this condition stems from honouring the 
fundamental norms as well as achieving outcomes in the form of agreements favourable to 
conflicting parties. 
The revolutionist diplomacy is considerably different as revolutionists do not believe in 
diplomacy. Attention is diverted to protesting, meaning under certain conditions of international 
relations, the need arises to abate tension in order to negotiate. The revolutionist tradition 
upholds the notion that ‘something ought to be done and can be done to reduce tension’ and 
this is to ‘make a gesture’, either collective or individual, which ‘has nothing to do with security 
but to gain the psychological improvement of an atmosphere of lessened tension’.213 As a 
sovereign state, Iran has diplomatic relations with most of the countries of the world and it 
should be examined to disclose patterns useful to the understanding of Iranian foreign policy. 
Diplomacy as defined by the parameters of the contemporary international society has become 
an essential tool in Iran’s foreign affairs ever since the establishment of Iran as a modern nation-
state after the Second World War.214 In most aspects related to Iranian external affairs, Tehran 
constantly engages with this institution. Some examples include the diplomatic negotiations 
surrounding the nuclear program as well as the diplomatic envoys sent by Tehran to Oman, 
Pakistan, Tunisia, Algeria and Lebanon to tackle the crisis in Yemen.  
2.4.2 Balance of Power 
Balance of power is an institution engaging the sovereign states of the contemporary 
international society. In the rationalist tradition, it pertains to an arrangement wherein not one 
powerful state can dominate and subject the other states to its rule. Bull identifies three 
functions of balance of power. Firstly, its existence ‘has served to prevent the system from 
being transformed by conquest into a universal empire’.215 Second, local (regional) balances of 
power have protected ‘the independence of states in particular areas from absorption or 
domination by a locally preponderant power’.216 Third, balance of power has ‘provided the 
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conditions in which other institutions on which international order depends (diplomacy, war, 
international law, great power management) have been able to operate’.217  
This institution is likewise influenced by the three traditions but both Bull and Wight focused 
on the rationalist dimension, especially following the establishment of the modern international 
society of sovereign states. The rationalist tradition has an idealist aspect dictating the ‘need to 
‘take thought for tomorrow’, and to take responsible decisions; balance of power is policy, not 
law’.218 This means, when taking the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention into 
consideration, a state must be mindful of its actions and avoid violating these fundamental 
norms. Thus, balance of power becomes an order wherein no state could be subject to another’s 
power. Cooperation policies and agreements between states demonstrate the rationalist 
dimension of balance of power.  
The realist tradition questions the validity of the rationalist argument pertaining to this 
institution of an ‘even distribution of power on the grounds that there is no way of measuring 
relative power’ and, hence, ‘remains at a linguistic level’.219 Realists think in terms of the 
present circumstances, have little regard for idealism in international affairs and thereby are of 
the view that balance of power means the state has to strive to be the most powerful in the 
system in order to impose its will on the others. Domination and preponderance regulates state 
behaviour where weaker states in the system bend to the rules set by the powerful states. Once 
a state is powerful enough within the system, breaking the rules becomes a possibility thus 
‘disregarding the rights of other states’.220 
For the revolutionists, balance of power is considered ‘unreliable and unmanageable in 
practice’, thus rejecting the institution altogether.221 ‘There is no agreement or clear-sightedness 
about what one is meant to be measuring’ in the institution of balance of power making it 
irrelevant in the revolutionist tradition.222 Revolutionists ultimately aim to establish a 
revolutionary state and balance of power is one of the prime obstacles to be overcome otherwise 
the revolutionist endeavour becomes impossible.223 If mankind could be united into one 
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organism, states would dissolve as a consequence and balance of power will be rendered 
meaningless. 
In the contemporary era, Iranian statesmen conform to the institutional arrangements of balance 
of power and operate within the rationalist framework. Tehran has invested on its relationship 
with China and Russia to thwart the preponderance of the United States to balances the power 
structure in international affair in an attempt to forge policies favourable to Iran, particularly 
regarding the nuclear issue.  
2.4.3 International Law 
International law generally refers to the ‘rules and principles of actions which are binding on 
sovereign states in their relations with each other’ derived ‘from two main sources: international 
custom (of the sort which creates customary international law) and treaties’.224 Bull ascribes 
three functions to international law for the maintenance of international order. First, it 
determines the sanctity of the society of sovereign states and identifies it ‘as the supreme 
normative principle of the political organization of mankind’.225 Second, it articulates ‘the basic 
rules of coexistence among states…in international society’.226 Lastly, it facilitates the 
mobilization of ‘compliance with the rules of international society’.227 A related concept to this 
set of rules represented by international law is the notion of international obligation and it is 
discussed by Wight. Legal treaties and conventions agreed upon by sovereign states could be 
categorized under the rubric of international law, necessitating the compliance of the parties 
involved.  
Rationalists aim ‘at the codification of decisive rules of international law and its administration 
by effective international courts’.228 International human rights law as well as conventions 
against genocide are examples of such codified rules and the International Criminal Court an 
example of an international court. ‘International law is conceived as the existing practices and 
treaties of states, constantly refined by references to certain fundamental standards and norms 
of which they are the imperfect expression’.229 The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for instance 
is a treaty among states of the international society aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons while facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In quoting the NPT, Iran has 
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been showcasing its right under an international treaty to have a peaceful nuclear program 
serving civilian purposes, which stems from a rationalist tradition of thought. With regard to 
international obligations, the rationalist tradition places emphasis on the binding nature of 
contracts and treaties or pacta sunt servanda’.230 Signing treaties becomes as important as the 
implementation of the treaty, with the parties abiding by the rules set by the agreement. The 
rationalist tradition promotes adherence to the law as well as treaties to promote order and peace 
among the sovereign states of international society. The treaties and laws are deemed to be a 
source of security and stability regarding matters potentially endangering or harming the 
international community. 
For the realist, ‘international law operates in the domain of subsidiary importance. The state is 
prior to international law, both logically and historically’.231 This entails the primacy of the 
state and its right to disregard international law altogether in pursuit of national interest. They 
conceive international law ‘as the sum of treaties agreed to by sovereign states who ex hypothesi 
will abate no essential of their sovereignty’.232 Laws and treaties are seen as factors constraining 
the sovereignty of the state. As such, this practice is used sparingly for a temporary resolve of 
an issue such as after a defeat in war. In terms of international obligations, realists tend to regard 
treaties and contracts as temporary and observance of it is conditional or ‘rebus sic stantibus’.233 
For instance, the party who lost a war would yield into signing a treaty with the victor but will 
only abide by the rules as long as they remain weak and violate the rules once they are powerful 
enough to challenge the victor regarding the treaty. These types of treaties were prevalent 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire where treaties were signed and 
implemented temporarily.  
Revolutionists insist international law ‘is an ideological weapon for the prosecution of holy war 
by the Revolutionist state’.234 International law is a prime hindrance to the realization of the 
revolutionary state or world society as it deems the revolutionary action as crimes. They uphold 
the notion of ‘Cum haereticis fides non servanda’ or promises made to heretics cannot be kept 
in the realm of international obligations.235 Disregarding international law and treaties is 
regarded necessary for the revolutionary state to materialize and as such the practice of a 
rationalist international law is unnecessary. Individual rights in the revolutionist tradition stem 
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from morals set by the revolutionist state designed for individuals. Hence, individual rights as 
stated in the institution of international law are overwritten by individual morals. Universal 
moral principles of mankind are the rules in the revolutionist tradition, thus replacing 
international law altogether. 
Since the revelation of Iran’s nuclear program in 2002, Tehran has insisted on its legal right to 
a peaceful nuclear program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty it has signed in 1968. Iran’s 
pursuit of nuclear technology has shown the multifaceted nature of international law and the 
options at the states’ disposal in achieving their national interest. This demonstrates the utility 
of the institution of international law and, its corollary, international obligations, in analysing 
and understanding Iranian foreign policy. 
2.4.4 Great Power Management 
It is important to define the term ‘great power’ before proceeding with a discussion on what 
‘great power management’ is as well as its function in maintaining international order as an 
institution of international society. Wight does not discuss this institution as such and so 
reference will come from the work of Bull. There are three implications upon using the word 
great powers.236 First, there is no singular power and an exclusive club facilitated by special 
rules exist.237 Second, these countries have similar, if not equal, military capabilities.238 Third, 
these powers are ‘recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples 
to have, certain special rights and duties’.239 Such a conceptualization of the terminology of 
great powers ‘presupposes and implies the idea of an international society as opposed to an 
international system, a body of independent political communities linked by common rules and 
institutions as well as by contact and interaction’.240 This indicates that great powers, having 
the capabilities as well as accepting their duties in the international society, have a significant 
contribution to the preservation of international order through the management of their 
relationship with each other and through the exploitation of their predominance in directing 
international affairs.241 There are six distinct ways they manage their relationship with each 
other to preserve order.242 First, they preserve the ‘general balance of power’.243 Second, they 
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seek ‘to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another’.244 Third, they attempt ‘to 
limit or contain wars among one another’.245 Fourth, they unilaterally exploit ‘their local 
preponderance’.246 Fifth, they generally agree ‘to respect one another’s spheres of influence’. 
Lastly, they engage in ‘joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or 
condominium.’247 Taking military capabilities into account in determining the great powers in 
the international society today, we may count the United States, Russia and China to be part of 
this exclusive club. This setting entails means that powerful states in the system must engage 
with one another to maintain order and mitigate conflicts. They exert their influence over the 
weaker states in their spheres to prevent conflicts as each great power has a responsibility 
toward its own sphere of influence. This way, international affairs are managed and regulated 
for peace to be maintained.  
Neither Bull nor Wight have discussed the realist and revolutionist dimensions of the institution 
of great power management implying it does not exist in these traditions. However, great power 
management in the realist tradition can arguably be understood as being related to the institution 
of war since great powers tend to use war against each other in a quest for dominance. Great 
powers then neither manage nor cooperate since cooperation is not part of the realist doctrine. 
Rather great power rivalry comes to the fore creating conflict and war in the international 
system. Hence, great power management can technically be renamed as great power rivalry 
making war the constant state of international affairs. As for the revolutionist tradition, great 
power management cannot possibly exist as the foundation of this institution is the state which 
is likewise non-existent in the tradition. Since the revolutionist world society are made up of 
individuals in one society, neither engagement nor rivalry is foreseen rendering great power 
management meaningless. 
2.4.5 War 
War is defined as ‘organized violence carried on by political units against each other’248. There 
are three different perspectives on the function of war depending on the points of view of an 
‘individual state’, a ‘system of states’ and ‘society of states’ each corresponding to one of the 
three traditions.249 First, from the perspective of an individual state war is an instrument of 
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policy—a means to attain certain objectives.250 When fused with the revolutionist tradition of 
thought wherein a world society of mankind exists, this perspective becomes adopted as a 
means to maintain the just cause and violence will be directed at the dissidents of the world 
society. Second, taking on the perspective of an international system, war becomes an essential 
determinant of the system at any given time following the realist tradition.251 It is this function 
war has served for most of the history of mankind. ‘It is war and the threat of war that help to 
determine whether particular states survive or are eliminated, whether they rise or decline, 
whether their frontiers remain the same or are changed, whether their peoples are ruled by one 
government or another, whether disputes are settled or drag on, and which way they are settled, 
whether there is a balance of power in the international system or one state becomes 
preponderant’.252 Third, through the perspective of an international society, it has a dual 
function referring to the rationalist tradition.253 On the one hand, war functions as the 
‘manifestation of disorder in international society’ threatening to disintegrate the society ‘into 
a state of pure enmity or war of all against all’.254 For this reason, the contemporary international 
society has persisted in limiting and containing war, keeping ‘it within the bounds of rules laid 
down by the international society itself.255 On the other hand, war functions as ‘an instrument 
of state policy and a basic determinant of the shape of the international system – is a means 
which international society itself feels a need to exploit as to achieve its own purposes’.256 
Though this second aspect may appear to reflect the function of war from the perspective of an 
individual state, its role is significantly different as it aims to maintain the international order, 
and should be regarded positively.257 Nevertheless, the contemporary international society 
operates within the first aspect since the society of sovereign nation-states have ‘been impelled 
to restrict and contain war’258 As a matter of fact, the first line of the preamble of the Charter 
of the United Nations refers to this and it states: ‘We the peoples of the United Nations 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…’.259 
The Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 was the last interstate war Iran has fought to date with 
severe ramifications for the country, proving the dual function of war in the ‘society of states’: 
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it showed a disorder while at the same time, it functioned as an instrument of Iran’s state policy. 
Considering Iran’s eight-year-war as well as the military intervention of the United States in 
neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, there is good reason for the Iranian administration to take 
the threat of war, present in the U.S. administration’s rhetoric, very seriously. The paranoia of 
Iran in engaging with the institution of war is self-explanatory and it has serious implications 
on Iran’s foreign policy. Since the 1979 revolution, the United States has had difficulties 
recognizing the Islamic regime in Iran, which was used to justify Washington’s support of 
Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran, being a sovereign state and a member of the 
international society, certainly perceived this as a threat to their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as the regime was not mutually recognized as the sovereign entity in Iran. The 
ramifications of such an insecurity has certainly influenced Iran’s foreign policy, especially in 
terms of seeking recognition. There are indications, nonetheless, that through the para-military 
Hezbollah group, Iran has somehow involved itself indirectly with the institution of war despite 
its paranoia in engaging with the institution. This is in part due to the perceived security threats 
in addition to the insecurities of not being fully recognized as a sovereign nation-state by the 
United States. From Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech until 2009, the threat of regime change in 
Iran was not completely off the table in Washington and hundreds of millions of dollars were 
being invested by the United States on funding domestic opposition groups intensifying such 
efforts by 2006.260  
Awareness of this has naturally provoked a backlash from the conservative factions of the 
Iranian government, strengthening the capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) within Iran and in the Middle East to prepare for possible attacks, culminating in the 
bloody crackdown following the 2009 presidential campaign in Tehran. Violent scenes gripped 
the world beginning from the shooting of a young woman called ‘Neda’ resembling inter-state 
war despite it happening domestically, reflecting the transformation of the institution of war. 
Similar developments can likewise be observed in Iran’s involvement in the Syrian war as the 
government relentlessly support Bashar Al-Assad while the West primarily backs the 
opposition groups unfolding one of the few proxy wars Tehran is engaged in. Yet another such 
war is with Saudi Arabia in Yemen as part of the regional rivalry games between the two 
countries. The nature of wars has fundamentally changed in a way as Bulls’ ‘political units’ 
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now includes non-state actors targeting mostly civilians with the goal of inflicting as much 
casualties as possible to weaken the opponent echoing Mary Kaldor’s concept of ‘New and Old 
Wars’ demonstrating that Iran’s support for para-military groups across the Middle East is an 
engagement with the institution of war.261  
2.5 Joining the Three Traditions and the Classic Institutions  
Being an integral part of the institutions, the three traditions operate within each of the 
institutions as currents, each guided by their own logic. Adhering to their own characterization 
of interactions among states, the three traditions bestow specific qualities to each the institution, 
which shapes the meaning of the institutions and their functionality. To illustrate this, let us 
consider the three traditions to be a continuum starting from realism, moving on to rationalism 
and ending with revolutionism. The institutions are conceived to have different definitions and 
functions depending on their place in the continuum. 
 Realism Rationalism Revolutionism 
Diplomacy 
Self-sufficiency, survival, 
independence; Negotiation 
through coercion 
Cooperation, policy; 
Negotiations on equal terms 
Must be abolished 
International Law 
Unimportant; Conditional 
adherence to legal obligations 
Codification of rules; Treaties 
are binding 
Only universal moral 
principles of mankind must 
be adhered to. 
Balance of Power Preponderance, dominance Equal distribution of Power Unreliable, Non-existent 
Great Power 
Management 
Can only be understood in terms 
of war 
Engaging with other powers to 
maintain order 
Non-existent 
War 
Constant a state of war to 
determine the system; Means to 
achieve national interest 
Indicates disorder; Must be 
avoided or used only in 
emergencies 
Missionary war 
Table 2. Visualization of the Institutions under the continuum of the three traditions based on Bull and Wight 
Such an exposition of Iran’s adherence to a dominant tradition can help us understand and 
explain their justifications for pursuing certain policies regarding their interaction with other 
nation-states of international society. Relations with the West and the countries in the region 
can be comprehended more thoroughly through deciphering their perspectives using the three 
traditions and the institutions as analytical tools. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the main framework of this dissertation through an elaboration 
of the theory guiding this research. Two key features of the English School were presented: the 
three traditions and the norms and institutions of international society. The three traditions of 
thought, realism, rationalism and revolutionism, are considered as currents in a constant 
                                                 
261 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 178; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 
3rd [fully rev. and updated] ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
68 
 
interplay within international politics, informing statesmen on how to approach foreign policy. 
The second feature, international society, refers to the contemporary international order of the 
community of sovereign states emerging after the Second World War. This contemporary 
international society is constituted by fundamental norms at the very basic level and institutions. 
Institutions are the fundamental practices regulating interaction among states and are defined 
to be the shared understanding among all the members of this society. The norms of sovereignty 
and non-intervention are considered as the building blocks of the institutions and are thus 
crucial aspects determining the interactions between states. The five classic institutions of 
diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great power management and war are social 
structures and fundamental practices where the states operate. The synergy of both the three 
traditions and four of the five institutions—diplomacy, international law, balance of power and 
great power management—form the analytical tool I use to examine the speeches, and official 
statements and other texts of Iranian statesmen to provide a comprehensive analysis of Iranian 
foreign policy. Taken together the three traditions and the five classic institutions of 
international society determine a country’s foreign policy.  
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3 Chapter three: Methodology 
 
To answer the question: ‘How can Iran’s inconsistent foreign policy be explained?’ and prove 
Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while 
the means are rationalist. I have set two goals for this research. First is to prove Iran’s foreign 
policy is consistent and follows a certain logic effectively explained by the three traditions of 
the English School. By analysing both the statements of Iran’s statesmen and Iran’s foreign 
policy actions the three traditions at work can be demonstrated. Second is to show the 
simultaneous coexistence and interplay of the three traditions in the statements and actions of 
Iran’s statesmen. This aims to confirm the second part of the research statement: Iran’s foreign 
policy is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist.  
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical and analytical framework of this study arguing 
that Iranian statesmen who engage in foreign policy are influenced by three traditions of thought 
as reflected by the English School’s realism, rationalism and revolutionism. These traditions 
manifest themselves as a dynamic interplay of ideas and are evident in the five classical 
institutions of international society – diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great 
power management and war – which Iranian statesmen operate in. Being a member of the 
contemporary international society of sovereign nation-states established after the Second 
World War, Iran is not devoid of knowledge and understanding of these institutions. Failure to 
recognize the existence of an interplay of the three traditions within these institutions can 
mislead us into conjecturing Iran’s foreign policy to be a product of a single theoretical 
framework. In such a case, Iran’s foreign policy may at times seem inconsistent since following 
a strictly realist, neo-liberalist or constructivist framework does not leave room for dynamism 
in terms of policy. Foreign policy is, nonetheless, very dynamic and inconsistencies can be 
explained logically if we use a multi-faceted approach. Iran’s foreign policy can simultaneously 
consist of all the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism and the use of the 
English School.  
I began by collecting speeches of Iran’s statesmen delivered to international audiences while 
compiling a list of key words and phrases from the work of English School scholars, mainly 
Wight and Bull as well as Islamic Studies scholars such as Irfani, Lafraei and Martin, to 
generate a table of the three traditions to guide the research. This table has three columns 
representing the three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Once the dataset has 
been completed and the table finished, I moved on to find a software to quantitatively analyse 
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the data by means of counting the repetition of these words within the statements. 
Unfortunately, I have not found the appropriate software for the task, and so I asked a 
programmer to create a software specifically for my research. Percentage values measuring the 
dominance, i.e. the repetitiveness, of the words representing the traditions and institutions from 
the period since 1997 emerged in the results and are discussed in the quantitative chapter of this 
research. A further step involved a qualitative analysis of the data, wherein I had a close reading 
of the materials to examine whether new themes and discourses within the same traditions could 
be revealed or if the Iranian statesmen have a completely new perspective altogether separate 
from the pre-supposed three traditions. Both results were combined together to present holistic 
evidence based on the political discourse of the statesmen framing the parameters where they 
base their foreign policy decisions on. Then, I look at Iran’s foreign policy actions and connect 
their discourses with their international activity to show the consistency of Iran’s foreign policy 
in terms of it following the logic of the three traditions as well as verifying the statesmen ‘mean 
what they say’. 
3.1 The Political Discourses of Iranian Statesmen  
As opposed to the conventional method of choosing one political institution, such as the Office 
of the Supreme Leader, in analysing Iranian foreign policy, I have chosen three main political 
institutions to provide more inclusive results. These three institutions together are responsible 
for the foreign policy of Iran. One may be more powerful than the other but nonetheless all are 
vital in the country’s foreign policy-making process. I work on the political rhetoric from the 
Office of the Supreme Leader, the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry Office, 
particularly the Iranian delegation to the United Nations. 
The Office of the Supreme Leader is the most influential body in terms of decision and policy-
making processes in the country. It is the highest political and religious institution established 
by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to uphold and safeguard 
the revolution. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, has held this permanent 
position since Khomeini’s death in 1989. Khamenei is considered the most powerful political 
figure in the country and his decision penetrates all of the political, economic and social 
institutions in Iran. Thus, he has played and continues to play a major role not only in the 
domestic politics of Iran but also the country’s foreign policy. For this reason, all his speeches 
are of great relevance for this research. I have downloaded them from his official website: 
www.khamenei.ir as well as www.leader.ir. These websites provide digital archives of all the 
speeches of the supreme leader since 1987. 
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The Office of the President ranks second in terms of power after the supreme leader in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. It is an institution playing a significant role in foreign policy-making, 
which makes it an important source of data for the study. This position has been held by three 
prominent personalities since 1997: Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan 
Rouhani. I have collected the key speeches and interviews made by the three presidents but also 
included statements made by Hashemi Rafsanjani from 1997 onwards. Rafsanjani’s political 
rhetoric also carry a substantial weight in Iranian foreign policy as he was the president of Iran 
from 1989 until 1997. Furthermore, he has been involved in Iranian politics by holding different 
positions in the government under all the presidents after the end of his term. Most of the 
speeches and interviews of the president are archived in the website www.president.ir while 
those addressed to the international community directly are likewise available in different news 
agencies websites and the website of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations: http://iran-
un.org/en/. This website has an archive of all the statements made by Iran’s official delegation 
to the United Nations, Iran’s presidents, foreign ministry officials and other political elites to 
the United Nations and other international organizations. 
The third source of data is the Iranian Foreign Ministry since it is the main political institution 
directly involved in foreign policy. The only issue is that the website of the foreign ministry 
does not publish the full version of statements made by their officials prompting me to turn to 
the special department of the foreign ministry: the Iranian delegation to the United Nations. 
This department not only publishes the speeches made by the foreign ministers since 1997 but 
also other important figures involved in Iranian foreign policy such as the ambassador to the 
United Nations, the deputy foreign minister, permanent representative to the United Nations, 
Deputy Director of Disarmament and International Security Department of the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry to name a few. All their speeches and correspondence are available from the United 
Nations website: http://iran-un.org/en/. 
In addition to those websites I have previously mentioned, I have included various news 
agencies websites as well since certain materials are available only through these channels. For 
instance, CNN has interviewed Iran’s presidents several times since 1997 and the transcript of 
these interviews are only available from their website and not the official website of the Iranian 
president. I extensively use a wide variety of news agencies and research institutions in 
collecting reports of Iran’s international activity linked directly to their foreign policies. These 
reports are useful in the last phase of the qualitative analysis where I attempt to classify Iran’s 
foreign policy actions under the three traditions. 
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In terms of the political statements, I have gathered those specifically aimed at international 
and regional audiences. As such, the documents had officially been translated into the English 
language and are made available to the public through the official websites earlier mentioned.262 
Since foreign policy is typically about external politics, I have chosen to analyse those political 
statements aimed at regional and international audiences. External politics refer to the politics 
beyond a state’s own borders, the way in which a state decides to interact with another state is 
its foreign policy. External actions of a state are regulated from within the state but are practiced 
outside the state. Although foreign policy can be used for domestic consumption in a country, 
the focus here rests on external affairs and the message Iran wants to send to the world. Hence, 
I have not included political statements addressing the Iranian local audience since they are also 
mostly available only in Farsi. Nevertheless, I have likewise collected copies of the Iranian 
political rhetoric especially from Khamenei since some of the speeches are only available in 
the abridged version. Thus, I had to double check with the original Farsi texts whether the 
important contents remain intact in the English version. 
3.2 Digital Data Gathering and Mixed-Methods Analysis 
Collecting data from the internet may rather seem straightforward but it requires a lot of effort 
much in the same way as the traditional method of going to old dusty archives and digging up 
speeches from decades ago. One is spared from the physical logistics of having to travel to Iran 
and going to the library of the respective offices once a permit has been obtained to access the 
archives and copy the relevant speeches, making the work of digital data gathering much more 
attractive, particularly considering the potential danger of conducting such research. Still, it is 
not so much easier to obtain the statements needed for this study as digital security mechanisms 
are in place to prevent people from taking advantage of the online archives in the official 
websites of the Iranian statesmen. Since the supreme leader wants to expand his popularity and 
audience abroad, his two websites contain all his speeches translated in English but there are 
set limits as to how much a certain IP address can download, a problem I have encountered 
quite frequently, which I elaborate on in the section on limitations of the study below. 
Downloading problems aside, the digital data gathering process proved to be tedious and 
complicated with problems presenting themselves at different stages.  First, it took a couple of 
years to collect all the speeches. Second, the speeches did not have the same format. So, all of 
the speeches had to be converted into one single format to ensure the smooth running of the 
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analysis software. For some speeches, relying on the good-old copy-paste method to convert 
some of the speeches on the websites as well as the PDF attachments to a text (.txt) file was the 
only option. Third, the date the speech was uploaded did not always correspond to the date the 
speech was delivered. For instance, a speech made by the supreme leader in 2003 was only 
uploaded in the 2006 folder of the website. To ensure the speeches were dated at the time they 
were delivered by the speaker, I went through and checked the files by reading them one by 
one. Fourth, I renamed each of the downloaded speeches for them to have the same format as 
those files I have converted to .txt, which took as much time as checking whether the dates were 
accurate. It took an enormous amount of time and patience to be meticulous about the data 
considering there are 1,930 speeches. Fifth, all the speeches were not in the same website. Some 
speeches have been deleted in the official websites but were available on third-party websites. 
Interviews of presidents for instance were mostly unavailable at the official websites but were 
found at the media outlet’s website like CNN and other news channels. Using the google search 
engine was not straightforward in digitally digging for the missing speeches as they were not 
usually in the mainstream websites appearing at the top of the results list. Lastly, noting the 
context of which the speaker was speaking to be able to find out at what event it was made was 
challenging since it required another reading of the 1,930 speeches. Due to the timeframe of 
this study, from the 1,930 speeches, only 1,888 were used for the analysis as these were the 
speeches from 1997 to 2015. 
The data used for the quantitative chapter ends in December 2015 while the speeches read for 
the qualitative chapter, includes two speeches from 2016. The main reason for this being the 
completion of the quantitative part of the analysis in the first six months of 2016 using 
documents gathered only until 2015. I have attempted to download the data for 2016 from Iran’s 
official delegation to the UN website in 2017 only to find out they have eliminated their archives 
due to the construction of their website. I have checked for many months but the archives remain 
unavailable. Apart from the problem of unavailability, if the data were available, it would still 
require a significant amount of time to download the archives and go through the entire process 
of making sure the files are dated accurately and converting the files into a single format as well 
as noting the context of the hundreds of files from 2016. As I do not have the luxury of time, I 
have limited the dataset to 2015 at least for the general purposes of the quantitative chapter. But 
for the quantitative chapter, I added two easily accessible and available speeches. The two 
speeches are Khamenei’s Hajj speech in 2016 and Rouhani’s statement at the United Nations 
General Assembly respectively. They are both added to the graphs discussing the Hajj speeches 
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and the UN General Assembly speeches of the presidents and foreign minister but not included 
in the yearly summary graphs as they are only two speeches of 2016 out of the numerous data 
available for the period. Apart from their accessibility, formatting and analysing the two 
speeches from 2016 did not consume so much time. Reading these two speeches from 2016 
were vital to the qualitative part of the analysis as they contain significant themes and 
argumentations useful for this research. 
The digital files I have collected were analysed using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. I aimed to show how the three traditions are reflected in the political rhetoric of the 
statesmen providing them with a roadmap of their foreign policy and using mixed-methods can 
generate a more holistic analysis. The quantitative phase provides the first indications of the 
three traditions through the percentage of shares, meaning the number of words per tradition 
divided by the total number of words within the text multiplied by one hundred. Meanwhile the 
qualitative phase deals with the careful examination through a close reading of the texts to 
reveal the themes, strategies and meanings, bringing the three traditions together thereby 
explaining Iran’s foreign policy manoeuvres. 
3.3 The Quantitative Phase of Analysis 
The quantitative phase of the analysis is the first phase of the study, which seeks to quantify the 
data found in the texts. My aim is to look at the percentage of the traditions in each of the text 
I have gathered to determine the most dominant and the dormant traditions. First, I had to devise 
a table containing all the keywords related to each of the three traditions. Second, I had to find 
a software to be able to analyse the data. Third, once the software ‘read’ the texts and found the 
number of keywords, I had to organize the data it generated and derive the percentage values. 
3.3.1 Establishing the key phrases from the theory 
The three traditions English School – realism, rationalism and revolutionism – as well as the 
five institutions of international society as discussed in the theory chapter were used to extract 
key words and phrases for the analysis of the speeches. I created a table by carefully choosing 
words and phrases related to the three traditions from Hedley Bull’s ‘The Anarchical Society’ 
and Martin Wight’s ‘International Theory: The Three Traditions’. These books led to the 
establishment of the English School of international relations making them the most appropriate 
and elaborate primary sources of the words and phrases. Moreover, the two books represent the 
classical perspective of the English School, which minimizes the possibility of getting 
entangled in the debates originating from the later discussions of the theory. Hence, the choice 
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of key words and phrases was based on a basic classical understanding of the English School 
theory. Realism and rationalism were extensively elaborated in the words of Bull and Wight, 
yet the revolutionist strand suffered from some shortcomings in terms utility as my research 
focuses on an ‘Islamic’ revolutionist tradition. Revolutionism in the English School was based 
purely on the Christian tradition and thus, I had to add terminologies capable of transforming 
the revolutionist tradition to a utility compatible with my research – an Islamization of the 
revolutionist tradition. My own interpretation of Iranian revolutionism, which is inherently 
Islamic in nature, has been a secondary source for the key words and phrases of the revolutionist 
tradition. 
I made a table with three columns representing realism, rationalism and revolutionism and listed 
down beneath them all the relevant phrases used by the authors in defining and describing the 
respective traditions. To maximize the key words and phrases in creating an exhaustive list, I 
have also included the synonyms of certain concepts as well. With regard to revolutionism, I 
have added Islamic concepts and words I found to be equivalent of those described by Bull and 
Wight. For instance, apart from ‘world society’ and ‘world community’, I have added ‘Islamic 
society’ and ‘Islamic community’ as well as ‘Ummah’ (Islamic Community) and ‘touhid’ 
(Monotheism) or ‘tawhid’, a different spelling variation of touhid, to the list of revolutionist 
terms. Thus, certain terms such as jihad, are also to be found as I equate it with the term 
‘missionary war’. Such additional words and phrases complete the essence of the revolutionist 
tradition within the Iranian political sphere, which is fundamentally drawn from Islamic 
political philosophy. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, I have drawn from the works of 
three scholars, Irfani, Martin and Lafraei for they give a summarized account of the most 
prominent political Islamic philosophers and discuss the revolutionist aspect of Iranian political 
philosophy. The philosophy stems from the Iranian Islamic Revolution is valuable for my 
research. I have provided a segment of the table below to illustrate the keywords chosen for 
each of the three traditions. The full version of the two tables, including synonyms and 
abbreviations are available in the appendix. 
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Realism Rationalism Revolutionism 
anarchy 
annihilate 
arena 
arms 
arms race 
assert 
bandwagon 
bargaining position 
battle 
be ahead 
be independent 
be self sufficient 
be self-sufficient 
belligerence 
bribe 
brinkmanship 
coerce 
coerce state 
combat 
abide 
abide by the law 
abide by the rule 
accord 
act responsibly 
adhere 
adjust 
adjustment 
agree 
agreement 
amend 
arrange 
avoid crises 
bind 
chaos of war 
commit 
compliance to convention 
compliance to treaty 
compliance with the rule 
abolish diplomacy 
adherence to morals 
against hypocrisy 
against tyranny 
all humans are equal 
amoral 
assimilate 
balance of power is non-
existent 
balance of power is 
unmanageable 
balance of power is 
unreliable 
believer 
brother 
brothers and sisters 
charity 
civil rights 
collective 
Table 3. Part of the table of keywords used for this research 
3.3.2 The Software: Compount 
I initially looked around for a software that could count the number of keywords of each of the 
traditions within the text realizing I can make use of text mining software available online for 
free. I came across Orange, an open-source datamining software which also has a text mining 
tool that could be utilized for analysing text documents but once I learned to operate it, I faced 
more challenges than opportunities in using it for my data. After many attempts in testing 
softwares such as MAXQDA and Nvivo, I realized that none could help me with my project. 
Either I faced the problem of not having free access to them or if they were free of charge, such 
as Orange, they were quite complicated to learn. Moreover, the amount of time learning to 
operate the software was not a price I was willing to pay since there were also not guarantees I 
would be able to extract my data right as the possibility of not learning them correctly increased 
the chances of getting a false outcome. Thus, to save time and money, I asked a programmer to 
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develop a simple program to analyse the speeches in the easiest way possible. Compount is the 
resulting software program made through the programming language python. Compount can 
generate the data I needed for this research by creating a comma-separated values (.csv) file 
which can be opened by Microsoft Excel. Before it could generate results, I had to follow 
several steps. First, I had to compile my data in one folder and make sure all the files are text 
(.txt) files. In this folder, there are two separate folders, one for ‘speeches’ and one for the 
‘keywords’ and the software Compount. The folder for keywords have three .csv files called 
realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Each file represents the list of keywords corresponding 
to the tradition representing is its filename. The other folder called ‘speeches’ contains all of 
the speeches in the form of .txt files. I could only run the program by opening the Windows 
command window of the folder with the respective files for analysis and I had to run the 
program twice in two different folders as I wanted to separate the findings of Khamenei and 
those from the UN website Khamenei’s speeches were in a folder simply called Khamenei while 
the others were in a folder named UN dataset, which corresponds to the presidents and foreign 
ministry official statements taken from Iran’s official delegation to the UN website. 
Once the software had run through all the speeches in a folder, it created a folder of ‘results’ 
wherein three other sub-folders were to be found, ‘daily, monthly and yearly’ indicating it had 
counted the keywords and organized the results based on the day, month and year. The most 
specific results are in the daily folders as details for each speech are stated while the monthly 
results mean it is the accumulated tally of the keywords for all the speeches within a given 
month while the yearly refers to those tallied speeches of a certain year. Within each sub-folder 
were three .csv files corresponding to the three traditions – realism, rationalism and 
revolutionism – albeit in an alphabetical order. In each .csv file, one could see how many times 
each word was mentioned in a speech and could tally all the words of a tradition. I transferred 
the figures into a Microsoft Excel workbook wherein I could rearrange and organize them the 
way they were needed for this study. Compount is a very basic software entailing me as a 
researcher to do much of the rearrangement of the results, but it is more flexible and I am certain 
the results are what I need and I can organize them according to my criteria. You may say that 
a software is meant to remove the bulk of work of rearranging the data for you but I had 
specifically asked for Compount to work this way as I see it to be more manageable despite a 
significant amount of time being spent on organizing the figures. Compount is relatively easy 
to learn and use in comparison to all the other text mining software I had to learn, which is an 
advantage for a social scientist like me. 
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3.3.3 Deriving the percentage values of each of the traditions 
Once I had the figures I needed with Compount doing the job of counting all the keywords of 
each of the traditions in every document, I rearranged them in Microsoft Excel workbooks. This 
way, I can keep track of the developments, make comparisons and graphs based on the results. 
For the daily results, I made a table in Excel showing the date of the speech, which also happens 
to be the filename of the .txt file, the total number of realism, rationalism and revolutionism 
within the text as well as the total word count of the entire speech. The initial table looks like 
this: 
Date 
Realism 
Word count 
Rationalism 
Word count 
Revolutionism 
Word count 
Total number of words in text 
2013_09_24 47 75 55 2658 
2013_09_25 (2) 5 40 6 1075 
2013_09_25 74 152 58 5950 
2013_09_26 (2) 27 34 5 1031 
2013_09_26 62 122 60 6399 
2013_09_27 (3)  23 75 14 1187 
Table 4. Sample tally of the three traditions in the text of the speeches. 
I derived the percentages by tallying the number of words per tradition as used in the text and 
divided it by the total number of words within the file. I then multiplied the result by one 
hundred and organized them in the same row on the same table. I added the following to the 
table: 
Date 
Realism 
percentage 
Rationalism 
percentage 
Revolutionism 
percentage 
Event 
2013_09_24 1.768247 2.82167 2.069225 Rouhani UNGA 
2013_09_25 (2) 0.465116 3.72093 0.55814 Rouhani WP interview 
2013_09_25 1.243697 2.554622 0.97479 Rouhani CNN Amanpour 
2013_09_26 (2) 2.618817 3.297769 0.484966 Rouhani on behalf of NAM 
2013_09_26 0.968901 1.906548 0.937647 Rouhani council on foreign 
relations 
2013_09_27 (3)   1.937658 6.31845 1.179444 Rouhani NAM ministerial mtg 
Table 5. Percentage values derived from the word count tally (see Table 4 above). 
Having these values, I can compare them with each other to see the percentage value each 
tradition has at specific dates enabling me to see the most dominant tradition at a given point in 
time. With such a table I can quickly identify the most prominent tradition during specific 
international events, for instance, the table above shows Rouhani’s speeches to be 
predominantly influenced by the rationalist tradition shortly before having the historic phone 
call with the former president of the United States, Barack Obama. Using the daily results, we 
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can effectively zoom in on a text on a specific date, for instance, the president’s speech at the 
United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2013 and look at the percentage values of 
the three traditions and then compare it with his UN speech in 2014. 
The monthly and yearly results are also used in much the same way but have a much larger 
scope as they represent the figures of the traditions accumulated in months and years and can 
be specifically help in identifying patterns across a longer span of time. As an example, for the 
year 2008, the percentage of realism based on all the texts collected from the same year is 
specified and contrasted with the percentage of rationalism and revolutionism. Then the 
findings of the year 2008 could be compared to those in 2000 or 2015. This way, variations 
over time could easily be traced.  
The quantitative method provides us with a more general overview of the distribution of the 
three traditions highlighting the dominance of a tradition based on the percentages. 
Simultaneously, competing traditions could be recognized with less difficulty since those with 
similar percentages could be singled out and the dormant tradition is also made visible for if it 
has a value above 0.0, it means the tradition is present in the speech. After all, the three 
traditions are supposed to be co-existing with each other at the same time in the speeches at 
least according to the English School theory. This approach ultimately produces the first traces 
of the three traditions in the form of percentages of the total word count as it relates to the three 
traditions touching upon the surface of the analysis. Nevertheless, such an approach in 
combination with qualitative analysis has seldom been used and I believe it to have distinct 
advantages benefitting this research. 
3.3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Quantitative Analysis Method 
The primary advantage of quantitative analysis lies in the amount of data processed allowing 
for a more exhaustive use of all the resources available. The speed at which the data is analysed 
is also a positive advantage. Extensive amounts of data are generated since all the related 
documents are included, amounting to about two thousand, instead of simply choosing a sample 
of a few hundred texts. This eventually gives a thorough summary of the enormous amount of 
texts enabling me to make comparisons across time periods. Moreover, it allows for a more 
objective analysis since I keep my distance as a researcher, thus minimizing unintentional and 
unconscious biases, since the texts are analysed by a software. The results are objective and 
hard facts, bestowing the potential of the research to be replicated as the conclusions are more 
generalizable.  
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Nevertheless, I am aware of the disadvantages of this approach. Its limitation lies in its strength 
as well since percentages as outcomes could not provide a detailed narration of the three 
traditions, thus making the discursive context become irrelevant. Furthermore, there is also a 
degree of a structural bias present as I have pre-selected the key words and phrases on the table, 
not permitting new ideas to be discovered. For this reason, the qualitative approach as a 
supplement for a deeper examination of the texts is beneficial. 
3.4 The Qualitative Phase of Analysis 
The qualitative phase of this dissertation follows the quantitative phase. I have used the same 
material as the quantitative one but approached these differently by examining the political 
rhetoric closely, resulting in a deeper analysis. It is through the qualitative method where 
underlying themes, argumentations and meanings are revealed from the data explaining Iran’s 
foreign policy at the discursive level.  
3.4.1 Choice of Texts 
Forty-two speeches were selected for the qualitative analysis part of this research as these were 
the most important documents holding the key to understanding Iran’s foreign policy discourse. 
The main criteria in choosing the documents were: type of audience, length of document and 
the event the speech was made for. A large international audience consisting of representatives, 
in the form of political elites or simply citizens, of many different countries is a prerequisite for 
the speeches to be chosen. Since we are discussing foreign policy here in this research, these 
speeches aimed at large international audiences make sense in so far as the speaker wants to 
spread his ideas in the form of argumentation and themes giving them meaning and thereby 
showcasing their foreign policy perspective. It gives us a glimpse of the important matters for 
the speaker, which he is trying to address by speaking to the world about it. The event where 
the speaker delivered the speech also matters as it must be an international event, attracting 
wide international audience for the speech to be an effective tool for spreading Iran’s foreign 
policy ideas. The length of the document also matters as a mere paragraph can only reveal so 
much and is limited in terms of providing argumentation and themes. The minimum length I 
have set for the speeches is two pages, with the normal font (TNR 12) since it is long enough 
to contain the vital arguments and themes related to foreign policy whilst anything shorter has 
less contents. 
With such criteria in mind, I have included all the president’s speeches at the United Nations 
General Assembly as they address the international community and are have the appropriate 
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length, while I left out the Iranian delegation’s explanation of vote on draft resolutions speeches 
as they are generally only a few sentences long. The annual United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) debate is an event attended by all world leaders and is televised across the globe for 
many viewers are keen to hear what the countries want to say thereby allowing the speakers to 
reach a greater international audience. There are twenty-one statements made by the former and 
current presidents and former foreign ministers and I read them carefully to properly analyse 
them. As for the supreme leader, I have chosen the annual Hajj pilgrimage speeches since they 
are delivered to a wide international, albeit predominantly Muslim, audience. However, due to 
the enormity of the event, with about two million pilgrims attending it each year, it attracts 
worldwide attention and Khamenei’s speeches may well reach non-Muslim audiences as well, 
especially political elites interested in the politics of the region. Like the UNGA speeches, there 
are twenty-one statements made by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since 1997. 
3.4.2 Potential Bias 
There is always a potential bias in every research and this dissertation is not exempt from it. 
Two types of potential bias are present in this study. First is the selection bias. The forty-two 
texts selected from the pool of speeches were picked due to the assumption that they are the 
only ones relevant for the purposes of this study based on their audience and their lengthiness. 
It may be the case, though, where the other speeches with a local audience also contain 
information useful for the analysis. Hence, the full spectrum of arguments may be left 
incomplete. To mitigate such a problem, I have randomly selected other speeches for a close 
reading to check whether new arguments may be present in them related to this dissertation, 
specifically to Iran’s foreign policy issues. Luckily, the content of most of the speeches are 
repetitive, particularly those I have selected randomly as well as those used for the qualitative 
analysis. 
Another, second form of bias, is the confirmation bias and it is quite common in research. For 
the qualitative phase of the analysis, certain arguments may be picked due to their relevance to 
the argument and so there is some possibility of other arguments being left out. To address this 
problem, I have broken down all the forty-two speeches into single sentences and made a table 
out of them where I identified and classified each of the sentences based on the content and 
specified which category they may belong to (three traditions and institutions). I read the 
sentences multiple times to challenge the type of category they belong to and to check whether 
they present something new minimizing the confirmation bias. 
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3.4.3 Questions for the qualitative analysis phase 
I have devised a set of questions for the very purpose of analysing the texts. These questions 
guided me in reading the text to draw the important details regarding the three traditions 
exposing their interplay within the speech as well as connecting them with Iran’s foreign policy 
actions.  
1. What are the main themes in the speech? 
2. What are the argumentations used for each theme?  
3. How do these argumentations and themes relate to the three traditions?  
4. How do the arguments and themes relate to the five institutions? 
5. How are the three traditions and five institutions reflected in Iran’s foreign policy actions? 
The general aim is to trace how the speeches of the statesmen or what they say officially are 
linked with their foreign policy actions and pinpoint how the traditions and institutions play out 
in Iran’s foreign policy. Being able to map out the answers to the questions and highlighting 
the relationship of the three traditions and institutions in the texts and in the actions of statesmen 
crucially proves Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and yet very dynamic. 
3.4.4 Connecting the discourses with Iran’s foreign policy actions 
By foreign policy actions, I mean the activities wherein prominent Iranian statesmen are 
involved in internationally, such as the supreme leader, the president and the foreign minister 
as well as other top officials of the government, be it in the form of sending an official letter, 
diplomatic exchange or signing deals. Three important criteria should be fulfilled to be regarded 
as international activity: 
1. Top government officials from Iran and, if possible, the other country should be involved, 
such as a president, prime minister, supreme leader, foreign minister or deputy foreign minister 
or key military personnel. In the case of Iran, for instance, General Major Qasem Soleimani has 
been greatly involved in Iran’s operations in Iraq and Syria and thus is regarded to be a top 
official executing Iran’s strategy in the two countries. 
2. The activity causes a significant change in the two country’s relations, economically, socially 
or politically. 
3. The activity should make headlines around the world and is widely discussed in the academic 
and non-academic literature. 
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Having these points in mind narrows down the international activity relevant for the analysis of 
Iran’s foreign policy here in this research as day-to-day diplomatic exchange is left out in favour 
of extraordinary and unique events usually mentioned in the statements of the statesmen. 
With the help of news articles published online by various news agencies such as the BBC, the 
Guardian, Tehran Times and many more, I made a timeline of Iran’s foreign policy actions and 
then connected them with Iran’s political discourse. I looked for relations between the 
arguments of the Iranian statesmen, which comprised of the three traditions, and the actions 
Iran has pursued as a state to show how they are linked. There are two reasons for this. First, 
connecting Iranian statesmen’s argumentation to foreign policy actions demonstrates the three 
traditions at play. This proves Iran’s foreign policy is consistent as it follows the logic of the 
three traditions and these are enacted simultaneously. Second, another point of consistency can 
be seen through this method as it exhibits that Iranian statesmen ‘mean what they say’. Such an 
addition to the qualitative phase is beneficial and can enhance the analysis since it considers all 
the components of foreign policy. 
3.4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Qualitative Analysis Method 
A close reading of the texts has enabled me to trace the themes and argumentations related to 
the three traditions and the discourses. Moreover, I could identify additional expressions 
regarding the three traditions I was unable to capture on the table. Reading the texts can disclose 
hidden meanings and themes vital to understanding Iranian foreign policy by being linked to 
the three traditions. Secondly, it allowed me as a researcher to explore fresh ideas and insights 
into realism, rationalism and revolutionism as understood by the Iranian statesmen. It opened 
pathways to new themes that can be classified under the three traditions not been previously 
considered when dealing with the theory alone. Furthermore, categorically new information 
had emerged leading to alternative perspectives in terms of understanding Iran’s foreign policy 
as it is different from what has been presented in the theoretical framework of this research.  
These advantages, nevertheless, are the very source of the weakness of the approach as the 
results cannot be generalized and it makes it more difficult to make comparisons over time as 
the varying contexts are taken into consideration. Such an approach also permits some 
unconscious biases in terms of interpretation as I closely immerse myself in the texts and it 
cannot be regarded positively. Nevertheless, combining the qualitative approach with the 
quantitative one could circumvent the weakness of both approaches precisely by being used 
together on the same set of data giving the research the best of both worlds. 
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3.5 Limitations of the study 
There are three limitations with regards to this dissertation, one concerns the dissertation itself 
and the other two concerns the data of this research.  
Being able to discuss the policies of Iran from a limited time frame of 1997 onwards is but a 
small window into the foreign policy apparatus, standing for the first limitation. To date, 
research regarding a multi-dimensional Iranian foreign policy is minimal, making this research 
unique and timely. It is important to remember though, the results presented here only captures 
a minute explanation of Iran’s foreign policy discourse as ‘uttered’ by Iran’s statesmen and 
reflected in their actions. The research does not involve all the documents related to Iran’s 
foreign policy as access to all of them is almost impossible. In addition, only forty-two 
statements were read closely. Hence, the scope of the data is relatively small limiting the study 
to this specific aspect of research involving only the political discourses of the supreme leader, 
presidents and foreign ministers. However, as these three political positions largely determine 
Iran’s foreign policy, the chance is high that the documents analysed reflect the realities of 
Iran’s foreign policy both in terms of statements and actions.  
English being the official language of the data used for this research has also limited the 
outcome of the study as the software could only ‘read’ English texts and not Farsi ones. There 
were occasions when I had to refer to the Farsi version of the texts but they were seldom and 
did not affect the results as I have resorted to them only to double-check when I was in doubt 
regarding the translation of certain words. By using only English, certain themes might have 
been missed in the case some of the official translations are weak but during a closer reading 
of the text, this was not the case. Including Farsi texts in this research, nevertheless, would have 
created its own set of problems which have been avoided by sticking to just one language. 
The second and more practical challenge my dissertation had faced concerns the data gathering 
process. It was particularly difficult to obtain the complete set of electronic copies of the 
speeches. I have experienced being blocked several times by the president.ir website for 
downloading some speeches. Apparently, after a certain number of downloads, the computer’s 
IP address is automatically blocked. Nonetheless, I started downloading from other computers 
with different IP addresses. Naturally, after a number of downloads had been reached, I was got 
blocked once again but the availability of the computers in the libraries of both St. Andrews 
and Tübingen Universities have helped me circumvent this problem. Apart from being blocked, 
the websites of the Iranian officials were at times disabled and their functions limited. In some 
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occasions, access to the archives were impossible due to their servers, but with time and 
patience, the collection of data was completed. It took about a year to complete the data set and 
at some point, it involved me getting help in using another python software to download the 
speeches at the same time in some websites to avoid getting denied access after several separate 
attempts. It is important to note some speeches were downloaded in its abridged version where 
the first paragraph pertaining to the religious formalities were already omitted. In such cases, I 
had to cross-check the speeches with the original Farsi (Persian) to ensure that important details 
vital to the speech itself and this research were not excluded. 
By May 2017, I realized the Iranian delegation to the United Nations website, http://iran-
un.org/en/, has completely removed all the documents I have previously downloaded. This 
means all the statements of the former presidents and foreign ministry officials no longer exist 
in their online version thus affecting the referencing stage of this dissertation. Since I 
downloaded the files earlier, I still have the complete set of statements formerly available on 
their website although in a .txt format. Despite the format being stylistically weak, it is, 
nevertheless, legible and can be used for analysis. The snapshots of some of the documents 
from 2013 onwards can still be accessed through the website archive.org:   
https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://iran-un.org/en/. 
The www.president.ir website has also presented some problems as they do not keep an archive 
of previous presidents, thereby prompting me to look for alternative sources of the speeches of 
the presidents. Luckily, those statements necessary for the study were made available through 
the website of the Iran’s permanent mission to the United Nations, which I have downloaded 
before the documents were deleted. The two official websites of the supreme leader - 
www.khamenei.ir; www.leader.ir – likewise had given me some difficulties. After using the 
software to download some speeches, I have noticed several of them got deleted. Whether this 
action was directly linked to my acquisition of files, bypassing their download limits per day 
and their blocking mechanism I previously mentioned, remains uncertain. Fortunately, although 
some are no longer available online, I have managed to keep copies in my computer for the 
analysis. 
The third and last limitation of the study lies on the margin of failure regarding the quantitative 
data of the research. Since the software cannot distinguish the words from the context whether 
it is suited to be in a respective tradition, there is the possibility that there may be some mistakes. 
For instance, the word ‘arms’ is listed to be under the realist tradition but since the program 
cannot take the previous and the word following ‘arms’ into account, it could be counted as 
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belonging to the realist tradition. In the complete sentence, though, it says ‘we condemn arms 
race’ and hence, the word should be listed under the rationalist tradition instead. For this reason, 
it is important for the qualitative part of the thesis is supplemented by qualitative analysis to 
minimize such errors through a close reading considering the context of the words. The results 
derived from the software constituting the quantitative phase of the analysis are presented and 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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4 Quantitative Analysis 
In this chapter, I present the quantitative findings of the documents I have run through the 
software. The results show the presence of realism, rationalism and revolutionism in all the 
statements I have collected. Each tradition has its own unique trajectory and these trajectories 
vary significantly when certain statements are disentangled from the entire sample. The 
statements were divided into two based on their download origin and these are the Khamenei 
dataset and the UN dataset. First, I provide an overview of both datasets, accumulating the 
yearly counts of the three traditions in all the texts of the respective dataset, which I have 
converted into percentage values. I describe the findings and discuss them analytically 
elaborating both the similarities and differences of the datasets. Second, I take a closer look at 
each dataset. The speeches I ran in the software ends in December 2015 with the exception for 
two documents from 2016 that were vital for the qualitative analysis. For the reasons behind 
this discrepancy, please refer to section 3.2 Digital Data Gathering and Mixed-Methods 
Analysis of the Methods Chapter. Thus, in some graphs such as the general overview, as you 
shall see below, the data ends in 2015 but in those graphs indicating the speeches of Khamenei 
at the Hajj and the UN General Assembly speeches, the two additional documents are included. 
4.1 General Overview of Sample 
A description of the overall sample as well as a brief analysis between the Khamenei dataset 
and the UN dataset is the focus of this section. I first look at the general findings from each 
dataset discussing interesting developments and then I elaborate on the differences and 
similarities of both datasets. 
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Graph 3. Yearly Khamenei Dataset 1997-2015 
The Khamenei dataset (Graph 3) above shows the general findings from the documents I have 
gathered including all the speeches of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in its full and 
abridged versions from 1997 until the end of 2015. The number of documents analysed accounts 
to a little over half of the UN dataset documents. The graph represents the accumulated values 
of each of the three traditions within a given year in the form of percentages. To understand 
how I have arrived at these percentage values, please refer to section 3.3.3 ‘Deriving the 
percentage values of each of the traditions’ in the Methods Chapter. As we can see, 
revolutionism significantly dominates over the other two traditions and it is consistent 
throughout the selected time frame except for the years 1997, 2001-2003 and 2013-2015. 1997 
was the year the moderate President Khatami was elected in Iran under the platform of reform. 
In the years 2001 until 2003 the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil occurred followed by 
Iran being designated to be part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ by Bush and the US military interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. From 2013 until 2015, Rouhani, another moderate political figure was 
elected to the presidency who advocated dialogue and had direct talks with the United States to 
resolve Iran’s nuclear program. It is perhaps due to these events the graphs show the dominance 
of revolutionism to be undermined by the other two traditions accounting for the fluctuations. 
Revolutionism reaches its peak value in 2002 with about 2.6%, but this is slightly surpassed by 
realism, which was also at its peak value, with 2.69%. In general, the years from 2001 until 
2003 were marked by fluctuations, particularly challenging the dominance of the revolutionist 
tradition making it an interesting period for a closer examination below. In 1997, realism and 
revolutionism almost reached equal percentage values with realism having 2.05% and 
revolutionism having 2.04%. Although realism had 0.01% more, the difference is too small to 
indicate realism’s dominance over the two traditions. 2001 marks the beginning of a telling 
fluctuation when the percentage value of revolutionism (1.83%) almost amounted to 
rationalism (1.81%) once again as in 1997. However, a year later in 2002, it was realism at the 
top reaching its peak at 2.69% with revolutionism having a little less at 2.6%. In 2003 realism 
likewise dominated with 2.35%, while revolutionism reached a modest 1.98%. By 2004, 
revolutionism regains its position and dominates over the other two traditions once again and 
this trend continues until 2013 where rationalism comes close with 1.54% while revolutionism 
was minutely higher in percentage value with 1.58%. Revolutionism maintains only a small 
lead from rationalism in the next couple of years, deviating from the norm wherein 
revolutionism dominates with a huge margin from the other two traditions, which I call a strong 
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domination. Thus, although revolutionism has been the dominant tradition in most of 
Khamenei’s speeches, it does not remain unchallenged and unchanged. Before 2004, realism 
competed with it and won over it in 2002 and 2003 while from 2013 onwards, rationalism seems 
to gain more percentage value to challenge revolutionism, preventing revolutionism from 
achieving a strong dominant position over the other two traditions. Another interesting point as 
we can see in the graph is that realism seems to have been more prevalent in the speeches prior 
to 2004 whilst after that period, rationalism prevails over realism. There seems to be a 
correlation between the events happening in the international stage, especially in the Middle 
East. By 2004, Saddam had already been ousted and it is perhaps only through a revolutionist 
rhetoric that Khamenei could gain the support of the Iraqi nation and turn it into an ally. At the 
more extreme end of the revolutionist tradition is the idea of forming a coalition of the believers 
against the heretics to wage a missionary holy war with the aim of conquering evil and 
establishing a moral system.  
Such developments prompt the question of how such changes and fluctuations came to be and 
how were they negotiated in the speeches of Khamenei if dominance is allocated to 
revolutionism? The answer to this question lies in the qualitative chapter as it involves a close 
reading allowing me to elaborate on the themes, argumentations and discourses, which may 
also contain the contexts strengthening the dominant tradition. I zoom in on the periods of 
fluctuations in the next sections of this chapter aiming to show supplementary evidence of the 
exact occurrences of the fluctuations and to find the respective speeches that need to be analysed 
qualitatively. For now, let us turn to the UN dataset.  
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The UN dataset (Graph 4) presents a clear-cut dominance of rationalism over realism and 
revolutionism as the percentage of the shares of rationalism far exceeds the values of the other 
two traditions being consistent throughout the time frame of this research. Rationalism peaks 
in 1997 with 3.92% and in 2015 when it reached 3.90% and despite its lows in 2006 (2.65%) 
and 2007 (2.83%), rationalism retained its dominance over the two traditions. Realism and 
revolutionism in the UN dataset are clear rivals as their values were almost always but a few 
points away from each other and their positions in the hierarchy of the three traditions are quite 
interchangeable all throughout the time frame. Revolutionism peaks in 1997 with 1.64% and 
2012 with 1.67%, is too little to challenge rationalism. The same modest amounts of peak 
percentage shares can be seen with realism, peaking at 1.53% in 2010 and 1.52% in 2012. It is 
important to note, the graph represents the entire collection of speeches taken from the UN 
website including the presidents and foreign ministry officials, particularly those representing 
Iran to the United Nations. The speeches of the presidents and the foreign ministers are not 
disentangled from the entire sample. I allocate a section on specifically mapping the three 
traditions in the statements of the presidents and the foreign ministers, which you can find in 
section 2.5 of the Theoretical Framework chapter. Separating the speeches of the president and 
foreign ministers is important as they show more variety in terms of fluctuations of the interplay 
of the three traditions and are not as monotonous as the general yearly findings where 
rationalism overwhelmingly dominates the two traditions. Moreover, these are the speeches 
used in the qualitative analysis chapter as they successfully meet the criteria I have set in 
choosing the statements to be analysed. 
The dominance of revolutionism in Khamenei dataset and rationalism in the UN dataset can be 
foreseen due to the context of the speeches. The Supreme Leader’s office of Khamenei is 
directly linked with revolutionist tradition, since it is through the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
that revolutionist discourses were strengthened and institutionalized in Iran’s political 
discourse. Khamenei’s role as the supreme leader was likewise a product of the Islamic 
Revolution with the aim of keeping the Revolution alive in the Islamic Republic. Revolutionary 
values and ideas reflecting the revolutionist tradition is expected to be evident in his speeches 
since the existence of his office is tied to the revolutionist discourses. Without the revolutionist 
nature of his speeches, his office may cease to exist as it is those discourses forged the creation 
of his position.  
As we have seen in the graph, there is room for manoeuvre in terms of the three traditions 
showing their interplay in Khamenei’s dataset, which is absent from the UN dataset. In the case 
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of the UN dataset, as was expected and shown in the graph above, rationalism strongly 
dominates over the two traditions. The very fact that most of these speeches were delivered at 
the United Nations by Iranian officials related to the UN implies that the statements must 
conform to the standards of the organization. After all, the United Nations was established in 
the spirit of the rationalist, or Groatian, tradition reflecting the five classic institutions of 
diplomacy, international law, balance of power, great power management and war, generating 
order in the international society. As such, it is not surprising that these speeches delivered at 
the United Nations, related to the issues debated within the Organization, have a strong 
rationalist dimension. This allows the rationalist tradition to dominate over realism and 
revolutionism but not eliminating the other two weaker ones. The phenomenon where the 
institution related to the speeches – the Office of the Supreme Leader for Khamenei and the 
United Nations for the rest of the documents – affect the dominance of a tradition as an 
inevitable characteristic of the data I have collected. What makes the effort of quantitatively 
looking at the dataset worthwhile is that there are fluctuations in the micro-level, defying the 
general trend of a specific tradition constantly dominating the others. Differences across the 
dominant traditions across the datasets and speakers, as well as the varying percentages of each 
of the traditions, are also interesting information to convey in this research. 
The dominant tradition in each of the dataset is one of the major differences the samples have. 
Mention has already been made that the Khamenei dataset is dominated by revolutionism whilst 
the UN dataset is dominated by realism due to their respective contexts. Values relating to the 
dominance of a tradition in the dataset are higher in the UN documents averaging at 3.44%, 
highlighting the sheer strength of the dominance of rationalism. The gap between rationalism, 
which is the dominant tradition, is strikingly wide and it seems as if rationalism is on a different 
level altogether. However, in the Khamenei dataset, although the dominance of revolutionism 
is strong, the values are significantly lower than in the UN dataset with revolutionism having 
an average of 2.07%. The gap between the dominant revolutionist tradition and the other two 
traditions in the Khamenei dataset is comparatively smaller from that in the UN dataset. 
Another significant difference between the two datasets relates to the low values of the 
respective dominant tradition. Whereas in the Khamenei dataset, the low points of the dominant 
revolutionist tradition meant that another tradition gained prevalence over revolutionism, the 
lows of rationalism in the UN dataset didn’t translate to a fluctuation in the dominance of the 
rationalist tradition. Consequently, there are more fluctuations in the Khamenei dataset as 
compared with the UN dataset. Such an observation may change once the speeches of the 
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presidents and foreign ministers are separated from the general sample. Additionally, apart from 
the fluctuations, the Khamenei dataset exhibits a change or a shift in the development of the 
three traditions. For instance, the dominant revolutionist tradition has become significantly 
weaker over time. By weaker, I mean the values of revolutionism are not so much higher than 
the tradition following it – the gap between revolutionism and rationalism from 2013 until 2015 
has been miniscule in comparison to the previous years. Realism in the Khamenei dataset has 
also undergone a noticeable change being much stronger before 2004 and significantly left 
behind since that point, while the opposite goes for rationalism, which was weak prior to 2004 
gaining strength afterwards. Such changes are non-existent in the UN dataset due to the strength 
of the rationalist dominance. The rationalist tradition has managed to trump the other two 
traditions that the consistency of the dominance has been maintained over time. 
4.2 Speeches of the Presidents and The Foreign Minister 
The development of the three traditions in yearly statements of the Iranian presidents and 
foreign minister at the United Nations General Assembly are significantly different from the 
overall UN dataset sample as the dominance of rationalism is not pronounced (see Graph 6 
below). Rather, the tendency of the revolutionist tradition to challenge rationalism is 
demonstrated, with revolutionism reaching peaks higher than rationalism with 4.99% in 2000 
and 4.88% in 2009. Both rationalism and revolutionism managed to dominate for an 
accumulated duration of eight years respectively indicating the potency of the two traditions to 
challenge each other. Revolutionism was more prevalent prior to Rouhani’s presidency in 2013, 
particularly during the Ahmadinejad period. Ahmadinejad’s Iranian foreign policy is a telling 
sign that that revolutionism may well have had a better hand as his government tended to 
prioritize making alliances by having a confrontational stance against the United States and its 
Western allies. Ahmadinejad had gained widespread popularity in the Arab world as he was a 
staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and the unity of the Ummah, the community of the 
faithful, referring to the Muslim community, which contributed greatly to the percentage values 
of the revolutionist tradition during his presidency. During the Khatami era, this was not the 
case as the moderate former president invested more on diplomacy and cooperation, thus 
allowing the rationalist tradition to dominate. 
From 2013 onwards though, the situation changes from revolutionist dominance to that where 
rationalism became the stable predominant tradition. This can be traced to Rouhani’s approach 
to foreign policy issues, which are very much like Khatami’s wherein cooperation, diplomacy 
and dialogue are encouraged to resolve issues. Realism in these statements is, in terms of 
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percentage values, almost identical to the entire UN dataset sample as it has the least percentage 
shares. Apart from 2004 and 2007, such a trend has been quite consistent. In Khamenei’s 
speeches (Graph 3), realism is the weakest tradition, sliding down to being the dormant tradition 
since 2004 onwards, which accounts for a partial similarity with the speeches of the presidents. 
The peaks of revolutionism in 2000 and 2009, its lows in 2014 and 2015 as well as the 
dominance of rationalism from 2001 to 2005 and 2013 onwards is examined more closely in 
the next sections as their fluctuations could reveal something useful for the qualitative chapter. 
 
Graph 5. Speeches of the Presidents and Foreign Minister at UNGA from 1997 to 2016 
In separating the annual speeches made by the presidents and a foreign minister at the United 
Nations General Assembly, we see that more fluctuations occur particularly in conjunction with 
rationalism and revolutionism suggesting an interplay throughout the duration of the sample. 
Since the presidents provide the argumentation and negotiate Iran’s foreign policy together with 
the foreign minister but with reference to the Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is responsible 
for the country’s policies, it is more likely that fluctuations occur in their speeches compared to 
the entire UN dataset sample. Revolutionism peaked and dominated on two occasions in the 
speeches at the UN General Assembly, in September 2000 with 4.99% and in September 2009 
with 4.98%, which is something not demonstrated by the UN dataset that shows the general 
yearly summary of the three traditions. This already shows how substantially different the 
speeches of the presidents are from the entire sample. Interestingly, not only did revolutionism 
manage to dominate the statements but also its peaks were much higher than rationalism at its 
respective peaks. Rationalism peaked and dominated in 1998, a year after Khatami’s election– 
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the advocate of the rationalist tradition. Realism was unable to dominate any speech despite its 
peak in September 2007 of 2.37%.  
The only true contender of rationalism in the annual statements of Iranian officials at the UN 
General Assembly seems to be the revolutionist tradition, due in part by the propagation of 
specific foreign policy agendas of the political figures. Such a tendency of revolutionism to 
affect the supposed dominance (from the results of the entire UN dataset sample) of rationalism 
in the speeches of the president shows a link with the Office of the Supreme Leader, which 
harbours a more revolutionist approach. Nevertheless, a similar occurrence after 2013 is 
exhibited in both the presidents and the supreme leader’s speeches, which is related to 
revolutionism. In Khamenei’s speeches, revolutionism’s dominance grew weaker while in the 
president’s speeches, it has been replaced by rationalism altogether. This implies, among others, 
how intertwined the Office of the Supreme Leader is with the Office of the Presidency.  
To provide a clearer picture of the similarities and differences between the annual statements 
of the presidents and foreign minister at the UN General Assembly from the UN dataset and 
the Khamenei dataset, I have segregated the Hajj speeches of Khamenei from the Khamenei 
dataset. This way, a more accurate comparison could be made as the speeches occur in quite a 
similar context. Whereas the president’s annual remarks at the UN General Assembly addresses 
the international political community, the Hajj speeches of Khamenei appeals to the 
international religious community. Both speeches have an international audience and are made 
each year marking international events – the difference being only in the nature of events, one 
political and one religious. These statements made at the UN and at the Hajj are analysed in the 
qualitative chapter. 
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Graph 6. Khamenei’s Hajj Statements from 1997 to 2016 
The Hajj pilgrimage is one of the most important occasions in Islam and in his capacity as the 
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khamenei delivers an annual speech aimed at 
the Muslim community. The graph shows the overall general predominance of revolutionism 
in his speeches from 1997 until 2015. Revolutionism peaks in 2002 with a 4.24% percentage 
share and in 2007 with 4.05%, which are quite remarkable as they go over 4%. This tradition 
enjoys a relatively high margin in comparison to the two traditions, demonstrating the strength 
of its dominance in most of the statements. Revolutionism is only overtaken in four occasions 
by realism: 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003. Realism is the next favoured tradition after 
revolutionism, peaking in 2004 with 2.86% share and in 2011 with a 2.7% share although both 
peaks were not able to surpass the shares of revolutionism. Nevertheless, the trend has not been 
consistent since after 2013 as rationalism has become significantly stronger leaving realism at 
the bottom. This tendency can be observed, although with a smaller margin of difference, in the 
years 2002, 2007 and 2009. In general, revolutionism plays a dominant role in the annual 
statements of Iran’s presidents and foreign minister at the UN as well as the supreme leader’s 
speeches. However, in the President’s speeches, rationalism usually follows revolutionism, 
which is unlike the supreme leader’s speeches where realism usually comes in second. In the 
years 2006 until 2012, both the annual speeches at the UN General Assembly and Khamenei’s 
Hajj speeches were dominated by revolutionism, indicating a possible similarity in terms of the 
content of the speeches, verifying the linkage between the Office of the President and the Office 
of the Supreme Leader. Rightly so as the foreign policy of the Ahmadinejad government 
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follows Khamenei’s agenda of uniting the Ummah, justifying Iran’s actions in its 
predominantly Shi’a neighbour, Iraq and intensifying confrontational rhetoric against the 
United States largely due to Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
Graph 7. Speeches of Foreign Ministry Officials 1997-2015 
In contrast to the president’s speeches, the speeches and remarks of the foreign ministry 
officials (Graph 7), including the foreign ministers, follows the results of the entire UN dataset 
where there is a distinct dominance of rationalism. This could be due to the fact that the foreign 
ministers were discussing issues set by the United Nations making them follow the language of 
rationalism. Their speeches are distinct from the annual speeches at the General Assembly made 
by the presidents and a foreign minister as they focus more on issues such as reporting on human 
rights situation in their country or speaking on behalf of their group, for instance Iran was head 
of the NAM and had to issue statements on behalf of the NAM. The annual General Assembly 
speeches, in contrast, are aimed at discussing Iran’s foreign policy agenda and the issues related 
to it, explaining the difference between the two. 
Apart from March 2015, when revolutionism had a peak percentage share of 6.46% dominating 
over the two traditions in the speeches of the foreign ministry officials, rationalism had 
maintained the top tradition in most of the speeches. Rationalism has had a strong dominance 
over the other two traditions as its percentage shares were significantly higher giving it a bigger 
lead throughout the entire time frame. Meanwhile, revolutionism and realism competed for 
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second place for most of the time with realism never managing to overtake the two other 
traditions. Developments such as rationalism’s strong dominance as well as the struggle of 
revolutionism and realism at the bottom are features likewise observed in the entire UN dataset. 
This also indicates that unlike the Office of the President, which is linked with the Office of the 
Supreme Leader, the Foreign Ministry is more independent in terms of the similarity of the 
traditions as they represent a stark rationalist tendency. In a way, instead of being pulled 
towards the supreme leader’s office, the administrative language of the United Nations seems 
to affect the statements of the foreign ministers.  
The three graphs in this section provide a snapshot into Iran’s foreign policy since 1997 as they 
reflect the three traditions in the statements of the three most prominent political figures 
responsible for Iran’s foreign policy: the supreme leader, the president and the foreign minister. 
In comparing them, we can see similarities as well as differences the speeches have in terms of 
prevalent traditions and fluctuations, implying how closely linked these positions are with each 
other. The next section discusses the two datasets separately from 1997 until 2015, comparing 
and contrasting the development of the three traditions within the respective dataset. The 
speeches are divided based on the presidential periods usually beginning in August of the 
election year (2001, 2009, 2013). 
4.3 A closer look at the Datasets 
In what follows, I present the accumulated monthly percentage values of the three traditions 
from the respective datasets, explaining why certain values are much higher in comparison to 
the overall values in the first section of this chapter. 
4.3.1 The Khamenei Dataset 
Khamenei’s speeches, as we have already seen above, have been mostly dominated by the 
revolutionist tradition and the same is true when we break down the graph into smaller periods. 
Yet, despite the prevalence of realism, the speeches are more complex and much more 
fluctuations can be observed at this level.  
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Graph 8. Khamenei Dataset Khatami Period 
In the Khatami period of Khamenei’s speeches (Graph 8), the revolutionist tradition was able 
to achieve an extraordinarily high peak of 8.86% in August 2000, while other more modest 
peaks can be observed such as in February 2001 with 5.69%, in May 2001 with 4.37%, in 
February 2002 with 4.24%, in September 2002 with 4.27% and lastly in July 2003 with 4.21%. 
Nevertheless, the revolutionist peak in July 2003 was surpassed by realism with its own 
extraordinary peak of 5.39%, an incident which can be only observed during this presidential 
period. Rationalism only managed to climb up to 3.22% at its peak in April 2002, which is 
relatively low in comparison to the peaks of the two traditions. The dominance of revolutionism 
is exhibited by its average for the entire Khatami presidency, reaching 2.3% with realism 
following at 1.98% while rationalism’s weakness is demonstrated by its average of 1.70%. 
These results coincide with a period in time when Iran was under scrutiny for its nuclear 
program, which was disclosed following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Moreover, 
due to the attacks, the United States had embarked on a ‘war of terror’ initiating military 
offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq – both countries being Iran’s immediate neighbours.  
The correlation of realism’s relative strength in the speeches of the Supreme Leader Khamenei 
is understandable especially considering the geopolitical context unfolding in the Middle East 
at that time. Iran was facing a direct military threat since the message of being branded as part 
of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and then attacking another member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ group, in this case 
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Iraq, is easily interpreted as a threat. The Bush administration also had plans for a regime change 
in Iran during that period, justifying the Iranian governments fears of a military intervention by 
the United States. Tehran needed to stress their readiness to fight for their country in case they 
were attacked next and Khamenei ensured that the nationalist rhetoric anchored in the realist 
tradition remained high to keep patriotism alive. Preparing the country for war implicates the 
use of terminologies stemming from the realist tradition as the main priority of the country is 
its survival. With such a threat perception, it is not unjustified for the West to become suspicious 
of Iran’s nuclear program since if Iran felt that its survival is at stake by being part of the ‘Axis 
of Evil’ with one of the members being attacked by the United States, it makes logical sense 
that Tehran would want to pursue better military capabilities by creating a nuclear weapon, 
hence the suspicion regarding its nuclear program. However, the percentage values of realism 
plummet after 2004, replaced by revolutionism. 
Graph 9. Khamenei Dataset, Ahmadinejad Period 
During the Ahmadinejad era (Graph 9), revolutionism continued to dominate, this time mostly 
with a higher margin than during the Khatami period. The prevalence of revolutionism is more 
pronounced as its dominance was overtaken only on rare occasions. For instance, rationalism 
toppled revolutionism in August 2010 with 2.22% while revolutionism only managed to reach 
1.39% but such instances are seldom during the entire presidency of Ahmadinejad. 
Revolutionism peaked in November 2012 with a 3.31% share and in December 2015 with 4.3% 
share. The peaks of both realism and rationalism coincide with the revolutionist peak in 
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December 2005, realism reaching 4.1% and rationalism 3.1%. In this presidential period, 
rationalism generally fared better than realism with a mean average of 1.45% and realism 
having 1.30% while revolutionism triumphed reaching an average of 2.06%. Yet realism still 
managed to dominate on two occasions, in February 2006 with 2.73% share and November 
2011 with 2.62%. Mention has already been made in the previous section that the reason 
accounting for the predominance of revolutionism is the fact that Saddam’s government had 
already been overthrown by the US military intervention. By 2004, revolutionist rhetoric had 
to be increased by Khamenei to appeal to the Iraqi Shi’ites to strengthen the alliance between 
Iran and Iraq using religion as their bond. Such revolutionist rhetoric of course legitimizes 
Iran’s foreign policy in Iraq, making it less questionable for the general Iranian population as if 
it is stressed that they share the same religion and perhaps history, then supporting Iraq and 
turning it into an ally makes it more acceptable for the Iranians. The prevalence of 
revolutionism, then, may have been used by Khamenei to legitimise his foreign policy agenda.  
The Ahmadinejad administration was also marked by Iran’s controversial nuclear program and 
sanctions combined with harsh political rhetoric towards the United States. Further US military 
intervention in the Middle East, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood of Iran, was 
contained within Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, the results reflect that the percentage shares of 
realism are much less as compared to the Khatami period, perhaps due to the geopolitical 
developments as well as the attention of Iran being focused on the nuclear program, going hand 
in hand with negotiations and talks. Diplomacy was underway during the Ahmadinejad era 
although without little success, leading to a deadlock in the nuclear talks and, later in his 
presidency, the devastating sanctions on Iran. Since diplomacy is linked with the rationalist 
tradition, it could be argued that it affected the relative strength of rationalism in the speeches 
of the Khatami era in comparison with the previous presidential period. Another issue linked to 
the rationalist tradition regarding the nuclear program that could have increased its values is the 
fact that under the rationalist institution of international law, being a signatory of the NPT, Iran 
had the right to access nuclear technology for civilian purposes. A point most likely reiterated 
by the supreme leader in his speeches contributing to the strength of rationalism. 
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Graph 10. Khamenei Dataset Rouhani Period 
In the Rouhani administration on Graph 10, Khamenei’s speeches have been likewise 
dominated by revolutionism. But unlike the previous presidential period, rationalism could 
overtake revolutionism in some years and dominate the three traditions. In fact, for three 
consecutive months, from March 2015 until May 2015, rationalism dominated, while a month 
before and after this period, rationalism had approximately equal percentage values as 
revolutionism. Perhaps this could be attributed to the supreme leader’s efforts in justifying 
Iran’s foreign policy of directly negotiating with the United States. It was the period prior to 
the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and he must have discussed 
the diplomatic endeavours of Iran to finally find a solution to the nuclear dilemma, and by doing 
so, the rationalist keywords are used. This in turn strengthens the case of rationalism giving it 
higher percentage values in the speeches as the tradition was utilized by Khamenei to legitimize 
Iran’s actions abroad to his audiences. After all, the main rationalist themes that could have 
seeped into Khamenei’s statements involve negotiations, diplomacy and especially Iran’s 
legitimate right to obtain a civilian nuclear program.  
Revolutionism reaches several peaks: 2.56% in January 2014, 2.68% in May 2014 and 2.51% 
in September 2015. Rationalism’s peak is observed in March 2014 with 2.32% and 2.21% in 
March 2015, wherein both cases rationalism was the dominant tradition. Realism barely 
managed to reach a decent peak although in February 2014 it went as high up as 1.67%. The 
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overall average of the three traditions indicate that revolutionism was relatively dominant with 
1.72% share, followed by rationalism with 1.56%, while realism struggled to gain only 1.18%. 
Considering the developments during the Rouhani period, the historic phone call with the 
United States, where Iranian and US Presidents talked directly for the first time since the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979, as well as the negotiation of the nuclear program and the lifting of 
sanctions, it can be argued that Khamenei’s speeches were made in a different political context 
as the two previous presidents. Just as the Ahmadinejad administration, the speeches during the 
Rouhani period had seen significantly weakened realist tradition and the dominance of 
revolutionism albeit a much stronger rationalist tradition, reflecting the political environment. 
4.3.2 The UN Dataset 
Unlike the Khamenei dataset in the previous section, at a closer look the UN dataset reveals a 
more consistent trend all throughout the three presidential periods as we will see below. This 
consistency points to the dominance of rationalism in most of the statements of the presidents 
and foreign ministry officials. 
 
Graph 11. UN Dataset Khatami Period 
Rationalism has been the most dominant tradition of the entire UN dataset as we have seen 
earlier. This has not changed looking at the data more closely. In fact, the dominance is more 
pronounced particularly during the Khatami period (Graph 11) perhaps due to the 
administration’s commitment to the rationalist tradition as the former president outlined a 
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foreign policy approach based on diplomacy, cooperation and dialogue. Apart from rare 
occasions where rationalism was experiencing a low, the data shows how prevalent the 
rationalist tradition is in the statements of Iran’s president and foreign ministry officials. 
Rationalism reached peaks exceeding 5% several times such as in March 1998 with 5.65%, in 
February 1999 with 5.44% and in November 2002 with 5.05%. The other two traditions 
managed only to reach peaks of 2.88% for realism in April 2002 and again 2.88% for 
revolutionism in November 1997. Nevertheless, their peaks were unable to overtake the 
dominance of rationalism. Such a profound dominance of rationalism is distinguished by the 
overall average of this time frame with 3.46% share while revolutionism had 1.19%, just a few 
points higher than realism at 1.15%.  
During the Khatami presidency, rationalism was practically unchallenged and the competition 
can be observed only between the realist and revolutionist tradition. This success of rationalism 
in the statements can be attributed firstly to the language used by the officials that follow the 
regulations of the United Nations as a rationalist institution as the themes discussed are largely 
diplomatic international issues. Secondly, the Khatami government was already known to be 
moderate and an advocate of cooperation, dialogue and negotiations, whose terminologies can 
be traced from the rationalist tradition, strengthening its dominance throughout the entire period 
of his presidency. It was also in Khatami’s watch when certain diplomatic successes were 
achieved as Iran opened itself to the world and attempted to have a rapprochement with the 
West and its neighbours. The Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), for instance, was 
hosted in Tehran for the very first time in 1997 indicating Iran’s efforts to diplomatically re-
establish and strengthen ties with the countries of the region, a rationalist feat. Due to Khatami’s 
foreign policy of easing tensions and achieve a certain degree of rapprochement with the United 
States, Madelaine Albright, the former US Secretary of State reciprocated Khatami’s efforts by 
issuing an official apology for American historical interference in the coup of 1953. Through a 
CIA operation called ‘Operation Ajax’, the United States together with some local groups 
within Iran, the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was 
overthrown. Mossadegh was a stark nationalist who nationalized Iran’s oil much to the dismay 
of the West. The apology issued by Albright highlighted the success of the Khatami 
governments moderate and conciliatory approach to Iran’s foreign policy. However, due to the 
terrorist attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001, the efforts were undermined as the Bush 
administration went on an offensive and labelled Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. 
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Graph 12. UN Dataset Ahmadinejad Period 
During the Ahmadinejad period on Graph 12, the UN dataset exhibits similarities to the 
previous presidential era as rationalism maintains its dominance over the other two traditions 
in the speeches. Still, unlike the time of Khatami administration, rationalism is challenged in 
the Ahmadinejad period on several occasions such as in May 2006 when revolutionism reached 
2.67% while rationalism had 1.59%. A month later, realism dominated at its peak with 3.47% 
while rationalism was at 2.75%. Two other occurrences show a weak dominance of 
revolutionism: in August 2006 where its shares reached 1.96% with rationalism having 1.78% 
and in September 2009 where revolutionism was at 1.86% while rationalism had 1.61%. In 
other cases, rationalism’s dominance was challenged as another tradition’s percentage shares 
came very close to the values rationalism had. Examples include September 2005 with 
revolutionism getting to 2.99% while rationalism was at 3.7%, April 2007 where realism 
reached 3.67% and rationalism was at 3.78%, in April 2009 rationalism had 3.01% and 
revolutionism slightly dominated the month having 3.06% and a month later realism reaches 
3.32% while rationalism had 4.20%. The same pattern is seen in December 2009 where realism 
was at 3.36% and rationalism had 4.48% and in August 2012, we can see that realism manages 
to get close to rationalism with 2% while rationalism had 2.02%. But despite these instances, 
rationalism had a strong dominance and at times, it enjoyed high margins from the other two 
traditions such as in August 2005 when rationalism was way ahead at 3.03% and the other two 
were below 1%, in May 2007 when rationalism hit an all-time high of 6.55% while 
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revolutionism had 1.08% and realism just 0.8% and lastly in April 2011 when rationalism was 
at 4% and revolutionism had 1.28% and realism struggled at 0.94%. These occurrences where 
rationalism’s dominance was marked by having distinguishably high values from the other two 
traditions were more common in the Khatami period and although rationalism is still dominant 
in the Ahmadinejad period, the challengers were more able to get closer to the top unlike in the 
previous presidential era. 
These fluctuations in the Ahmadinejad period represent how different his foreign policy 
approach is in comparison to his predecessor. It does not take wild imagination to conclude that 
with such confrontative rhetoric, complicated debates and issues questioning Iran’s political 
behaviour were brought up in the United Nations. For instance, following the controversial 
Iranian presidential elections in 2009 wherein the government responded through a violent 
crackdown on the protesters who took to the streets claiming that there had been an election 
fraud, the issue of human rights may have been raised at the United Nations wherein the official 
delegation of Iran had to respond to. The mere discussion of human rights could potentially 
raise the values of revolutionism and rationalism, accounting for more fluctuations during the 
Ahmadinejad era. The nuclear program of Iran is yet another issue that prompts much debates 
within the United Nations thereby affecting the development of the three traditions. Thus, the 
three traditions at varying degrees reached peaks during the Ahmadinejad period which are 
inconceivable in the other presidential eras. Realism reached several peaks above 3% during 
the Ahmadinejad period. In June 2006, it reached 3.47%, in April 2007 it reached 3.67%, in 
May 2009 with 3.32% and in December 2009 at 3.36%. Revolutionism reached a peak above 
3% only in April 2009 with 3.06%, this was before the disputed presidential elections in Iran. 
The overall average of the three traditions reflect the dominance of rationalism with an average 
of 3.14% while realism followed with 1.29% but was not far off from revolutionism having 
1.28%. The results are like in the Khatami administration with rationalism leading in the 
speeches albeit the values of the other two traditions were slightly higher. 
UN dataset speeches in the Rouhani era (Graph 13), like the previous presidential periods, 
exhibit the dominance of rationalism, which has been quite consistent throughout the entire 
research time frame. In this particular period, we see similar patterns to the Khatami’s 
presidency where rationalism remains unchallenged and starkly dominant. Rationalism reached 
an extraordinary peak of 6.03% of shares in February 2015 and 5.36% in August 2015, 
indicating that the period surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the 
rationalist tradition was prevalent in Iran’s foreign policy as the nuclear program was 
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negotiated. Realism and rationalism barely made it to 3% with realism peaking at 2.57% in 
August 2014 and 2.26% in April 2015 while revolutionism reached up to 2.78% in March 2015 
and only 2.29% in November 2015. In the time covered in the graph, we can observe only one 
instance where two traditions came close to each other, that of revolutionism at its peak in 
March 2015 with 2.78% getting close to rationalism with 2.99%. For this reason, such a pattern 
with a strong dominance of rationalism is likened to the Khatami era since rationalism enjoys 
a higher margin in terms of percentage values all throughout the period. The average of each of 
the traditions though, are more like the Ahmadinejad period as the values of the non-dominant 
traditions were slightly higher than at the time of Khatami’s administration. Rationalism had a 
remarkable average of 5.51% share, which is much higher than the other two periods, while 
revolutionism had 1.36% and realism managing 1.24%. Rouhani’s era signified, as Khatami’s 
presidency did, Iran’s rationalist approach to foreign policy accounting for the consistent 
dominance of the tradition. With the principles of cooperation, dialogue and diplomacy being 
the imperative of Rouhani’s policies, it is not surprising that his officials at the United Nations 
would reflect the same rationalist values. 
 
Graph 13. UN Dataset Rouhani Period 
4.4 Conclusion 
We have seen that more fluctuations exist in the speeches of Khamenei as opposed to the UN 
dataset. The dominance of a tradition in Khamenei’s speeches seem to correlate with 
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geopolitical events as we have seen in the description of the years 2002 and 2003 above. As the 
overall graph at the beginning of this chapter has demonstrated, Khamenei’s speeches are 
largely dominated by revolutionism while the UN dataset is dominated by rationalism. By 
looking at geopolitical events and taking snapshots of the speeches, certain differences can be 
concluded. Since Iran was named a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and a U.S. military 
intervention was underway in the neighbouring Iraq, it is plausible to assume that such a 
disposition is correlated with the rise of realism as a dominant tradition in those two years in 
Khamenei’s statements. However, since the same fluctuation from the norm cannot be observed 
in the UN dataset, it can be assumed that this is more likely to be caused by institutional factors 
such as the affiliation of the speakers with the UN. As we know, UN’s very existence is founded 
in the spirit of the rationalist tradition and for this reason, it is likely that those affiliated with it 
must adhere to the normative framework of the institution in their speeches. 
To verify these assumptions, we must turn to the qualitative phase to uncover whether certain 
argumentation can be linked to either geopolitical or institutional factors. Apart from 
argumentations, the qualitative phase aims to identify the themes and discourses the 
argumentations are attached to allowing certain traditions to prevail in specific periods. 
Pinpointing these can show us how certain traditions are negotiated and in what context, 
framing and forming Iran’s foreign policy at different time periods. Such detailed outcomes 
taking the very statements and discussions of Iranian statesmen into consideration to provide 
us with the full picture of Iran’s foreign policy cannot possibly be delivered by the quantitative 
phase alone, which is why it is vital to have a closer reading of the documents in order to step 
away from surface generalizations that the quantitative phase offers.  
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5 Khamenei’s Foreign Policy Discourse 
At first glance, Khamenei’s foreign policy statements at the Hajj seem to be comprised of 
entirely revolutionist discourse. He often speaks of unifying the Ummah, the community of the 
faithful, referring to the Islamic community. To attract audience and potential followers, he 
points to the actions of the United States and the West as the cause of all the suffering and the 
problems in the Muslim world. He presents such issues as a certainty and explicitly describes 
the actions of the United States and the West to be evil and immoral. Hegemony, domination 
and exploitation are only some of the terms he attaches to these evil antagonists and enemies of 
the Islamic world. In contrast, Islam and Iran are depicted in a positive light bestowing heroic 
qualities to convince the audience that the Ummah can do something about the problems in the 
Islamic world caused by the enemy if they are to unite. It is a dichotomy between good and evil, 
a very revolutionist strategy to bring about a missionary war that will establish justice. 
However, as argued earlier, it is easy to slip from the revolutionist tradition into the realist one 
by aiming for the extreme revolutionist vision of winning the missionary war and establishing 
an empire through Islamic cosmopolitanism. In many ways, Khamenei speaks of this ‘empire’ 
in the form of restoring the ‘Islamic Civilization’, requiring the unity of the Islamic Ummah. 
This demonstrates that the demonization of the United States and the West is ultimately realist 
in conception, manifesting the revolutionist-realist axis of Khamenei’s foreign policy discourse. 
Rationalism though, is not entirely cut out of his statements as it is a vital component in 
showcasing Iran’s potential to lead the Islamic world in Khamenei’s campaign against the 
United States and the West. Showcasing Iran’s rationalist dimension creates a positive image 
less threatening to the states in the Islamic world since rationalism dictates adherence to the 
rules and institutions of the international society. Even at the level of discourses, as we explore 
below, the main argument: ‘Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with 
a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist’ can already be traced.  
For the Muslim community, the Hajj is one of the most essential of all gatherings as it brings 
together Muslims of all sects from across the globe, making it an important platform for 
Khamenei to express his views as the Supreme Leader (Vali-ye Faqih) or Guardian Jurist. The 
creation of Khamenei’s position, was one of the key features of the Islamic Republic that 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 
consequently subduing the state to religion. The supreme leader was conceived to be 
responsible for guarding and protecting the country ‘with a divine mandate’ drawing on 
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Islam.263 Whilst Khomeini focused on Iran, as we see here in this chapter, Khamenei’s speeches 
reflect his assumed guardianship of the Islamic world in its entirety even though he belongs to 
the minority Shi’a sect and is not considered to be an official leader of Islam outside Iran. 
Regardless of the broadening of his guardianship role to include all Muslim countries with his 
insistence on unity and solidarity, Khamenei has maintained and propagated the worldview of 
his predecessor since it has the potential to attract other Muslim countries to his cause. To this 
end one historical factor joins the Muslim world – the experience of Western imperialism. For 
Khomeini Islam is the bastion against imperialism and he identified ‘imperialism and Western 
materialism with the figure of Satan – and the greatest exponent of capitalism, the United States 
being accorded the title of ‘Great Satan’.264 Such narratives form the very foundation of Iran’s 
Islamic revolution and has been increasingly spread in the Islamic world through the statements 
of Khamenei bestowing on it a revolutionist twist as he attempts to engage other Muslim states.  
But beneath the revolutionist surface of Khamenei’s speeches are strong realist currents, which 
I discuss below. 
One of the key points of this chapter is to demonstrate how revolutionism with its narratives 
and discourses is entangled with the realist tradition generating arguments guiding Iran’s 
foreign policy. It supplements the quantitative data, exhibiting the dominance of revolutionism 
with realism not far behind. Furthermore, despite the dormancy of the rationalist tradition, its 
argumentations are still visible and intertwined with both realist and revolutionist traditions in 
Khamenei’s statements. At one level, discourses rooted in revolutionism such as solidarity, 
monotheism and universal moral values drawn from Islam are regularly expressed indicating 
the worldview of a unified whole albeit within the confines of the Islamic world. Islam is the 
binding element transcending nation-state boundaries where individual Muslims can identify 
with regardless of their sect in an Islamic cosmopolitanism viable through the revolutionist 
tradition. On another level, this revolutionist vision is defined against Western imperialism, 
bestowing a realist dimension to it as Khamenei elaborates on the capacity of this unified 
religious whole, subsequently referring to it as one Islamic nation, to challenge the materialist 
West. The nature of this challenge, despite its realist aspect and rationalist elements, stems from 
the revolutionist tradition and for the revolutionists, the world is divided into binary 
oppositions. With the faithful, or liberators, in one camp – the Islamic camp – and the heretics, 
or oppressors, in the other, the ideological background of the conflict comes to the fore, thus 
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264 Ibid., 197 
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justifying Iran’s foreign policy within the Islamic world as propagated by Khamenei. What is 
surprising is that despite the emphasis on revolutionism, rationalism still plays a role though it 
is much less pronounced. 
The chapter is arranged based on the main themes of Khamenei’s annual Hajj statements and I 
discuss the three traditions and their respective institutions within each of the themes. I point 
out the arguments and discourses that relate directly to the traditions and institutions, labelling 
them accordingly while elaborating on the policies they constitute. After all, rationalism is the 
means to which Iran can achieve its essentially realist, and to an extent revolutionist, goals. 
5.1 The West versus Islam: the realist pretext for revolutionism 
To advocate the starkly revolutionist notion of unity of the Islamic world to achieve Islamic 
cosmopolitanism, we should understand the issues plaguing the Islamic world as described by 
Khamenei in his annual Hajj statements. Most of these issues involve the encroachment of the 
West on Islamic countries taking on many forms from plunder to violence, which are tied to the 
realist principle of expediency and dominance from the side of the powerful. Since the realist 
tradition is essentially devoid of morality regarding the actions of the powerful on the weaker 
state and highly favours expediency and dominance, it makes sense to identify the issues of the 
revolutionist-rooted Islamic world to be caused by the materialistic West embedded in the 
realist tradition creating the binary opposition necessary to contextualize Iran’s foreign policy. 
This is a view strongly shared by former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. To challenge the 
immoral realist camp of the West, the revolutionist moral Islamic world must be consolidated 
with the leadership of Iran. A moral revolutionist vision can mobilize resources to fight an 
ideological battle with realist intentions of conquering the enemy and establishing an Islamic 
cosmopolitan civilization akin to an empire. Hence, the problems caused by the West solidifies 
the reasoning for the pursuit of a united Islamic whole, which simultaneously strengthens the 
material capacity of the Islamic community to confront the United States and its allies.  
Another way of interpreting this realist dimension is that Iran’s capabilities as a nation-state 
alone are not sufficient to challenge the West and it therefore uses Islam to gain more allies and 
consolidate power through advocating Islamic unity making Khamenei’s statements drastically 
lean towards the revolutionist tradition. To achieve the goal of uniting the Islamic world behind 
Iran, the suffering inflicted by the West upon the other Islamic countries becomes a necessary 
factor as it taps into the discourse of resentment, eliciting strong emotions such as anger and 
frustration stemming from historical grievances from the Muslims. The two opposing camps of 
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the faithful and heretics then is respectively defined to be the Islamic World led by Iran and the 
West led by the United States, each country tied to a realist cause of a nation-state but at the 
same time transcending their own territorial boundaries forming a greater whole. Thus, the anti-
imperialist discourses come into play with its argumentations, which I discuss below. The next 
sections elaborate on this interplay of revolutionism and realism through the different 
discourses as well as the core messages of Khamenei’s statements representing his worldview 
that can be traced in Iran’s foreign policy. In each segment, I introduce the arguments 
underlined by Khamenei in spreading his message targeting imperialism adhering to the 
principles and institutions of the realist tradition. Then, I go on to discuss the corresponding 
revolutionist discourses meant to provide the anti-imperialist antidote to the sufferings 
experienced by the Islamic countries. It is important to remember that although Khamenei 
frequently mentions ‘the West’, he specifically means the United States or ‘the Great Satan’ 
and that most of the argumentation draws on the discourse of resentment, which is strongly 
anchored in the anti-imperialist narrative. At the end of this chapter, I highlight the instances 
wherein rationalism plays a role in Khamenei’s statements proving that the supreme leader 
cannot entirely disentangle his political worldview from the rationalist currents embedded in 
the international society. 
5.1.1 Hegemony of the West: The Evil realists 
Powerful countries, particularly the United States, in the international system are delegated a 
prominent role in the Hajj statements of Khamenei as he attempts to draw on their actions to 
define the importance of Islam and unity of the Muslims with Iran as the muse. According to 
Khamenei, Iran’s experiences – from eliminating U.S. influence on the government to fighting 
imperialism – are meant to provide inspiration to other Muslim countries being the first Islamic 
state established through an Islamic Revolution. Iran’s supreme leader’s message to the entire 
Muslim world is simple: follow us. He boasts of Iran’s multifaceted liberation and 
independence from the West, claiming that the country has rid itself of tyranny, suffering, 
oppression and materialism since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Hence, those states 
experiencing the pain inflicted by the imperialist powers have no other choice but to follow 
Iran’s footsteps on the path to freedom and salvation through Islam.265 This imparts the foreign 
                                                 
265 Ali Khamenei, “Imam Khamene'i 's message on the occasion of Hajj (1997),” accessed May 23, 2015, 
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policy goal of Iran as Khamenei speaks to the whole Islamic world during the Hajj. Tehran 
wants to build alliances at the very least, in the realist sense, and at the very best, in a 
revolutionist sense, lead the Islamic Ummah once unity has been attained. While the most 
favourable scenario lies on the horizon, attention is mainly centred on issues plaguing the 
Islamic world at present, which are caused by the West and its imperialistic aims victimising 
Muslim countries and its people, in hopes of getting a step closer to the best scenario.266 
Coercion is a standard norm in the realist tradition and coercive diplomacy is a significant 
feature of powerful countries since negotiation is based on material capabilities and, often, is 
largely on unequal terms resulting in weaker states to submit to the wishes of the powerful one. 
Using Iran’s previous experience during the Pahlavi monarchy, Khamenei points out that many 
countries in the Islamic world are subservient to imperialist powers.267 The imperialists and 
colonizers have plundered the resources of Muslim states to satisfy their own interests referring 
to the realist balance of power institution.268 As such, the U.S. military intervention in Iraq was 
meant to establish American dominance in the region by controlling the oil and conspiring 
against Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.269 This foreign intervention exhibits sheer disregard for 
international law, corresponding to the realist understanding of the institution of international 
law – an action which only the most powerful in the international system could afford. 
Instigating wars in the Middle East has likewise triggered tragic experiences for the Islamic 
world, giving way to sectarianism and extremism, a purely realist institution exercised by the 
imperialist powers.270 The most influential element of Western domination, however, is not 
restricted to military capabilities and political power as it involves cultural and ideological 
aspects such as materialism and capitalism, which are corrosive to Islamic countries in terms 
of destroying religious spiritual values.271 Nevertheless, taking into account the capabilities and 
greed of the imperialist powers, particularly the United States, the Islamic world must anticipate 
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further attacks of the West, both material and ideological, to curb the progress of Islamic 
countries, especially the spreading of Islamic awakening.272  
Due to the hegemony of the United States, the Great Satan, Muslim countries have been 
suffering, solidifying the position of the U.S. as the enemy in the speeches of Khamenei. 
Primarily, nonetheless, such enmity is directed towards Iran since the establishment of an 
Islamic Republic in Tehran as the American regime lost all influence on the government.273 But 
despite the U.S. enmity against the Islamic Republic, Khamenei stresses that Iran was able to 
remain independent and simultaneously progress, showcasing the country’s invaluable 
achievement made possible by marrying Islam with the state apparatus.274 By harnessing the 
power of Islam, Khomeini was able to liberate Iran from the grip of the United States and the 
West, enabling the country to achieve ultimate freedom and so the rest of the Islamic world 
must follow his example and turn to Islam as a way to freedom from Western domination to 
end the suffering and pain of the Muslims.275 
By painting such a dire picture of the United States and the West as being driven by pure 
national interest with little regard for other countries in the system, the supreme leader wants to 
imply the wrongness of their behaviour. It shows that he is aware that such acts are based on 
the selfish interest of the great powers, which is interpreted in realist terms as he points out the 
evils of imperialism. This can only be possible if he holds an alternative view of international 
affairs, suggesting the criticism comes from his belief that the situation could be better, perhaps 
in a rationalist understanding of the world where the weaker states are not dominated by the 
powerful ones and their resources are not plundered leaving them to suffer. Sovereignty of a 
weaker country, meaning freedom from the domination of a powerful state, indirectly resonates 
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in Khamenei’s message, which is a vital norm in the modern international society of sovereign 
nation-states subscribing to the rationalist tradition. To prove his point of a weak country being 
able to be independent and gain their own sovereignty back from foreign influences, he 
relentlessly refers to Iran as an example. 
5.1.2 The Power of the Islamic Revolution and sovereignty 
Islam as a tool to take back sovereignty from the hands of a foreign power like in Iran is an 
argument Khamenei repeats over time. Internal meddling of the United States in Iran’s political 
affairs in the period preceding the Islamic Revolution of 1979 had resulted in corruption, 
suppression, violence and the plundering of Iran’s wealth and Khamenei points this out as a 
common ground with other Muslim countries suffering from the same problems.276 The 
situation in Iran during the Pahlavi monarchy was everything Islamic teachings rejects, thereby 
making it a potent force for regime change, a force that Ayatollah Khomeini had employed in 
establishing an Islamic Republic. Islam was then placed at the apex of political power, 
transferring sovereignty from man to God and the position of the Supreme Leader was created 
to guard this new order. What made Islam so powerful was the universal moral principles it 
upheld such as justice, freedom from oppression and salvation, appealing to the people as these 
values were a compelling force against the West allegedly responsible for all the problems in 
the Islamic world. By discussing Islam and its potential to change the political situation in a 
country, Khamenei expects the Muslims to find inspiration in Islam to bring about regime 
change in their own countries and integrate religion into politics just as in Iran with one major 
difference – that he remains the supreme leader. He makes no mention of what happens once 
such a move is taken and a country becomes an Islamic Republic, but it is safe to assume based 
on current events that he would not encourage the establishment of a multiplicity of supreme 
leaders in such a unified Islamic whole. In any case, expanding the sovereignty of God to other 
Muslim countries effectively transforms them into a unified ‘Islamic nation’, exhibiting 
revolutionist tendencies as the idea of transcending the nation-state come into play. This of 
course entails that under the pretext of monotheism, the one God entrusts the task of 
guardianship to just one supreme leader, embodied in his position. Despite the questionable 
feasibility of realizing such a goal, traces of revolutionism are evident with Islam being the 
foundation of the envisioned ‘great Islamic Ummah’, a point I tackle below. Hence, the 
seemingly immoral hegemonic powers led by the United States can only be challenged by 
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embracing Islam and universal moral principles harboured in the revolutionist tradition aimed 
at unifying the Islamic Ummah. Interestingly, he is claiming that a rationalist norm such as 
sovereignty can be put in place by using a revolutionist instrument such as religion, in this case 
Islam, for which he provides extensive supporting arguments to prove it as an effective tool. 
A comprehensive account on the Islamic teachings and values Khamenei insists could save 
other Islamic countries suffering from the United States and the West, leading them to a path 
of progress and development, was coincidentally discussed less than three weeks after Bush’s 
infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in 2002:  
Islam is a religion of life with dignity and liberty, it is a religion of ‘logic and 
rationalism…unity, fraternity and world peace…realism…innovations and new 
ideas…sacrifice and tolerance…civility, science and development…of Jihad…dignity, 
power and sovereignty…is the guardian of human rights and nobility…guarantees and 
protects ethical precepts and moral decency…is the staunch supporter of peace and 
security’.277 
Such a profound statement on Islam, to protect the sanctity of Islam as a religion being a force 
of good, comes at a time when the suspects of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 were 
proven to be Muslim extremists, which was immediately followed by Bush’s statement 
declaring a ‘war on terror’. Reference to Islam as the ultimate impetus for removing corruption, 
overcoming plots of enemies (the United States) and surviving hostilities in addition to 
achieving development and progress sounds like a superhero solution in achieving sovereignty 
within a state.278 Khamenei, however, skips the valuable rationalist benefit of using religion and 
goes a step further in inviting all of mankind to Islam, momentarily seeming to turn Islamic 
principles and values to fit into global cosmopolitanism, a remarkable feature of the 
development of the institution of international law in the revolutionist tradition. Arguing that 
ethics and morality are collapsing in the West, Khamenei puts Islam forward as the sole path to 
salvation for all mankind inviting ‘each and every member of the human races’.279 People in 
Western societies are said to be trapped in materialism and lust for power and are in ‘dire need’ 
of Islam, as it is the only ideology that can deliver ‘justice and freedom long-aspired by the 
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free-minded people of the world’.280 Such sentiments in the supreme leader’s statements are 
brief, nonetheless, and are mostly targeted towards demonizing the West as much as glorifying 
Islam in the eyes of the Islamic world and those sympathetic to Islam due to disappointment 
with the West. The core message though, lies on how Iran was transformed by Islam turning it 
into a sovereign state free from foreign intervention, a very rationalist arrangement 
underpinning the respect for the plurality of states in international society. Thus, Iran’s 
successes must be elaborated to convince the Islamic world and Khamenei wastes no time in 
discussing Iran’s achievements.  
5.2 Follow Iran – the champion of self-sovereignty and rationalism 
Iran’s achievements regarding completely liberating itself from the Great Satan, surviving 
decades of hardships including the eight-year-war with Iraq as well as the sanctions regime 
imposed on Iran, holding the United States into account, enjoy a great deal of repetition for 
good reasons. By being able to free itself from foreign influence, Khamenei wants to prove Iran 
could gain its sovereignty back from the United States – a success story of using Islam to gain 
freedom from domination. But the rationalist ideal stops there as he refers to the independent 
Iran, surviving a long war with Iraq. Footprints of the realist tradition make itself visible in such 
statements through an elaboration of the actions of the West and Iran’s reaction to it. War as a 
realist institution is invoked in Khamenei’s recollection of the events with the United States 
harbouring imperialist intentions, prompting Washington to militarily support Saddam during 
the eight-year-war by providing him with all sorts of weapons. Iran’s engagement in this realist 
institution can be seen in the reality of Iran fighting back and eventually ending the war through 
a ceasefire. Yet despite the inherently realist nature of the war with Iraq, Khamenei calls the 
ceasefire a victory attributing Iran’s success to Islam and combines it with the doctrine of 
martyrdom as known in the Shi’a tradition, adding a revolutionist element to it. After the war, 
the United States placed consecutive sanctions on Iran for various reasons, indicating the 
function of the realist institution of diplomacy where powerful states use coercion, including 
economic sanctions to achieve certain goals. Iran did not yield to the economic pressures for 
decades while sanctions added up particularly after the disclosure of Iran’s nuclear program, 
showing independence, the resistance to the sanctions system as well as self-sufficiency, on the 
part of Tehran, to survive marking the Islamic Republic’s commitment to the realist tradition. 
Khamenei proudly proclaims this resistance underlining how Iran could reconstruct itself after 
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the war and stand up against all the mounting pressures much to the dismay of Washington until 
finally negotiating directly and reaching a deal with the West in 2015.281 Such a negotiation 
though, is rationalist in perception as Iran as a sovereign nation-state sat on the same table to 
diplomatically find a solution to exercise their right to have a nuclear facility for civilian 
purposes. 
The importance of emphasizing Iran’s strength as a sovereign country is paramount to the goal 
of marketing Iran’s Islamic revolution for purposes of either gaining allies or being propelled 
to the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. The goal of gaining allies could be translated in all 
three traditions. The realist interpretation means forming a front to stop the imperialist threat, 
the rationalist one could mean he wants further cooperation and simply to be part of the regional 
international society predominated by Arab countries who dislike Iran or he wants to form an 
alliance in the revolutionist sense of the word. If it is a revolutionist interpretation of finding 
allies, then Khamenei must be after the creation of a front to combat the evil West. For that, the 
supreme leader needs to show how strong his country is to lead this battle.  
Strength, stability, confidence and perfection are some of the key words Khamenei uses to 
describe Iran. His discussion of Iran’s strength is always in relation to all the pressures and 
hostilities of the powerful West drawing on a rich source of realist principles since they involve 
manoeuvres that can be attributed to the realist tradition such as coercion in form of economic 
sanctions, psychological warfare and false propaganda. In all these scenarios, Iran has engaged 
itself in retaliation to ensure the survival of the Islamic regime, reiterating the presence of the 
realist tradition in Iran’s foreign policy.282 As a matter of fact, at the height of the nuclear crisis, 
Khamenei boasted about nuclear know-how and that such technology is within their reach 
referring to Iran’s capabilities as if playing a game of chicken with the United States.283 This 
achievement, alongside other scientific and technological developments within Iran are very 
much publicized as hallmarks of the success of Islam in Iran. 284 It is symbolic since it exhibits 
the increase in Iran’s aggregate capabilities, which in turn emphasizes the country’s self-
sufficiency and determination to survive and prosper in this hostile international system 
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dominated by great powers conveying a purely realist approach. These arguments strengthen 
Khamenei’s insistence on Iran’s potential to lead the Islamic Ummah as he stresses:  
‘Iran has shown its mettle in administering the affairs of a large country. In addition, it 
has proved its capability in mobilizing the masses of the people, in foreseeing and 
confronting great events and in its successful presence in the international scene. The 
Islamic republic has also shown its competence and genius in the areas of construction 
and reconstruction, despite many hostile international confrontations and without 
receiving any political or economic assistance from others’.285 
Such strength and progress is often conflated with the ideology of Islam, particularly Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s teachings, displaying a harmonious interplay of realism with revolutionism.286 
Islam effectively is described as the source of power for Iran without which the country would 
not have succeeded in its endeavours. The power of religion for Iran is so meaningful to a point 
where Khamenei insists it was the ‘establishment of the glorious Islamic system which turned 
Iran into a strong fortress for the idea of Islamic rule and civilization’, once again presenting 
Iran’s Islamic Republic as the leader of the Islamic world.287 He says Iran is the ideal Islamic 
nation that should be expanded to include other Muslim countries – a sheer display of the 
interaction of realism and revolutionism. Hence, Iran’s noble example must then be followed 
since it is the only path to prosperity and progress, as Khamenei puts it: ‘There is no other path 
of prosperity for other nations except this one’, resembling the message of Islam that there is 
no other God, except Allah.288 The supreme leader is direct in saying the valuable experiences 
of Iran set ‘very good examples for others to follow’, straightforwardly conveying the main 
message of: follow us.289 Iran is determined to establish ‘an ideal Islamic society’ by ‘holding 
up the flag of Islam as the religion of noble teachings, enlightenment, salvation and liberty’ 
grooming Iran for a position of leadership within the Islamic community.290 There are rarely 
any speeches that do not mention Iran as the prime example of the ideal ‘Islamic state’, although 
with the rise of Islamic militancy in the form of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
also known as Daesh, who are also competing for leadership, the phrase may need to be 
reconsidered for its appropriateness. 
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5.2.1 Iran’s Democracy and Diplomacy 
For Iran to become the true ideal leader worthy of being followed by other countries, it must 
first establish ties with its neighbours, requiring moderate policies and demonstrating that the 
country can offer a system better than the demonized West. At this point, Khamenei introduces 
the concept of an Islamic democracy as exemplified by Iran as well as diplomacy to establish 
friendly relations with its neighbours and the wider Muslim world. This shifts the arrangement 
of the traditions to one constituted by an intertwining of rationalism and revolutionism instead 
of the realist-revolutionist interplay discussed so far. 
The value of Iran’s sovereignty and independence from the West as a nation state is frequently 
mentioned in the Hajj speeches of Khamenei, which is of course tied to Islam. After all, Iran is 
an Islamic Republic and its present state would not have been achieved without the religion. 
The republic aspect is then securely tied to elections as a vital part of a religious democracy, 
where the people vote freely. The supreme leader often talks about the elections in Iran and in 
other countries trying to rebuild themselves such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunisia, and Syria.291 He 
stresses that in Iran, elections determine the government and ‘a sovereign state as that of the 
Islamic republic’, is ‘a unique model of the strongest ties between the people and their 
government, whose constitution, every legal organ and establishment have been decided on free 
will and the free election of its people’.292 The explicit description of a system agreeable to the 
international society, i.e. a democratic arrangement where citizens have the right to choose their 
leaders, aims to boost Iran’s appeal in the region. It shows Iran’s government is legitimate as 
the people have chosen their leaders and that it is modern – admirable qualities that should be 
followed and respected. 
Iran’s diplomatic moves have also been stressed by the supreme leader to showcase Iran’s 
friendly face and downplay the threat it poses to the region. He aims to establish strong relations 
with its neighbours and offset the memory of the past where Iran went on an offensive in 
exporting the revolution. Iran is a diplomatic nation, which can be as good for the Middle East 
states as the United States and thus can be trusted is his main message. Khamenei reminded the 
Muslims prior to the ‘war on terror’ that the Islamic Republic of Iran ‘has never attacked another 
country’ – a very rationalist claim.293 He wanted to stress that Iran is a well-behaved actor in 
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international society, following the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in hopes of 
dampening the mistrust of its neighbours. The supreme leader spoke at a time when a moderate 
government was in place, with former President Mohammad Khatami introducing the 
‘Dialogue among Civilizations’, which became increasingly popular worldwide. This period 
reflects the most rationalist moment of Khamenei’s speeches where he discussed its aim of 
establishing and fostering friendly foreign relations.  
‘The Islamic Republic has proved that it is not after creating tensions in his relations 
with other countries, and does advocate the sorts of relations in his foreign policies that 
are based on the three principles of dignity, wisdom and expediency, it has shown that 
its main guidelines and criteria for such material and moral relations are the interests of 
the country, respects for the dignity and good of this great nation and maintenance of 
peace and security in the world's political climate. Our relations with our neighbours 
and other countries of the world including the European countries are clear, expressive, 
evidence of the policies. Our unfailing efforts at brotherly dialogues with every Muslim 
country, some of which are producing sweet results at present are there for all people of 
the world to see’.294 
‘In all sincerity, I extend my hand of friendship towards all Muslim states and welcome 
their co-operation and mutual understanding in solving the problems of the Islamic 
world’.295 
True enough, the time he made those statements regarding diplomatic relations with Muslim 
states, particularly in the region, coincided with Iran’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Iran 
also hosted the Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) soon after 
Khatami took office in 1997. Speculations were made that due to the reformist government in 
Iran, not only does Iran seem ready to normalize relations with its neighbours but perhaps ties 
with the United States may be re-established. However, nothing more could be farther from the 
truth as the supreme leader continued to speak of the U.S. as an enemy: 
‘How is it probable for the Iranian people and government extend a hand of friendship 
to an enemy who is still, with a heart full of spite and vengeance and angered at its 
repeated failures, striving hard to strike a blow at Iran and the Iranian people? How 
could we be deceived by an adversary who, even today while smiling spitefully holds a 
poisoned dagger in his hand? The United States of America, that is a great Satan, and 
the arrogant leader of the global trouble and tensions, we shall always consider it our 
enemy, as long as it adheres to its present places, and never, stretch out a friendly hand 
to it’.296 
Following the rationalist institution of diplomacy, Iran wanted to negotiate with the United 
States on equal terms as the last part of his statement indicates—Tehran was reluctant to 
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negotiate with the United States for as long as the U.S. administration sticks to the same 
policies. At the time, apart from accusing Iran of supporting terrorism, many restrictions and 
economic sanctions were imposed on Iran, exhibiting the realist coercive diplomacy exercised 
by Washington. The weight of the sanctions and accusations aggravated the historical 
grievances Tehran had against America such as the CIA coup on Iran’s democratically elected 
Prime Minister in 1953, U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war as 
well as Washington not acknowledging the atrocities caused by using chemical weapons on 
Iran during the war to name a few. Such message from Iranian leaders in conjunction with 
Khatami’s proposal of a ‘dialogue among civilizations’ prompted a symbolic response from the 
White House. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright, admitted taking part in the 
1953 coup indicating perhaps the willingness of U.S. to re-establish diplomatic ties.297  
The rationalist momentum was lost, nonetheless, since two events halted the potential 
rapprochement with the West. First, the internal power struggle within Iran where the people 
favoured the reformists, caused a conservative backlash. Second, the terror attacks of 
September 11, 2001 in the U.S., effectively changing the international political atmosphere. 
Reference to diplomacy with the West diminished in the speeches of Khamenei and was 
replaced with strengthening ties with Muslim countries to ‘find solutions to the current disputes 
or conflicts in the Islamic world’ especially after 2001.298 It was nonetheless still rationalist to 
talk about regional cooperation to find solutions to the problems in the Middle East. The 
supreme leader’s focus, however, from the outset of the ‘war on terror’ has been kept within 
the Islamic sphere as he revived and intensified his rhetoric against the West to appeal more to 
the Muslims to strengthen ties for cooperation. 
There is a great schism in Islam between the Shi’ites and the Sunni’s and Khamenei’s goal is 
to downplay it and unify the Islamic world through establishing and strengthening ties around 
its neighbourhood as a first step. For this to work, he needs to use the United States or the West 
as the scapegoat and after the 9/11 events, this strategy has been constantly practiced by 
Khamenei in his statements. The world was different after the attacks in the United States as 
the supreme leader described the division of the world among the Muslims, who are oppressed 
by the West and yet collectively accused of terrorism, and the West and their supporters. He 
effectively turned the schism in Islam into something bigger to that of the West and Islam in 
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attempts to unify the greatly divided Islamic Ummah against an external enemy that threatens 
to dismantle the Muslims. After 2001, he found a solid base for his claims as Muslims became 
more marginalized worldwide and the ‘war on terror’ brought about chaos in the region. Such 
negative developments in the Islamic world naturally feed the discourse of resentment and 
heightens the grievances against and hatred of the Muslims towards the West, manifesting the 
continuation of the anti-imperialist narrative, which began before the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic. To increase the effectiveness of his claims further, Khamenei tends to 
magnify the failures of the ‘war on terror’. This effectively segregates the world into two camps 
of oppressors, or the heretics, and the believers, the liberators, signalling the influence of the 
revolutionist tradition. He makes this division official in 2011 when he calls the U.S. and the 
West ‘the camp of the unfaith and arrogant powers’.299 On the camp of the faithful, though, he 
bestows a rationalist twist by promoting Islamic democracy and rationalist diplomacy 
exemplified by Iran, the liberator, demonstrating a moderate, peaceful façade appealing to the 
rest of the Muslim world. Hence, we see how the rationalist component of Khamenei’s foreign 
policy discourse has been reserved largely for the Muslim world, excluding the West. Whereas, 
the West is the enemy in a struggle for justice and morality framed in the revolutionist tradition. 
5.2.2 Criminality of the Great Satan: breaking international law 
The United States, ‘the Great Satan’, is the embodiment of evil and cruelty against mankind.300 
It is depicted as a largely inhuman character, with claws and fangs.301 This makes it capable of 
sheer animosity and horrendous acts of violence, which Khamenei condemns to be criminal due 
to the widespread suffering of those affected, usually the weaker states in the Islamic world. By 
characterizing the United States as such, Washington is stripped off all human values that 
follow moral principles invalidating America’s campaign for democracy and freedom with 
Khamenei branding the country and its allies ‘hypocritical Western powers’.302 Without regard 
for moral values, just as realist principles dictate, in pursuit of national interests the United 
States commit atrocious crimes inflicting suffering on the Muslims, increasing particularly after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. Prior to 2001, the U.S. animosity was restricted and directed 
only towards Iran for transforming into an Islamic Republic, the response of the Washington 
after the terror attacks, however, triggered an expansion of this animosity towards the rest of 
the Islamic world. The main ‘evil purpose’ of the United States was limited to provoking Iran 
                                                 
299 Khamenei, “Ayatollah Khamenei’s Message to Hajj Pilgrims (2011)” 
300 Khamenei, “The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole world (2006.12)” 
301 Khamenei, “Islamic Revolution Leader Ayatullah Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims (2009)” 
302 Khamenei, “Full text of leader's message to this year's hajj (1999)” Khamenei, “Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
Message to Hajj Pilgrims (2011)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
123 
 
into a confrontation but as time progressed this purpose turned into an ‘evil power’ as 
Washington and its allies targeted a collective in its ‘war on terror’.303 The war exposed the 
‘brutal and merciless nature of the powers’ looking at the catastrophic outcomes of foreign 
intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan and later Syria.304 It also simultaneously unleashed ‘tragic 
scenes here and there across the Islamic lands’.305 Thus, the demon has ‘bloodstained claws’ 
for many Muslims die as a result of the ‘war on terror’ and that civil wars such as that in Syria 
have broken out from it together with other ‘mischievous policies of America’ in the region.306 
This characterization of the United States as the main antagonist in the Islamic world since the 
outset of the ‘war on terror’ once again discloses the influences of the realist tradition. The 
supreme leader identifies the moves made by the West as an attack on Islam based solely on 
Western interests, such as controlling the oil in the region.307 The realist understanding of 
international law is likewise reflected by the military intervention in Iraq since abiding by 
international law significantly impedes the freedom of states to pursue their interests whatever 
it may be. As such, disregard for and violation of international law is considered a criminal act 
when looking at it from a rationalist and even a revolutionist perspective where Khamenei has 
positioned Iran, earning the Islamic Republic the right to condemn such illegal and criminal 
acts of the United States.308 As admitted by former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, the military intervention in Iraq was in fact illegal as it was not approved by the Security 
Council and violates the United Nations Charter.309 Here we are seeing an interplay of the 
rationalist and revolutionist traditions challenging the West’s realist manoeuvres, giving us an 
insight into the worldview of Khamenei since it validates the existence of the three traditions 
in his political discourse. Khamenei’s condemnation of the activities of the United States, which 
were against international norms and defying international law exhibits his understanding of 
the rationalist tradition wherein sovereignty and non-intervention must be upheld by all 
countries and that nation-states must abide by international law. In contrast to the United States, 
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the supreme leader has mentioned Iran’s merit of never attacking another state indicating that 
the Islamic Republic has abided by international standards framed by the rationalist tradition 
whereas the United States had not.310 
The biggest crime of the United States, however, according to Khamenei rests on its support of 
the Zionist regime, the occupiers of the Palestinian territories who have imposed a cruel and 
inhumane regime of suffering on the Palestinian people for many decades.311 The issue of 
Palestine lies at the heart of the Muslim world and injustices committed by the Israeli 
government are frequently voiced out by Iran’s political elites.312 The theme appeals to the rest 
of the Islamic world strengthening the Islamic Republic’s claim of leadership. The Zionist 
‘usurper’ and ‘enemy’ supported by the United States and the West is normally mentioned in 
conjunction with the suffering of the Palestinian people in most of Khamenei’s statements, 
denoting a continuity of Ayatollah Khomeini’s campaign of fighting for the oppressed. The 
campaign symbolizes the revolutionist strand enabling Iran to connect with the rest of the 
Muslim world despite its predominantly Shi’a background. This makes it an essential 
component of Khamenei’s speeches and a point of consideration in Iran’s foreign policy. The 
victimisation of the Palestinian people is constantly recapitulated in each speech to remind the 
Islamic world of the common pain that they share. ‘Palestinian people continue to be the target 
of the most barbaric and brutal crimes of the Zionists. As a consequence of the ‘occupation of 
their land’ they are being massacred, tortured, humiliated, with their property being pillaged 
and their houses demolished’ despite their ‘the inalienable rights’.313 With a historical record 
of the Great Satan supporting the ‘brutal’ Zionist regime and the ‘war on terror’ ongoing, 
Khamenei expands the victimisation of Muslims, formerly restricted to Palestine, to include 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria claiming such plots are a joint project of the United States and 
Israel.314 While the American and Zionist regimes are moving based on the dictates of the realist 
tradition, destroying and making the Muslims in the region suffer, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
capitalizes on the revolutionist tradition as a force to defeat the enemies in the supreme leaders 
political discourse. The very notion of wanting to defeat the enemy though, has a very realist 
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aspect to it as we see below since Khamenei propagates the consolidation of power within 
Islam. Extending the suffering of the oppressed Palestinians to the Iraqis, Afghanis and Syrians 
is meant to incite the feeling of solidarity within the Islamic world as the anguish of the ‘war 
on terror’ has now spread out throughout the entire region. The main reason for all these 
sufferings is attributed to the powerful evil enemies, i.e. the United States and its main ally in 
the region, the Zionist regime, but another part is attributed to the weak and subservient 
governments of some Muslim countries, a phenomenon Khamenei calls ‘postmodern 
colonialism’.315  
Khamenei’s concern is to keep the momentum and the feeling of resentment and the anti-
imperialist discourse alive to propagate the consolidation of the Islamic power desperately 
needed to fight the forces of darkness and end the pain of the Muslims. Iran of course, in the 
supreme leader’s perspective, is a very strong Muslim country, as he describes, in comparison 
to many other Muslim states since 1979. The Revolution rid Tehran of all the influences of the 
devil, thereby making the officials of Islamic Republic independent of Western influence unlike 
the weak government of some countries in the Islamic world. Therefore, accordingly, with such 
independence from evil Western politics, Iran is the appropriate leader and the most suitable 
liberator of the Islamic world with valuable experiences of keeping the Great Satan at bay. Until 
2016 Khamenei has been silent on the subject, indirectly implying that since countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main rival in the region, have ties with the United States, they are more 
susceptible to implement Western interests and hence are not suited to lead the Islamic Ummah. 
Yet after the Mina stampede incident in 2015, Khamenei has been more vocal and directly 
associated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to be allies of the US and the Zionists, effectively 
shaming them in his Hajj speech.316 Such tragedies feed on Iran’s desire to prove itself as the 
right leader who is reliable, strong and secure and does not break international law to pursue its 
own interests, unlike the US, Zionist regime and now Saudi Arabia, causing suffering to the 
people of the region. Khamenei wants to show that in contrast to these countries, Iran is a 
rationalist actor and would not commit such criminal acts and uphold the rationalist 
                                                 
315 Khamenei, “Imam Khamene'i 's message on the occasion of Hajj (1997)” Khamenei, “Message of Ayatollah 
al-Odhma Khamenei on the auspicious occasion of Hajj (1998)” Khamenei, “Full text of leader's message to this 
year's hajj (1999)” Khamenei, “Message to the Hajj prigrims of the Muslim Ummah (2000)” Khamenei, 
“Leader's Hajj Message (2001)” Khamenei, “The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from 
the whole world (2005)” Khamenei, “Supreme Leader’s Hajj Message (2015)” 
316 Ali Khamenei, “Imam Khamenei's Hajj Message (2016),” accessed December 17, 2016, 
http://english.khamenei.ir/print/4121/Hajj-hijacked-by-oppressors-Muslims-should-reconsider-management 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
126 
 
international norms of sovereignty, non-intervention and the institutions of diplomacy and 
international law. 
5.2.3 Iran’s leadership ambition 
In the face of such cruelty and suffering in the Islamic world from the American-led ‘war on 
terror,’ the only way is to turn to Islam and use it as a force to end all the troubles of the Muslims, 
the way Iran had rid itself of all evils through an Islamic revolution is one of the key points of 
Khamenei’s annual statements at the Hajj. By accentuating the suffering of the people in the 
region particularly due to the ‘war on terror’ and its failures, Khamenei hopes to perpetually 
incite hatred in the Islamic world towards the enemy, the Great Satan, and strengthen the anti-
imperialist discourse already popular in the region, which may be quite useful for foreign policy 
purposes as it enhances the image of Iran. It also serves Iran’s main realist goal of survival and 
security in the region. If the United States is shown to be the devil, with animal-like features, 
devoid of morality, allowing them to commit such atrocities and inflict such pain on the 
Muslims, then the Islamic Republic could be appropriately juxtaposed to shine as the human, 
moral agent of God meant to save the Islamic world. In fact, in 2010, Khamenei makes a 
statement directly related to this: ‘There is no ‘right thing’ (ma’ruf) more significant than 
rescuing nations from the satanic claws of the global Arrogance, and there is no ‘wrong thing’ 
(munkar) uglier than dependence on the Arrogant and servitude to them’.317 
Although the talk on unity of the Islamic world has existed prior to 2001, the pain of the military 
interventions in the region has propelled it to a whole new level. Khamenei had believed in the 
day when the ‘entire Muslim Ummah with millions of hearts in one body, rise up in unity 
against all these atrocities’, long before the beginning of the Arab Uprisings in 2010.318 Here 
we are seeing the revolutionist tradition at play where unity and solidarity among Muslims is 
being endorsed as an antidote to all the suffering in the Islamic world. He sees all the pain as a 
malady infecting the entire Muslim world, originating from the West, a sickness which has been 
left untreated and the only cure lies in the unity of the Islamic Ummah to fight the disease. This 
unity and solidarity is directed towards a powerful enemy – the United States, the Great Satan, 
and its allies – giving it a realist twist since it includes repulsion with a tone of revenge as well 
as a repetitive discussion of the material capabilities and resources of the unified Islamic 
Ummah. Unity and solidarity, however, also takes a more rationalist form with cooperation and 
negotiations to settle issues and fix problems, usually restricted to the Islamic world, but clearly 
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the supreme leader anchors it in a more revolutionist – realist axis, with the revolutionist edge 
turning it into an Islamic cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision showing the interplay of the three 
traditions. 
Khamenei argues that the Islamic world has vast amounts of resources at its disposal, with 
natural wealth, geopolitical significance and a big population, but ‘lacks the power and prestige 
on the international arena’ indicating the realist dimension of the call for unity.319 Calculating 
the material capabilities can be interpreted from a purely realist perspective as it conveys the 
message of power and survival, the two main components of the realist tradition. Statements 
referring to the capabilities of the Islamic world transforms the revolutionist project of uniting 
the Islamic Ummah into a purely realist enterprise. Nevertheless, the revolutionist project is 
endorsed with Khamenei insisting that the ‘valuable resources are available everywhere to help 
us establish a new situation; the necessary means and motivation for changing this situation 
exist in all Islamic countries’, including spiritual resources rooted in the Islamic faith.320 Hence, 
he sees unity as a vital game-changer on the stage of international politics as it challenges the 
international system once it solidifies. Prior to the Arab Uprisings, Khamenei had envisioned 
the ‘rise of the united Islamic power in the arena of global politics’, highlighting the realist 
intention behind the revolutionist approach.321  
Earlier I mentioned that Iran’s foreign policy is aimed at searching for allies in the region. 
Before the terror attacks in 2001, Iran was largely isolated and its material capabilities were no 
match to the enemy, the Great Satan, and so to enhance its own national capacity and security 
through the religious channels, discussing the potential of a unified Islamic world is vital. 
However, since Saddam was overthrown through the U.S. military intervention, Iraq became 
an ally of Tehran automatically expanding Tehran’s leverage as well as ambitions in the region. 
Iraq, an Arab state, playing a vital role in the history of the Middle East, was now Iran’s friend 
and if Iran’s influence works on one Arab state, for Khamenei, it can work on the rest of the 
Islamic countries bolstering the Islamic Republic’s ambition of attaining the leadership of the 
Islamic Ummah. For Iran to gain the leadership, nevertheless, it must first advocate the unity 
of the harshly divided Islamic world suffering from sectarian violence, which of course is 
conveniently blamed on the meddling of the United States. After all, the Great Satan is the root 
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cause of all the suffering in the Muslim world and there is a rich historical anti-imperialist 
discourse Khamenei can draw from and simply build-up on to charm the Muslim audience into 
his cause. 
5.3 The Dawn of an Islamic Awakening and revolutionism 
When discussing Islam, the idea of one unified organism under the banner of a ‘nation’ is often 
mentioned by the supreme leader suggesting the existence of a ‘huge Islamic nation’.322 This 
Islamic nation transcends state boundaries and encompasses the entire Islamic world, unifying 
it into one ‘Islamic Ummah’ with the Hajj being the statement of their identity.323 Here we see 
an important tenet of the revolutionist tradition being exhibited wherein mankind is perceived 
to belong to one unified entity, in this case though, it is restricted to Islam. The revolutionist 
tradition, or the Kantian tradition, have also expressed such unity in the name of religion, albeit 
using Christianity as it was the doctrine that the Western world was familiar with during the 
inception of the revolutionist tradition in the West. Thus, Islamic unity being put forward by 
Khamenei to be the ultimate goal should be seen along the same lines since he attempts to 
construct (or re-construct) a theological cosmopolitanism. He occasionally mentions the 
reclaiming the glory of Islam lost to the West indicating believing such had existed.324 
Nonetheless, the factuality of the epic of a glorious unified Islamic Ummah existing in the past 
prior to the rise of the West which Khamenei tries to connect within his speeches remains 
questionable.325 His imparting of the notion of a unified entity, that can be constructed, or 
reconstructed if it indeed had existed in the past, conveys a starkly revolutionist message despite 
the underlying realist intentions pointed out earlier. In fact, Khamenei calls it a ‘New Islamic 
Civilization’ and it solidifies the vision he had set out in all his speeches in unifying the Islamic 
Ummah.326 
By identifying the power of Islam and setting Iran as the prime example of a country saved by 
the religion, Khamenei invites other Muslim states to have a similar revolution for Islam to 
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prevail in the political systems of the countries suffering from Western imperialism. Khamenei 
had, in effect, continued the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini not only in terms of maintaining 
and building up on the same narratives and discourses but also in terms of exporting the Islamic 
Revolution. He had called for Muslims to revolt against the West and the corrupt governments 
the United States have controlled in the region persistently. Khamenei had little anticipation of 
the occurrence of the Arab Uprisings, which ironically, happened not long after Iran’s own 
green revolution in 2009, a point he does not mention. For the very reason of anticipating such 
a movement, the Arab Uprisings or the Arab Spring became appropriated with the term Islamic 
Awakening Khamenei has long called for. The branding of the movement as the long-awaited 
Islamic Awakening reflects Iran’s narcissism. Khamenei relates the movement directly with the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 beginning with the conversion of Iraq to an ally and he strongly 
believes, or at least seems to be convinced of in his speeches, that it is just the beginning.327 
The supreme leader has been attempting to transform the image Iran from being a menace in 
the region to a hero of Islam insisting the Islamic Revolution to belong to all Muslims and 
countries can benefit from it.328 
The Islamic Republic claims to own the Islamic Awakening or Reawakening movements, a 
point prominent in Khamenei’s Hajj statements. To showcase Iran’s leadership potential, he 
claims that Iran accelerated such movements and thereby increasing Tehran’s influence in the 
Islamic world.329 Nonetheless, prior to the ‘war on terror’ and the Arab Uprisings, Khamenei 
focused more on convincing the Muslims to change their situation to liberate themselves from 
the West. This stems from the anti-imperialist narrative: ‘valuable resources are available 
everywhere to help us establish a new situation; the necessary means and motivation for 
changing this situation exist in all Islamic countries’.330 His statement accompanies the 
emphasis on the material capabilities highlighting the collective potential of the Muslims to 
challenge the Western-dominated system. In turn, it reflects the realist dimension as discussed 
earlier, wherein the supreme leader adds a spiritual, revolutionist vision to appeal to a wider 
audience in the Islamic world. In conjunction with these sentiments of Islamic revivalism, 
which began in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khamenei gives special attention to the Muslim 
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youth, who are portrayed to be at the centre of such a movement, perhaps due to the 
demographic realities on the ground. He insists that they should not be culturally dominated by 
Western ideas to avoid ‘moral degradation’, so their Islamic zeal and vigour can be kept intact 
to go marching for the victory of Islam.331 Khamenei points out that ‘the youth aspire for the 
restitution of the grandeur and glory of the Islamic Ummah’ making Islamic Awakening 
movement spread across the Muslim world ‘exposing the bullying face of the domineering 
powers’.332 Hence, to restore the greatness of the Islamic Ummah, a struggle led by the youth 
against the ruthless dominant powers of the international system is necessary, likewise 
retrieving their an identity lost to the West.333  He says such a struggle is evident in Palestine, 
Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan.334 Although the fate of the latter two are tightly knit with the 
‘war on terror’, in Palestine and Lebanon, Iran supports the Hezbollah’s fight against the Zionist 
regime demonstrating the properties of the realist struggle concealed through the revolutionist 
Islamic vision.  
Ironically, just a few weeks before the Arab Uprising began in Tunisia, the supreme leader 
boasted about the Islamic Awakening’s promise of a bright future expanding from Iran to the 
region, making the Islamic Republic the ‘vanguard of the movement’.335 By 2011, after more 
Muslim countries experienced the Uprisings, Khamenei made clear there were two opposing 
camps, one is the faithful Islamic camp of Muslim nations, which have started the Awakening 
process, and the other is the ‘camp of the unfaith’ composed mainly of those who still cling to 
the West.336 Whereas the message of such a division was quite subtle and discussed within the 
context of the anti-imperialist narrative before the Uprisings in the Islamic World, from the 
time when more countries followed Tunisia’s example, he insisted on this clear-cut segregation 
of the world for in his view, Iran was no longer alone. This reflects Iran’s narcissism as it sees 
its own Islamic Revolution being replicated in the Muslim world, effectively turning it into a 
more revolutionist business since for him as it then transcended one state, i.e. the Islamic 
Republic, and expanded into others. Hence, the anti-imperialist struggle could be given a fresh 
face through the Uprisings and neatly dividing the world into two opposite poles of good and 
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evil, just as the revolutionist tradition dictates. He urges the Muslims to unite and turn the 
Islamic world into a ‘powerful pole’ to avoid the sinister plots and dangers from the evil powers 
that will try to undermine the Islamic Awakening movements saying that ‘faithful men and 
women throughout the Islamic world, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya should make the 
most of this opportunity for the formation of an international Islamic power block’.337 He 
directly invites Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to join Iran’s cause of uniting the Islamic Ummah, 
and allowing Tehran to lead it, since their uprisings have followed Iran’s example. In the 
supreme leader’s logic, the events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were an exact recapitulation of 
the events of 1979 in Iran since these countries overthrew despotic and corrupt governments 
allied with the United States like the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran. Iran’s realist ambitions at this 
point of the Arab Uprisings, emboldened previously by the transformation of Iraq to friend and 
the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, were almost within reach and had Egypt, Tunisia and 
Libya heeded to Khamenei’s invitation, the Islamic Republic would then have been a step closer 
to the leadership of the Islamic Ummah. A year on, in 2012, developments may not have been 
as what Khamenei had expected since he remarks that missing the ‘great opportunity and failing 
to use’ the Islamic Awakening movements ‘to reform the Islamic Ummah are a great loss for 
Muslims’.338 This makes us question whether the reformation is meant for the benefit of Iran 
considering the realist aspirations we have discussed or for the advantage of the Islamic Ummah 
as a call to ease sectarian tension erupting almost at the same time when Iran’s ambitions 
flourished, which has been devastating the Islamic world up to the time of writing. Either 
answer downplays rationalism altogether and highlights the realist-revolutionist axis of 
Khamenei’s Iranian foreign policy discourse. 
5.3.1 A United Islamic Front 
Unity of the Muslims is a key message, regardless at this point whether they follow or join Iran, 
since the Islamic world can only reach its potential by being together and joining their resources. 
Not only will Muslim unity bring material strength but also justice and prosperity and so 
brotherhood, solidarity and equality is constantly promulgated to achieve this utopian Islamic 
society ruled by the tenets of political Islam. If political Islam is to be utilized, then moral and 
spiritual values come to the fore. When Muslims perceive the world dominated by the West as 
the entire opposite of Islamic teachings, then Muslim countries need to save themselves from it 
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since the dire situations in their countries were specifically caused by foreign intervention.339 
Anti-imperialist discourse once again surfaces since all evil and suffering is attributed to the 
West, specifically the United States. In fact, Khamenei sees the sectarianism plaguing the 
Islamic world to be another plot of the United States and its Western allies to stop the unification 
of the Islamic Ummah, a topic I tackle below. The ‘united Islamic power’ was already 
introduced by Khamenei in 1999 but only years later does he express it clearly:  
‘We call on all Muslims to unite. This unity is neither directed against the Christians nor 
against followers of any other religion or creed. It is in fact a call for resistance to 
aggressors, occupiers and war-mongers. It is a call for carrying out the norms of ethics 
and spirituality, for the revival of rationality and Islamic justice, for scientific and 
economic progress and for the restitution of Islamic honour’.340 
‘Muslim nations led by their political and religious authorities, intellectuals and national 
leaders need to form a united Islamic front against this invading enemy with full 
strength. They need to muster all the elements of power within themselves and properly 
strengthen the Muslim Ummah’.341 
Events following the 9/11 terror attacks emboldened this call for unity in the context of the ‘war 
on terror’ for Muslims began to feel they were being targeted by the West. Anti-Muslim 
sentiments in tandem with technological advances, i.e. widespread use of the internet, and the 
dominance of Western media spread like wildfire across the globe. Khamenei utilized it in 
favour of his vision of uniting the Islamic Ummah since the chain of events from 2001 caused 
more chaos and suffering in addition to what had already existed in the Islamic world, with the 
Palestine issue not being resolved and the Bosnian war being initially ignored by the West in 
the 90s. Such tragedies plus the war on terror and the rise of anti-Islam sentiments in the West 
could only awaken the sense of solidarity and unity among the Muslims if framed in a way 
where the whole is under attack by the United States and the West. In this context, hopes of a 
brighter future through the establishment of a unified Islamic Ummah may have a certain appeal 
since Khamenei promised it would end the suffering and pain in the Islamic world. The supreme 
leader has envisioned the creation of a ‘New Islamic Civilization’ the reconstruction of which 
was well underway before the Islamic Awakening movements since Islam became victorious 
in the Islamic Republic and led Iran to this bright future.342 He strongly believes that ‘…the 
sole means of deliverance from the oppression and guile of the United States and other Western 
hubristic powers is to establish a global balance of power conducive to their interests’, the 
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formation of a strong ‘international Islamic block’ is the only way.343 Such statements exhibit 
the starkly realist aspect of Khamenei’s political discourse for the only way he sees Iran, and 
the Islamic world, can find deliverance from all the suffering caused by the West is through 
consolidating the power of Islam through uniting Muslim countries, turning it into a force, an 
army to fight evil. However, the reconstruction of Khamenei’s Koranic Islamic Ummah may 
or may not have factually existed before the rise to global dominance of Western powers since 
tensions and wars among different empires coming from different Islamic sects were not 
unusual but discovering the truth is a task better left to the historians.  
What is of interest here is the very idea of a unit, an Islamic nation progressive as much as it 
was materially and morally powerful, which Khamenei wants to endorse for the Muslim world 
to find appealing as a response to terrible circumstances caused the West. The moral dimension 
bestows a revolutionist touch to this idea, while the Islamic cosmopolitan edge is being utilized. 
Khamenei describes the united Islamic Ummah to be constituted by ‘peoples of diverse 
nationalities, races, traditions and cultures and it is indeed a symbol of coherence, bravery, 
awakening and self-awareness’.344 It is a description consisting of cosmopolitan elements such 
as equality and tolerance boiling down to justice within the Islamic world. It is quite a utopian 
outlook far from reality but meant to entice the Muslim public. This is the moral dimension of 
the united Islamic Ummah, with the promise of a utopian Islamic society, underlining 
Khamenei’s resort to the revolutionist tradition as he repeatedly mentions justice, brotherhood 
and equality in most of his speeches.  
Only when the spirit of unity and solidarity is harnessed can the Islamic front be a potent force 
to face the darkness and evil of this world, mainly characterized by the antagonists, the United 
States and its allies. Khamenei’s speeches suggest he is aiming for a situation resembling the 
Cold War between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). For him 
Iran leads a united Islamic front similar to how Russia led the Communist Bloc against the 
United States. After all, the struggle against the West is ideological as much as it is political 
and economic and he does make mention of it briefly saying that: ‘With the decline of certain 
ideologies such as Marxism or Socialism, and with the unveiling of the real nature of western 
liberal democracy founded on the bases of deceits and hypocrisy, Islam has now emerged as 
the sole and ideal set of thoughts’ and the only path of deliverance from the injustices 
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experienced by the Muslims.345 Yet no matter how grand and international his ambition is for 
the Islamic Ummah to be a great force challenging the West, his vision of a Cold War remains 
very regional resting with Iran’s main rival, Saudi Arabia. The supreme leader, nonetheless, 
does not falter and carries on at every opportunity to spread his vision of unity and the most 
ideal place for experiencing and advocating unity is at the Hajj. Thus, we see Khamenei’s main 
message living on in his Hajj statements: follow us, join us and let us fight the devil. 
5.3.2 The Hajj as Training Grounds 
The Hajj is one of the few – if not the only – occasion when all Muslims from different sects 
come together, a ray of hope in a region that suffers from violence and sectarianism. It is seen 
as ‘a high platform for the growth of awakening of the Muslim Ummah’, it is a ‘great camp’ 
and ‘a drill for the advancement of the solidarity of the Islamic Ummah’ where Muslims can 
learn the lessons of solidarity, brotherhood and unity against oppressors.346 It does not take long 
for the unity of the Hajj to be politicized by Khamenei transforming the holy rituals into real-
life notions of struggle against the evil West as he said the Hajj to be ‘a collective repudiation 
of the devils of all kinds, human and demonic’.347 Hence, the Hajj is the optimal location to 
remind Muslims of their problems, both personal and social, and to incite hatred against the 
Great Satan which is at the very root of the problem of the Islamic world. This effectively turns 
a very personal journey, since the Hajj is a vital obligation of all Muslims, into a very political 
one for Khamenei’s means to stir feelings in hopes of turning them into action. The supreme 
leader draws on values such as equality by pointing to the idea of everyone wearing simple 
white clothes, also part of the tradition, leaving all material valuables behind to do the rituals, 
making the individual unanimous with the whole with no boundaries of colour, race, age and 
social disposition. Equality also means doing the exact same rituals as the rest, with no 
exceptions. Among others though, one ritual is highly politicized in Khamenei’s speeches: the 
stoning of the symbol of Satan. It is a re-enactment of Prophet Abraham’s actions wherein he 
threw pebbles at three pillars representing the three devils of temptation. 
The stoning of the symbol of Satan has a special place in the Hajj and in Iran’s foreign policy 
as conveyed by Khamenei’s statements. The supreme leader connects the stoning of the symbol 
of Satan with the stoning of the enemy, i.e. the United States or the Great Satan and its allies. 
                                                 
345 Ibid. 
346 Khamenei, “Imam Khamene'i 's message on the occasion of Hajj (1997)” Khamenei, “Message of His 
Eminence Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Addressed to the Haj Pilgrims of the Holy Mecca (2002)” Khamenei, 
“The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole world (2005)” 
347 Khamenei, “The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole world (2005)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
135 
 
Personal frustrations caused by the devil could then find an expression through stoning the 
symbol of Satan and when the personal frustration can be traced to sufferings caused by the 
West, as the pilgrims are reminded of constantly by Khamenei, it becomes political. The 
collective stoning of the symbol of Satan further enhances the feeling of brotherhood and unity 
since pilgrims do it together, venting out their frustration on such a symbol. The supreme leader 
does not stop short of reminding the Hajj participants of the enemy, where knowing the enemy 
is one of the two main lessons of the Hajj, the first being brotherhood.348 In addition, Khamenei 
also calls attention to the responsibility of Muslims to stone the symbol of Satan, the enemy, at 
the Hajj as it is a way to seek justice. If the symbol of Satan is the United States and stoning is 
the Islamic Awakening, then Muslims are obliged by their faith to join the figurative stoning of 
the Great Satan by taking part in the Islamic Awakening as means to seek justice for all the 
wrongs inflicted on the Islamic world affecting all Muslims. As such, the revolutionist tradition 
finds its expression in Khamenei’s statements as the individual motivations of the pilgrim are 
synced with the larger political agenda that he is endorsing. Iran, true to its religious obligations, 
beat the enemy, which is the Great Satan, through the Islamic Revolution and this successful 
action can be found on a microscale version in the ritual of stoning the symbol of Satan during 
the Hajj. If enough pilgrims heed to the supreme leader’s call, then Satan will be defeated by 
the powerful Islamic Ummah. The Hajj after all is for Khamenei the training grounds for a full-
blown confrontation with the evil West and it symbolizes a vision of the ideal Islamic society 
where all Muslims are equal, are brothers and are unified in their fight against evil, a picture 
defying the reality of a divided Islamic world with violence spreading through sectarianism.349 
The ritual of stoning Satan brings a sense of justice as it is an appropriate punishment for those 
who commit crimes against Islam. If Iran’s way of stoning the symbol of Satan is by having an 
Islamic revolution, then forming a united Islamic front and establishing a ‘New Islamic 
Civilization’ will punish the criminal that is the West. With all the atrocities committed by the 
United States and the West, from the suffering of the Palestinians due to their support of the 
Zionist regime to the ongoing civil war in Syria, solidarity among the Muslims is easily sparked. 
Khamenei anticipates solidarity to encourage unity seen at the Hajj through amplifying the 
grievances of the Muslims against the West and combining it with the anti-imperialist narrative. 
He seems convinced the unity of the Islamic Ummah, as slowly being manifested by the Islamic 
Awakening movements in the Muslim world, will greatly anger and punish the West for it curbs 
                                                 
348 Ali Khamenei, “Supreme Leader's Hajj Message (2013),” accessed May 23, 2015, 
http://www.leader.ir/en/content/11187/Supreme-Leader's-Hajj-Message 
349 Khamenei, “Leader's Hajj Message (2012)” Khamenei, “Supreme Leader's Hajj Message (2013)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
136 
 
their influence. Khamenei’s reasoning stems from the experience of the United States’ enmity 
towards the Islamic Republic since its establishment in 1979 when Islam triumphed over its 
imperialistic goals. Since he is encouraging the entire Islamic world to follow suit and unite to 
form a powerful Islamic front, he expects the enmity of the Great Satan to reach great heights, 
which is demonstrated by their evil plots. 
Thus, we see how Iran’s foreign policy from Khamenei’s discourses is dictated by tenets of the 
revolutionist and realist traditions. It is realism with a revolutionist face. Imagine the scenario 
of stoning the symbol of Satan in front of you where millions of people wearing white gowns 
are throwing stones. On the side of the people, the revolutionist tradition stands in all its 
grandeur, boasting morality, equality, brotherhood, solidarity and unity and on the side of the 
symbol is everything immoral, it is the epitome of inequality, conflict, discord and disunity, a 
very realist camp while the very ritual of stoning represents justice and Islam’s triumph over 
Satan. This element of justice is the binding force that brings revolutionism and realism together 
as the Muslims suffered injustices as a result of the West’s immorality. For the supreme leader, 
the only way of vindication is to form a united front, transcending geographical nation-state 
boundaries and is anchored in the dogma of revolutionism with Islam being the ideological 
weapon of choice. What Khamenei hopes to achieve internationally is very much like his 
predecessor’s Ayatollah Khomeini although the latter was successful only at the national level 
effectively overthrowing the Pahlavi regime. Khomeini drew on a rich legacy of Islam and Shi’a 
political thought as his knowledge base enabling him to succeed over the long established 
monarchical system in Iran.350 Khomeini did try to export the revolution, nevertheless, but was 
rather unsuccessful and it is Khamenei who is now trying to pick up where his predecessor had 
left since the political tide in the Middle East seems to turn into Iran’s favour, reviving the 
revolutionist project. 
5.3.3 The Attack of the West 
The more Islam prospered and eventually dominated the entire system in Iran, the more the 
enmity of the United States grew over time against the Islamic Republic as the ‘first flagbearer 
of the victory of the Islamic Awakening’.351 In Khamenei’s perspective, the Great Satan has an 
issue against Islam and with the Islamic Awakening movements spread across the Muslim 
world, in Palestine, Lebanon and later in Iraq, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, the American regime 
is devastated for they know ‘how a dynamic “political Islam” can seriously jeopardize their 
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interests’.352 The devastation stems from the idea of losing control and power over important 
Islamic countries with vast amounts of resources that can be plundered for their own advantage, 
a primary concern of the realist aiming only to survive in the international system. Here we 
have Khamenei elaborating on a very realist perception of the events taking place throughout 
the Islamic world, which he directly links with the United States and the West. He stresses that:  
‘…obviously world powers with all their material resources and destructive forces, will 
never easily succumb’.353  
‘They foresee that if they fail to control or suppress this Islamic awakening in the next 
few years with political and economic measures, through propaganda, and as the last 
resort through military aggression, all their plans for an absolute global hegemony and 
control of the most vital oil and gas resources, which make the sole powerhouse of their 
industrial machinery and cause of their material edge over the rest of humanity will 
come to nothing’.354 
Khamenei’s realist understanding of the West’s involvement in the region is very fixated on the 
‘international domination and hegemony’ of the United States, implying a power struggle that 
could only be won through uniting the Islamic Ummah, initially drawing from revolutionist 
precepts.355 As such, the aim of creating a new Cold War based on the unification of the good 
forces of the Islamic Ummah against the evil forces of the West is explicated through an 
amplification of the threat posed by those against Islam, specifically referring to the United 
States. 
Khamenei provides the audience with a glimpse of the intentions of the Great Satan in stopping 
the Islamic Awakening for the movement can consolidate vast amounts of resources in the 
hands of its rightful owners in the Islamic world. Since he understands realism and the realist 
intentions of the enemy, it is fathomable his worldview prompts him to likewise design Iran’s 
foreign policy in realist terms, making the unification of the Islamic Ummah a priority since it 
is the only source of power he could draw upon to challenge the United States. On the evil U.S. 
camp, strategies of implementing certain plots to mitigate the spread of the Islamic awakening 
and the realization of a powerful united Islamic Ummah, according to the supreme leader, is a 
logical move. For Khamenei, Islamic unity undermines Western dominance in the Islamic 
world for they lose an important power source, demonstrating how permeating the realist 
tradition is in his political discourse. He argues that plots are meant to create disunity and chaos 
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and as such the United States and its allies are heightening their propaganda and psychological 
warfare against Iran, who is leading the Awakening movements, and they are fuelling 
sectarianism as well as supporting takfirism.356 The supreme leader claims dangers in the 
Islamic world are increasing as the Great Satan threatens the long-awaited fulfilment of the 
formation of one ‘great Islamic nation’, the powerful international united Islamic front, which 
is an additional cause for concern apart from the already scathing issues already plaguing the 
Muslim world. He says Islam is the ultimate fortress against imperialism and this fortress has 
constantly been attacked and these attacks are intensifying since the united Islamic front is 
already taking shape. 
Among the plots to hamper the emerging unification of the Islamic Ummah, Khamenei stresses, 
the West, led by the U.S., is creating disunity, fuelling Sunni-Shi’a sectarianist conflicts.357 He 
elaborates the plans of the West further saying they want: 
‘to create discord among Muslim sects, to incite sectarian prejudices, to bring about 
pseudo-confrontations between the Sunnis and the Shi’ah, to create disunity between 
Islamic states and to aggravate their differences, to change them into hostility and 
unsolvable conflicts, its employment of intelligence and espionage outfits to propagate 
corruption and immorality amongst the youth, all these are nervous and bewildered 
responses to the steady and firm advances of the Islamic Ummah towards awakening’.358 
By blaming sectarianist tensions on the West, Khamenei intends to instigate a kind of ‘rally 
round the flag’ effect for the Muslims to join forces and unite to form the united Islamic force, 
that the enemy must reckon with. In creating discord, the United States effectively turns all the 
Muslim states into victims, including Iran, which has been targeted by false propaganda. To 
this end, not only does Khamenei accuse the United States and its allies of fuelling sectarianism 
but also propagating Iranophobia as the idea of a Shi’a revival, or even a Shi’a Crescent 
forming, since the fall of Saddam became quite prominent in the media.359 Nevertheless, it is 
logical to argue with Khamenei seeing the actions of the West through a purely realist 
perspective, he is very likely to hold similar aspirations of Iran’s domination and hegemony of 
the region, if not the entire Islamic world, which is not far from the claims the media has been 
making although he has been very careful in wrapping his revolutionist vision on it. The 
revolutionist asset he maintains is the most appealing way he can endorse Iran’s capacity for 
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leadership by citing Iran’s previous experiences in the hands of the West as if to say: ‘been 
there, done that’. 
In the face of such threats and plots meant to impede the establishment of a unified Islamic 
Ummah, Khamenei demands the Muslims to be vigilant and prepared, urging the Islamic world 
to do something together in the same way as all Muslims do the obligatory rituals during the 
Hajj. As a matter of fact, he points out in his speeches that ensuring the continuity of the Islamic 
Awakening movements is a vital obligation of all Muslims since it needs to thrive to achieve 
the goal of uniting the Islamic world to restore the unitary Islamic Ummah into its rightful place. 
Nevertheless, the supreme leader urges those who heeded to the call of an Islamic awakening 
to be cautious in differentiating pure ‘Mohammedean Islam’ and ‘American Islam’, claiming 
the latter is involved in feeding the fire of sectarianism as well as allying themselves with the 
enemies of Islam, whereas pure Islam is about ‘tolerance and spirituality…piety and 
democracy’.360 Thus, Muslims must be vigilant, know the enemy and follow the right kind of 
Islam, the Islam, which Iran is practicing of course. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The supreme leader’s realist worldview manifests itself in the significance of classifying the 
actions of the United States as hegemonic, evil and immoral. The United States and its Western 
allies are characterized to be pure realists with the goal of dominating and expanding its 
influence in the Muslim world. This shows that Khamenei is fully aware of the capabilities of 
Washington and explicitly sees the threat it poses to Iran’s survival in the region. Hence, Iran 
should follow a fundamentally realist foreign policy powered by a revolutionist vision that he 
relentlessly propagates to other Islamic countries to achieve Iran’s realist goal of survival. 
However, since countries of the Middle East are wary of Iran’s actions, mistrust is high and 
Khamenei’s campaign usually falls on deaf ears as the Islamic Republic historically tried to 
export the revolution thereby threatening its neighbours. To thwart this, the supreme leader uses 
rationalism in the form of diplomacy and cooperation to improve Iran’s image. He also 
constantly voices out concerns on the West breaking international law to show that Iran is on 
the side of the victims of the unjust actions of the United States. Thus, Khamenei’s statements 
support the main argument of this research that ‘Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is 
fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist.’ 
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Graph 6 (From Quantitative Chapter p.91). Khamenei’s Hajj Statements from 1997 to 2016 
The graph above from the quantitative chapter shows how strong the revolutionist tradition is 
in Khamenei’s speeches, which is mainly composed of his vision of a united Islamic Ummah. 
The realist tradition is also remarkable, but as mentioned earlier, he attributes the realist 
terminologies to the United States and its wrongdoings. By doing so, he demonstrates his realist 
worldview and affirms the threat that the United States poses to Iran and the Islamic world. The 
revolutionist strategy then becomes vital and, hence, he invests most of his statements on 
propagating his vision to unite the Islamic Ummah to fight the United States. In comparison to 
the two traditions, rationalism does not fare high in Khamenei’s statements. Still, it is there and 
is essential in creating a more positive image of Iran in the international society. Rationalism 
was higher during the times it was needed such as prior to the 2015 nuclear deal where Iran had 
to display its rationalist side for the whole world to see. 
Two realist goals of Iran are survival and security. Khamenei is well-aware of Tehran’s inability 
to confront the United States, the main power broker in the region, whose threat is affirmed 
each time he demonizes Washington. By classifying the United States as an enemy, Khamenei 
inadvertently magnifies the power of the West in the Islamic world and heightens the sense of 
threat to Iran. Since Iran cannot counter the United States and its Western allies alone, a 
revolutionist vision is necessary. For this reason, the supreme leader advocates solidarity and 
brotherhood to harness the power of a united Islamic Ummah. Once united, he sees Iran as the 
leader of this ‘New Islamic Civilization’. If this ambition of dominating the Islamic world holds 
true, then it makes sense that all the problems of the Muslims are blamed on this external enemy, 
the United States and its allies. This is useful for two reasons. First, pointing out that the Islamic 
world is suffering and everything is in chaos, Khamenei emphasizes the stability of Iran, which 
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he attributes to the victory of Islam in turning the country into an Islamic Republic.  Second, if 
Iran is stable, then it can lead in repairing the Muslim world and getting rid of the West. Both 
reasons are meant to appeal to all Muslims to heed to the Supreme Leader’s call to stand behind 
Iran and fight the evil West.  
Seen from a different perspective, Khamenei seems to promote the idea of an Islamic Union 
along the same lines as the European Union. Since the only common denominator Iran has with 
all the other countries in the region is Islam, he uses religion to appeal to other nation-states. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can be seen to symbolize the regional international 
society of the Middle East much in the same way as the European Union represents the 
European international society and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
Asia. The only problem is that GCC was established precisely as an alliance to counter Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq war, leaving Iran out of the equation of a regional international society. 
Hence, Khamenei tries to compensate for this loss by creating a league of his own, which 
manifests itself in his vision of uniting the Islamic world into a ‘New Islamic Civilization’ or 
simply an Islamic Union. He often states Iran’s wish to establish friendly ties and cooperate 
with the other Muslim states, indicating the aim of creating some sort of alliance. Since the 
GCC states mostly have strong ties with Washington, he must convince them of the evil that 
the United States is capable of to subscribe to his vision of an Islamic Union. At the same time, 
he markets Iran’s Islamic democracy to show how the country has progressed and thus can 
replace the United States as an ally of all the countries in the Middle East. He inflates the idea 
of a utopian Islamic Union, clearly going beyond the boundary of rationalism and into 
revolutionism, to make it more attractive than the current situation in the region based on realist 
ideologies concealed through a rationalist framework. If it is not so different that it cannot 
transcend boundaries, then it is pointless to put much effort, which is why religion becomes a 
vital tool for him. Providing a revolutionist Islamic cosmopolitan vision is the only way 
Khamenei can appeal to the people in the region. From his discourses one thing is clear: 
Khamenei wants to make Islam great again but it is clearly going to be Iran first. 
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6 Khatami’s Foreign Policy Discourse 
Former President Mohammad Khatami is the primary figure when discussing the rationalist 
tradition. Rationalism is the means through which Iran can achieve its fundamentally realist 
goals with a revolutionist vision proving Iran’s foreign policy to be consistent as it follows such 
logic is the main argument of this research. It is widely known Khatami was and still is an agent 
of change in Iran and it is perhaps for this reason that his foreign policy became popular. 
Khatami is credited to having engaged Iran with the international community, outshining the 
efforts of his predecessor, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, although it was the latter who began 
international engagement to reconstruct the country after a devastating eight-year war with Iraq. 
Khatami sought to reform Iran domestically and extended his reforms to Iran’s international 
relations as the Islamic Republic was isolated from the West since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. His election to the presidency came at a time when globalization and international 
connectivity through information technology was quickly gaining pace. The internet started to 
revolutionize how people, especially the youth, acquired information about the world changing 
the lives of individuals, communities and nations. A millennium was about to come to an end 
and begin anew, auguring a promising future for humanity and Khatami wanted to capitalize 
on this important transition in history with globalization as its catalyst. 
Many would agree that Khatami’s presidency was characterized by rationalism, as the former 
president advocated diplomacy, dialogue and cooperation within the international community. 
However, his foreign policy discourse contained revolutionist and realist elements as well, as 
this chapter elaborates. I discuss below the themes and arguments linked with the mainly 
rationalist dominated foreign policy of Khatami’s administration, which is remarkably a step 
away from Khamenei’s highly revolutionist approach. Since their audience at the General 
Assembly are far more diverse, appealing to the international political audience consisting of 
heads of state perhaps the statements had to be more rationalist. It might as well be that the 
statements within the framework of the United Nations are tailored to reflect the institution’s 
rationalist foundations. The former president and his foreign minister approached international 
relations with a starkly rationalist mindset taking globalization and its impact on changing the 
world into consideration. Instead of focusing on demonization and enmity, which is a prominent 
feature of Khamenei’s statements regarding the United States and the West, Khatami and 
Kharrazi aimed at building trust, increasing Iran’s credibility at the international stage and 
calling for cooperation, effectively reflecting a peaceful image of an Islamic Republic as it was 
never seen before. The ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ (DAC) was perhaps Khatami’s most 
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revered legacy promoting the importance of diplomacy and negotiations in resolving issues. 
Yet as I discuss below, the DAC had a revolutionist dimension to it since Khatami spoke of a 
‘human society’ that can benefit from the success of such an initiative, showing that the 
revolutionist tradition is also at work in his political discourse. The realist tradition is likewise 
present almost in a similar way as the supreme leader’s use of it in denouncing the actions of 
some global players in their foreign policy behaviour albeit with less demonization. 
6.1 Building bridges and the rationalist tradition 
Diplomacy anchored in rationalism is what defines the Khatami administration at the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debates. The president and foreign minister emphasized 
rationalist principles of cooperation and negotiation on equal terms when discussing relations 
with other states in international society. Khatami and Kharrazi often stressed the Iranian 
government’s priority of easing tensions with the countries of the region and with the rest of 
the world. The origins of these tensions date back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution as 
neighbouring countries feared a spill-over effect potentially destabilizing their governments. 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s efforts to export the Revolution exacerbated these fears further 
increasing tensions in the regions. Thus, many nations supported Iraq during the war with Iran 
and alongside the Arab states established the GCC in hopes of eliminating or at least containing 
the threat of an Islamic Iran. The war with Iraq made Iran reconsider Khomeni’s edict of 
exporting the Revolution since Iran became isolated and suffered heavy losses shifting the 
priority of the newly found Islamic Republic to reconstruction. Rafsanjani took on the enormous 
task of opening up Iran’s doors to establish working relations with neighbouring states to help 
rebuild the country with moderate success as he was seen as still a vital part of the 
establishment, being a close confidante of Khomeini.361  
It was Khatami who proved that Iran was ready for change. Perhaps it was his reformist policies 
within Iran that attracted much support from across the region and the world as it gave the 
impression that he was doing what he preached. Kharrazi stated at the outset of the Khatami 
presidency that Iran’s foreign policy ‘is founded on peace, self-restraint, confidence-building 
and the reduction and elimination of tension, particularly within’ the Middle East region, a 
sentiment echoed by Khatami the following year.362 In fact, a detailed account of the Khatami 
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administration’s foreign policy was provided by the foreign minister at the UN General 
Assembly debates, highlighting the dominance of the rationalist tradition: 
‘…the expansion of relations with all countries on the basis of mutual respect, common 
interest and non-interference in the internal affairs of others; emphasis on the 
institutionalization of international law as the foundation of global order and as the final 
arbiter among States; the establishment and strengthening of mechanisms of mutual 
confidence-building and security through regional cooperation and the negation of the 
presence and influence of foreign powers; the protection of all human rights and the 
rejection of attempts at selective and discriminatory abuse of human rights as 
instruments of policy; emphasis on the fundamental rights of oppressed individuals and 
nations, particularly the Palestinian people; the arresting of the arms race at the regional 
and global levels, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the control of 
conventional weapons; the strengthening of the bonds of amity and solidarity among 
Islamic and non-aligned countries; an active presence and constructive participation in 
the United Nations and other international organizations, with an effective contribution 
in international efforts on global issues such as arms control and disarmament, 
comprehensive and sustainable development, human rights, peacekeeping and 
combating terrorism and illicit drugs, as well as the reversal of unjust international 
arrangements; and, finally, defending the rights of Iranian citizens all over the world’.363 
With all the rationalism, and a small dose of revolutionism, in Iran’s foreign policy outlined by 
Kharrazi, it becomes clear that an interplay exists. The more dominant tradition here though is 
rationalism, showing us the significance of the rationalist institutions of international society. 
International diplomatic efforts of the Khatami administration exhibit that Iran not only focuses 
on strengthening ‘solidarity among Islamic and non-aligned’ states but also wants to ease 
tensions with all countries. Priority was placed on emphasizing Iran’s commitment to the 
rationalist institutions of international society. In the statement, we see the insistence on mutual 
respect with regards to diplomacy and finding common grounds for cooperation, highly 
rationalist sentiments. The principle of non-interference, which is a trademark of the rationalist 
tradition, is also given importance. International law in regulating the affairs of states in 
international society, placing emphasis on the issue of Palestine, further accentuates the aim of 
strengthening the rationalist institution of international law. Tasks of international organizations 
such as the UN in tackling problematic global affairs and Iran’s pledge to actively participate 
likewise reflect the rationalist political discourse. Despite the dominance of rationalism 
nevertheless, traces of revolutionism loom in the background as ‘solidarity among Islamic and 
non-aligned countries’ is mentioned leaving out those not within these two spheres. Such an 
expression of preference for specific groups is striking indicating a slight tinge of parallelism 
with the foreign policy discourse of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. 
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Khatami insisted that Iran ‘has accorded the highest priority in its foreign policy to the removal 
of tension’ and expand its relations with its neighbours as well as the rest of the world ‘on the 
basis of respect for independence and equality of rights’.364 This statement is likewise 
remarkably rationalist in nature as Khatami wants to engage with the world on an equal footing. 
One of the first occasions he demonstrated this noble diplomatic intention was when Iran hosted 
the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Tehran in 1998. The event 
was the very first gathering of the Islamic countries in Iran and such was its success that the 
OIC declared that they will establish a Parliamentary Union with headquarters to be based in 
Tehran.365 As if in unison, the former President Khatami and his foreign minister, Kharrazi, 
constantly highlighted the need for understanding, building confidence and trust to get rid of 
the tensions to promote understanding and peace among states in the region as well as with the 
West. To do this, Khatami put forward a proposition that gained widespread popularity – the 
Dialogue Among Civilizations. 
6.2 Dialogue Among Civilizations and the revolutionist-rationalist axis 
Khatami wanted to have friendly relations with Iran’s neighbours and he made it very clear 
from the beginning of his presidency in 1997 and he had effectively used the language of 
diplomacy to this purpose. Fostering ties though, is not easy if you are Iran but he managed to 
utilize his position in re-establishing and enhancing Iran’s relations by introducing a concept of 
dialogue. The DAC was conceived as a response to Huntington’s more fatalistic Clash Among 
Civilization and was an innovative approach to international relations, highlighting the potential 
of mankind to achieve a peaceful world society anchored in the revolutionist tradition. It 
encourages and facilitates exchange among the cultural, social and political proponents of all 
countries to provide a better understanding of one another and bring mankind a step closer to 
the realization of a peaceful world society. Kharrazi emphasized that: 
‘Dialogue is the product of concurrent acceptance of commonality and diversity. From 
this perspective, international endorsement of dialogue illustrates recognition of the 
diversity of cultures and civilizations and the reaffirmation of the cultural rights of all 
peoples and nations, so that all human beings can engage members of other civilizations 
from the standpoint of their own culture, civilization and historical background, and not 
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by simply echoing the mentality of a totally alien culture. Only such interaction can be 
mutually enriching and indeed meaningful’.366 
Equality, tolerance and understanding amidst diversity is the main message, all reflecting 
universal moral values the revolutionist tradition dictates, which are among the vital ingredients 
enabling a cosmopolitan world society to emerge, if not meant merely to strengthen the 
rationalist international society. The DAC ‘was designed to facilitate communicative action, 
which would eventually lead to coexistence, tolerance and a degree of cooperation in the global 
arena’ while the discourse attached to it was a ‘message to the international community that 
Iran intended to come out of isolation and to assume a more active role in regional and global 
affairs’.367 Externally, meaning at the regional and international levels, the dialogue was 
primarily aimed at the non-political sectors such as sports, the arts and sciences especially from 
the West. Such exchange among individuals, communities and nations can facilitate an 
understanding between states building a foundation for trust and cooperation in international 
society demonstrating the rationalist and revolutionist dimension of Khatami’s political 
discourse. The rationalist end of the dialogue wants the world to recognize the plurality of 
nation-states within the international society and foster understanding among them to achieve 
common goals. The revolutionist end of the dialogue aims to transform international society 
into one whole organism that transcends the nation-state. At this point we can observe how 
cosmopolitanism has made its way into Iran’s political discourse. It is, however, a significantly 
different revolutionist vision as to that advocated by the supreme leader since it taps into a 
global cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision as opposed to an Islamic cosmopolitan one, which 
I discuss in Chapter 9 in the section on revolutionism. 
Making the DAC operational within the rationalist framework meant Iran’s ancient 
civilizational heritage had to be introduced to the world to show that at a cultural level, Iran 
was at par with the rest of the nation-states of the world. Misconceptions about Iran should be 
changed and Khatami ensured that Iran’s legacy to the world is made known at the United 
Nations and together with his foreign minister, they made special mention of this at the General 
Assembly as part of the justification of Iran’s call for peace through dialogue. 
‘Iran— as the biggest country in the region, enjoying a historical depth of several 
millennia combined with the richness of Islamic civilization — does not need to engage 
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in any arms build-up or competition. Our message to our neighbours is one of friendship 
and fraternity, and we shall warmly welcome any initiative to strengthen the foundations 
of confidence and cooperation in the region’.368 
‘I come from the noble land of Iran, representing a great and renowned nation famed for 
its ancient civilization, as well as for its distinguished contribution to the founding and 
expansion of the Islamic civilization…It is a nation which pioneered in the East the 
establishment of civil society and constitutional government in the course of its 
contemporary history…And it is a nation which carries the torch of its popular 
revolution, not won by force of arms or a coup, but by dethroning a regime of coup 
d’état through the power of the enlightened word…Our nation draws on its past to 
contemplate a better future, while defying reactionary tendencies and, backed by 
principles and ideals rooted in its religious, national, historical and revolutionary 
heritage and benefiting from positive achievements of contemporary civilization, 
marches, be it through trial and error, towards a promising tomorrow. The Islamic 
Revolution of the Iranian people was a revolt of reason against coercion and 
suppression. Certainly, a revolution which resorted to logic in the phase of destruction 
is much better disposed to resort to dialogue and reason in the phase of construction. 
Hence, it calls for a dialogue among civilizations and cultures instead of a clash between 
them’.369 
Vestiges of nationalism permeates throughout their messages, which is not an isolated 
phenomenon as it is observed in almost all the speeches used for this research, including those 
of the supreme leader. Nationalism as a more modern rationalist institution of international 
society, does not belong to the classic five that Hedley Bull had put forward but nevertheless 
bestows a rationalist touch to the statements and in the speeches above, it was specifically 
utilized to assert Iran’s rationalist mindset in engaging with the world through the DAC. 
Endorsing the rationalist dimension of Iran for the Khatami administration did not necessitate 
the creation of an enemy to solidify its national identity as it is only through inclusion that 
diplomatic ties can be built and restored. After all, Khatami and Kharrazi wanted to step away 
from the ‘Cold War mentality’ with its strategy of enmity exacerbating issues of international 
affairs. Iran, as a peace-seeking nation with a rich historical and civilizational background 
wanted to make friends with the rest of the world, including the West and integrate itself into 
the modern international society of sovereign nation-states with rationalism as its foundation. 
Whereas the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, aimed at demonizing the West to strengthen his 
vision of unifying the Islamic Ummah in a revolutionist venture, the former president, 
Mohammad Khatami, seeks to promote mutual understanding between Iran and the United 
States and settle issues of the past showcasing the more rationalist enterprise of the Islamic 
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Republic. Such an interplay of Khamenei’s revolutionist and Khatami’s rationalist strategies 
are evident in the speeches of both leaders. In the previous chapter, I indicated the rationalist 
influence in the supreme leader’s statements during the first term of Khatami’s presidency 
where the rationalist momentum was building up. In turn, we saw the revolutionist touch to 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse put forward by the former foreign minister where ‘the 
strengthening of the bonds of amity and solidarity among Islamic and non-aligned countries’ 
are prioritized indicating the presence of Khamenei’s influence.370 Regardless of this call for 
solidarity connoting a union against the West, Khatami made sure his message was heard by 
the West to overcome differences and try to understand each other through the DAC. To that 
end, the former president, unlike the supreme leader, did not straightforwardly attack the West 
and instead focused on advertising Iran’s strengths and Tehran’s commitment to rationalist 
principles of diplomacy, effectively leaving the door open for negotiations with those who 
understood Khatami’s intentions. His strategy was so effective that by March 17, 2000 the 
former U.S. Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright, admitted the role of the United States in 
the coup that ousted the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh 
in 1953.371 The move augured a possible warming up of relations between Tehran and 
Washington, the ultimate triumph of rationalist diplomacy that Khatami was targeting. The 
impetus, however, was short-lived as domestic issues mounted after the reformists dominated 
the second round of elections of the Iranian parliament in May 2000 sparking the conservative 
party backlash against the Khatami administration. 
‘Discourse and dialogue’ as opposed to ‘war and bloodshed’ is nevertheless the key feature of 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse under Khatami in spite of the internal domestic dilemmas his 
government was facing.372 In contrast to Khamenei, who vouched that the nature of the West 
was evil and violent and therefore makes it capable of criminality beyond forgiveness, Khatami 
stressed the importance of understanding each other’s civilization through dialogue to avoid 
bloody conflicts to move towards cooperation. Once again, rationalism emanates from 
Khatami’s message while Khamenei insists on a revolutionist approach to confront the United 
States. 2001 was designated as the United Nations ‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations’ as 
proposed by the former president. It was ‘a declaration of readiness to try a new model of 
interaction’ assuming that ‘the prosperity, welfare, development and security of one group, in 
                                                 
370 Kharrazi, “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 52nd Session of 
The UN General Assembly (1997)” 
371 Albright, “Secretary of State Albright announces easing of U.S. trade ban on Iran (speech transcript)” 
372 Khatami, “H.E. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, President of the I.R. of Iran before the 53rd Session of the UN 
General Assembly (1998)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
149 
 
spite of, or at the expense of, the poverty, hunger, underdevelopment and insecurity of others 
are simply deceptive and short-lived, and thus they need to be abandoned’.373 2001 though 
marked the year of the first major terrorist attack on U.S. soil and Iran’s aims of bringing states 
together became impeded by the events that followed. Iran was put in ‘the axis of evil’, showing 
the deep division between Iran and the United States which dialogue alone may not be able to 
repair. The ‘war on terror’ that followed further alienated the concept of dialogue and 
cooperation despite the best efforts of Khatami and Kharrazi to voice out that dialogue is the 
key to facing the difficulties of a post 9/11 world.374 Concerns were raised by the international 
community, headed by the United States, at the revelation of Iran’s nuclear program in 2002, 
becoming yet another enormous obstacle for the DAC that will haunt Iran for more than a 
decade. Diplomacy was not dead yet and Khatami’s administration assured the international 
society that the nuclear program was for peaceful civilian purposes with Iran proposing a 
‘Grand Bargain’ in 2003, only to be shot down by Washington. The American government 
simply did not trust Iran, the same way the Iranian government did not trust the Americans and 
so Khatami embarked on endorsing Iran’s cooperative side to prove that Tehran is a reliable 
team player. 
6.3 Iran the Team-player and Peace-maker 
From the outset, Khatami’s administration advocated cooperation and active participation in 
dealing with issues afflicting the international society whilst promoting a peace-seeking image. 
This emphasis on the rationalist principles of Iran’s foreign policy was a constant throughout 
Khatami’s presidency regardless of the circumstances. Due to Iran’s tarnished reputation since 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, it was clear that many countries, especially Western states, did 
not trust Iran. The only way to change this view of Tehran was through the promotion of 
dialogue as Iran sought ‘a world blessed with peace’ instead of a world dominated by Islam, 
which Khamenei envisions.375 In fact, shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United 
States, the former president suggested that ‘a coalition for peace instead of war and hostility’ 
should be established arguing that the ‘dialogue among civilizations is a step in this direction, 
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and it offers a new paradigm of interaction among nations and cultures in a world that longs for 
peace and security’.376 Of course, what ensued was completely the opposite and a coalition was 
built mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom to militarily intervene in Afghanistan 
(Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom).  
While the United States and the United Kingdom were preoccupied with the ‘war on terror’ and 
the respective military operations, Iran was engaged in cooperation efforts to stabilize the 
situation in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the interventions. Preventing the collapse 
of two of its neighbours was key for Iran in order to contain possible negative repercussions 
beyond the influx of potentially millions of refugees. It was clear that after 2001, terrorism had 
become a dangerous threat to international society and states must come together to combat it, 
hence the popularity of the ‘war on terror’. Terrorism has been known to pose a challenge and 
was considered a menace, years prior to the 9/11 attacks and globalization made it more 
complicated to deal with this phenomenon rooted in a culture of violence.377 Peace and order 
has become increasingly threatened and the rationalist principles and institutions of the 
international society were summoned to extinguish the threat or at the very least contain it. A 
‘coalition for peace’ may have been an idealistic way of combating terrorism and we would 
never fully understand what would have happened if the world had taken that course instead of 
displaying military might but what mattered at the time was a response to such a shocking attack 
on the West. Something had to be done and fast, regardless whether this meant breaking the 
rationalist principle of non-intervention, thus military interventions commenced even without 
a mandate from the United Nations. Iran of course did not want to be left behind knowing that 
the roots of terrorism are looming in its backyard, although Iran preferred a different approach 
as mentioned earlier. After all, terrorism was not just a problem that began in 2001 but was 
already well underway in the Middle East and Iran was finding ways to tackle the problem. 
Kharrazi reiterated Iran’s commitment to fighting terrorism in conjunction with drug-
trafficking already in 1997, which is an enormous problem in the Islamic Republic, as part of 
the foreign policy outline of the Khatami government whilst clearing out that the country has 
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been wrongly accused of supporting terrorism to achieve certain political purposes.378 In fact, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran portrays itself ‘as a victim of the most brutal acts of terrorism’ 
perhaps referring to the terror attacks of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Iran’s far-left political 
organization.379 The call to unite against this threat was already voiced out by Khatami years 
before the tragic event in the United States: 
‘The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have honest and sincere efforts to 
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism 
constituting an important priority. As required by our religious, moral and cultural 
values and norms, we unequivocally oppose all forms and manifestations of terrorism, 
and we shall combat it vigorously and earnestly. In our view, in order to eradicate this 
menace, we should engage in serious and transparent international cooperation to 
combat terrorism, and at the same time redouble our efforts to attain the objective of 
global justice.380 
By bringing together countries through the DAC, Khatami had hoped that a global multilateral 
coalition against terrorism would be formed with Kharrazi highlighting the need for ‘common 
and rule-based strategies to fight and eradicate’ terrorism citing the significance of the role of 
the United Nations.381 When Khatami discussed his ‘coalition for peace’ he mentioned that 
‘combating the sinister phenomenon of terrorism is an urgent and unavoidable imperative’ 
which the United Nations can legitimately arrange to uproot terrorism ‘through viable, just and 
non-discriminatory measures’.382 Once again, the dominance of rationalism in statements 
regarding terrorism is striking as resort to military intervention and violence is downplayed 
referring to the principle of the rationalist institution of war where war should be avoided at all 
costs as it disturbs peace. However, by legitimizing a war against terrorism through an 
international organ such as the United Nations, perhaps a justified retaliation towards terrorism 
could have been tailored with the cooperation of all nation-states in the international society 
making it a means to restore peace. It was clear that terrorism was a ‘global phenomenon’ 
requiring collective effort of the states in international society but unilateralism got ahead of 
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the game.383 Working with the United Nations has long been considered as an effective strategy 
by the Khatami administration and the former president and foreign minister consistently 
stressed the successes of such a method in tackling international problems, demonstrating Iran’s 
strong faith in the potential of the organization as well as the more rationalist mindset of 
Khatami. 
Promoting Iran’s credibility is one of the ways the Khatami government could draw other states 
to its cause of participating in a concerted effort against threats to humanity such as terrorism. 
In order to achieve this, Khatami and Kharrazi stressed Iran’s active humanitarian and peace-
making role in Afghanistan working with the United Nations as well as the OIC.384 By 
informing all the states of international society through the UN channel of Iran’s efforts in 
tackling the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan as well as mediating between warring factions, 
the Khatami government wants to prove that it is an agent of peace, with the intention of solving 
problems in the region as well as in the world. Khatami was well aware that the world is yet to 
find confidence in Iran and trust it in order to see the country as a team player. Afghanistan is 
the prime example wherein Iran could display its rationalist worldview ultimately aimed at 
convincing the world of the new image of Iran as a reliable partner with its political worldview 
anchored in the rationalist tradition. Iran is working to assist the people of Afghanistan in 
rebuilding their country and ensure that their citizens regain their rights as well as regain their 
sovereignty not through unilateral measures but through cooperating with international 
organizations.385 This shows that Iran is not interested in destroying the country or any other 
country for that matter upholding the rationalist norm of non-intervention. The urgency of the 
situation in Afghanistan has been brought to the attention of the international community by 
Kharrazi years before the terror attacks in New York and the call has been repeated annually in 
hopes of getting more states to help.386 
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The elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is also another significant point 
highlighted in the yearly statements of the Khatami administration at the United Nations. 
Having been a victim of the use of deadly chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran 
emphasizes how deadly and inhumane the use of such weapons is. Saddam Hussein used 
mustard gas and nerve agents against Iran at different points during the war causing severe 
casualties. Those that survived these attacks still suffer from the effects of the chemical 
weapons. At the time of writing, the Tehran Peace Museum in Park-e Shahr in Tehran had on 
display illustrations of the effect of such harmful weapons as a reminder of the tragic effects of 
war and the use of WMDs. This bitter experience is engraved in the minds of the Iranian nation, 
especially since the international community did not come to Iran’s aid during the war. Hence, 
condemning the use of and demanding the complete eradication of WMDs have been a top 
priority of Iran’s foreign policy and the Khatami administration accentuated this in almost every 
statement they made at the United Nations. Along the same lines, Iran has constantly 
condemned war and the suffering of peoples in different countries as a result of war since the 
Islamic Republic speaks from its own experience and the Khatami government has supported 
the proposition of a zone free from WMDs in the Middle East to bring about peace.387 This 
insistence on peace and avoidance of war at all cost further emphasizes the dominance of the 
rationalist tradition in Khatami’s foreign policy discourse and having gone through the horrible 
experience of an eight-year long war, it is understandable that Tehran adheres to such a 
rationalist understanding of war. War, as an institution of the modern international society of 
sovereign nation-states, is supposed to be avoided and the United Nations was established after 
the Second World War ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourges of war’ as stated in 
the preamble of the UN Charter.388 Iran sees the UN as a project of peace and the Khatami 
administration wanted to prove that Iran could also partake in this project of peace and even be 
an active agent in promoting peace instead of bloodshed with Khatami’s government 
referencing the Islamic Republic’s experience during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Insecurity in the Middle East due to Israel’s possession of WMDs and its treatment of the 
Palestinians have also been raised as an issue of concern by both Khatami and Kharrazi at the 
United Nations insisting that failure to address these core issues in the region inhibits the 
establishment of security, stability and peace. Such a demand and a vision reflects a rationalist 
understanding of international relations wherein the rights of the Palestinians, like the Afghans, 
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should be given to them as demanded by the rationalist institution of international law 
demanding the state of Israel to recognize the human rights of the Palestinians.389 The negation 
of war as a rationalist institution of international society, is considered viable by the Khatami 
administration only through a total elimination of WMDs. For a country that had no access to 
any type of WMD during the eight-year long war with Saddam while being a victim of the use 
of chemical weapons, it is only logical that Iran does have insecurities regarding these weapons 
and this has two implications. First, is that in principle, due to experiencing such horrid 
incidents caused by WMDs, Iran feels more secure if WMDs were to be eliminated in the 
region. Second, since no one had come to the aid of Iran and provided them with weapons to 
defend itself during the war with Iraq, Iran might be keen on developing its own WMD for its 
own future defence. It is here that the suspicion of Iran’s uranium enrichment with its potential 
for developing weapons grade uranium is aimed at and Tehran is well-aware of it. Nevertheless, 
the Khatami administration, and later, the Ahmadinejad government persistently insist on Iran’s 
right to have a nuclear program for peaceful civilian purposes. Being a member of the NPT, 
Iran does reserve the right to have a peaceful nuclear program, reflecting the rationalist 
institution of international law despite all the suspicions of the United States. At least during 
the Khatami administration, Iran was prepared to negotiate with the West to prove that the 
nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, hence the ‘Grand Bargain’ was proposed by 
Tehran. However, this move that could have spared both countries almost a decade of agitation 
was dismissed by Washington, perhaps as a repercussion of the events of 9/11. Diplomacy was 
Khatami’s strength and his government tried to prove, but with little success, that Iran is capable 
of being rational on the same level as the West and of building trust through dialogue instead 
of confrontation, which was preferred by his successor. 
6.4 A New World Order: the thin line between rationalism and revolutionism 
Without demonizing the United States and the West, Khatami and Kharrazi managed to criticize 
the current system by pointing out that the current order is outdated and cannot address the 
problems of humanity. Suffering through oppression, violence and aggression has become 
widespread and the system has mostly exacerbated the situation as most actors at the global 
stage still play by the rules of the Cold War, encouraging exclusionism: 
‘During this century, exclusion often surfaced as a paradigm of global interaction, in 
which the world is viewed in terms of modes of loyalty, countries are viewed as 
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belonging to coalitions or not and are divided, rewarded and blamed accordingly. Today, 
the utility of this paradigm is being seriously questioned, as is the validity of some of 
our basic assumptions. The cold war was the last episode of exclusion. It has 
undoubtedly left its negative imprint on international affairs, but more regrettably it has 
permanently scarred the mentality of global actors and international relations theory. 
One of the most horrifying manifestations of exclusion has been the global arms race’.390 
Highlighting the end of the bipolar world, the former president and his foreign minister, wants 
to draw the world’s attention to the need of changing the dynamics of international relations to 
inclusion, cooperation and active participation at the global level requiring a change of mindset. 
Khatami states that ‘confidence and peace cannot be attained without a sober revision of the 
mentality of the cold war’.391 He wants to showcase that Iran’s approach to international affairs 
has changed respectively as shaped by his government. Realism as the foundation of the Cold 
War is not found appealing by the Khatami administration thus an emphasis on the much-
needed transition from the realist tradition to a rationalist one is observed in most of the 
speeches Khatami and Kharrazi gave at the United Nations and at certain points in their 
statements, the revolutionist tradition makes itself visible. Indeed, the former president spoke 
of a ‘human society’ when discussing issues plaguing mankind, which can be interpreted as a 
very revolutionist way of perceiving the world through the Kantian notion of an entity that 
transcends the nation-state.392 Since tragedies, catastrophes and suffering happens at the 
individual level, Khatami makes use of the concept of ‘human society’ to refer to mankind as a 
whole, making it a terminology linking the former president’s statements to the revolutionist 
idea of a world society that transcends nation-states. ‘Human society’ is at the heart of 
Khatami’s DAC as it promotes an exchange at the individual level, with nation-states being set 
aside to encourage understanding at the civilian level of the population again reflecting 
revolutionist currents at work in the former president’s approach to foreign policy. With more 
understanding among individuals of different nation-states, more cooperation to bring about 
peace and prosperity is envisioned to bring ‘human society’ forward and for this reason, the 
strengthening of civil society was also important for Khatami, indicating his subscription to the 
revolutionist tradition. 
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In the realist tradition, power was situated in the hands of a few – during the Cold War only in 
the hands of two – which was criticized heavily by the Khatami government as he believes in 
the rationalist tradition wherein power must be shared by all the states in the system. It is this 
very point wherein Khatami propagates more participation of states in the system. Unilateralism 
is likewise outright rejected by the Khatami administration and Kharrazi characterizes it as ‘the 
antithesis of universal participation in decision-making and law-based cooperation at the 
international level’.393 The former foreign minister believes that the international community 
‘simply cannot provide a peaceful and prosperous life for people through coercion, autocratic 
decisions and a cultural domination and hegemony’ highlighting the repudiation of realist 
interpretation of balance of power wherein expediency and coercion is given priority in foreign 
policy.394 During the military intervention of the United States in Iraq in 2003, realism reached 
a peak in the statements as Iran condemned the actions of Washington describing it in realist 
terminologies as it embodies unilateralism, which the Khatami outright rejected from the 
beginning. The military intervention was ‘an unsanctioned war against Iraq,’ and ‘lawless 
militarism’ highlighting that the United States was operating in the realist institution of war 
since it was not approved by the United Nations.395 The war of course proved that the current 
order was indeed following Cold War mentality and that an alternative must be found. 
From the outset, the Khatami administration proposed a new doctrine for regulating 
international affairs based on the rule of law, a remarkably rationalist approach in dealing with 
the challenges of the time. Kharrazi put forward a ‘doctrine of global civil society’, which ‘is 
predicated on two major principles, the first being the institutionalization of the rule of law in 
domestic and international relations’ and the second ‘is that of empowerment and 
participation’.396 Khatami’s government was a strong proponent of taking democracy to the 
international level where all states of international society submit to the rules of international 
law and his government believed that ‘expansion and broadening of the participatory base of 
the future global order on the basis of norms acceptable to all cultures and peoples is most 
conducive to building a better tomorrow, and to ensuring freedom, security, stability and 
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sustainable development at the national, regional and international levels’.397 The rationalist 
understanding of the institution of international law is evident in the Khatami administration’s 
statements as well as the role of civil society. 
Domestically, during Khatami’s presidency, Iran enjoyed an empowerment of civil society as 
part of the reforms and internationally, Khatami echoed the need for a global civil society in 
addressing the challenges of the rapidly globalizing world. The rationalist approach is not only 
promoted within the country but also outside the country proving that Iran means business and 
is ready to engage with the rest of the world through its thorough reform agenda. Democracy 
was a key aspect of Khatami’s strategy anchored in the rationalist tradition and it is within the 
framework of an Islamic democracy that civil society in Iran flourished. At the Millennium 
Assembly, Khatami stated that:  
‘The right of man to determine his destiny, the emanation of authority, particularly 
political authority, from the free will and choice of the population, its submission to the 
continued scrutiny of the people and the institutionalization of such human 
accountability constitute the major characteristics of democracy… No particular form 
of democracy can be prescribed as the only and final model. Let us allow the unfolding 
endeavours to formulate democracy in the context of spirituality and morality usher in 
yet another model for democratic life. Let us strive so that the exigencies of a few power-
holders do not supersede the interest of humanity through familiar practices of the 
endorsement of undemocratic Governments not responsive to the will and needs of their 
people and the application of double and multiple standards of response to incidents 
around the globe. Let us submit to democratic principles not only as the criteria of good 
governance domestically, but also as the new norm governing interaction in the global 
society, whose constituents, much like equal individuals within nation states, are nations 
of equal right and dignity’.398 
Khatami’s government was trying to reformulate democracy to fit the framework of Islam in 
Iran, exhibiting that rationalist democratic principles can also be found in a country that had 
undergone a religious revolution. Democracy at the national and international levels were 
advocated by Khatami and Kharrazi to bring about a more just decision-making process 
regarding international affairs, indicating a diffusion of power that can be shared by all states 
in determining policies that affect the entire international society of sovereign nation-states. It 
is through this rationalist perspective that Khatami and his foreign minister framed the 
attainment of peace and stability which can be stimulated through understanding brought about 
by the DAC as well as democracy and cooperation. If a global civil society can be realized 
through such mechanisms, then nations can work together to tackle issues challenging the 
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‘human society’ since the September 11 attacks indicating ‘that the division between centre and 
periphery can no longer define the security order of the world today, for even the most 
marginalized sectors might be able to inflict blows on the biggest powers’.399 The only way to 
move forward, from the point of view of the Khatami administration is through dialogue and 
cooperation – a profoundly rationalist approach. It was a very positive one as much as it was 
idealistic. Nevertheless, international political events following the 9/11 attacks overwhelmed 
the rationalist momentum as the United States ventured into the Middle East in a unilateral 
militarist intervention reducing the DAC to an unfinished diplomatic fairy-tale. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Khatami’s mainly rationalist foreign policy discourse has worked well for Iran as it became the 
means through which Iran could attain a degree of security ensuring its survival by re-
establishing ties with its neighbours and the world. His revolutionist vision though, diverges 
from Khamenei since he talks of a world society consisting of all humanity instead of just the 
Islamic world alone. The realist tone in Khatami’s political discourse is limited to criticizing 
the West and the current system ran by hegemonic powers, reflecting the former president’s 
knowledge of the tradition. He is more an advocate, though, of rationalism or said differently, 
responsible for executing the ‘means’ of Iran’s foreign policy, at least at the discursive level. 
Cooperation and dialogue to achieve peace, anchored in the rationalist tradition, are the two 
principles set out by Former President Khatami and his Foreign Minster Kharrazi at the United 
Nations. Iran wanted to come out of isolation and progress further and to do this, speaking the 
language of the modern international society of nation-states is essential to activating the 
institutions. Diplomacy was the key rationalist institution, which Khatami’s government 
carefully tended to as he spoke of ‘mutual respect’ as a factor for negotiations with countries in 
international affairs. With diplomacy, the realization of ‘common interests’ can be achieved, 
another principle advocated by the rationalist tradition. ‘Non-interference in the internal affairs 
of others’ indicate Iran’s adherence to the norm of non-intervention that accompanies 
sovereignty in international society. Reference to the institution of international law in their 
statements further strengthens the profoundly rationalist approach of the Khatami government 
in Iran’s foreign policy. 
                                                 
399 Khatami, “H.E. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, President of the I.R. of Iran before the 56th Session of the UN 
General Assembly (2001)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
159 
 
 
Graph 14. The three traditions during the Khatami administration. 
Khatami’s DAC project was fundamentally rationalist in nature as it emphasized the plurality 
of the states in international society promoting better understanding among them to pursue 
cooperation in realizing common goals. However, it had a revolutionist dimension to it as it 
sought to strengthen the human constituency of the international society as the exchanges 
between nation-states were facilitated by non-governmental entities indicating that an element 
of transcending the nation-state is at work. A constant reference to ‘human society’, reflects 
this revolutionist vision of Khatami when he discusses the problems facing humanity that 
likewise transcends nation-states. The graph above shows the dominance of the rationalist and 
revolutionist traditions in the Khatami administration’s statements reflecting their foreign 
policy. As you can see, the values of rationalism reach up to 5.89%, indicating their conformity 
to the rationalist tradition whereas the realist tradition remains around 1%. The tendency of the 
revolutionist tradition to influence foreign policy is also reflected in the graph where values 
remain close to rationalism, even surpassing it at one point prior to 2001. It is important to 
remember though this sort of revolutionism is not like Khamenei’s which is bound to Islam. 
Rather, Khatami’s revolutionism conceived mankind as one organism called the ‘human 
society’, a more cosmopolitan approach. Interestingly, the 9/11 attacks perhaps changed the 
discourse leaving revolutionism to slack effectively crashing Khatami’s revolutionist vision for 
the international society. 
7 Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy Discourse 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected into office at a time when the devastating effects of the 
‘war on terror’ were becoming more widespread in the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear program 
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was being negotiated. It was during his presidency that Iran’s fundamentally realist goal of 
survival and security becomes evident as sanctions on Iran increased dramatically, affecting 
Iran’s economy. Thus, he had to use strategies guided by the rationalist tradition as a means to 
survive thereby strengthening bilateral trade relations to those willing to work with Iran. The 
revolutionist vision in his political discourse, however, overshadows the other two traditions as 
he delivered lectures on morality, justice and Islam at the United Nations General Assembly 
each year.  
Dialogue was not a part of Ahmadinejad’s typical political vocabulary manifested by his highly 
confrontational rhetorical approach. It was so confrontational that by the end of his second term, 
Iran was at loggerheads with the international community regarding the nuclear program, which 
made the realist goal of survival more difficult to achieve. Despite the difficulties, 
Ahmadinejad’s strategy enhanced Iran’s popularity within the Islamic and Arab world as it 
targeted the United States among others. Ahmadinejad effectively reversed the little successes 
of his predecessor in terms of reconciling with the West and engaged in a campaign of 
demonization of the system by obsessively pointing at U.S. domination, a revolutionist-inspired 
move strikingly identical to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Apart from that nonetheless, 
Ahmadinejad’s speeches contained a significant amount of rationalism reflecting the inevitable 
intertwining of the three traditions in foreign policy. 
The unashamedly and unapologetically revolutionist approach of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy 
discourse, is a prominent feature of the former president’s statements. Confrontational, populist 
or irrational are some of the words to be associated with Ahmadinejad. His revolutionist mission 
and vision at the General Assembly made him appear to be more interested in converting 
political leaders into being religious followers than practically solving international issues. The 
popularity of his revolutionist vision in the Islamic world outweighs the rationalist currents in 
his foreign policy message. This is evident when he talks about Iran’s right to access nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes and voices out the legitimate rights of the peoples who suffered 
from military interventions. Compared with the two traditions of revolutionism and rationalism, 
realism in Ahmadinejad’s statements remains in its modest role of demonizing the West. It is 
aimed at the United States justifying Ahmadinejad’s revolutionist agenda at the international 
stage – a strategy similar to the supreme leaders’ and Khatami’s criticism of the West to an 
extent. 
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7.1 Realism in the Unjust World Order  
From the outset of his presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was keen on exposing the 
weaknesses of the global system although it was a much more gradual process with a much 
lighter tone at his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to harsher ones 
as the years progressed. His predecessor had already mentioned the flaws plaguing the system 
and ways of potentially improving it in a much more diplomatic manner while Ahmadinejad 
capitalized on naming and shaming countries, particularly in the West, mirroring the Hajj 
speeches of the supreme leader. This was mostly due to the Security Council’s opposition to 
Iran’s nuclear program, which came under fire as soon as Ahmadinejad took office and resumed 
uranium enrichment. From Iran’s perspective, the West was once again intervening in the 
country’s affairs as it did historically to impede its technological progress. For him, it meant 
that Iran is being deprived of an alternative source of energy that will become more important 
as fossil fuel reserves are getting consumed to exhaustion. This is pure intervention and defies 
the rationalist norm in his view. I discuss nuclear politics in a separate section below but for 
now let’s return to how Ahmadinejad frames the unjust world order in his discourse. 
By pointing out power relations of states as well as the political expediency of the West, 
generating an unjust world order where weaker countries such as Iran must suffer, 
Ahmadinejad’s statements regarding the international community which I have analysed for 
this research showcase a strong presence of the realist tradition. Negativity and distress is quite 
clear in Ahmadinejad’s annual message to the UNGA, but instead of providing a rationalist 
solution such as his predecessor Khatami, he chooses a revolutionist vision and strategy 
typically used by the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Like Khamenei, Ahmadinejad argues that all 
the world problems can only be resolved through absolute faith and obedience to God and His 
will. His criticisms of the West, framed in the realist tradition, are very much like the exact 
repetition of the statements of Iran’s supreme leader. Actions of the West, in particular the 
United States, can only be interpreted in realist terms to legitimise and justify Iran’s disposition 
in international society as a revolutionist state guided by Islam, a move most evident in the 
statements of Khamenei. In every speech, realism is a purely materialistic enterprise practiced 
by the United States and its Western allies reflecting the core arguments normally found in the 
remarks of the supreme leader. Ahmadinejad simply resonates the same message at the United 
Nations for the international political elites to hear it justifying Iran’s foreign policy. The 
leverage of hegemonic powers, in particular the United States, is emphasized to be immoral 
bringing about dire consequences for the rest of the world and cementing an unjust world order 
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which Ahmadinejad argues is in place to systematically keep the powerful in their position.400 
He states that: 
‘Theories of development that are in line with the hegemonic system and not in 
accordance with the true needs of humankind and human societies have become 
repetitive and bland tools for assimilating economies, expanding hegemonic domination 
and destroying the environment and the social solidarity of nations. There is no end in 
sight to this. Poverty, hunger and deprivation are hurting more than one billion of the 
world’s population and have dashed their hopes for a decent life’.401 
In his view, such a system is pointless and so he turns to religion to point out that morality is 
needed in international affairs to stop the suffering of humanity. This is the main recurring 
theme throughout all his statements. Like Khamenei’s arguments, Ahmadinejad concludes that 
the suffering of humanity due to the immorality of the materialistic West, following the realist 
tradition, can only be countered through religion as it is the base of morality, reflecting the 
vitality of the revolutionist vision for Iran’s foreign policy. Ahmadinejad echoes Khamenei’s 
binary opposition by applying it to the issues plaguing the international system and speaking 
about this in front of an international political, rather than religious, audience. Instead of calling 
for a theological cosmopolitan whole, such as Khamenei’s Islamic Civilization, Ahmadinejad 
is endorsing a unity among those who suffer from the system, usually developing countries, 
encapsulating them as victims. Through this victimization narrative, he can endorse Iranian 
heroism of standing up to the powerful hegemon such as the United States – likewise a common 
theme of the supreme leader’s speeches. Thus, by the same premise, Iran is advertised to be a 
prime example of how states should gain their independence from such a system dominated by 
an immoral hegemon.  Ahmadinejad uses the nuclear program to prove his point gaining him 
widespread popularity among the developing nations, especially in the region. Former President 
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela perhaps best exemplifies the ‘Ahmadinejad effect’ on the 
international society when he blatantly called the former President of the United States, George 
W. Bush, a ‘devil’ in the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. ‘Hypocrisy and deceit’ is 
claimed by Ahmadinejad to be way Washington secures ‘their interests and imperialistic goals’, 
also a statement that could have exactly come from the supreme leader’s mouth.402 There are, 
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however, rationalist influences in Ahmadinejad’s political statements, which I discuss at the 
end of this chapter. But before I get into that, I elaborate more on the dichotomy of the actions 
of the immoral West, functioning within a realist premise and the religious revolutionist vision 
that Ahmadinejad presents to the international society. The intertwining of realist concepts 
within the revolutionist rhetoric, a trademark of Khamenei’s speeches, is also explored in the 
next sections. 
7.2 The immoral materialistic West 
Realism, in the sense of pursuing goals by disregarding the law and moral values, in the 
speeches of Ahmadinejad can be identified through how he defines the West, particularly the 
United States, and their actions. He classifies the United States as a realist actor, proving his 
knowledge of the tradition by speaking of the U.S. as a power. Khamenei’s influence in his 
remarks is evident although what is striking is that the former president does not demonize the 
United States and its allies such as Israel the way the supreme leader does. Ahmadinejad simply 
never used the term ‘Great Satan’ in referring to America in his speeches at the UN. He only 
makes an association by saying that ‘the self-proclaimed centres of power’ ‘have entrusted 
themselves to the Devil’.403 Practicing the realist tradition is synonymous to following the 
teachings of Lucifer since the former president urges that the ‘centres of power’ are accountable 
for the ‘current abysmal situation of the world’.404 Below, I discuss the details of the actions of 
the West that, according to Ahmadinejad, have brought distraught to the international society 
reflecting realism in his worldview. 
When it comes to the institution of diplomacy, the United Nations is an important regime 
through which sovereign nation-states of international society can discuss, interact and 
negotiate certain issues and was founded based on the rationalist tradition. As I am going to 
elaborate in the last section of this chapter, Ahmadinejad’s political discourse contains a strong 
rationalist dimension amidst the dominance of revolutionism and realism. For the former 
president, the true potential of the United Nations has not been realized as the ‘powers’ have 
instrumentalized the Security Council, using it as a tool of ‘threat and coercion’ making certain 
global arrangements unjust and discriminatory.405 Here he exposes the realist dimension of the 
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institution of diplomacy as coercion in the UN becomes a means through which the powerful 
states attain their goals. He believes that the Security Council can no longer perform its 
obligation of maintaining ‘international peace and security based on justice’ due to the 
‘monopolistic powers’.406 The very definition of the United States and its Western allies as 
‘powers’ already denotes the former president’s realist understanding of their position and 
action in the international system. In the institution of diplomacy, according to the statements 
of Ahmadinejad, the West negotiates from a position of power showing their independence 
from the system and their capacity to coerce other nation-states with the Security Council being 
one of their instruments. 
Since realist actors in the international system disregard international law and norms to pursue 
their objectives, Ahmadinejad’s description of the actions of the United States and its allies 
affirm his realist classification of them as he accuses them of violating international law despite 
being the ones who drafted it.407  
‘Threats with nuclear weapons and other instruments of war by some powers have taken 
the place of respect for the rights of nations and the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and tranquility; For some powers, claims of promotion of human rights and democracy 
can only last as long as they can be used as instruments of pressure and intimidation 
against other nations. But when it comes to the interests of the claimants, concepts such 
as democracy, the right of self-determination of nations, respect for the rights and 
intelligence of peoples, international law and justice have no place or value’.408 
Occupation of a sovereign nation-state, such as Iraq, is one of the recurrent issues that the 
former president points out as an example of the United States’ violation of international law – 
a similar argument seen in the speeches of the supreme leader. He condemns occupation as ‘an 
unforgivable crime’ referring to U.S. unilateralism and the Israeli conflict as such actions defy 
international law, and made it a point to remind the international society of these issues at the 
UN each year.409 
The realist institutions of balance of power, great power management and war are perhaps the 
most prominent in Ahmadinejad’s speeches. Already by referring to the United States and the 
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West as ‘centres of power’ he expresses their dominant position in the international system in 
a realist framework. Statements such as: ‘Certain powers equate themselves with the 
international community’ and ‘consider themselves the masters and rulers of the entire world’ 
clearly reflects the former president’s realist perspective of the West.410 These can be traced 
within the institutions of balance of power and great power management as he adds to it that 
the ‘powers sacrifice all human values, including honesty, purity and trust, for the advancement 
of their goals’.411 The powers are devoid of morality as they embark on a realist path in the 
international society and are depicted not as the devil but as a ‘bully’ that uses the language of 
threats, intimidation and advocates arms race.412 A constant state of conflict within the 
international system reflects the realist institution of war. To this end, Ahmadinejad highlights 
the militarism and possession of nuclear weaponry of the U.S. and its allies as part of their 
national interest to facilitate arms race in their favour to preserve their positions of power.413 
Explicitly positioning the U.S. and its allies as the ‘powers’ in an international system behaving 
within the confines of the realist tradition reinforces Ahmadinejad’s realist worldview. He calls 
attention to the flaws generated within the system as the ‘powers’ break international law and 
engage immorally with weaker nation-states. Like the supreme leader, the former president’s 
finds the solution in the revolutionist vision of Islam, which opposes immorality and 
materialism. Ahmadinejad feeds the anti-imperialist discourse as he raises the issue of injustices 
committed by the West inflicting suffering to the people of the region through military 
intervention after 9/11. He crafts the binary opposition from within international society by 
classifying the two poles of ‘the powers’ and ‘the rest’ showing parallelism with the supreme 
leader’s ‘the Great Satan’ and ‘us Muslims’. I discuss Ahmadinejad’s revolutionist campaign 
within the United Nations in the next section before expanding on the rationalist contents of his 
arguments at the end of this chapter. 
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7.3 The myth of the Saviour: Mahmoud, the Supreme Leader of the UN 
Ahmadinejad wants to gain allies in a holy war against the West, mimicking the supreme leader. 
He wants to set Iran as an example so he chooses his words carefully and avoids using the 
supreme leader’s favourite phrase ‘the Great Satan’ when referring to the United States. To 
him, the U.S. and its allies are simply ‘hegemonic powers’ or simply ‘powers’, pure realists by 
his classification. The former president said: ‘Is it not high time for these powers to return from 
the path of arrogance and obedience to Satan to the path of faith in God?’.414 The United States 
and its Western allies then, are not the devils per se, but are only following Satan. He seems to 
indicate that there is hope and they can redeem themselves by following the path of God. Here 
we see a missionary statement in Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourse, where the U.S. and 
its allies have a choice to submit themselves to the will of God. After all, it would be a great 
achievement for him as an individual to convert non-Muslims to Islam or at the very least 
convince a non-believer to believe in God as Ahmadinejad assumes the task of an Imam or a 
priest. Such missionary statements reflect the revolutionist vision, anchored in religion, 
penetrating Ahmadinejad’s political discourse and affects Iran’s foreign policy. The former 
president’s sentiments are close to Khamenei’s remarks as the supreme leader advocates the 
union of Islamic countries while Ahmadinejad spreads monotheistic doctrine with an Islamic 
touch. The only difference is, the former president attempts to create a camp including all 
monotheistic religions against non-believers whereas Khamenei’s battle is between the moral 
spiritual Islam versus the immoral materialistic West. This division into binary opposition, 
camp of the faithful versus heretics, is one defining characteristic of revolutionism as discussed 
in the theory chapter. The main concept in the discourses of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad 
remained the same. They both demand states to choose between moral spiritual monotheism, 
Islam if possible, which they claim can solve all of humanity’s problems, and immoral 
materialistic West led by the United States, who is following Satan. 
Justice is one of the themes wherein the former president starkly anchors the revolutionist 
tradition, as he links it to morality, spirituality and monotheism, particularly naming Islam and 
the Shi’a’s belief in the coming of the Hidden Imam. Imam Mahdi, the last of the twelve Shi’a 
Imams is supposed to have gone into occultation and will return alongside Jesus Christ to bring 
about a reign of justice in the world.415 Frequent reference is given to Mahdi by the former 
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president and his arrival being awaited by many. Ahmadinejad refers to him in the speeches as: 
‘the promised one’, ‘the perfect man’, ‘the complete human’.416 With Jesus Christ, Mahdi’s 
main mission is to ‘design and implement just and humanistic mechanisms for regulating the 
constructive relationships between nations and Governments’ and ‘lead the freedom and justice 
lovers to eradicate tyranny and discrimination, and promote knowledge, peace, justice freedom 
and love across the world’.417 Here the ‘myth of the saviour’ becomes evident, a characteristic 
of Iranian politics, and ‘a recurrent motif which enjoys both a religious and a nationalist 
constituency’.418 According to Iranian history scholar, Ali Ansari, ‘successive crises and 
instability, at least since the eighteenth century, have generated demands for a saviour to restore 
order, stability and a measure of justice’.419 With the problems of humanity spiralling out of 
control, Ahmadinejad promotes this myth in the international society framing it in a 
revolutionist perspective arguing that monotheism is the only solution. Unlike the supreme 
leader who promotes exclusively Islam as the sole path, Ahmadinejad includes monotheistic 
religions like Christianity as evident in his frequent reference to the second coming of Jesus 
Christ together with Imam Mahdi. Khamenei speaks of strengthening Islam as a whole without 
preference to any sect as his audience are mainly Muslims during the Hajj whereas 
Ahmadinejad advocates monotheism as his audience at the UN are international political elites. 
Both foreign policy discourses of the former president and the supreme leader exhibit a 
commonality not only in their inclusivity, which is heavily dependent on the audience, but also 
towards the enemy being the immoral materialistic West led by the United States. The realist 
undercurrent of their messages developed through revolutionism becomes apparent as 
Ahmadinejad claims an ultimate confrontation between good and evil forces will take place 
when the saviour returns.  
‘Would it not be easier for global powers to ensure their longevity and win hearts and 
minds through the championing of real promotion of justice, compassion and peace, 
than through continuing the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the threat 
of their use?’.420 
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For Ahmadinejad, the longevity of global powers can also be achieved through true moral 
values such as justice, compassion and peace but since they are purely evil realists, the powers 
dominate with military might. This enhances the good versus evil argument of the former 
president with Iran of course being in the good side. Through this statement, Ahmadinejad is 
appealing to the hearts and minds of the international society as he speaks of ‘justice, 
compassion and peace’ propagating monotheism and God’s will – a missionary revolutionist 
manoeuvre. Of course, he sees these values to be the opposite of the evil militaristic realist 
tradition that the global powers have practiced. He goes as far to say that ‘monotheism, justice 
and compassion for humans should predominate in all the pillars of the United Nations, and this 
Organization should be a forum for justice, where every member should enjoy equal spiritual 
and legal support’.421 Monotheism is considered here as a revolutionist concept as it transcends 
nation-state barriers similar to the unification of the Islamic Ummah advocated by the supreme 
leader. Surprisingly, in 2007, the former president invited nation-states to create a ‘Coalition 
for Peace’ meant to be a ‘front of fraternity, amity and sustainable peace, based on monotheism 
and justice… to prevent incursions and arrogance and to promote the culture of affection and 
justice’ led by Iran.422 In this sense, Ahmadinejad positions himself as the supreme leader of 
the United Nations by relentlessly repeating the message of monotheism each year at the 
General Assembly. In some instances, it appears as if he views himself as the saviour by voicing 
out the concerns of humanity in the UN and making his defiance of the West regarding the 
nuclear program the beginning of this holy war as he seeks to bring justice in the system. In 
fact, Ahmadinejad’s speech in 2009, literally resembles a statement of the supreme leader in 
2004 slamming liberalism, Marxism and capitalism in favour of religion: 
‘Liberalism and capitalism that have alienated human beings from heavenly and moral 
values will never bring happiness for humanity because they are the main source of all 
misfortune wars, poverty and deprivation… By the grace of God, Marxism is gone. It is 
now history. The expansionist Capitalism will certainly have the same fate. Because 
based on the divine traditions referred to as a principle in the Holy Koran, the wrong is 
like the bubbles on the surface of water, will disappear. There remains only what that 
can be used forever towards the interest of human societies’.423 
‘With the decline of certain ideologies such as Marxism or Socialism, and with the 
unveiling of the real nature of western liberal democracy founded on the bases of deceits 
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and hypocrisy, Islam has now emerged as the sole and ideal set of thoughts that can 
bring justice and freedom long-aspired by the free-minded people of the world’.424 
The awakening of nations, a recurrent theme in the supreme leader’s statements, likewise 
appears in the former president’s speeches as he mimics the revolutionist language normally 
used by Khamenei where religion becomes an instrument to mobilize those against the West.425 
Defeating the realist immoral materialistic and highly militarized West through the revolutionist 
tradition by means of submitting to monotheism, morality and spirituality and showing 
resistance presupposes a conflict between two binary poles of good and evil. Confrontation 
through whatever channel, such as religion grounded in the revolutionist tradition, reverts to 
realism, as the aim of such a battle is to have a victor. Once the victor has emerged, in their 
vision the Islamic Republic, an empire arises to dominate the weak. This explains the 
intertwining of revolutionism and realism. Mobilizing a religious group, such as the Islamic 
Ummah in Khamenei’s vocabulary and the monotheistic club in Ahmadinejad’s terms, against 
an imperial entity such as the United States and its allies suggests the intent of war, which is an 
institution that opens the channel from revolutionism to realism as it is the foundation for the 
creation of an empire belonging to the victor.  
If religion is used within the revolutionist tradition to invoke mobilization of masses against a 
defined enemy, in this case the immoral materialistic West led by the United States, a 
missionary war is intended by those spreading the message. It is within this institution of war 
where the border between revolutionism become delicate since Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
advocate a form of ‘messianic universalism’ to provoke a missionary war with the vision of 
creating a religious empire once the battle ends in their favour. Revolutionism and realism then 
cannot be disentangled from each other at this stage, which is perhaps the reason behind the 
argumentations used by both the supreme leader and the former president. The quantitative data 
reflects these high values of revolutionism and realism whilst the discourse exposes the 
underlying arguments leading us to the point of understanding the relationship between the two 
traditions in Ahmadinejad and Khamenei’s discourses. Despite being played down, rationalism 
manifests itself occasionally in the speeches of the former president in the same way as in the 
remarks of the supreme leader particularly if it serves the purpose of achieving their realist 
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goals of survival and security. The next section focuses on the rationalist dimension linked with 
the issue of democracy, Palestine and Iraq as well as Iran’s nuclear program. 
7.4 Democracy, solidarity and the rationalist tradition 
Democracy is painted in Iran’s foreign policy discourse as a symbol of rationalism and 
modernity. A faint echo of democracy as discussed by Khatami is evident in the first speech of 
Ahmadinejad at the UNGA where he described the Islamic Republic of Iran to be ‘a symbol of 
true democracy’ and ‘it is the manifestation of true democracy in the region’ while ‘the UN 
must be the symbol of democracy and the equal rights of nations’.426 Democracy at the national 
and international level as initially mentioned by Khatami is well reflected and likewise 
anchored in rationalism when Ahmadinejad says ‘all nations must be allowed to exercise their 
rights on an equal footing and in a democratic process’ and people within a country have a say 
at the national level since ‘all officials including the Leader, President, members of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, city and village councils are elected through the vote of the citizens’ in 
Iran.427 However, the similarity with Khatami stops there as Ahmadinejad’s conceives 
democracy as linked to ‘tranquility, peace, justice and development’ achievable only through 
monotheism, mirroring the supreme leader’s view.428 With democracy tied to peace, justice and 
monotheism, the concept takes on a positive meaning at least for an Islamic republic like Iran. 
In the following years, Ahmadinejad questions whether Western liberal democracies are 
genuinely democratic since those ‘powers’ do not really promote peace: 
‘Is the development and stockpiling of these deadly weapons designed to promote peace 
and democracy?...For some powers, claims of promotion of human rights and 
democracy can only last as long as they can be used as instruments of pressure and 
intimidation against other nations’.429 
‘The time has come to an end for those who define democracy and freedom and set 
standards whilst they themselves are the first who violate its fundamental principles. 
They can no longer sit both the judge and the executor and challenge the real 
democratically established governments’.430 
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‘Is it acceptable that they call themselves the sole defender of freedom, democracy, and 
human rights, while they militarily attack and occupy other countries?...Can the flower 
of democracy blossom from NATO’s missiles, bombs and guns?’.431 
Ahmadinejad also insists on the independence of the General Assembly from the ‘big Powers’ 
and its role in defining ‘new structures based on justice and democracy… thereby bringing 
about enduring stability and security’.432 The former president does not relate democracy with 
the great powers at all due to their abuse of the concept for ‘occupation is introduced as a gift 
towards promotion of freedom and democracy’.433 Such statements usually refer to the issue of 
Iraq and Palestine, which are constant themes in Iranian politics. All Iranian presidents 
condemn the occupation of Palestine and point out the humanitarian tragedy that has unfolded 
there resulting from neglect of the international community. Ahmadinejad has been very vocal 
about these affairs earning him widespread popularity in the Muslim world. He describes the 
situation in Palestine in a different manner as the previous government, visualizing the situation 
on the ground through his statements using words that accentuate the crimes against the 
Palestinians as well as the deprivation of their rights: 
‘Women and children are being murdered and adolescents taken prisoner. Houses are 
being demolished and farms burnt down’.434 
‘People are being bombarded in their own homes and their children murdered in their 
own streets and alleys…It does not matter if people are murdered in Palestine, turned 
into refugees, captured, imprisoned or besieged; that must not violate human rights’.435 
‘The Palestinian people have been displaced or are under heavy military pressure, 
economic siege or are incarcerated under abhorrent conditions’.436 
‘60 years of carnage and invasion is still continuing at the hands of some criminal and 
occupying Zionists’.437 
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‘Who imposed, through deceits and hypocrisy, the Zionism and over sixty years of war, 
homelessness, terror and mass murder on the Palestinian people and on countries of the 
region?’.438  
Invasion and occupation are two concepts rejected by the rationalist tradition wherein 
sovereignty and non-interference are the standard norms in international society. 
Ahmadinejad’s condemnation of the actions against the Palestinian people as well as the 
invasion of Iraq are telling signs that he subscribes to the rationalist tradition regarding these 
issues. It serves his purpose of improving Iran’s image as it promotes the idea of Iran being a 
reliable rationalist modern actor in international society. He strongly believes that ‘that the 
occupation of other countries under the pretext of freedom and democracy is an unforgivable 
crime’ questioning the role of Western powers asking whether it is ‘acceptable that they call 
themselves the sole defender of freedom, democracy, and human rights, while they militarily 
attack and occupy other countries?’.439 The Khatami government had likewise opposed the 
military invasion of Iraq from the beginning highlighting that ‘the United States waged an 
unsanctioned war against Iraq’ reflecting ‘lawlessness’ in the international community.440 
However, it was Ahmadinejad who rubbed the issue on the faces of the Western powers to 
partly support his revolutionist campaign against the West. He described the situation in Iraq 
the same way as he did Palestine, with words capturing the minds of his audience, constantly 
referring to the United States. The U.S. is an ‘occupier…incapable of establishing security in 
Iraq’ thereby subjecting the Iraqi people to being ‘killed in cold blood’.441 The attacks of 
September 11, 2001 was used as a ‘pretext to attack Afghanistan and Iraq, killing, injuring and 
displacing millions in two countries with the ultimate goal of bringing into its domination the 
Middle East and its oil resources’.442 This echoes Khamenei’s message about the hypocrisy of 
Washington. 
Solidarity with the people of Palestine, Iraq as well as Afghanistan is well reflected in the 
statements of Ahmadinejad indicative of the rationalist current in his political discourse. But 
                                                 
438 Ahmadinejad, “Address by Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the I.R. of Iran at the 66th Sesson of the 
UN General Assembly (2011)” 
439 Ahmadinejad, “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran at the 65th Session 
of the UN General Assembly (2010)” Ahmadinejad, “Address by Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the 
I.R. of Iran at the 66th Sesson of the UN General Assembly (2011)” 
440 Kharrazi, “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 58th Session of 
the UN General Assembly (2003)” Kharrazi, “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of 
Iran before the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly (2004)” 
441 Ahmadinejad, “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran before the 61st 
Session of the UN General assembly (2006)” 
442 Ahmadinejad, “Address by Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the I.R. of Iran at the 66th Sesson of the 
UN General Assembly (2011)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
173 
 
this solidarity is mostly confined to the Middle East resembling the supreme leaders’ discourse. 
Although Ahmadinejad makes few references to Latin American and Asian countries, the main 
motif of solidarity in his speeches at the General Assembly relates to the Muslim world. This 
restriction allows him to strengthen his arguments on monotheism. His solidarity with the 
suffering of the Palestinians’, Iraqis’ and Afghanis’, prompting him to verbally fight for their 
rights at the international stage belongs to the rationalist tradition as much as promoting his 
conception democracy at the international level. Interestingly, although this theme is 
fundamentally rationalist in conception, the atrocities suffered by the people in these countries 
form the basis of Ahmadinejad’s revolutionist call to unite nations under the banner of 
monotheism to counter the evil West. The same goes for Khamenei. As such, the interplay of 
the traditions becomes evident since all three exist in the same theme but at varying degrees. 
Take the issue of solidarity. Firstly, Ahmadinejad’s solidarity with Palestine, Iraq and 
Afghanistan is rationalist due to the issue of their sovereignty, which has been violated by the 
West. Secondly, his solidarist statements underscoring the human cost of the tragedies is 
essentially revolutionist highlighting the importance of moral values he insists could only be 
found in religion. The tragedies and sufferings of these nations are drawn to be the pretext of 
forming a religious alliance of monotheistic nation-states to go on a holy war against the U.S. 
to put an end to these atrocities. Third, with such strategy of fighting and envisioning triumph 
over the ‘powers’ Ahmadinejad crosses the boundary of revolutionism reaching realism where 
he foresees the establishment of a religious empire.443 Here Ahmadinejad’s connection to the 
political discourses of the supreme leader becomes apparent as they are identical. 
7.5 Iran’s nuclear program and rationalism 
2002 was the year that Iran’s nuclear program was revealed to the world beginning more than 
a decade-long crisis between Iran and the international community. Khatami sought diplomacy 
over confrontation proposing a grand bargain in 2003, which the United States rejected. 
Khatami was not disheartened, continued negotiations with the U.K., France and Germany 
(EU3) and paused uranium enrichment. When Ahmadinejad came into power, nuclear activities 
resumed provoking stern responses from the U.K., France, Russia, United States, China and 
Germany (P5+1). Ahmadinejad then blatantly argued for Iran’s rights to have a peaceful nuclear 
program. Being a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
Iran is entitled to have a nuclear facility for civilian purposes to generate energy. However, the 
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international community has been highly suspicious of Iran’s nuclear activities with the U.S. 
and its allies claiming that Iran’s genuine intention is to make nuclear weapons. As 
Ahmadinejad stepped up his rhetoric demanding Iran’s rights for a peaceful nuclear program, 
negotiations became complicated and at times halted, while the UN and the European Union 
(EU) with the help of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined whether 
Iran received sanctions or not. Ahmadinejad’s insistence on Iran’s rights to access nuclear 
technology reflect the rationalist institution of international law in his political discourses. With 
such a rationalist view, he expects the United Nations to be a platform for interaction of 
sovereign nation-states in international society. The UN should be free from the vestiges of the 
realist institutions of balance-of-power and great power management but the United States and 
its allies dominate the agenda of other nation-states through the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). This argument is not unknown in Iranian political discourse and was already 
evident in Khatami’s speeches but it was Ahmadinejad who publicized it. Having the right to a 
peaceful nuclear program, Iran technically should be protected under international law 
according to the rationalist tradition. By this logic, the UN and IAEA are tasked to safeguard 
Iran’s rights under the NPT stating that signatories can have access to such technology for 
civilian purposes. Ahmadinejad is well aware of this noting that: 
‘Nuclear energy is clean and cheap and a heavenly gift which is amongst the most 
suitable alternatives to cut the pollutions emanating from fossil fuels. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows all member States to use nuclear energy without 
limits and the International Atomic Energy Agency is mandated to provide member 
States with technical and legal support’.444 
The former president’s demands and expectations then were not completely unfounded but due 
to the United States’ and its allies’ persistence on halting, and if possible denying, Iran’s access 
to nuclear technology, his rhetoric became highly confrontational escalating the nuclear crisis 
further. It is here where Ahmadinejad’s rationalism is seen to be limited to the institution of 
international law and not diplomacy. The former president sought to expose the scandal of how 
the United States and its Western allies dominated the world in his speeches primarily due to 
their reluctance to grant Iran’s request of having a nuclear program to save Iran’s tarnished 
reputation. His exposé was grounded in a revolutionist vision with monotheism, morality and 
justice as the frontrunners of his speeches. This allows his government to justify their actions 
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of resisting such immoral materialistic powers, becoming more evident during the nuclear 
negotiations.  
In some statements, Ahmadinejad briefly refers to the rationalist institution of balance of power, 
asserting that the power of the U.S. and the West should be limited. He says: ‘today, the thought 
of hegemony quickly becomes a demerit’ and the ‘next rulers’ of the world ‘must limit 
interference to their own borders’.445 He claims ‘it is no longer acceptable that a small minority 
would dominate the politics, economy and culture of vast parts of the world by its complicated 
networks, and establish a new form of slavery, and harm the reputation of other nations’.446 
Non-interference in the rationalist perspective is his most striking theme where he proclaims: 
‘It is not acceptable that some who are several thousands of kilometres away from the 
Middle East would send in their troops for military intervention and for spreading war, 
bloodshed, aggression, terror and intimidation in the whole region while blaming the 
protests of nations in the region, that are concerned about their fate and their national 
security, as a move against peace and as interference in others’ affairs’.447 
He questions the institution of Great Power Management, understood in the realist tradition as 
closely linked to war, by throwing a rhetorical question in one of his speeches: ‘Is it acceptable 
that they call themselves the sole defender of freedom, democracy, and human rights, while 
they militarily attack and occupy other countries?’ while at the same time asking for a 
justification for the presence of hundreds of U.S. military bases around the globe.448 
Highlighting the military actions of the United States and its dominance in the international 
society effectively challenges the rightfulness of the system where, in Ahmadinejad’s view, is 
unjustly treating Iran manifested by the nuclear crisis. 
The rationalist institution of international law dictates that treaties are binding, rules are codified 
into law and these laws must be followed accordingly. Depriving Iran of a peaceful nuclear 
program despite being a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) then defies the 
directive of rationalism, a point Ahmadinejad makes at the General Assembly each year. He 
says ‘nations are not equal in exercising their rights recognized by international law. Enjoying 
these rights is dependent on the whim of certain major powers’.449 The hegemonic powers, with 
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policies and actions rooted in the realist tradition, see technological progress of nations such as 
Iran as a ‘challenge to their monopoly on these important instruments’ such as nuclear 
technology.450 The former president accuses the powers of derailing ‘Iran’s nuclear issue from 
its legal tracks, and have politicized the atmosphere to impose their wishes through taking 
advantage of all their potential’ effectively depriving ‘the Iranian people of all their inalienable 
rights’.451 Double standards have also been brought up as he insists that some powers who 
‘drafted disarmament regulations’ ‘test and stockpile new generations of lethal weapons’ 
daily.452 He claims that the powers themselves do not abide by the regulations they have set up, 
supposedly illegal under the rationalist institution of international law.  
In 2008, Ahmadinejad’s statement contained a line that could have come from a moderate like 
Khatami: ‘Iranian nation is for dialogue, but it has not accepted and will not accept illegal 
demands’.453 He effectively expressed his government’s willingness to participate in 
negotiations, a move reflecting the rationalist institution of diplomacy in the former president’s 
political discourse. In keeping the option of dialogue open, he hinted at the probability of 
rationally solving the nuclear crisis if the U.S. and its allies accept Iran’s rights under the NPT 
to have a civilian nuclear program. He once again resorts to the rationalist institution of 
international law as he emphasized that ‘illegal demands’ won’t be accepted. Such a rationalist 
understanding of international law should normally be accompanied by a rationalist 
comprehension of diplomacy and until 2008, this was the case in Ahmadinejad’s statements. 
However, the rationalist institution of diplomacy in his discourses were replaced by realism 
evident in the escalating tension between Washington and Tehran. The more Iran perceived the 
demands of the P5+1 as ‘illegal’, the more the situation intensified as coercion became a tool 
on both sides. Sanctions were imposed while Iran simply stopped negotiating, ultimately 
leading to a deadlock in 2010. 
Nevertheless, before the crisis escalated, Ahmadinejad’s statements reflected vestiges of the 
rationalist tradition indicating their presence within the political worldview of even a highly 
conservative president with harsh rhetoric against the United States and the West. Despite the 
dominance of revolutionism and realism in Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourse, hints of 
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rationalism wherein diplomacy, international law and other rationalist institutions of 
international society remained rendering some hope in reaching an agreement. Yet such hope, 
ended up in complications ultimately leading to a deadlock in the nuclear program negotiations.  
7.6 Conclusion 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourse mirrors Khamenei’s in many respects showing their 
connection to each other and the consistency of Iran’s foreign policy at least at the discursive 
level. This means the supreme leader’s strategies are reflected in the former presidents’ political 
statements although with slight improvisations. Discussing the realist actions of the United 
States in terms of Washington’s power and capacity to cause devastation and suffering without 
being accountable, Ahmadinejad affirms the threat Iran is exposed to. This in turn, reasserts 
Iran’s fundamentally realist goal of survival in the anarchical world, which can only be achieved 
through rationalist means and a revolutionist vision. Rationalism in Ahmadinejad’s political 
discourse is tied to his defence of Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, his solidarity with 
Iraq and Palestine as well as promoting Iran’s democracy to improve the image of the Islamic 
Republic. Rationalism in international society is a must to prove reliability facilitating good 
relations with other states. Ahmadinejad’s revolutionist vision, similar to Khamenei’s vision, is 
tied to religion but instead of Islam, the former president focuses on monotheism to be more 
inclusive. In the same way as the supreme leader, he offers religion to be the solution to the 
problems of mankind promoting values and morals. With such vision, Ahmadinejad wants to 
create a believer’s camp to fight the materialistic greedy realist non-believers devoid of morals 
led by the United States. This of course reverts back to Iran’s realist agenda as when the battle 
ends in Iran’s favour, then it will be in a position of power with its goal of survival secured in 
the establishment of an Islamic or at least monotheistic empire. Thus, we see that Iran’s foreign 
policy is consistent and fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision but achieved through 
rationalist means. 
Ahmadinejad’s mainly realist statements about the unjust world order led by hegemonic powers 
such as the United States at the UNGA are plentiful. He calls attention to the suffering of weaker 
states in the international system caused by the institutionalization of the domination of Western 
powers. The former president characterizes the actions of Washington in the Middle East as 
immoral and materialistic, traits attributed to actors practicing realism. He believes that the UN 
Security Council is being manipulated by the West to achieve their own interest and exploit 
international community. This is based on his rationalist understanding of the UN being an 
unbiased platform for sovereign states to interact. The West’s disregard for international law, 
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evident in the military intervention of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, is also 
highlighted by Ahmadinejad. He strongly rejects the dominance of the United States claiming 
it is not the master of the world underscoring the negativity of the realist institution of balance 
of power. Likewise, he condemns the realist institution of war, which he sees Washington use 
in Iraq to pursue its own interests in the Middle East.  
These ‘realist’ flaws were mentioned by his predecessor, former President Khatami as his 
government disagreed with unilateralist policies, particularly the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and the order of the international system based on Cold War mentality. However, Khatami 
did not blatantly revert to a religious revolutionist vision and instead remained within the 
rationalist framework as he envisioned to solve the problems of human society through 
cooperation and the Dialogue among Civilizations (DAC). It is this point wherein Khatami 
implicates revolutionism without a missionary religious agenda in the same way as 
Ahmadinejad and the supreme leader. 
Ahmadinejad’s realist conception of the United States is meant to legitimise his missionary 
agenda of gaining allies to fight the West and end all the world’s current problems in a 
revolutionist endeavour identical to Khamenei’s strategy by bringing back morality and values. 
His emphasis on monotheism and the return of the Hidden Imam alongside Jesus Christ to bring 
justice and peace to the world is a deeply embedded theme in his speeches. Ahmadinejad 
delegates a significant amount of time preaching to the international political elites in the same 
way Khamenei addresses his followers. The main difference is that the supreme leader limits 
the vision of success to Islam and creating an Islamic Civilization with the understanding of 
non-Muslims converting to Islam. Ahmadinejad though, stresses monotheism and accepts the 
diversity of such religions in conquering the non-believers led by the immoral United States. 
Unlike Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is careful not to call the United States 'the Devil' perhaps still 
hoping that through his lectures at the UN, Washington may change its mind. Ahmadinejad’s 
missionary war is not about good versus evil, which the supreme leader advocates, rather it is 
believers versus non-believers still presenting the binary opposition required by the 
revolutionist tradition with such war waged against heretics. Apart from legitimising Iran’s 
revolutionist foreign policy discourse of creating allies against the West, realism is not utilised 
by Ahmadinejad to imply Iran’s disposition as a regional power as it defeats the very purpose 
of Iran being the anti-imperialist agent in the world. Interestingly, as the graph below shows, 
revolutionism peaked in 2009, the year of the disputed Iranian presidential elections wherein 
the ‘Green Revolution’ protests broke out as claims of election fraud surfaced. If the 
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revolutionism represents the moral spectrum the Ahmadinejad government is propagating, it 
makes sense that at such a controversial period in Iran, the former president emphasizes his 
religious revolutionist vision. His statement at the General Assembly, a few months after being 
re-elected, focused on revolutionist themes abroad instead of at home. He reiterated Iran’s 
commitment to fighting for the Palestinian cause showing his solidarity for the Palestinians and 
other people suffering in the region who have been deprived of their rights victimized by the 
injustices mainly perpetrated by the West. 
 
Graph 15. The three traditions during the Ahmadinejad administration. 
As we can see above, despite an emphasis on revolutionism and the fight against the West, 
Ahmadinejad’s statements contain a significant amount of rationalism and at the first term of 
his presidency it surpasses revolutionism marking the transition and perhaps the influence of 
the former president. Ahmadinejad speaks frequently of the General Assembly as an institution 
wherein states all have an equal say reflecting the rationalist institution of balance of power in 
his political discourse. His message of solidarity with the Palestinians, Iraqis and Afghanis 
suggests a rationalist understanding of international affairs where the norms of non-intervention 
and sovereignty prevail, which is why he highly condemns the military intervention of the 
United States. Yet his description of the dire consequences of the intervention, especially the 
suffering of the people of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan can be interpreted as a strategy to 
attract more allies in his revolutionist agenda against the West. Rationalism, in its purest form 
is best seen in Ahmadinejad’s demands in exercising Iran’s rights as dictated by the NPT in 
gaining access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes wherein he implicates the rationalist 
institution of international law. Such move is consistent throughout all the presidencies as well 
as in the statements of the supreme leader indicating that they are all aware of their rights under 
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international law and that the international society of sovereign nation-states must respect their 
rights. After all, Iran is in fact a signatory of the NPT and is not making baseless claims. 
  
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
181 
 
8 Rouhani’s Foreign Policy Discourse 
Towards the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the threat to Iran’s survival was imminent and 
the former president’s revolutionist vision had only helped exacerbate the situation. Tehran’s 
isolation from the West was at its height and the sanctions were devastating Iran’s economy. 
At a certain point, access to some basic food and commodities started to become an issue and 
to secure it, the government turned to barter. Practically, a rationalist approach was needed as 
a means for the Islamic Republic to solve the economic problem and threat to their survival. It 
had been more than a decade since Iran had been negotiating with the West regarding its nuclear 
program before Rouhani was elected President of the Islamic Republic in 2013. The 
Ahmadinejad administration had steered the country into a deadlock over the nuclear program 
back in 2010 and it did not take long before the economy suffered from the harsh sanctions, 
deliberately targeted the banking and oil industries. A good example is the drastic reduction of 
EU imports of non-agricultural products, fuels and chemicals from Iran between 2012 and 2013, 
falling to almost nothing recovering only in 2016.454 Simultaneously during this period, the 
Arab uprisings were dramatically changing the political landscape of the Middle East with Syria 
and Iraq suffering from internal turmoil fuelling further instability in the region. Rouhani had 
the mandate of fixing Iran’s economy by negotiating the country’s nuclear program with the 
United States and the West, to ideally re-establish ties and secure a degree of internal stability 
that could support a stronger Iran in the region.  
His presidency embodied a more rationalist approach mirroring Khatami and this time around, 
the world was listening to what Iran had to say especially after international society had 
experienced Ahmadinejad’s fiery revolutionist rhetoric. Despite the overtly rationalist foreign 
policy discourse of Rouhani, however, Iran’s realist foreign policy and the revolutionist vision 
accompanying it were far from dormant. It was the first time Iran was directly described by its 
president as a regional power at the United Nations, indicating the realist dimension of 
Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse. The former president sparingly uses the revolutionist vision 
in his statements, but when he does it resembles Khatami’s conception. I elaborate more on this 
interplay of the three traditions in Rouhani’s political discourse below. 
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8.1 Moderation, Democracy and the rationalist tradition 
Moderation is Rouhani’s anchor in Iran’s political sphere proclaiming it at the United Nations 
the year he was first elected saying that ‘the Iranian people, in a judiciously sober choice in the 
recent elections, voted for the discourse of hope, foresight and prudent moderation – both at 
home and abroad’.455 Through the popular election of Rouhani, a moderate key figure once 
again surfaced in Iranian politics reflecting the promise of a reliable Islamic Republic in dealing 
with the world – a far cry from the harshly confrontational government of Ahmadinejad. With 
Rouhani in power, Iran sought to redefine itself within rationalist a framework wherein 
institutions of international society play a significant role in the country’s interactions with the 
outside world resembling Khatami’s approach. As such, development, cooperation and 
understanding are argued to be the key elements in achieving peace and prosperity in 
international society.456 Regional cooperation, for instance, has been a recurring theme in Iran’s 
foreign policy discourse, further exhibited by the preference to negotiate and settle conflicts 
through dialogue and diplomacy, evident in Iran’s nuclear negotiations. This led to the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as Rouhani’s World against Violence and 
Extremism (WAVE) initiative. 
In his first speech at the General Assembly in 2013, Rouhani had already expressed the ‘hope 
of preference of dialogue over conflict, and moderation over extremism’ signalling to the world 
that Iran had a different approach to international affairs.457 He says:  
‘The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all challenges can be managed – successfully 
– through a smart, judicious blend of hope and moderation. Hope is founded on the 
belief in the universal will of the people across the globe to combat violence and 
extremism, to cherish change, to oppose imposed structures, to value choice, and to act 
in accordance with human responsibility. Hope is no doubt one of the greatest gifts 
bestowed upon human beings by their All-Loving Creator. And moderation is to think 
and move in a wise, judicious manner, conscious of the time and the space, and to align 
exalted ideals with choice of effective strategies and policies, while cognizant of 
objective realities’.458 
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The rationalist tradition is reflected in his statements as it touches upon dialogue and moderation 
in ways to avoid conflict and extremism. Although he mentions the ‘Creator’, which has so far 
been related to the revolutionist tradition and the missionary war concept propagated by the 
supreme leader and, to an extent, Ahmadinejad, it takes on a more rationalist meaning. Rouhani 
connects it with universal solidarity instead of creating a binary opposition of good and evil. 
Instead of promoting monotheism as his predecessor relentlessly did, he links hope to religion 
and moderation claiming that such a setting ‘will ensure a bright future for the world’ and his 
hope ‘emanates from the belief shared by all divine religions that a good and bright future awaits 
the world’.459  
Iran’s image is effectively altered by Rouhani’s moderate tone and he capitalizes on this in 
promulgating the country’s potential to act within the confines of rationalism, which is much 
valued at the United Nations. He positions Iran as a reliable actor insisting on cooperation 
instead of conflict in resolving issues in the region. He stressed that Iran is ‘a moderate and 
independent nation’ and ‘while some of the countries around Iran have fallen prey to war and 
turmoil, Iran remains secure, stable and calm’.460 
‘There are moderate politicians and elites in our region who enjoy the confidence of 
their peoples. They are neither anti-Western nor pro-Western. While aware of the role 
of colonialism in the backwardness of their nations, they are not neglectful of the role 
of their nations in reaching the development they seek. They do not absolve the West 
from its misdeeds, but are also aware of their own failings. These leaders can take 
positions of active leadership by attracting the confidence of the people in their societies 
and establish the strongest national and international coalitions against violence. The 
voices of these leaders are the true voices of moderation in the Islamic world; the 
familiar sound of an Afghan tired of war; an Iraqi victim of extremism, a Syrian fearful 
of terrorism; and a Lebanese worried over violence and sectarianism’.461 
‘All nations of the region have to keep in mind that we are in the same boat. Thus, we 
need broad cooperation with regard to social and political as well as security and defence 
issues with a view to reaching common and durable understandings. Had we had greater 
cooperation and coordination in the Middle East, thousands of innocent Palestinians in 
Gaza would not have been fallen victim to Zionist regime’s aggression… We support 
any measure to promote cooperation between Islamic nations to combat extremism, 
threats, and aggression, and in this connection, are prepared to play our permanent 
constructive and positive role.’462 
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Solidarity with the suffering of the people in Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Yemen is part of the 
political discourse of the Islamic Republic regardless of the political figure. It is normally 
connected to Iran’s revolutionist vision as they represent the cases to be addressed through 
morals and values found in religion. However, instead of using it as a pretext for revolutionism, 
Rouhani uses the issue to advocate cooperation, a rationalist move. The rationalist team-player 
and peace-maker spirit voiced by Khatami during his presidency had once again emerged 
renewing the optimism of international society. Demonization has no place in his statements 
and no characterization of an evil empire or powerful state, which needs to be defeated by a 
moral religious army. The revolutionist vision of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei is non-existent 
in Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse. Amidst tension with some countries in the region and 
the West, Rouhani insists on re-establishing ties through cooperation:  
Iran’s policy ‘is to continue our peace-seeking efforts in the region based on the same 
win-win principle, and act in a way that would lead to all in the region and world 
benefiting from these new conditions. This opportunity can be seized in order to look to 
the future and avoid focusing on the past and rebuild our relationships with the countries 
in the region, particularly with our neighbours, based on mutual respect and our common 
and collective interests’.463 
Mutual respect, common and collective interests are core rationalist concepts, while identifying 
shared interests is key to cooperation. The use of these terminologies signals the dominance of 
rationalism in Rouhani’s political discourse. He cites the JCPOA as an example for the win-
win approach to encourage countries in the region to cooperate in resolving issues asserting that 
‘the Muslim people, be they Shi'as or Sunnis, have and continue to live together for centuries 
in harmony and mutual respect’ putting forward the pretext for regional cooperation.464  
Rouhani echoed Khatami’s concept of religious democracy claiming ‘the realization of 
democracy consistent with religion and the peaceful transfer of executive power manifested 
that Iran is the anchor of stability in an otherwise ocean of regional instabilities’.465 Peace is 
attainable through stability, which is in turn a result of democracy. Iran thereby defends ‘peace 
based on democracy and the ballot box everywhere’ believing ‘there are no violent solutions to 
world crises’.466 As such Rouhani argues that ‘securing peace and democracy and ensuring the 
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legitimate rights of all countries in the world, including in the Middle East, cannot – and will 
not – be realized through militarism’.467 The rationalist current makes itself apparent in his use 
of the terms peace, democracy and rights in his statements. For rationalists, war should be 
mitigated and avoided as much as possible as it disrupts peace and order. Rouhani excluding 
militarism in the quest for securing peace, democracy and rights indicates his adherence to the 
rationalist tradition, at least on the discursive level. Rouhani does not blatantly condemn 
militarism as evil acts such as Ahmadinejad and the supreme leader as he does not intend on 
creating binary oppositions of good and evil to promulgate a revolutionist vision of a missionary 
war against the heretics in the system. This proves that Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse is 
largely based on rationalism for demonizing a state hampers the willingness of states to 
cooperate. 
When it comes to the topic of democracy, Rouhani is convinced it is a ‘product of growth and 
development’, it ‘is not an export’ commodity which ‘can be commercially imported from the 
West to the East’ and thereby cannot be imposed as it ‘leads only to a weak and vulnerable 
government’.468 This way of discussing democracy is different from Ahmadinejad who insisted 
Iran has the right kind of democracy. For Rouhani, assisting countries in achieving democracy 
like in ‘the establishment of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan’ is part of Iran’s foreign policy 
agenda in the region as the country defends ‘the rule of the majority that respects the rights of 
minorities’.469 Here we see the faint reverberation of Iran setting itself as an example for the 
countries of the region – a theme of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s political discourse. Apart 
from democracy at the national level, Rouhani reiterates both Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s view 
of attaining ‘genuine democracy’ and ‘real participatory approach’ at the ‘transnational levels’, 
which he says can ‘combat criminal and terrorist networks’.470 Rouhani’s rationalist endeavour 
of cooperation materializes through democracy in the form of an initiative called the WAVE. 
He introduced this concept in 2013 to combat an issue affecting all nation-states in international 
society. 
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8.2 World Against Violence and Extremism (WAVE) 
Terrorism has plagued the international society and has intensified following the tragic attacks 
of September 11, 2001. Islam became associated with terrorism and Iran was not spared from 
the suspicions. Tehran was allegedly supporting terrorists legitimizing the sanctions against the 
Islamic Republic. When Khatami was in power, he wanted to engage with the world to give 
Iran’s image a positive turn. Hence, he initiated the Dialogue Among Civilizations (DAC) in 
1997, which was later overshadowed by the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Rouhani 
learned from Khatami, he wants to change the distorted view that terrorism has bestowed upon 
the Islamic world. Hence, he initiated the WAVE at the General Assembly in 2013.  He invited 
‘all states, international organizations and civil institutions to join this effort of combating 
terrorism’, i.e. to join WAVE, and to ‘start thinking about “Coalition for Enduring Peace” all 
across the globe instead of the ineffective “Coalitions for War” in various parts of the world’.471 
Whereas Khatami’s DAC was the anti-thesis of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Rouhani’s 
Coalition for Enduring Peace is Iran’s reaction against Coalitions for War and the War on 
Terror. Rouhani hopes his approach will open a new horizon in international affairs where 
‘peace will prevail over war, tolerance over violence, progress over bloodletting, justice over 
discrimination, prosperity over poverty, and freedom over despotism’.472 Framing the 
eradication of terrorism as the international society’s common interest, to pursue cooperation 
and achieve peace through the WAVE, further strengthens Rouhani’s rationalist political 
discourse. Violent means and militarism do not have a place in his WAVE project. Speaking of 
ending terrorism through peace negotiations, diplomacy and cooperation demonstrate Iran’s 
capacity to remain within the rationalist tradition when dealing with international issues. 
Addressing problems does not have to involve an extreme revolutionist vision put forward by 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei where the world is divided between good and evil, which incites 
hatred and war. 
Rouhani encourages states in the Middle East to ‘form a coalition and accept to shoulder the 
responsibility of leadership to counter violence and terrorism’ since the pain ‘is better known 
by the countries in the region’.473 Terrorism affects Muslims of all sects and in the Middle East 
alone, it claims more lives compared to all Western countries combined. Rouhani’s WAVE 
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initiative became a resolution and was welcomed by the international community. He highlights 
that it ‘requires well-intended solutions and the use of experiences gained in the realm of 
diplomacy…with a view to fighting ignorance, dictatorship, poverty, corruption, terrorism, 
violence and their social, political, cultural, economic and security impacts’.474 For him, the 
success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations is a blueprint in forming a ‘United Front Against 
Extremism and Violence’, citing the deal with the West as an example of working together in 
solving an issue in favour of the interest of the international society.475 Rouhani provides a 
rationalist guideline of action in tackling the global problem of extremism and violence, 
manifested by terrorism, involving dialogue, cooperation and diplomacy. He urges states to: 
‘Create a collective and global movement to tackle regional problems in a serious 
manner through dialogue.  
Prevent the slaughter of innocent people and the bombardment of civilians, as well as 
the promotion of violence and killing of other human beings.  
Provide for stability in cooperation with established central governments to maintain 
stability and once stability is established, build diplomacy and democratic governance 
in the Middle East region’.476 
Peace through dialogue and cooperation is the aim of such a movement, it is a standard hallmark 
of rationalism for it rejects violence and war. After all, it takes the cooperation of the entire 
world to combat such a global problem and the best means to achieve any sort of success is 
through dialogue and diplomacy.  Militarism, as we have seen, has done little to solve the issue 
and in some ways, it has exacerbated terrorism. Rouhani refers to the U.S. ‘war on terror’ as an 
example. It has ‘sown the seeds of borderless terrorism everywhere on earth’ and ‘we need to 
find out which approaches, policies and erroneous actions paved the way for the spread of 
insecurity throughout the world…and what would be the picture the world 15 years from 
now’.477 The world should be open to non-military alternatives in tackling such problems 
effectively finding solutions within the rationalist tradition. This means relying on the 
rationalist institution of diplomacy and international law to achieve peace by eradicating 
terrorism and promoting the stability of the countries in the Middle East. Rouhani is optimistic 
in spite of all the difficulties. He ‘deeply’ believes that ‘moderation will prevail over extremism, 
peace will triumph over violence, enlightenment will overcome ignorance, and finally justice 
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will rise above injustice’.478 It is here where revolutionism be seen as he stresses: ‘what is 
important is that belief, hope and efforts are towards realizing peace and justice and there is no 
doubt that the Almighty will assist all those who endeavour towards peace, justice and 
moderation’.479 He does make mention of God as all the other Iranian leaders do in their 
speeches, however, his approach is much more subtle. Rouhani connects it with a rationalist 
view of international affairs rather than giving it a revolutionist missionary character, trademark 
of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. Following the footsteps of Khatami, Rouhani projects a 
rationalist image of Iran. His government has achieved something which was not possible for 
many decades in negotiating the nuclear program with the West. In particular, directly talking 
with the United States had showcased Iran’s potential in championing the rationalist institution 
of diplomacy. Here’s where the JCPOA comes in. 
8.3 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
Iran’s nuclear program and Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach made the world hold its 
breath as tensions escalated towards the end of his presidency. Once Rouhani was elected, there 
was a sigh of relief in Iran and the international community. Governments of Iran, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany (P5+1) wanted to find a 
peaceful means of ending the deadlock.  Rouhani’s adoption of the rationalist institution of 
diplomacy in his foreign policy discourse marked a change in tone. Ahmadinejad had likewise 
engaged with the institution of diplomacy but with realist conduct of coercion and defiance, 
which did not end favourably for all the parties involved. In a rationalist note, Rouhani says: 
‘There is no issue or dossier that cannot be resolved through reliance on hope and 
prudent moderation, mutual respect, and rejection of violence and extremism. Iran’s 
nuclear dossier is a case in point. As clearly stated by the Leader of the Islamic 
Revolution, acceptance of the inalienable right of Iran constitutes the best and the easiest 
way of resolving this issue…I listened carefully to the statement made by President 
Obama today at the General Assembly. Commensurate with the political will of the 
leadership in the United States and hoping that they will refrain from following the 
short-sighted interest of warmongering pressure groups, we can arrive at a framework 
to manage our differences. To this end, equal footing, mutual respect, and the recognized 
principles of international law should govern the interactions. Of course, we expect to 
hear a consistent voice from Washington’.480 
Paving the way to restarting the nuclear negotiations with the West, Rouhani’s remarks 
reopened the rationalist chapter in Iran’s foreign policy discourse. Although the rationalist 
                                                 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Rouhani, “Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the General Debate of the 
General Assembly of the UN (2013)” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
189 
 
institution of international law regarding Iran’s nuclear program had been outlined by 
Ahmadinejad, it was Rouhani’s presentation of the issue, which fixed rationalism in the nuclear 
issue. He was an experienced rationalist, ready to cooperate and showed an understanding of 
the concerns of the international community since he negotiated Iran’s nuclear program during 
the last three years of Khatami’s presidency.481 Rouhani stated that the international community 
and the United States, has to accept and implement ‘the right to enrichment inside’ the country, 
insisting that Iran ‘seeks constructive engagement with other countries based on mutual respect 
and common interest, and within the same framework does not seek to increase tensions with 
the United States’.482 Emphasizing words such as ‘equal footing’, ‘mutual respect’ and 
‘common interest’, makes Rouhani’s remarks resemble the very lines describing the code of 
conduct in the rationalist institution of diplomacy as stated by Bull and Wight, which I discussed 
in the theory chapter, section 2.4.1. Iran wants to be on equal terms with the P5+1 in negotiating 
the nuclear program and equal also meant in terms of respect.  
The United States reciprocated the positive signal from Rouhani. Not long after his statement 
at the General Assembly in September 2013, Rouhani had a historic phone call with former 
President Barack Obama. It was the first high-level direct contact between the two countries in 
34 years demonstrating the readiness of Iran and the United States to diplomatically engage 
with each other to peacefully solve the nuclear issue. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who 
was formerly the country’s ambassador to the UN headed the talks with the P5+1 countries as 
he became the chief negotiator of Iran for the nuclear issue. The following year at the General 
Assembly, Rouhani once again restated his country’s commitment to solving the nuclear issue 
through diplomacy: 
‘We are committed to continue our peaceful nuclear program, including enrichment, 
and to enjoy our full nuclear rights on Iranian soil within the framework of international 
law. We are determined to continue negotiations with our interlocutors in earnest and 
good faith, based on mutual respect and confidence, removal of concerns of both sides 
as well as equal footing and recognized international norms and principles. I believe 
mutual adherence to the strict implementation of commitments and obligations and 
avoidance of excessive demands in the negotiations by our counterparts is the 
prerequisite for the success of the negotiations. A final accord regarding Iran’s peaceful 
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nuclear program can serve as the beginning of multilateral collaboration aimed at 
promoting security, peace and development in our region and beyond’.483  
He spoke in the language of rationalism, welcomed with great optimism by the international 
society. Based on the definition of rationalism presented in the theory chapter, this statement of 
Rouhani perfectly meets the standards of the rationalist institution of diplomacy as he highlights 
negotiations on equal terms as well as the goal of cooperation within the region. The rationalist 
institution of international law where codification of rules and respect for the binding nature of 
treaties and agreements are likewise reflected in his statement above. Avoiding conflict, to 
maintain peace and order, a key element of rationalism was also reiterated as he says: ‘We are 
of the view that the nuclear issue could only be resolved through negotiation, and those who 
may think of any other solution are committing a grave mistake’.484 Such a renewed image of 
an Iran actively engaged in diplomacy, which international society has encouraged for the sake 
of international security regarding Iran’s nuclear program, was not welcomed, nevertheless, 
with the same enthusiasm by some states in the Middle East. Iran’s Arab neighbours started to 
feel threatened by an emerging regional power no longer viewed as a pariah by the West at least 
while the negotiations were going on. 
Once the JCPOA agreement was reached after many rounds of negotiations, Rouhani reassured 
the international community that ‘Iran, due to the important fatwa of its leader and its defence 
doctrine, has never had the intention of producing a nuclear weapon’ aimed to ease the fears of 
countries claiming Tehran is after the bomb.485 Rouhani was proud in proclaiming the success 
of the negotiations making a statement, which radiated with rationalism: 
‘From the standpoint of international law, this instrument sets a strong precedent where, 
for the first time, two sides rather than negotiating peace after war, engaged in dialogue 
and understanding before the eruption of conflict. The nuclear deal which is a brilliant 
example of “victory over war”, has managed to disburse the clouds of hostility and 
perhaps even the spectre of another war and extensive tensions from the Middle 
East…Through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we were not solely seeking a 
nuclear deal. We want to suggest a new and constructive way to recreate the 
international order. An order based on mutual respect, non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of others as well as on sustained cooperation and co-existence between the 
members of the United Nations’.486 
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Effectively, Rouhani was promoting the rationalist tradition to the international society 
suggesting a new way of recreating international order in favour of rationalism. After all, 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, unilateralism and military 
intervention initiated by Washington prevailed in international society. This of course follows 
the realist doctrine and Iranian statesmen, especially the Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, called 
the world’s attention to it in their statements.  
A year on after the deal, Rouhani continues to promote the rationalist ideal of cooperation and 
resolving issues through diplomacy citing the JCPOA as a product achieved through 
‘moderation, constructive interaction and the promotion of dialogue’ bringing ‘a long, 
complicated and unnecessary crisis to an end by adopting a win-win approach’.487 He declares 
that ‘the JCPOA contains important lessons for resolving complicated international problems’ 
advertising it to be a blueprint for solving Iran’s issues in the region.488 However, Iran’s 
eagerness to resolve issues to bring peace and stability in the Middle East may contain a tinge 
of realism and the states in the Middle East are well aware of this. 
8.4 The relic of the realist and revolutionist tradition 
The sheer amount of perfectly rationalist statements of Rouhani makes it easy to assume that 
due to the dominance rationalism, realism and revolutionism are obsolete in his political 
discourse. This is, unfortunately, not the case. Revolutionism and realism have had very low 
occurrences in Rouhani’s speeches. Both have an average of 1.41% and 1.47% respectively 
during the first term of his presidency demonstrating their existence in his foreign policy 
discourse. True enough, there are issues Rouhani addresses in the realist language and the 
strongest of it was in 2013, where realism reached a high of 2.12% of the entire text. He clearly 
mentions Iran’s status as a regional power indicating that in the Middle East, Iran’s definition 
of the institution of balance of power is realist in conception. ‘In foreign policy…the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, as a regional power, will act responsibly with regard to regional and 
international security, and is willing and prepared to cooperate in these fields, bilaterally as well 
as multilaterally, with other responsible actors’.489 By saying ‘cooperation with other 
responsible actors’ he acknowledges the existence of other regional powers, such as Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey engaging the institution of great power management. He refers to the 
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institution at the regional level and with a rationalist intent since he condemns the realist 
dimension of this institution. He says: ‘pursuit of expansionist strategies and objectives and 
attempts to change the regional balance through proxies cannot be camouflaged behind 
humanitarian rhetoric’.490 His rejection of realist practices in international relations constitutes 
most of the content of the realist tradition in much the same way as his predecessors and the 
supreme leader. In line with his arguments regarding violence and extremism, Rouhani 
denounces the old ways of militarism and coercion aimed at domination and subjugation of 
others hinting at the past actions of the West.491 Strategic blunders like ‘occupation, invasion 
and military intervention’ made at the expense of maintaining hegemony have caused the region 
to transform into ‘a haven for terrorists and extremists’.492 This affirms the continuity of the 
anti-imperialist discourse running through all the statements of Iran’s statesmen. 
Rouhani proclaims that: ‘In the tumultuous and chaotic region of the Middle East, Iran is one 
of the most tranquil, secure and stable nations’.493 By saying so, he supports Iran’s claim to lead 
the region against terrorism and violence through the WAVE initiative. When he says, ‘the pain 
is better known by the countries in the region, better they can form coalition, and accept to 
shoulder the responsibility of leadership to counter violence and terrorism’ keeping in mind that 
‘all nations of the region…are in the same boat’, he has rationalist intentions.494 However, there 
is a tinge or realism in it when linked with Iran’s perception of itself as a regional power. The 
Arab neighbours have interpreted it as rivalry. To them, Tehran’s quest is to dominate and 
control the Middle East. Rouhani addresses this dismissing their fears to be ‘a myth fanned in 
the recent years in the context of an Iranophobic project’.495 Regardless of such issues, Rouhani 
presses for finding a solution ‘that comes from within the region…not from the outside the 
region’.496 Yet when the 2015 Mina stampede happened in Mecca wherein 2177 pilgrims were 
killed, among them Iranians, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia took on a new level and 
the Arab’s interpretation seemed plausible. Rouhani revealed Saudi’s involvement in the spread 
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of the ‘Iranophobic project’ while the supreme leader banned Iranian pilgrims from doing the 
Hajj in Saudi Arabia.  
‘If the Saudi government is serious about its vision for development and regional 
security, it must cease and desist from divisive policies, spread of hate ideology, and 
trampling upon the rights of neighbours, accept its responsibility for the protection of 
the lives and dignity of pilgrims and construct its relations with the nations in the region 
on the basis of mutual respect and accountability’.497 
Looking at this statement, lack of dialogue and cooperation, contrary to the rationalist image 
Rouhani has been advocating, seems to be the status quo between the two countries 
underscoring the persistence of realism in Iran’s foreign policy discourse. Realism exists in the 
condemnation of the realist manoeuvres the United States in the region, which they characterize 
as imperialist. The difference of Rouhani’s approach from Ahmadinejad and Khamenei is that 
his response to imperialism is framed within the rationalist instead of the revolutionist tradition. 
The revolutionist vision seems to be more of a formality in Rouhani’s speeches as he mentions 
it only at the beginning and at the end of his speeches, a standard procedure for any document 
issued by the officials of the Islamic Republic. He rarely makes any reference to revolutionism 
within the statements itself beyond this formality. Rationalism cannot seem to move forward in 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse without dragging the ghost of the religious revolutionist vision. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Rationalism has triumphed in Iran’s foreign policy discourse during the Rouhani 
administration. He has embarked on moderation, cooperation and dialogue in negotiating with 
the world. Rouhani revived Khatami’s notion of dialogue and incorporated it once again to 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse regarding the United States and its Western allies, which 
Ahmadinejad eliminated. Rouhani advocated the rationalist principle of cooperation, rejected 
the institution of war and elaborated on finding solutions through peaceful means. Reaching out 
to the countries in its immediate neighbourhood in a peaceful gesture to encourage diplomacy 
in addressing the issues of the region became a significant foreign policy objective. Using the 
language of rationalism, he promoted the re-establishment of ties with the West that has faced 
difficulties due to the nuclear program. He urged for mutual respect and equal footing in 
negotiations, opening direct talks with the United States to resolve the Iran’s nuclear dossier. 
Being able to directly negotiate the nuclear program with Washington using the tenets of the 
rationalist tradition is a remarkable achievement indicating the capacity of Tehran to resolve 
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issues through peaceful means. The Rouhani government’s efforts led to the JCPOA in 2015. 
Adopting a rationalist tone, restarting the negotiations and eventually signing an agreement 
with the P5+1 became the symbol of Iran’s rationalist foreign policy discourse. 
Rouhani’s WAVE initiative further strengthened the rationalist framework by encouraging the 
establishment of a worldwide alliance to combat the global problem of terrorism. Although the 
foundation WAVE rests on mainly rationalist terminologies with the principle of cooperation 
as the most defining element of it, a hint of revolutionism is visible. Rouhani spoke of a joint 
effort at all levels of international society incorporating non-state actors in resolving the 
problem of terrorism for mankind’s future. He makes no mention of religion indicating a 
revolutionist vision of a world without a missionary character that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
valued. Religion plays a minimal role in Rouhani’s statements and is usually restricted to the 
introduction and conclusion of his speeches as per formality of the Islamic Republic, which 
perhaps can question whether his vision is revolutionist at all.  
 
Graph 16. The three traditions during the Rouhani administration. 
The percentage values of realism and revolutionism are quite low in comparison to rationalism 
and they gradually reach the very bottom with realism having 1.56% and revolutionism 
reaching only 1% by 2016. What is most striking is the realist tradition, which reaches a peak 
of 1.72% in 2013 when Rouhani spoke of Iran as a regional power. Interestingly, this type of 
realist language did not exist in the former president’s statements as Iran was perhaps not in a 
situation to declare itself as such. Saddam’s fall in Iraq turned Baghdad into an ally of the 
Islamic Republic. With the Arab Spring causing chaos in the Middle East since 2010, it is only 
during Rouhani’s presidency that Iran could proclaim itself as a stable, secure nation and a 
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regional power in the region. Confidence in Iran’s capacity to handle its foreign policy in a very 
rationalist way supported by the achievement of the JCPOA, Rouhani positions Iran in a 
different light. He sees Iran leading the region in addressing the problems of the Middle East. 
This aspect of his administration’s foreign policy has a hint of realism as he speaks of Iran’s 
power. However, he ascribes his language to the rationalist institution of great power 
management, at a regional level, by encouraging cooperation with the other powers in the region 
to resolve conflicts.  
Rouhani carefully crafts Iran’s foreign policy discourse in the framework of the rationalist 
tradition, but as this case shows, it is not entirely devoid of revolutionism and realism as the 
English School theory posits. Having a similar approach as Khatami, a fellow reformer, as well 
as integrating aspects of Ahmadinejad’s and Khamenei’s discourses show the consistency of 
Iran’s foreign policy at the discursive level. Rouhani used rationalism effectively as a means to 
promote Iran’s fundamentally realist foreign policy goal of survival. The sanctions related to 
the nuclear program threatened Iran’s survival and security prompting him to strengthen 
rationalism in Iran’s foreign policy discourse to re-establish ties and resume diplomatic talks to 
save the country’s economic, social and political future. The religious Islamic revolutionist 
vision normally tied to realist foreign policy discourse is largely absent in Rouhani’s statements. 
In its place is a pinch of Khatami’s revolutionist vision aimed at creating a better future for 
mankind. This shows that the revolutionist vision in Iran’s foreign policy discourse have two 
divergent paths. First is the religious and Islamic revolutionism advocated by Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad. For them, the world is divided into two opposite poles of good and evil or 
believers and non-believers instigating war where the moral religious victor could establish its 
rule – making the revolutionist vision revert to realism. Second is the cosmopolitan revolutionist 
vision of Khatami and Rouhani devoid of binary opposition and focusing on uniting mankind 
into one regardless of faith to create a better future for all. I elaborate on these two types of 
revolutionist vision in Iran’s foreign policy in a separate chapter. 
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9 Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iran’s Foreign Policy 
This chapter focuses on the international activities, conduct and principles of Iran’s statesmen 
in their foreign policy. These activities, conducts and principles are guided by the three 
traditions as elaborated in the theory chapter.498 My aim is to classify Iran’s foreign policy 
activities under realism, rationalism and revolutionism and to assess whether these activities 
correspond to the foreign policy discourses in the previous chapters to demonstrate one of the 
aspects of the consistency of Iran’s foreign policy – the other aspect being the similarity of 
approaches among the statesmen. The following sections show Iran’s foreign policy’s realist 
goal, revolutionist vision and rationalist means on the international stage as proven by their 
activities, conduct and principles. 
The fundamentally realist goal of Iran’s foreign policy surfaces in Iran’s efforts to counter the 
influence of the United States and its allies in the region, posing a threat to Iran’s survival and 
security. To this end, Iran deploys its military arm, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) and the Hezbollah (Party of God) in various countries, to secure Iran’s goals in the 
region. The rationalist means allowing Iran to achieve its goals are discussed to be anchored in 
international trade with countries willing to do so with Tehran. Such rationalist means exhibit 
how Iran could improve its security and survival amidst the threat of the West in the form of 
sanctions. Iran’s revolutionist vision is elaborated here to be divided into two: religious Islamic 
cosmopolitanism and global cosmopolitanism. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad promote the 
religious Islamic cosmopolitanist vision while Khatami and Rouhani advocate the global 
cosmopolitanist vision.  
9.1 Realism 
The realist principle dictates that the goal of survival should be based on both prudence and 
expediency as international relations is fundamentally a state of war or pure conflict. The main 
international activity consists of war with an international conduct of freely pursuing goals 
without moral and legal restriction. 
To understand Iran’s fundamentally realist foreign policy, a recollection of the threats to Iran’s 
survival as a country is necessary. Not long after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war began as 
Saddam Hussein launched an offensive against Iran. Most of the states in the Middle East, as 
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well as the United States, supported Iraq while Iran fought alone. Based on this experience, for 
the Islamic Republic, the world is anarchical and realism is the order of the day as the Iraqi 
offensive and the resulting war had shown. Survival is vital for the government and the people 
of Iran and being a lone wolf in this endeavour is a reality they must face as history has taught 
them. Hence, realism is etched in the mindset of Tehran’s political elites as most, if not all, 
were involved in the fight against Iraq to defend Iran’s territory and sovereignty. Insecurity 
normally accompanies such a threat to survival in the form of war. Since Iran was forced into 
an engagement with the realist institution of war soon after the birth of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Tehran cannot help but think of its country’s security, effectively shaping its foreign policy 
especially in its immediate neighbourhood. After all, parallel to the Iran-Iraq war the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) was established precisely to counter Iran in the region, 
institutionalizing the threat to Iran’s survival and security. Remnants of this animosity between 
Iran and the Gulf states are still visible at the time of writing as proxy wars between Iran and 
its main rival, Saudi Arabia, wreak havoc across the region. The involvement of the United 
States in the affairs of the Middle East serves to intensify the rivalry between the two regional 
powers. 
9.1.1 The United States 
The United States is considered by Iran as a hegemonic superpower that meddles with Iran’s 
regional affairs causing enormous chaos and suffering to the Islamic world. Iran’s Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei is the most vocal political elite in the Islamic Republic exposing the 
misdeeds of the United States and criticizing its hegemonic agenda in the Middle East 
emphasizing its immoral realist activities as we have seen in the previous chapters. 
Washington’s alliance with Riyadh exacerbates the rivalry with Tehran as it reflects the 
continuity of what has transpired during the Iran-Iraq war thereby threatening the survival of 
the Islamic regime in Iran. The ‘war on terror’ prompted by the attacks on September 11, 2001 
confirmed the power and influence of the United States in the region as its military capabilities 
were used to topple the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. The Islamic Republic then became 
neighbours with U.S. troops and with Saudi’s anti-Iranian stance, the threat to Iran’s survival 
loomed on the horizon. Hadian described Iran’s situation to be a ‘strategic nightmare’.499 Such 
description is not very far from the truth since, despite Iran’s efforts to cooperate with the United 
States in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration invested millions of dollars funding 
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opposition groups to bring about regime change in the Islamic Republic.500 This confirms the 
threat the U.S. poses to Iran’s survival and security, which is not an illusion created by 
Khamenei. The supreme leader’s description of the threat that is the United States in his 
statements, grounded in the realist tradition, serves to prove that Iran understands what is going 
on justifying the realist foundation of Iran’s foreign policy. Retaliating against the United States 
though, using the realist tradition is difficult considering Iran’s relationships in the region. Thus, 
the revolutionist vision is used to attract potential allies in this mainly realist battle of Iran 
against the United States. Yet to convince the Muslim world, such a vision is insufficient as 
practical issues must first be addressed and it is at this point that Iran uses rationalism as the 
means to achieve its mainly realist goal of survival and security. 
9.1.2 The Hezbollah and IRGC 
To understand the realist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy, it is necessary to know about the 
military arms of the Islamic Republic that extends to regional affairs through the revolutionist 
Islamic vision: the IRGC and the Hezbollah. On the one hand is the IRGC (in Farsi Sepah-e 
Pasdaran), which was initially created to serve the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader and to 
safeguard the revolution from the traditional army. Its main task was to ‘defend the gains of the 
revolution and act as a foil to the regular army’.501 The IRGC counters any kind of threat to the 
Islamic Republic and is responsible for suppressing mass oppositions against the government, 
as the world witnessed during the 2009 crackdown on the protesters after the disputed 
presidential elections. The IRGC has been active in Iran’s foreign military policy through the 
works of its General Qasem Soleimani, who has been involved in Iraq and Syria, directing 
troops.502 By 2017, IRGC have become so embedded in the chaos in the Middle East that they 
sent countless military advisers, volunteers and training professionals to Iraq and Syria.503 On 
the other hand is the Hezbollah, a loosely structured organization established decades before it 
surfaced during Iran’s Islamic Revolution to assist Ayatollah Khomeini. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, members of the Iranian Hezbollah assisted the Islamic 
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Republican Party (IRP), Khomeini’s party that would eventually establish the Islamic Republic 
of Iran in the early 80s. In June 1981, the Hezbollah became known as an official group with 
about 20,000 men and they worked closely with the IRGC.504 Both the Hezbollah and the IRGC 
were tasked to dismantle the political challengers to Khomeini’s bid for power. Once Khomeini 
had installed the Islamic Republic, the Hezbollah focused their attention on implementing social 
changes in Iran such as enforcing the Islamic dress code on women and banning alcohol.505 
Although fundamentally Shi’a, the Hezbollah had also accepted Sunni members.506 The 
Hezbollah started organizing themselves in Lebanon with the support of Iran during the Israeli 
occupation in 1982.507 Hezbollah has since evolved into a large military and social organization 
in the Middle East operating mainly in Lebanon and Iraq with the aid of Iran.508 Despite their 
spread in the Middle East, the Hezbollah and their affiliates share the same doctrine and loyalty 
to the establishment of a ‘worldwide central Islamic state’ written in the 1985 manifesto of the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, a point I elaborate on below.509 
The type of extreme revolutionism based on religion, i.e. Shi’a Islam, is the main factor 
enabling para-military groups such as the IRGC and the Hezbollah to transcend the revolutionist 
boundary into realism since they get involved in the primary realist international activity of 
war, particularly proxy wars. These wars are mainly aimed at securing Iran’s stronghold in the 
region to decrease threats to the survival of the Islamic Republic. Hence, the revolutionist vision 
of unifying the Ummah turns into the realist goal of establishing an empire, an Iranian empire 
extending across the Middle East reviving what has been the Persian empire. Below, I discuss 
how Iran has been aiming to expand its influence to achieve its realist foreign policy goal of 
survival and security, which has turned into a quest for power and dominance. 
9.1.3 Iraq  
Iraq and Syria symbolize distinct developments of Iran’s realist foreign policy as the country’s 
strong military presence in the two countries is undeniable. In the case of Iraq, especially, Iran 
plays an important role in many strategic decisions. This is exemplified by the importance of 
IRGC’s General Soleimani, who has been actively engaged in the internal affairs of Baghdad 
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as well as leading the fight against Daesh (ISIL) in collaboration with the United States.510 He 
has also been credited for his achievements in Syria in supporting the Assad regime.511 A large 
segment of the Iraqi population is Shi’a and they are concentrated in the oil-rich Gulf area, 
making the country a strategic ally for Iran. The realist aspect of Iran’s foreign policy is 
reflected in Iran’s mobilization of the Iraqi Shi’as as a means for controlling oil resources. Iran 
can use this to disrupt the flow of petrol in the Hormuz strait at times when international 
pressure mounts against Tehran. A former CIA agent notes in his book that: 
‘Basra and its surrounding area are not really part of Iraq anymore. Quietly, without 
firing a single shot, the Iranians have effectively annexed the entire South, fully one-
third of Iraq. In Basra today, the preferred currency is the Iranian Rial. The Iraqi police, 
the military, and at least one of its intelligence services answer not to Baghdad, but to 
the Iranian-backed political parties, SCIRI, Da’wa, and other Shi’ite groups under 
Tehran’s control. But it’s just not the police, the same Iranian proxies run the 
universities, the hospitals, and the social welfare organizations’.512 
 
Such a connection has been aided by historical developments within the region effectively 
planting the seeds for future cooperation. During Saddam’s reign, many Iraqi’s sought refuge 
in Iran, including prominent individuals such as the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who has returned 
to Najaf to assume the duty of being one of the most influential clerics in Shi’a Islam. His 
connections to Qom, the religious centre of Iran, has established a transnational Shi’a vein that 
binds Iran and Iraq, subsequently bestowing a sense of brotherhood between the two countries, 
which has had significant ramifications for the entire Muslim world.513 Other influential 
personalities that have ties with Iran include Ibrahim al-Jaafari, former Prime Minister and, 
since 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Humam Hamoudi, second in command in the 
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, as well as the incumbent Minister of Oil Adil Abd al-Mahdi. 
All three have spent a significant amount of time in Iran during the Saddam regime and have 
returned to Iraq to assume important offices within the Iraqi government. Iran has thus been 
able to influence Iraqi internal affairs reflecting the realist conduct of freely pursuing goals 
without moral or legal restrictions. It is in this Iranian influence in Iraq that Nasr’s ‘Shi’a 
Revival’ comes into play. 
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Morgenthau’s ideological solidarity argument, as stressed by Walt, is suitable here as he argues 
that cooperation is based on the similarity of two states, such as in terms of religion.514 With 
the revolutionist anti-imperialist discourse aimed at the presence of the United States as a 
foreign power in the region, constituting a threat that the two countries should ally against, 
Walt’s balance-of-threat thesis also becomes apparent. Walt  defines an alignment as a formal 
or informal ‘commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to 
augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence’ wherein the main function lies at 
the ‘commitment for mutual support against some external actor(s)’.515 Alliances are more 
likely when states share similar ‘political, cultural or other traits’, which normally appear ‘in 
the in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side or opposition to 
another’.516 As such, Khamenei’s revolutionist call for solidarity serves Iran’s fundamentally 
realist agenda of thwarting the threat that is the United States. This, of course, had upset the 
Saudis as the period following the U.S. military intervention allowed Iran to restore its claim to 
dominance in the region, sparking a renewed rivalry which had been dormant after the Iran-
Iraq War had devastated Iran’s capabilities. While the Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari 
denies the claims of Iran’s involvement in Iraqi affairs, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-
Faisal insisted that ‘Iran is taking over the country’  showing the dynamics at play within Iraq.517 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq tipped the balance into Iran’s favour as political power went into 
Shi’a hands encouraging them to develop political, economic and cultural relations without any 
obstacles.518 Tehran established political, business and cultural networks in Baghdad to offset 
‘future Iraqi threats’.519 Iran was the first country that sent arms and military commanders such 
as Soleimani to command Iraqi and Shi’a militias in their fight against the Islamic State (known 
as Daesh or ISIL).520.  
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Iraq is not just a strategic ally that is useful for controlling the Strait of Hormuz, it is also ‘home 
to Shi’a Islam’s holiest shrines’ and it connects Iran to Syria.521 Tehran funds and arms about 
100,000 soldiers to fight in Iraq and Syria, which end up as casualties, but the IRGC 
commanders insist ‘if they don't take the fight to Iraq or Syria, the war will come to Iran’.522 
Iran’s mission is to ‘dominate its neighbour’ so it ‘could never again endanger it militarily’ as 
in the Iran-Iraq war.523 The sense of threat to Iran’s survival and security is so strong Iran must 
implement its realist objectives in Iraq. Reports claim that ‘at some border posts in the south, 
Iraqi sovereignty is an afterthought’ showing that Iran has encroached into Iraqi sovereignty 
following the dictates of the realist tradition.524 Syria, Lebanon and Yemen are also on Iran’s 
list as Tehran continues to arm its proxies there, effectively provoking Saudi Arabia and 
escalating tensions in the Middle East despite Iran’s calls for a rationalist dialogue. 
9.1.4 Syria 
In Syria, Iran’s strategic support for the Assad regime has been immense. As the Arab states, 
led by Saudi Arabia, continue their efforts in backing the opposition with the aim of eliminating 
the Assad regime, Iran has relentlessly struggled to turn the tide into Assad’s favour. Belonging 
to the Alawite Shi’a sect, the Assad regime is not necessarily regarded as Muslim on all 
accounts. The Alawites reject Shari’a law, general Islamic practices – praying, going on a 
pilgrimage to Mecca and forbidding the consumption of alcohol – and they ‘celebrate many 
Christian holidays and revere Christian saints’.525 The allegiance of Iran to the Assad regime is 
more a product of the power struggle with Saudi Arabia in the region, supporting the main 
argument of Iran having a fundamentally realist foreign policy. Iran does not want to see a 
Sunni government in Syria, which would bring Damascus closer to Riyadh and hamper Iran’s 
efforts dominate the region and arm the Hezbollah in Lebanon.526 Iran’s goal of survival and 
security, naturally has repercussions in the region as it becomes a threat to other states as Tehran 
expands its regional influence to become a hegemon. For instance, Iran is becoming an 
imminent threat for Israel as it advances to the southern part of Syria, confronting Israeli troops 
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by gaining access to the Golan Heights.527 Under both the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani 
administration, Iran has provided the Assad regime with financial, logistical and military means 
to remain in power. This is evident in the presence of the Iran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and 
the Iran’s own IRGC on Syrian territory, fighting the rebels.528 Here, Soleimani has once again 
played a key role by ‘delivering the strategy that has helped President Bashar al-Assad turn the 
tide against rebel forces and recapture key cities and towns’.529 However, Iran’s involvement 
in Syria is not as high profile as that in Iraq and support has been limited to funding, informing 
and arming the Syrian military as well as recruiting soldiers from outside Iran to fight for 
Assad.530 The struggle for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia is reflected in the 
battles of Damascus and with such adept motivations and willpower to externally support the 
fighting factions, the crisis in Syria may last for several years.531 This diminishes Syria’s right 
to sovereignty altogether as external powers intervene directly in Syrian internal affairs, using 
the country as the proxy-war stage, determining who dominates in the Middle East, in the 
contest of realism. 
9.1.5 Lebanon 
The Lebanese Hezbollah is the key military arm of Iran in the country where Iran’s proxy-war 
with Saudi Arabia extends. Lebanon is the perfect setting due to its weak democracy that is still 
recovering from a civil war with numerous parties based on religion, Hezbollah being one of 
them.532 Iran’s relentless support of Hezbollah’s military has transformed it into ‘a highly 
trained and equipped conventional ground force with regional reach’ as evident in its success 
of turning the Syrian war into Assad’s favour.533 Hezbollah is Iran’s security bet against Israel 
and the West reflecting the starkly realist nature of this alliance.534 Using the Hezbollah to 
threaten Israel and its ally the United States, grants Iran direct access to the power equation in 
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the Middle East.535 Iran’s expansionist ambition is also exhibited by this relationship since Iran 
can command it to fight for its cause, such as in Syria. However, this expansionist goal is mostly 
linked with the revolutionist vision of unifying the Islamic Ummah, which I elaborate on in the 
revolutionist chapter. 
9.1.6 Yemen 
There are traces of financial aid as well as rhetorical support from Tehran to the Shi’a Houthis, 
depicting the conflict in Yemen as yet another proxy war.536 For Saudi Arabia, this expansion 
of Iran in the region to its backyard, i.e. Yemen, is perceived as a great threat, verifying the 
suspicion of Iran’s realist expansionist agenda following the tenets of the realist tradition.537 
Still, there is little evidence that Iran provides the Houthi’s with substantial support since the 
conflict in Yemen has more to do with internal hostilities.538 Iran is most likely claiming 
involvement simply to upset Saudi Arabia by showing to what extend Tehran’s influence can 
spread in the region. Ali Reza Zakani, a member of the Iranian parliament had already made 
claims that the four Arab capitals – Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa – to have become 
part of Iran’s Islamic revolution pointing out that there is a bipolar tension in the Middle East, 
with the other pole consisting of Saudi Arabia and its allies.539 With such developments 
surfacing in the Middle East, the rise of a Persian-Shi’a empire, headed by the General 
Soleimani presents itself to be a force that the Saudis have to reckon with.540 This events 
demonstrate that Iran’s fundamentally realist foreign policy goal of survival and security has 
effectively turned into a quest for power and dominance in the region and Tehran seems to be 
quite successful at it so far proving that it is a major regional power that could police the Middle 
East in much the same way the United States has done. 
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9.2 Rationalism  
Rationalism as discussed in the theoretical chapter defines rationalist principles to be governed 
by prudence and expediency as well as imperatives of morality and law. International relations 
are equated with the existence of an international society of sovereign nation-states. The main 
international activity among the nation-states of international society is composed of trade, 
economic and social exchange. The international conduct of rationalists involves adherence to 
the law and legal restrictions. Two main rationalist themes are present in the foreign policy 
discourses of Iran’s statesmen. One is about improving relations with other countries, which 
was widely advocated by the Khatami administration reflecting the activeness of the rationalist 
institution of diplomacy in the statements. Another is regarding Iran’s rights to have a peaceful 
nuclear program dominating Iran’s political discourse from 2002 until the present. Both the 
supreme leader and the presidents discussed this issue insisting on their rights signifying 
attempts to frame the issue within the rationalist institution of international law since Iran is a 
signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Let us recall that 
rationalism in this study is described to be a means, thereby trade as the main rationalist 
international activity and the rationalist institutions of international society are merely methods 
in foreign policy. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran supports this having a section 
entitled ‘Economy is a means, not an end’ where it states that: ‘in Islam economy is a means, 
and what is expected of a means is nothing but better efficiency for attaining an objective’.541 
If rationalism, as represented by trade for economic purposes, is the means to attain an 
objective, then Iran’s realist goal survival and security driven by the revolutionist vision based 
on Islam must be the main objective of Iran’s foreign policy. 
For the rationalist means to work, however, good working relations should be established with 
the world. Khamenei’s statements often emphasized the need for cooperation among the 
Muslim nations, to mitigate the undesirable consequences of Western intervention in the region. 
In 1997, he explicitly said that he is extending his ‘hand of friendship towards all Muslim states 
and welcome their co-operation and mutual understanding in solving the problems of the 
Islamic world’.542 This coincides with the Khatami government’s foreign policy goal of 
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expanding relations with all countries as stated by the foreign minister and the president.543 
Both the supreme leader and the former president insisted that they want to ease tensions with 
other countries. Such a strategy aimed at ending Iran’s isolation and re-establishing diplomatic 
ties with the world including the West. I explore such foreign policy to see whether the initiative 
of the Khatami period has continuity and Iran has established and fostered ties with the world. 
Below I discuss Iran’s foreign policy actions as they correspond to international activity as 
defined by rationalism focusing on the two rationalist institutions, where Iranian statesmen 
actively operate – diplomacy and international law – in selected countries. I elaborate on the 
political exchanges of top officials representing the rationalist institution of diplomacy as well 
as the various agreements Iran signs with the respective country signifying the institution of 
international law at work in Iran’s foreign policy as a means to achieve fundamentally realist 
goals of survival and security. Before we proceed to that, let us look at one vital element of 
Iran’s rationalist international activity, trade. 
9.2.1 Trade: Iran’s main rationalist international activity 
Despite efforts of the United States to isolate Iran, Tehran has fostered good trading relations 
with many countries indicative of the rationalist tradition at work in the Islamic Republic’s 
international activities. Imports and exports are thriving despite Western sanctions, particularly 
related to the nuclear program, exhibiting that rationalism exists in Iran’s foreign policy. For 
the realist goal of survival and security to materialize, rationalist means should be employed by 
Tehran and trade is one telling indicator that Iran is actively finding ways to not only 
economically survive against the backdrop of Western sanctions but also to circumvent the 
United States’ and its allies’ attempt to isolate Iran from international society. 
Here are some of the yearly trade statistics gathered from the government’s Trade Promotion 
Organization of Iran showing the volume of Iran’s non-oil export and import figures in millions 
of USD. Three years are presented here: 2008, five years after the U.S. military intervention in 
Iraq, then 2012, the height of the nuclear program related Western sanctions on Iran and finally 
2015.544 
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2008 
Rank Export to In Million USD Import from In Million USD 
1 Iraq 2384 U.A.E. 13438 
2 U.A.E. 2328 Germany 5325 
3 China 2003 China 4915 
4 India 1172 Switzerland 3523 
5 South Korea 821 South Korea 3082 
6 Japan 587 U.K. 2033 
7 Afghanistan 539 France 1978 
8 Turkey 526 Italy 1970 
9 Belgium 410 India 1813 
10 Saudi Arabia 394 Turkey 1495 
Table 6. Iran’s non-oil Top 10 import and export countries in 2008.545 
 
2012 
Rank Export to In Million USD Import from In Million USD 
1 Iraq 6250 U.A.E. 10609 
2 China 5501 China 8161 
3 U.A.E. 4213 South Korea 4813 
4 Afghanistan 2874 Turkey 4539 
5 India 2607 Switzerland 3432 
6 Turkey 1479 Germany 2844 
7 South Korea 916 The Netherlands 2045 
8 Turkmenistan 749 India 2035 
9 Pakistan 736 Russia 1761 
10 Azerbaijan 502 Italy 1082 
Table 7. Iran’s non-oil Top 10 import and export countries in 2012. 546 
 
2015 
Rank Export to In Million USD Import from In Million USD 
1 China 7228 China 10454 
2 Iraq 6206 U.A.E. 7835 
3 U.A.E. 4922 South Korea 3682 
4 Afghanistan 2573 Turkey 3013 
5 India 2530 Switzerland 2539 
6 Turkey 1314 India 2298 
7 Italy 775 Germany 1811 
8 Turkmenistan 721 Italy 907 
9 Pakistan 635 The Netherlands 787 
10 Oman 375 France 760 
Table 8. Iran’s non-oil Top 10 import and export countries in 2015.547 
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Five years after Saddam’s regime was toppled by Western troops, we can see how Iraq has 
steadily remained in the top spot in the list of countries Iran exports its non-oil products to and 
its position has not changed even at the height of the sanctions on Iran in 2012. U.A.E., 
Afghanistan and Turkey are also favourite destination of Iran for its exports. China and India 
are also part of Iran’s top 10 export countries and the Western sanctions did not seem to affect 
their trade with Iran. Pakistan and Turkmenistan join Iran’s export country list in 2012. 
Azerbaijan was only part of this list in 2012 and Oman together with Italy in 2015. South Korea 
was a destination for Iranian goods until 2012, while Japan, like Saudi Arabia and Belgium 
were only part of the top 10 in 2008.  
The sanctions on Iran affected its trade relations with European countries such as Germany, 
France and the U.K. Iran enjoyed high amounts of imports from these countries prior to the 
2012 sanctions, with Germany being second in the list in 2008, making only a comeback in 
2015 together with France. In contrast to these countries, imports from Switzerland did not 
seem to have been affected by sanctions as the country was consistently among the top 10. The 
same goes for South Korea. Italy belongs to the top ten as well, although imports declined over 
time. Imports from the Netherlands also dropped from 2012 to 2015. Russia only makes it to 
the list in 2012 with imports reaching 1.7billion USD. 
China, U.A.E., India and Turkey seem to be Iran’s most reliable trading partners as they all are 
part of both Iran’s top export and import countries. Iran, however, significantly imports more 
from U.A.E., China and Turkey than it exports. Some of this have to do with barter agreements 
as sanctions on Iran’s banking system came into place in 2012. The volume of Iran’s non-oil 
bilateral trade with these countries is as follows: 
 
2008 2012 2015 
U.A.E. 15766 14822 12757 
China 6918 13662 17682 
India 2985 4642 4828 
Turkey 2021 6018 4327 
Table 9. Total volume of non-oil bilateral trade.548 
China’s trade with Iran increased over time, effectively replacing the U.A.E. as Iran’s number 
1 trading partner. Trade with U.A.E. in turn, decreased as trade with China grew. Trade with 
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India has also seen a moderate increase in trade volume while Iran and Turkey trade volume 
was a mix of increase and decrease. 
Oil remains Iran’s most important export commodity and data from 2011 until 2015 show how 
the sanctions have affected it. Figures obtained from OPEC show that Iran’s total value of 
exports, including petroleum has declined since 2011. Petroleum exports has decreased to 
27,308 million USD in 2015 from 114,751 million USD in 2011. After 2012 though, non-
petroleum exports have increased. 
Iran 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total exports 144,874 107,409 91,793 85,235 77,974 
Petroleum exports 114,751 101,468 61,923 53,652 27,308 
Non-oil export549 30,123 5,941 29,870 31,583 50,666 
Table 10. Values of Iran’s exports in million USD.550 
Iran’s crude oil exports seem to have suffered the most due to the sanctions as it was cut in half 
by 2015. Meanwhile petroleum products exports were only slightly affected and picks up again 
by 2014.  
Iran 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Crude Oil exports  2,537.30 2,102.00 1,215.40 1,109.20 1,081.10 
Petroleum products exports 441.3 456 394 469.9 514.3 
Table 11. Iran’s crude oil and petroleum products exports (1,000 barrels per day).551  
The regional destinations of Iran’s crude oil are mainly Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Africa 
as we can see below: 
Destination 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Europe 780.1 162 128 117 111.4 
Asia and Pacific 1,630.40 1,839 1,085.20 992.2 969.7 
Africa 126.7 101 2.2 -- -- 
Total crude oil exports 2,537.30 2,102 1,215 1109.2 1081.1 
Table 12. Iran’s crude oil export destinations (1,000 barrels per day)552 
Meanwhile the main regional destination of Iran’s petroleum products is mainly Asia and the 
Pacific with only a fraction going to Africa and none to Europe: 
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 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Asia and Pacific 441.3 456 394 469.3 513.6 
Africa -- -- -- 0.6 0.7 
Total petroleum product exports 441.3 465 394 469.9 514.3 
Table 13. Iran’s petroleum products export destinations (1,000 barrels per day)553 
Iran’s trade relations cannot be ignored as long as oil is a vital global commodity. Nevertheless, 
attempts to diversify Iran’s trade relations by moving towards non-oil products is a significant 
development as it seeks to establish stable economic partnerships with countries that do not 
conceive it as a threat such as the United States and some of its allies. The figures shown here 
in this section shows the significance of the main rationalist international activity of trade for 
Iran as it serves as a means for the country to survive. Thus, a key point in Iran’s foreign policy 
is to foster good trade relations with countries that are willing to accommodate Tehran. 
9.2.2 Iran’s Neighbours 
Afghanistan 
Iran has been an influential actor in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.  Iran’s 
foreign policy in Afghanistan is aimed at stabilizing the country; Tehran wants to help rebuild 
Afghanistan and has cooperated with the United States in this regard particularly initiated 
during the Khatami administration. However, Iran does not want to help create a strong 
Afghanistan that can challenge its interests.554 Iran’s relationship with Afghanistan ‘should not 
be viewed as hegemonic’ as Tehran is more concerned about its interests of ‘securing its eastern 
border, preserving the flow of water from Afghanistan, countering narcotics, and dealing with 
the large Afghan refugee population on its soil’.555 According to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2015 there were 951,142 documented Afghan refugees in Iran and 
an estimated 2 million undocumented Afghans.556 The Iranian government have tried to 
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accommodate the refugees, giving the documented refugees access to healthcare, schools and 
other essential services.557 
Afghanistan is part of Iran’s top 10 countries receiving Iran’s non-oil goods making Tehran an 
important trading partner of Kabul. Iran provides much-needed financial aid to Afghanistan 
supporting government expenses and projects, which come in the form of money bags once or 
twice a year.558 Most of Iran’s assistance to Afghanistan has been centred on rebuilding 
transportation and energy infrastructure as well as schools.559  In 2002 and 2004, agreements 
were made by the two countries about a railway project that connects Iran to Afghanistan 
initially meant for trade purposes with construction officially beginning in July 2006 and is set 
to be completed by 2018.560 Afghanistan is a member of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) since 1992. ECO was established in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey 
under its former name, Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).561 
Armenia 
Iran’s relations with neighbour Armenia is friendly and cordial with no reported complications 
and bilateral trade increasing steadily over the years.562 The two countries engage in joint 
‘multimillion-dollar energy projects’ funding the construction of gas pipelines to enable Iran to 
export natural gas to Armenia.563 Diplomatic exchanges involving top governmental officials 
between the two countries are regular with fourteen such visits recorded by the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of Armenia from 1997 to 2012.564 Armenia and Iran have signed forty-four 
documents including memorandums of understanding and cooperation, joint declarations, 
treaties, executive programs and protocols.565 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is home to the world’s second largest Shi’a community, playing a significant role 
in the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.566 Tehran spends millions of dollars in trying to 
propagate this ideological aspect of their relationship in Azerbaijan with little success as 
religious beliefs have been mostly replaced by atheism as the country was part of the former 
Soviet Union.567 Khatami took measures to enhance Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan with 
Ahmadinejad continuing such policies.568 By 2009, Iran restored maritime passenger 
transportation with Azerbaijan, which stopped in 1998.569 Iran finalized a gas deal with 
Azerbaijan the following year allowing Azerbaijani gas to flow to Iran’s northern regions that 
have difficulties accessing Iran’s major gas fields.570 Tehran has likewise continued efforts to 
improve bilateral trade relations with Baku, with positive results as demonstrated by the 
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visiting Iran in April 2014 to sign numerous agreements on 
cultural, economic and environmental cooperation.571 In 2015, an Iranian official declared that 
both Iran and Azerbaijan is providing 24/7 customs service meant to further boost their bilateral 
trade relations, a move that positively effects Russia and Georgia.572 In 2017, officials declared 
that trade between Iran and Azerbaijan has increased 75 percent since their relations were 
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established in 1992.573 Iran’s presidents and the foreign ministers visited Azerbaijan thirteen 
times from 1997 until 2012.574 Iran’s relationship with Azerbaijan could be better but due to 
certain issues such as Iran’s friendly ties with Armenia and the unresolved legal problems with 
regards to the use of the Caspian Sea, there are some disagreements between Tehran and 
Baku.575 
Iraq 
Before the ‘war on terror’, Iran had established bilateral relations with Saddam’s Iraq and 
Iranian pilgrims could visit holy Shi’a cities Karbala and Najaf.576 The ousting of Saddam 
Hussein as part of the operations of the U.S. ‘war on terror’ removed a significant threat beside 
Iran’s border. Tehran rushed in to help fill the power vacuum in Baghdad and turned the country 
into an ally exposing the realist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy, which is elaborated in the 
realist section.577 Iraq is the top recipient of Iran’s non-oil export goods as we can see on the 
table at the beginning of this chapter. In 2008, Iran’s exports to Iraq were valued at 2.38 billion 
USD, increasing steadily to 6 billion USD in 2012 and 2015.578 Iran’s support for Iraq is not 
unknown and Iranian leaders have frequently stressed it in their statements. In September 2006, 
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki visited Iran, a move Ahmadinejad reciprocated in March 2008, 
making him the first Iranian president to go to Baghdad in over three decades.579 Apart from 
such eloquent diplomatic moves, Iran’s agenda in Iraq is closely tied with its realist foreign 
policy goal of survival and security with the economic component being the rationalist means 
in achieving it. 
Pakistan 
Iran’s relations with Pakistan resembles that of Iran and Saudi Arabia albeit with a civil touch 
and a stronger economic element. The two are rivals and partners depending on the issue. The 
relationship is positive in terms of trade and energy but turns negative regarding religious issues 
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and Iran’s good relations with India.580 Pakistan is one of the founding members of ECO 
together with Iran signalling good economic ties. The first ECO freight train from Pakistan, 
destined for Turkey, was welcomed in Iran in its stop over on Aug 23, 2009.581 It was a project 
conceptualized in 2008 during an ECO meeting in Islamabad.582 During the Khatami period, 
the Iran-Pakistan multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline project became a topic of negotiations 
between Iran and Pakistan and by 2009, an agreement was signed with the implementation 
deadline set to December 31, 2014.583 The project was inaugurated by former President 
Ahmadinejad and his counterpart President Asif Ali Zardari on March 11, 2013, effectively 
defying the United States.584 At the time of writing in 2017, however, the project has not been 
completed despite Iran’s issuance of an ultimatum in 2015.585 
During the Khatami era, as the government called for establishing and enhancing ties with its 
neighbours, two official visits were made in 2001 by top Iranian officials.586 Former President 
Khatami paid an official state visit to Pakistan the following year.587 Such trips were continued 
by former President Ahmadinejad 2008.588 President Hasan Rouhani likewise visited Islamabad 
in 2016 eyeing increased trade with Pakistan aimed at annual volumes of up to 5 billion USD 
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by 2021.589 The volume of Pakistan’s total imports from Iran amounted to 120.3 million USD 
in 2012, 167.8 million USD in 2013 and steadily rose to 185.7 USD in 2014.590 
Turkey 
Turkey founded the ECO together with Iran and Pakistan benefitting the economic aspect of 
the relationship between Istanbul and Tehran. Turkey is Iran’s steady trade partner making it to 
Iran’s top 10 countries both for exports and imports as we have seen above. The volume of 
trade between the two countries are in billions of USD but it has been on the decline since 2012. 
The bilateral trade volume was valued at 21.89 billion USD in 2012, which decreased annually 
reaching only 9.65 billion USD in 2016 based on the figures provided by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey.591 Khatami had postponed a planned trip to Turkey in 2004 due to 
doubts regarding two contracts Iran had signed with Turkey.592 In 2008, Ahmadinejad visited 
Turkey but failed to reach an energy deal with Istanbul.593 Rouhani visited Turkey in 2016 to 
sign some agreements.594 From 1997 until January 2012, twelve economic agreements were 
made by the governments of Turkey in Iran in the energy, transportation, telecommunications, 
banking, health and automotive sectors.595 
Turkmenistan 
Since 2012, Turkmenistan has made it to Iran’s top 10 countries for exporting its non-petroleum 
goods indicating that trade relations between Turkmenistan and Iran are steadily improving 
favouring Tehran. Iran’s relations with Turkmenistan have been quite good. In 2003, when 
Turkmenistan’s former President Saparmurat Niyazov visited Tehran and was received by 
Khatami, nine bilateral cooperation documents were signed by the officials of both Iran and 
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Turkmenistan governments.596 Khatami pointed that Iran’s ties with Turkmenistan can serve as 
a model for the rest of the region.597 In 2005, the former presidents of the two countries 
inaugurated the ‘friendship dam’ in their common border at the north-eastern part of Iran.598 
Khatami and Niyazov opened the Korpedzhe-Kordkuy in December 1997 making it the first 
gas pipeline between the two countries.599 The second gas pipeline, the Dovletabat-Sarakhs-
Khangiran gas pipeline, was opened in 2010 when Ahmadinejad visited Turkmenistan to 
improve regional and economic ties with the country.600 Through the pipelines, gas from 
Turkmenistan could be easily exported to Iran’s northern areas.601 By 2016, Iranian total exports 
to Turkmenistan reached 1 billion USD, facilitated by gas barter between the two countries.602 
The ‘construction of the Khazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway link’ was agreed upon and 
signed by the leaders of the three countries in 2007 and was inaugurated and opened in 
December 2014.603 
9.2.3 Iran and the Middle East 
Saudi Arabia 
Iran has a sea border with Saudi Arabia and Riyadh has been Tehran’s main challenger in the 
region. Economic and political ties are not very strong but there had been occasions when there 
have been efforts to improve it. The Iranian government’s invitation to re-establish and improve 
ties with the world had already began during the Rafsanjani era, after Khomeini’s death. 
However, it was during Khatami’s presidency when this foreign policy move came into full 
swing as states reciprocated Iran’s diplomatic gesture. Iran hosted the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation Conference (OIC) in 1997 demonstrating that it was not isolated and was ready 
for the world. Khatami sought to reconcile with Saudi Arabia and its main ally the United States 
as his government has stated. To prove he means business, the former president went to Riyadh 
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in May 1999 – a first since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.604 He 
aimed at restoring ties with the Kingdom discussing their relations and regional security 
promising to cooperate to keep oil prices up.605 By 2001 the two countries signed ‘a security 
pact on terrorism and drug trafficking’.606 Such warming of relations between Riyadh and 
Tehran took a different turn after the ‘war on terror’, changing the political landscape of the 
Middle East tipping it in Iran’s favour particularly in Iraq. Ahmadinejad came to power and 
Iran’s foreign policy became confrontational, especially regarding its nuclear program, 
threatening the countries in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad still sought to keep cordial relations 
with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states by attending the Gulf Arab Summit in Doha in 2007.607 
He also accepted King Abdullah’s formal invitation to participate in the Hajj.608 He became the 
first Iranian president to take part both in the Gulf Arab Summit and in the Hajj.609 This 
rationalist diplomatic streak continued despite the Arab Uprisings and in the 2012 OIC 
Conference King Abdullah sat next to Ahmadinejad in a gesture of goodwill.610 Relations 
soured in 2015 after King Salman ascended to the Saudi throne and several incidents regarding 
the Hajj pilgrimage with the Mina stampede being the worst claiming 464 Iranian lives.611 Saudi 
Arabia closed its embassy in Tehran in 2016 after being attacked while Iran banned its pilgrims 
in participating in the Hajj that year. 
Syria 
Iran’s ties with Syria historically has been determined by the influence of the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. Damascus has constantly kept its distance while remaining cordial with Tehran 
to avoid alienating Riyadh and the Arab Gulf states. 612 Despite the Assad regime being a Shi’a 
Alawite, religious ties were obsolete and the relationship had more to do with Iranian pilgrims 
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visiting Shi’a holy sites in Syria, which are not significant for the Alawite Syrians.613 Economic 
ties with Iran before the uprisings in Syria were increasing nonetheless in the energy sector. For 
instance, a few months before the uprising, Iranian and Syrian officials signed a 10 billion USD 
agreement with Iraq to construct a gas pipeline stretching from Iran crossing Iraq to Syria, 
Lebanon and the Mediterranean.614 Around the same period, there had been a proposal to create 
an Iranian-Syrian ‘joint bank in Damascus, 60% of which’ Iran would own.615 At the beginning 
of the Syrian uprising and civil war in the country in 2010, Iran strived to keep the peace in 
Syria, organizing a conference attended by 20 countries from across the region and the world 
to promote dialogue among the warring factions to solve the conflict. When Iran hosted the 
Non-Alliance Movement Summit in 2012, finding a peaceful solution to the Syrian conflict was 
on top of the agenda.616 This shows the rationalist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy as the 
Iranian government strives to use the institution of diplomacy to mitigate war. However, as the 
civil war went on, Iran has relentlessly supported the Assad regime to remain in power mainly 
to avoid a Saudi-friendly Sunni government to be established in Damascus that will curb Iran’s 
strategic interests in the region.617 Iran wants to keep Syria as a client state and to do so, it has 
sent senior military personnel such as General Qasem Soleimani  as well as Lebanese Hezbollah 
military to help the Assad regime in its struggle for power in addition to providing the Syrian 
government with petroleum and financial credit.618 This shows the mainly realist agenda in 
Iran’s foreign policy in Syria as discussed earlier. To reaffirm Iran’s support for the Assad 
regime, Iran constantly sent official delegations to Syria, including Ali Akbar Velayati, the 
adviser to Iran’s supreme leader in 2015.619 When Syrian Prime Minister Emad Khamis visited 
Tehran in January 2017, he signed extensive economic agreements with Iran benefitting IRGC, 
who play a major role in Iran’s economy.620 
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U.A.E. 
Despite the dipute between Iran and United Arab Emirates regarding the ownership of three 
islands in the Gulf – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb – economic ties between the 
two countries are quite strong with the U.A.E. being one of Iran’s top trading partner. Although 
Khatami’s government called for improvement of relations with the countries in the region, no 
high-profile visits were made to the U.A.E. It was Ahmadinejad who went to visit the U.A.E. 
in May 2007 making him the first Iranian head of state to do so significantly improving their 
relations, particularly in terms of trade.621 Between 2005 and 2009, Iran-U.A.E. bilateral trade 
tripled to 12 billion USD.622 In 2010, there were an estimated 8,000 Iranian businesses and 
approximately 1,200 Iranian trading companies operating in the U.A.E.623 As the table at the 
beginning of this chapter showed, trade has been an important element of their relationship even 
though Iran imports more from the U.A.E. as it exports. Despite the sanctions affecting trade 
figures between the two countries, U.A.E. has served ‘as Iran’s unofficial backdoor’ at the 
height of the sanctions.624 Iran’s foreign policy with the U.A.E. can thus be viewed in a 
rationalist light as it is the means to which Iran could pursue its realist goal of survival amidst 
the Western dominated system. 
Lebanon 
Iran’s relationship with Lebanon is mostly facilitated by Tehran’s ties to the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, revealing the realist aspect of Iran’s foreign policy. Rationalism, nonetheless, in the 
form of economic ties simultaneously exist in Tehran’s relationship with the Lebanese 
government. Former President Khatami visited Beirut in May 2003 to prove that his call for 
improving ties with countries in the region. It was the first head of state visit made by Iran to 
the country since the Islamic Revolution with talks focusing on regional issues.625 Ahmadinejad 
also visited Beirut in 2010 and discussed Iran’s financial support for the post-war reconstruction 
of the southern parts of Lebanon as well as Beirut’s Al-dahiyeh suburb, both dominated by 
Hezbollah .626 In 2010 alone seventeen trade agreements were signed between the two countries 
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benefitting the economic, oil and energy sectors.627 The following year a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on energy worth 50 million USD was signed between Iran and Lebanon  
and Tehran offered ‘to provide Lebanon with its expertise in terms of petrol extraction’ .628 
Another MOU was approved in 2012 regarding the electricity and water sector with Iran 
pouring in 450 million USD worth of loans.629 A week after Michel Aoun was elected president 
in 2016, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif went to visit him in Lebanon stating that the 
‘presidential election should serve as an example to other politically troubled countries in the 
region’.630 
9.2.4 Iran and the World 
India 
Iran’s relations with India in terms of politics and trade have been good as the two countries 
have historical ties. India is among Iran’s most reliable trading partners and bilateral trade has 
been on the rise as shown on the table at the beginning of this chapter. Iran and India have 
signed several trade agreements mostly in the energy sector and the two countries ‘hold regular 
bilateral discussions on economic and trade issues within the framework of India-Iran Joint 
Commission Meeting (JCM)’.631 On one hand, India’s energy needs facilitate a close trading 
partnership with Iran. On the other hand, New Delhi’s rivalry with Islamabad drives India’s 
good relationship with Iran.632 Iran of course needs to diversify its economic partners to avoid 
isolation and counter the losses of not having relations with the United States exhibiting 
rationalist international activity of trade and economic intercourse as Iran’s means to attain a 
mainly realist goal. In May 2016, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tehran to sign 
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major agreements ‘on cultural exchange, increasing track one and track two policy dialogues, 
and infrastructure development and financing’.633 The Chabahar Port deal, which was also 
signed during Modi’s visit exhibits the good relationship between Iran and India as New Delhi 
will develop the strategic port located close to Iran’s border with Pakistan opening a trade route 
from India to Afghanistan, avoiding Pakistani territory.634 
China  
China has been a reliable economic partner of Iran with regards to trade. Both Tehran and 
Beijing have been quite ambitious in their economic ties and trade have steadily increased over 
time. Bilateral trade between the two countries increased from 3.3 billion USD in 2001 to 38 
billion USD in 2014.635 To avoid sanctions from crippling Iran’s economy, Iran were in talks 
to do barter with China in 2011.636 Iranian food imports were especially hit by the sanctions 
and the Iranian government used barter, offering gold or oil to its trading partners including 
China to keep the flow of food coming into Iran.637 This shows that China had not halted its 
trade with Iran amidst Western sanctions on Iran.638 Despite relative increase in trade volume 
over time, however, the pace of increase has generally slowed down.639 Iran and China have 
also agreed to create a 2 billion USD worth of railway projects in 2010 to tie the region to 
Beijing.640 Iran is part of Beijing’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative introduced in 2013, which 
involves constructing and modernizing Iran’s rail and road infrastructure among others.641  Due 
to Western sanctions, China remains to be Iran’s most important trading partner and market for 
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oil as well as the main source of enormous amounts of capital that can finance Iran’s 
infrastructure projects.642  
 
Russia 
Iran’s relations with Russia is dependent on Moscow’s relationship with Washington. When 
tensions are high between the U.S. and Russia, Moscow warms up to Iran and when Russia-
U.S. ties improve, Moscow distances itself from Iran.643 Khatami went on an official visit to 
Russia in 2001 being the first Iranian head of state to visit Moscow in almost four decades 
formalizing the development of the two countries relationship.644 In Moscow, Khatami and 
Putin signed trade agreements related to arms and oil.645 Energy cooperation increased by 2006, 
coinciding with the rift between Russia and the United States.646 High-raking Russian officials 
visited Iran in 2007 including Vladimir Putin who attended a summit of the Caspian heads of 
states held in Tehran indicating the enhancement of their relationship.647 In 2008, both countries 
discussed deals to cooperate and develop the gas industry with Iran and Russia having the 
world’s largest natural gas reserves.648 Ahmadinejad visited Russia to attend a regional summit 
held in Moscow right after his controversial re-election in 2009.649 At this point strategic 
partnerships have developed between the two countries in the fields of agriculture and 
telecommunication.650 By 2012, the two countries discussed plans on ‘building an underground 
gas storage facility near Tehran’ proving continued support of Gazprom for projects in Iran 
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despite Western economic sanctions.651 In 2015, Putin met with Rouhani in Tehran to boost ties 
by signing several cooperation agreements.652 
United States 
Iran has not had direct official relationship with the United States since the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic yet a significant part of the political discourse of Iranian statesmen emanates 
from the absence of relations with this powerful Western state. Prior to the Islamic Revolution 
of 1979, Iran was a key ally of the United States in the region but the relationship swiftly ended 
due to the hostage-taking crisis at the American embassy in Tehran where U.S. diplomats were 
held captive for 444 days before being released in January 1981.653 Since then, antagonism 
prevailed between Tehran and Washington and both sides have their own strategies of 
demonization to justify foreign policies directed against each other.654 Mention has already been 
made that the U.S. supported Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war and has imposed countless of 
unilateral sanctions on Iran as well as attempted to bring about regime change in Iran. The U.S. 
has basically tried to make life harder for the Iranian government since the inception of the 
Islamic Republic. It was only at the height of the Iranian nuclear crisis when officials of the two 
countries held direct talks.  
Khatami’s reformist government signalled efforts to re-establish ties with Washington and put 
forward the ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ to facilitate civil exchange between Iran and the 
Western country. For a while it seemed relations were thawing as former U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright issued a statement in March 2000 admitting the involvement of Washington 
in the 1953 coup ousting the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, which was one 
of the issues that had caused Iranian resentment of the United States.655 The odds could not 
have been worse as in 2001, the ‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations’ designated by the 
United Nations, the terror attacks of September 11 happened ripping apart any opportunity for 
reconciliation as Bush classified Iran to be part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. Shortly after, the ‘war on 
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terror’ ensued with the American military intervention Afghanistan. Khatami’s government saw 
this as an opportunity to pursue the reconciliation project. Thus, Iran cooperated with the United 
States together with Russia and India to overthrow the Taliban regime in 2001 to form a new 
Afghan government.656 Iran’s efforts were to no avail as the revelation of its nuclear program 
created more problems for both Washington and Tehran than their governments were ready to 
handle at that point. The United States had starkly opposed Iran’s nuclear program and 
negotiations were held frequently for more than a decade with little success eventually ending 
in a stalemate and numerous sanctions on Iran towards the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. 
Although former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was confrontational towards the United 
States in defending Iran’s rights to have a civilian nuclear program, he requested to visit the site 
of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York but was denied by the city officials.657 
The following year, Ahmadinejad congratulated U.S. President Barack Obama in a personal 
letter, marking the first such move from the Islamic Republic exhibiting a rationalist strategy.658 
It took until the election of Rouhani in 2013 when the United States and Iran held direct talks, 
which began when the Obama and Rouhani had the historic phone call in September 2013.659 
Several discussions regarding Iran’s nuclear program followed where Iranian diplomats 
negotiated directly with U.S. diplomats through the P5+1 meetings until the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached in 2015. This shows that despite the anti-
American rhetoric expressed by the supreme leader of Iran, this rationalist dimension of foreign 
policy towards the United States should not be neglected as it is a vital means for Iran to achieve 
its objectives rooted in the realist tradition. 
9.2.5 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
Iran’s nuclear program became the platform where Iran had to negotiate directly with the United 
States and the West. It was in the context of the rationalist institution of international law that 
Iran demanded its ‘inalienable rights’ to have a civilian nuclear program. Iran is a signatory of 
the NPT, giving it legal rights to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful use. Since 2003, 
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Iran has negotiated with different countries regarding its nuclear program signifying Tehran’s 
adherence to rationalist principles. In 2003, Iran met with the U.K., France and Germany (EU3) 
eventually agreed to suspend its nuclear program but the Ahmadinejad government decided to 
continue enrichment in April 2006.660 The U.K., France and Germany trio were joined by the 
United States, China and Russia (P5+1) two months later to convince Iran to halt its nuclear 
program with little success and sanctions on Iran were imposed.661 Three rounds of talks were 
held in July and August 2007 where a ‘work plan’ for Iran to clear any issues regarding its 
nuclear activities was reached but to no avail.662 UN passed a resolution in March 2008 aimed 
at broadening the sanctions on Iran and three months later, the P5+1 proposed an updated deal 
to Iran.663 The Obama administration began to fully participate in the P5+1 negotiations with 
Iran in 2009 and a ‘fuel swap’ agreement materialized but Iran began uranium enrichment 
process early in 2010 earning Tehran tougher sanctions.664 The P5+1 met with Iran again in 
January 2011 but were unable to arrive at an agreement prompting Iran to continue its activities 
and by the end of the year, the U.S. passed a legislation allowing Washington to sanction foreign 
banks that deal with Iran’s Central Bank.665 The EU followed suit and bans oil imports from 
Iran in 2012.666 Iran met with the P5+1 regularly from April to July 2012 to talk about the 
nuclear program, which was deemed positive but discussions were halted. Talks resumed in 
February and April of 2013 but still with no final agreement.667 
When Hassan Rouhani got elected in June 2013, Iran’s foreign policy tone changed. He 
propagated better relations with the international community through negotiating the nuclear 
program, resembling Khatami’s approach. Foreign ministry officials of both Iran and the P5+1 
met along the side lines of the UN General Assembly on September 26, 2013.668 The next day, 
the first direct phone conversation between the heads of state of Iran and the U.S. happened, 
renewing optimism on Iran’s nuclear program for all parties. Since then, Iran negotiated each 
month with the P5+1 and the IAEA on the nuclear program until July 2015 where several 
agreements were reached despite some delays. As the negotiations progressed, U.S. Secretary 
                                                 
660 Kate Lyons, “Iran nuclear talks: timeline,” July 14, 2015, accessed September 19, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-talks-timeline 
661 Ibid. 
662 Arms Control Association Staff, “Timeline of nuclear diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association, 
accessed September 20, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran 
663 Ibid. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Ibid. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
226 
 
of State John Kerry got involved in direct talks with the Iranian officials including the longest 
round of negotiations in Vienna beginning at the end of June 2015. Together with the P5+1, the 
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amanoat and Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, the JCPOA 
deal was reached by July 14, 2015.669 These constant negotiations show Iran’s adherence to the 
rationalist tradition of diplomacy, exhibiting the rationalist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy.  
To achieve their realist goal of survival and security, in this case energy security, rationalism 
had to be instrumentalized by the Iranian officials. Without rationalist diplomacy, it would have 
been impossible for Iran to continue its nuclear program as sanctions were starting to cripple 
the country’s economy. It is rationalism after all, which allows Iran to improve its image in 
international society making Tehran seem more approachable and reliable. 
9.2.6 The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
The IRGC is a unique institution within Iran’s political sphere involved in all three traditions 
and answerable only to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.670 It is comprised of many units, 
each having a specific task. For instance, the Quds unit is the IRGC arm responsible for 
activities outside Iran’s borders having a revolutionist vision but their actions mean to 
strengthen Iran’s realist goals.671 Regarding the economy, the Basij unit of the IRGC is at the 
forefront. The initial link between the Basij and the economy was forged to ensure the welfare 
of its personnel but as time progressed, the Basij penetrated ‘every sector of the economy, from 
construction and real estate to the stock market’ effectively increasing its control over Iran’s 
society and domestic politics.672 The Basij has allowed the IRGC to evolve into a business 
conglomerate being Iran’s third largest by 2007, controlling more than 500 companies in the 
nuclear power, banking, insurance and lifestyle sectors.673 During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, 
many took on a significant amount of ministerial posts in the government with ‘the ministers 
of energy, welfare and social security, industries and mines, justice, culture and Islamic 
guidance, petroleum, defence, commerce, and cooperatives’ having IRGC or Basij backgrounds 
while some were war veterans.674 The IRGC’s embeddedness in Iran’s economy indicates the 
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rationalist dimension of Iran’s domestic politics, spilling over to foreign policy. The existence 
of profit-driven companies controlled by the Basij prompts Tehran to foster good trading 
relationships with the world highlighting rationalism to be the means for their survival. 
9.3 Revolutionism 
Morality as an imperative principle together with the establishment of a community of mankind 
or cosmopolitan world society are the main tenets of the revolutionist tradition. Ideological 
conflict between two opposite camps of faithful and heretics define international activity while 
moral restrictions govern international conduct according to revolutionism. For the 
revolutionists, moral values regulate the affairs of individuals in the cosmopolitan utopian 
society of mankind. There are no borders and individual nation-states in revolutionism since 
the aim is to transcend such divisions to unite humanity under one super-state encompassing all 
individuals on earth. Kantian world society is a common term in the revolutionist tradition since 
Immanuel Kant had a significant contribution to its establishment. For instance, Kant’s 
‘federation of peoples’ or ‘foedus pacificum’ (pacific federation) based on his work, ‘Toward 
Perpetual Peace’, influenced many of today’s political developments directed towards the 
creation of a cosmopolitan world society of mankind.675 His federation seeks ‘to end all wars 
forever’ among nations by reaching an agreement to maintain peace where ‘every state, even 
the smallest one, could expect its security and its rights’.676 The United Nations and the League 
of Nations exemplifies Kant’s cosmopolitanist vision despite its shortcomings.  
Iran’s foreign policy likewise incorporates a revolutionist vision despite its fundamentally 
realist conception and rationalist execution. To understand the revolutionist vision in Iran’s 
foreign policy, we should discuss the two features of the Islamic Republic, leading to two 
distinct types of revolutionism: First is the religious cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision rooted 
in Islam, turning the vision into a realist endeavour prevalent in Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s 
political discourses. Second is what I call a global cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision, based 
on moral values regardless of faith advocated by Khatami and Rouhani in their statements. 
These two correspond to two different kinds of cosmopolitanism with two distinct outcomes, 
which Kant had put forward: political cosmopolitanism and ethico-theological 
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cosmopolitanism. The highest political good, which political cosmopolitanism represents as 
represented by the global cosmopolitanist vision in Iran, is the establishment of a world republic 
(global legal society of peaceful states), better known as the ‘federation of nations’.677 
Meanwhile the highest moral good, envisioned by Kant’s ethico-theological cosmopolitanism 
is ‘the establishment of a global ethical community’, represented by the Islamic cosmopolitanist 
vision in Iran’s foreign policy.678 I discuss the global and Islamic cosmopolitanisms briefly as 
they relate to Iran’s political structure and Iranian statesmen foreign policy action.  
9.3.1 Islamic cosmopolitanism  
Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 eliminated the Iranian Pahlavi monarchy and brought 
religion, particularly Shi’ism, into the epicentre of governance.  Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
introduced the concept of the sovereignty of God in Iran replacing that of the King following 
the Twelver Shi’a tradition.679. Khomeini and his followers believe that the Ummah, is to be 
led by the Vali Al-Asr (Governor of the Epoch) or Imam Mahdi, who has been in occultation 
for many centuries implying that the human dimension of sovereignty lies on the Vali Al-Asr. 
With the occultation of Mahdi, Khomeini drew on the principle of Imamat, belief in a divine 
guide, and created the Office of the Vali-ye Faqih (Guardian Jurist) or Supreme Leader to 
undertake such obligations, ‘a bold innovation in the history of Shi’ism’.680 Khomeini appointed 
himself as the intermediary between the Vali Al-Asr and the people of Iran, claiming the title 
of Vali-ye Faqih for himself, effectively making it the highest political position in Iran with the 
presidency being the second.  In the Shi’ite principle of Imamat, as a consequence of God’s 
justice, mankind is never to be left without an Imam tasked to guide the Ummah and interpret 
the Koran. The Vali-ye Faqih represents Imam Mahdi on earth while he is on occultation giving 
the Vali-ye Faqih ‘supreme power over men and responsibility only to God’.681 This integrates 
both divine and human aspects of sovereignty. Under this pretext, Khomeini actively sought to 
export the revolution to unite the Ummah to realize the universalist aspiration of the Islamic 
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Republic. After Khomeini’s death, Ali Khamenei took on the position of Vali-ye Faqih. It is in 
this context of the sovereignty of God where Iran’s revolutionist vision follows the Kantian 
tradition as the Islamic Civilization becomes the realization ‘God’s Kingdom on Earth’ as Kant 
envisioned. 
Khomeini and his followers advertised Islam as an indigenous philosophy free from Western 
influences thereby making it the only way to escape the ‘negative impacts of Western and 
Eastern ideological imports’.682 Iran’s Islamic Revolution, however, was not very popular in 
the Middle East and exporting it proved to be a problem for the Islamic Republic. Iran’s 
neighbours felt threatened and Tehran was isolated soon after. Thus, Iran fought alone in the 
Iran-Iraq war and it took serious political effort during the Rafsanjani and Khatami 
administrations to re-establish ties with the countries in the region. Statesmen of the Islamic 
Republic modified their approach in exporting the revolution by setting Iran as an example for 
the Muslim world to follow ‘as an alternative to existing Arab/Islamic regimes’ presenting 
themselves to be the heart of Islamic unification.683 The revolutionist vision is so strong, it is 
written in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. The ‘Method and Government in Islam’ 
section of the constitution states: 
‘With due consideration to the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution, which was a 
movement for the victory of all the oppressed people over their oppressors, the 
Constitution paves the way for the perpetuation of this Revolution in and outside the 
country, particularly on the area of expansion of international relations with other 
Islamic and peoples’ movements; it tries to prepare the ground for the creation of a 
single world Ommat (Nation). [Koranic Verse: Verily, this your nation is one nation; 
and I am your Lord, and so serve me (The Chapter of the Prophets, Verse 92)], and the 
perpetuation of the struggle for delivering all the deprived and oppressed nations of the 
world’.684 
 
Preparing ‘the ground for the creation of a single world’ Ummah thus becomes the task of the 
supreme leader Khamenei, who is responsible for propagating and implementing this together 
with heading ‘the struggle for delivering all the deprived and oppressed nations of the world’.685 
This last line is once again reiterated in article 154 of the ‘Foreign Policy Section’ stating that 
the Islamic Republic must support ‘the rightful struggle of the oppressed people against their 
oppressors anywhere in the world’.686 Hence, the establishment of a unified Islamic Ummah 
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constitutes the religious cosmopolitan revolutionist vision of Iran, which involves fighting for 
the oppressed and deprived nations. To this end, an ideological army should be established. 
God’s Armies: IRGC and the Hezbollah 
The ‘Ideological Army’ section of the Iranian constitution stipulates:   
‘In establishing and equipping the defence forces of the country, it shall be taken into 
consideration that faith and ideology are the basis and criterion. Therefore, the Army of 
the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards Corps will be formed in conformity 
with the above objective, and will be responsible not only for protecting and 
safeguarding the frontiers but also for the ideological mission, that is, Jihad (Crusade) 
for God’s sake and struggle for promoting the rule of God’s law in the world [Koranic 
verse: And prepare ye against them what force and companies of horse ye can, to make 
the enemies of God, your enemies, and others besides them, in dread thereof. (The 
Chapter of the Spoils, Verse 60)]’.687  
 
The IRGC was conceived to protect Iran’s revolution as well as its achievements and they are 
under the direct command of the supreme leader.688 They have been largely involved in the 
spread of the Islamic ideology within the Islamic Republic through the implementation of the 
Shari’a law, thereby concerning themselves with women’s dress code and public behaviour as 
previously discussed. After all, Article 1 of the IRGC statute states they are responsible for the 
‘expansion of the rule of law of God in accordance with the laws of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’.689 The IRGC is a very complex institution constituted of several units, each having a 
different task making them an active player both within Iran and in the world. They have a 
‘military force, intelligence service, covert action/special operations force, police, paramilitary 
force and business conglomerate, with proxies worldwide’.690 One of the units in particular is 
tasked with implementing the Islamic cosmopolitanist vision in the region, the Quds force 
(Sepah-e Quds). The Quds force is an IRGC unit responsible for operations outside Iran headed 
by Major General Qasem Soleimani. In fact, the name Quds (Arabic for Jerusalem) was chosen 
by the IRGC officials since it implied ‘that the force will one day liberate the holy city’ 
effectively implanting the issue into the heart of Iran’s foreign policy unifying the Islamic 
Ummah and realizing the religious cosmopolitan vision as stated in the Iranian constitution.691 
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The extensive reach of the Quds force is visible in the ongoing conflict in Iraq and Syria and 
the war against Daesh (ISIL) with Soleimani’s growing popularity.692 
To be able to fight, soldiers must be recruited and trained in the name of Islam attracting those 
empathetic to the Islamic Republic’s cause. The Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias such as 
Asa’in Ahl al-Haq and the Afghan Fatemiyun Division have collaborated with the Quds force 
in recruiting militant ‘jihadists’ for training and deployment in the region and there doesn’t 
seem to be a shortage of applicants from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.693 Volunteers are 
recruited as the ‘defenders of the oppressed and holy shrines’ and they believe the ‘non-Sunni 
communities’ are being eradicated in Syria with their ‘shrines, mosques and churches’ being 
destroyed as publicized ‘in state media and on social media networks’.694 The popularity of 
Soleimani and his remarks on the martyrdom, bravery and sacrifice of the soldiers fuel the flame 
of Islamic Shi’a patriotism in the hearts of the young Shi’a volunteers across the Middle East, 
prompting them to fight in Syria. They are fighting for God’s cause, for the oppressed and the 
survival of their fellow non-Sunnis while seeing themselves as part of the Islamic nation under 
the Shi’a flag. In Iran, which has a reputation for glorifying martyrdom, the fighters killed in 
Syria are declared by the state media as ‘“defenders of the holy shrine [of Sayeda Zeinab]” 
regardless of where they were actually killed’.695 Faith is the main factor drawing in new 
recruits where ‘Iranian officers delivered speeches invoking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, 
the revered seventh-century Shiite figure whose death at the hands of a powerful Sunni army 
became the event around which Shiite spirituality would revolve’.696 Invoking a religious 
narrative such as the death of Imam Hussein to incite action in the name of Islam is nothing 
new in Iran. As far as the Islamic Republic is concerned, Imam Hussein still has enemies to this 
day in the form of those against the Shi’ites ranging from the Sunni militias to the United States, 
practically any group hostile to the Shi’a faith.  
Afghani recruits were among those who first joined the fight in Syria together with the 
Hezbollah who were recruited from the ‘immigrant communities in Iran’, Syria and 
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Afghanistan through travel agencies.697 They join for many reasons: ‘religious grounds, to 
improve their chances of obtaining permanent residency or work permits in Iran, for financial 
compensation’ and even to avoid the death penalty in Iran if they were caught smuggling 
drugs.698 Most, however, volunteer for financial reasons as rampant unemployment in the 
region have left many young men without a job and prospects for the future. Fatemiyun 
commanders mainly recruiting Afghans, say their fighters get 450 USD monthly ‘plus 
temporary immigration benefits for their families in Iran’ although reports say this figure can 
go up to a 1000 USD.699 Young men from Syria are reported to have a monthly salary of 265 
USD.700 Iraqi Shi’ites seem to receive the least amount with only 150 USD a month.701 Apart 
from the financial motivation, the task of the fighters are defined to be holy in the name of 
Islam. There is a report from an eyewitness saying, ‘new recruits were asked to walk under a 
copy of the Koran held high and to kiss it as a token of reverence and steadfastness to its 
principles’.702 This emphasizes ‘the sacred nature’ of their commitment with individuals 
claiming to have been transformed into ‘God’s soldier at that moment’.703  
The Hezbollah has also been part of this revolutionist project and since becoming organized 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they have proven to be an effective tool of the Iranian 
government both within the country and across the Middle East. The Hezbollah or Party of 
Allah is an integral part of Iran’s religious cosmopolitanist vision. The most active and 
organized Hezbollah groups are mainly found in Iran and Lebanon but their influence stretches 
across the region. They are composed mainly of Shi’a members but also include Sunni’s as 
well.704 In the manifesto of the Lebanese Hezbollah the Islamic revolutionist vision is evident: 
‘Who are we and what is our identity? We are the sons of the Umma of the Hezbollah 
whose vanguard was made victorious in Iran by God to pave the way for a Worldwide 
Central Islamic State. We obey orders from one single leadership, wise and just, the 
leadership of the Fakih; the Imam, Ruhollah Khomeini. "Because of that, we are not in 
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Lebanon a closed and organized party .... We are an Umma associated with the Muslims 
of all over the world’.705 
 
Through this statement, the Lebanese Hezbollah’s connection with the Islamic Republic 
becomes clear helping us understand the reasoning behind the Islamic Republic’s support for 
the group. Iran provides enormous financial and military support estimated to be worth billions 
of USD to continue exporting the Islamic Republic’s religious cosmopolitanist vision aimed at 
realizing the unification of the Islamic Ummah.706 To this end, Iran has also provided some 
educational support to the group. For instance, about 300 seminarians from Lebanon are 
studying in Qom and 100 scholarships a year are allocated for Hezbollah in Iranian 
universities.707 Iran also finances the public services supplied by the Lebanese Hezbollah to its 
Shi’a communities in the country such as daily garbage collection, providing drinking water 
and some basic health services.708 In the Iraqi city of Najaf, a similar system for garbage 
collection is in place, this time with an Iranian company collecting the trash.709 These services 
reflect the expansion of the Islamic nation from Iran to other countries in the region, suggesting 
the serious intent of the Islamic Republic in realizing its religious cosmopolitan vision despite 
the realist component of Tehran’s actions. 
The invitation and Shi’a potential 
Da’vat (Farsi term for invitation) according to Fürtig is a vital part of an Islamic foreign policy 
with Iran leading the efforts since the Islamic Revolution.710 This involves propagating the 
message of Islam to attract followers. Iran being a majority Shi’a country does not advocate 
Shi’ism per se but local and regional propaganda tend to promote Shi’a narratives such as the 
martyrdom of Imam Hussein for the Quds force purpose of fighting in Syria and Iraq. The 
easiest people to invite to the Islamic cosmopolitan vision of Iran are the Shi’ites of the region. 
According to a 2009 estimate Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq have the biggest Shi’a populations 
in the world. Iran with about 66 to 70 million, Pakistan 17 to 26 million, India 16 to 24 million 
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and Iraq having 19 to 22 million. Yemen is not far behind with 8 to 10 million, Azerbaijan 5 to 
7 million, Afghanistan 3 to 4 million.711 
In Afghanistan, Iran has maintained good relations with the Shi’a Hazara community and 
provided them with good education.712 The Hazara ‘have traditionally looked to Tehran for 
religious and political guidance’ and since the fall of the Taliban, they have been free to express 
their Shi’a faith and organize ‘public processions’ during Shi’a ‘holy days’.713 Syria is 
important for Iran’s revolutionist vision since the two most notable holy Shi’a sites are to be 
found in the country. These are the Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus – tomb of Zaynab, 
the daughter of the first Shi’a Imam Ali – and Sayyidah Ruqayya Mosque in Damascus – tomb 
of Sukayna ‘Ruqayya’, the daughter of the third Shi’a Imam Hussein. Among the two, it is the 
Zaynab shrine which has been advertised to be in danger in order to recruit jihadists militia to 
fight alongside Assad’s troops.714 With regard to Azerbaijan, Iran spends millions of USD to 
endorse a common Shi’a identity but with little success due to the prevalence of atheism during 
their history in the U.S.S.R.715 When the 2011 protests in Bahrain took place, Iran openly 
supported the protesters who were predominantly Shi’a and was accused of meddling in the 
affairs of the country by some Gulf states.716 In the case of Yemen, there is vocal support from 
Tehran but it is difficult to trace. Some interviews have claimed, however, that ‘prominent 
Houthi supporters have converted to Twelver Shia over the past two decades and have visited 
Iran for religious instruction, prompting speculation that there is in fact a Twelver faction within 
the wider Houthi movement’.717 An Iranian official said three Arab capitals, Damascus, 
Baghdad and Beirut, are already ‘in the hands of Iran and belong to the Islamic Iranian 
revolution,’ with Sanaa being the fourth.718 Spreading Iran’s Islamic revolutionist vision, does 
not end there, nonetheless, as its religious schools in Qom funded by the government continue 
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preaching the message to those willing to listen. Ahmadinejad made an attempt to invite the 
world to this vision of Islam in his statements at the UN exhibiting the power of unification 
through religion. 
To discern the potential of the Shi’a population in the region, we must look at one of the most 
important holy events of the Shi’ite faith, the Arba’een (Arabic term for fourty), which happens 
in Iraq. The annual Arba’een pilgrimage ‘commemorates the end of the 40-day mourning period 
after the killing of Imam Hussein’ the third Shi’a Imam, in the Battle of Karbala, whose death 
is said to have resulted in the Shi’a-Sunni schism in Islam.719 In 2015, reports say up to 22 
million pilgrims from around the world participated in the annual pilgrimage in Karbala, Iraq, 
making it ten times larger than the Hajj.720 Many of the pilgrims go to Karbala on foot walking 
up to hundreds of kilometres from their hometowns. Some come from Basra in Iraq covering 
approximately 500 kilometers on foot for two weeks and make their way between Najaf and 
Karbala for the pilgrimage.721 On the way tents or Mawakeb, are put up the local villagers to 
provide free services to the pilgrims.722 These services include providing food and beverages, 
space to rest with laundry service, international calls and everything pilgrims need – all for 
free.723 
‘Mawkeb organizers intercept the pilgrims’ path to plead with them to accept their 
offerings, which often includes a full suite of services fit for kings: first you can a foot 
massage, then you are offered a delicious hot meal, then you are invited to rest while 
your clothes are washed, ironed, then returned to you after a nap. All complimentary, of 
course’.724 
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Up to 50 million meals daily for two weeks are provided free of charge by villagers, mostly 
farmers and labourers, who ‘who starve to feed the pilgrims and save up all year round so that 
visitors are satisfied’.725 In addition, volunteer fighters protect the pilgrims from potential Daesh 
(ISIL) attacks on their path to Karbala.726 Such cooperation of people freely serving their fellow 
Muslims during the Arba’een has no comparison in the world in terms of its large numbers. 
Both the pilgrims and those who serve them are devout Muslims. They believe in the sacrifice 
of Imam Hussein, who opposed the tyrant Yazid but did not resort to violence costing him his 
life at the Battle of Karbala. According to the Director of the Islamic Center: ‘For Muslims and 
non-Muslims, the sacrifice and noble message of Imam Hussain represents the peace and virtue 
of Islam’ it is ‘a model all of humanity can replicate’.727 
In a study on the views of the Iraqi and Iranian Arba’een pilgrims, ‘respondents saw Iran as a 
guardian of Shi’a interests in conflicts across the region’ and ‘strongly supported the provision 
of financial assistance to all Shiite groups mentioned, including the Houthis in Yemen, Syria’s 
government army, Hezbollah, the Shiite volunteer groups in Iraq known as Hashd al-Shaabi, 
the Shiite opposition in Bahrain, and Afghan Shiite groups’.728 This shows that the Islamic 
vision set out by Iran has significant support in the Muslim community. In a report, observers 
in Najaf believe Iran is simply waiting for the death of Ayatollah Ali Sistani before claiming 
‘religious guardianship of the holy cities’ in Iraq.729 There are many important holy Shi’a 
shrines in Iraq, mostly tombs of some of the twelve Shi’a Imams, attracting millions of Shi’a 
pilgrims from Iran and around the Middle East. Among the most notable are:  
Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf – tomb of the first Shi’a Imam, Ali 
Imam Hussein Shrine in Karbala – tomb of the third Shi’a Imam, Hussein, who was martyred 
during the 648 AD Battle of Karbala.730 
Al Abbas Mosque in Karbala – tomb of Al-Abbas, the son of the first Shi’a Imam Ali and the 
third Shi’a Imam Hussein’s half-brother ‘who also died at the Battle of Karbala’.731 
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Al-Kadhimiya Mosque in Baghdad – tombs of the seventh Shi’a Imam, Musa Al-Kadhim, and 
the ninth Shi’a Imam, Muhammad Al-Taqi 
Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra – tombs of the tenth Shi’a Imam, Ali al-Hadi, and the eleventh 
Shi’a Imam, Hasan Al-Askari 
From Iran alone, 1.5 million Iranian pilgrims visited the Shi’a shrines in 2016, marking the 
religious significance of Iraq for Iran.732 If Tehran is to be successful in its Islamic foreign 
policy, the revolutionist vision of establishing an Islamic cosmopolitanism could be a reality 
with the numbers of pilgrims increasing rapidly by the millions each year since the fall of 
Saddam. Once realized, however, as the militant components of this revolutionist vision shows, 
there is a thin line to cross in reaching Iran’s realist goal of creating an empire – an Islamic 
empire – which Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refers to as the ‘New Islamic 
Civilization’.  
9.3.2 Global Cosmopolitanism 
A global cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision in Iran’s foreign policy can be observed through 
the reformist current in Iran’s politics although it is not as prominent as the Islamic 
cosmopolitanist vision advertised by Khamenei. Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilizations 
(DAC) brought global cosmopolitanism into Iran’s political discourse and to prove he means 
business, his administration ushered in internal as well as external reforms. The former 
president went on landmark visits to Italy, France, Germany, Japan and Russia to improve Iran’s 
relations with the West showing Iran is opening up to the world.733 Khatami symbolized the 
global revolutionist vision of Iran through his active reformism aimed at establishing an Islamic 
democracy, whose legacy continues until the present time. The approach initiated by Khatami 
and continued by Rouhani enabled Iran to ease tensions with the United States, at least 
temporarily. Both Khatami and Rouhani want to be part of the ‘federation of peace’ instead of 
being the antagonists on the world stage making their vision parallel to the world society Kant 
perceived. Iran has made attempts towards this end by being an active member of the United 
Nations, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as proposing different approaches to promote 
peace at the interstate level. Khatami’s DAC and Rouhani’s WAVE are two prime examples. 
                                                 
732 Iran Daily Staff, “Number of Iranian pilgrims to Iraq to hit 1.5m,” June 29, 2016, accessed September 25, 
2017, http://www.iran-daily.com/News/154124.html 
733 United Press International Staff, “Khatami on landmark visit to Russia” 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
238 
 
Khatami issued a presidential order to establish the International Centre of Dialogue Among 
Civilizations (ICDAC), enabling his revolutionist vision to be implemented.734 This was later 
known to be the International Centre for Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations (IICDCC), 
which the former president chairs.735 The ICDAC was created during the first term of his 
presidency, on December 9, 1998 with one of its mandates being ‘orienting the external 
relations of the Islamic Republic as far as the concept of Dialogue Among Civilizations is 
concerned’.736 The objectives of the ICDAC are according to the website are: 
• ‘To promote dialogue among civilizations and cultures on an international scale as a 
means of advancing the interpretation of the UN Charter and of improving human well-
being. 
• To promote and expand the culture of dialogue at the national level. 
• To promote the culture of peace in order to foster peaceful coexistence and prevent 
human rights violations. 
• To help establish and broaden the international civil society through cultural interaction 
among nations. 
• To strengthen spiritual, moral and religious culture. 
• To conduct research on the significance and possible interpretations of Dialogue Among 
Civilizations and to release the findings nationally and internationally’.737 
 
In addition, one of the Centre’s main international activity was to hold international gatherings 
on cultural issues with a view to preparing the ground for and strengthening dialogue among 
cultures and civilizations’, which support the objectives.738 Publication of journals and 
organizing conference became part of the work of the Centre, even plans for a DAC TV channel 
were drawn. The Green Revolution of 2009 in Iran, however, made the Centre inactive but the 
former president claimed their projects have not been abandoned entirely.739 Nevertheless, the 
ICDAC inspired the world to work together on a global scale to attain deeper cultural 
understanding among nations and numerous conferences and activities were held in its honour. 
In fact, the phrase ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ has become part of the vocabulary of 
                                                 
734 Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, “Letter Dated 31 August 1999 from the permament representative of the I.R. of Iran 
to the United Nations address to the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly, accessed 
September 26, 2017, http://www.un.org/documents/a54-291.pdf 
735 UIA, “International Institute for Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations (IIDACC),” accessed 
September 27, 2017, https://www.uia.org/s/or/en/1100029527 
736 Nejad-Hosseinian, “Letter Dated 31 August 1999 from the permament representative of the I.R. of Iran to the 
United Nations address to the Secretary-General” 
737 Sasan Tavassoli, Christian Encounters with Iran: Engaging Muslim Thinkers after the Revolution, 
International library of Iranian studies 19 (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 94 
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United Nations address to the Secretary-General,” 3 
739 Iranian Diplomacy Staff, “Khatami speaks of Dialogue Among Civilizations,” Iranian Diplomacy, accessed 
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international affairs. Rouhani’s World Against Violence and Extremism (WAVE) initiative has 
also taken the same path and held a two-day conference in Tehran in December 2014 bringing 
together forty countries together to discuss anti-terrorism plans.740 Together, the efforts of 
Khatami and Rouhani help progress the global cosmopolitanist vision of Iran’s foreign policy. 
With these initiatives, Iran actively contributes to the realization of a revolutionist ‘federation 
of nations’, set forth by Kant, showcasing the Islamic Republic’s potential to be an integrative 
part of a future world society. However, the Islamic revolutionist vision is much stronger in 
Iran and government support for projects such as the DAC are quite low within Iran’s political 
sphere. 
9.4 Conclusion 
Iranian statesmen’s foreign policy discourse mainly depicts the United States as being a 
hegemonic immoral realist actor set to dominate the Middle East causing chaos and suffering 
in the region through its criminal acts breaking international law. This shows three things. First, 
Iran perceives the United States and its allies in the region as a threat to its own survival as an 
Islamic Republic. Second, Iran understands the principles and logic of the realist tradition 
thereby it can elaborately describe Washington’s actions in the Middle East. Third, perceiving 
the threat to its survival and full understanding the tenets of realism, Iran’s foreign policy is 
thus tailored to be fundamentally realist. The actions of Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen 
are telling signs that Iran’s international activity follows the dictates of realism, effectively 
mirroring the actions of the United States in the region. In many ways, once the export of the 
Islamic revolution becomes successful, the discourses and actions of Iran indicate there is an 
intention of creating an empire under the name of a ‘New Islamic Civilization’. This empire, 
however, seems to reflect the ambition of Iran’s leaders to revive the Persian Empire. Khamenei 
claims that the unitary Islamic Civilization should be restored but historically it is difficult to 
prove as there were many conflicts among the Shi’a and Sunnis. The glory of the past Islamic 
Civilization he mentions was factually divided between the Ottoman and the Persian Empires. 
Hence, he could only be speaking of the Persian Empire since a single peaceful unitary Islamic 
Civilization had never existed. For this reason, I argue that Khamenei’s project of unifying the 
Ummah has to do with Iran’s realist ambition of reviving its own fallen Persian Empire as the 
actions of Iran in the region shows. Iran wants to be a power-maximizing actor in the world 
arena for it to attain its goal of survival and security. 
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Trade being the main international activity of rationalist tradition is a predominant characteristic 
of Iran’s foreign policy as we have seen in this chapter. Despite sanctions, Iran continues to 
have trade relations with many countries showing the existence of rationalism in their foreign 
policy. The Islamic Republic’s trade and economic relations with its immediate neighbours, i.e. 
those connected to Iran through land borders, are generally good particularly in the energy 
sector. Gas pipelines and transportation routes are the main projects Iran undertakes facilitating 
a rationalist exchange with several states despite some political tensions among them. Such 
trend can be observed in Iran’s relations with countries in the region and the rest of the world. 
Even relations with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon have a rationalist dimension with Iran funding 
infrastructure projects in these states despite strong realist and revolutionist currents in their 
bilateral relationships with Tehran. With Saudi Arabia and the United States, rationalism has 
also been active despite the strength of the other two traditions. Iran’s needs rationalism to 
pursue its goals, without it, its realist goal of survival and security is impossible. Through 
establishing trading relations with many other countries, Iran can circumvent the sanctions 
imposed by the United States and some of its Western allies. If Iran did not foster such 
rationalist relations, the country’s economy would have collapsed, pulling the state down with 
it and the hopes of survival would have been shattered. The track record of the Islamic Republic, 
however, has been replete with rationalist actions unlike the United States, making Tehran an 
unfavourable alternative to Washington. Since Iran had tried to export its Islamic Revolution, 
states in the Middle East have been wary of building ties with the country. Iran simply suffers 
from an image problem. A more diplomatic and moderate approach had to be employed to avoid 
threatening its neighbours. Thus, Tehran had learned to redefine its foreign policy and use 
rationalism as a means to survive and thrive in the international society to achieve its 
fundamentally realist goal of survival fuelled by a revolutionist vision. 
Iran’s revolutionist vision is divided among the Islamic cosmopolitanists and the global 
cosmopolitanists. The Islamic cosmopolitan revolutionist vision is highly endorsed by the 
government spearheaded by the supreme leader, making funding readily available. We can see 
this in Iran’s support of Shi’a militias such as the Hezbollah and Quds Force of the IRGC and 
their relative successes in carrying out their revolutionist mission. To understand the potential 
of the Islamic cosmopolitanist vision as carried out by the Shi’a sect, we must look at the annual 
Arba’een pilgrimage which attracts more people than the Hajj. The global cosmopolitanist 
revolutionist vision is also simultaneously being promoted by the reformist camp in Iran led by 
Khatami although it is not as highly supported by the conservative elements in Iranian politics. 
Despite the revolutionist vision of Iran, however, realist currents are visible as they use Islam 
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to secure Iran’s position in the region. Through the Quds force and the Hezbollah, Iran’s Islamic 
cosmopolitanist vision crosses over to realism showing Iran’s fundamentally realist foreign 
policy objective of survival and security.  
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10 Conclusion 
Showing the interplay of the three traditions and their interconnectedness in the arguments and 
actions of statesmen to explain foreign policy is the main goal of this research. The quantitative 
chapter presented the data in charts to prove that all three traditions exist at varying degrees in 
the political discourse of Iranian statesmen as they speak to international audiences. Realism, 
operating on the logic of state-survival and independence prompts countries to take a selfish 
approach to foreign policy disregarding both the rights of other states and morality. Rationalism 
functions with the principle of cooperation and pursuit of common interests rather than going-
it-alone. The revolutionist tradition brings the meaning of cooperation to a new level turning it 
into a world unification project. In the case of Iran’s foreign policy, the fundamentally realist 
goals of survival and security could only be achieved by having a revolutionist vision 
implemented through rationalist means. The revolutionist vision is split into two: global 
cosmopolitanist and Islamic cosmopolitanist.  Diplomacy and cooperation are the rationalist 
means to which the essentially realist goals are to be reached. Iran’s foreign policy is the same 
as in the other states of international society – it is consistent and dynamic. It is simultaneously 
realist, rationalist and revolutionist with each tradition serving a specific purpose, which cannot 
be disentangled from the other two. This research affirmed the argument that Iran’s foreign 
policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while the means are 
rationalist, initially aimed at providing an explanation for the inconsistencies in Iran’s foreign 
policy. Let us recall the main findings supporting my argument. 
10.1 Iran’s foreign policy explained 
Iran’s foreign policy is consistent. There are three ways the findings support this argument. 
First being the similarities in the approaches of the political figure. On the one hand, Khamenei 
and Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourses mirror each other. Both are stark advocates of the 
Islamic revolutionist vision, conflating it with the realist threat the United States poses to the 
Muslim world by highlighting the suffering of the states in the region. Khatami and Rouhani, 
on the other hand, follow the same approach of promoting diplomacy to enhance Iran’s relations 
with the world. Both presented initiatives aimed at solving conflicts with Khatami endorsing 
the Dialogue Among Civilizations (DAC) and Rouhani campaigning for a World Against 
Violence and Extremism (WAVE). Their approaches to Iran’s foreign policy showcase the 
rationalist tradition entangled with a more global revolutionist vision. The similarities in the 
approaches is one point of consideration when discussing the consistency of Iran’s foreign 
policy. 
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Second, the statesmen ‘mean what they say’. By looking at the foreign policy discourses of the 
political figures, I could determine which of the actions they undertook internationally 
correspond to their arguments to show their utterances were not limited to the discursive level 
but have a practical policy dimension. For instance, when Khatami insisted on improving 
relations in his discourses, I traced his government’s actions internationally to assess whether 
their foreign policy reflects his statements. Indeed, he expanded ties with many countries 
including some in the West by embarking on state visits to prove his commitment to improving 
relations with the world. Rouhani followed Khatami’s footsteps when his government 
negotiated Iran’s nuclear program directly with the United States. Khamenei likewise sticks to 
his words about promoting Islamic Unity and fighting the United States and the West with 
policies of supporting transnational groups such as the Hezbollah and encouraging the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which he controls, to get involved in the conflicts in Iraq 
and Syria. Ahmadinejad’s confrontational statements were reflected in his administration’s 
reluctance to negotiate the nuclear program since the process was greatly influenced by 
Washington, whom he accused to be following the path of Satan. Thus, we see Iran’s leaders 
deliver on their statements, another consistent point of their foreign policy. 
Lastly, the three traditions shift based on the international context and domestic pressures as 
well as the speakers approach. This point was briefly discussed in the quantitative chapter as 
the graphs showed how the values of the realism, rationalism and revolutionism were expressed 
at times of crisis. For instance, after 9/11 and before the U.S. intervention in Iraq, realism was 
significantly high in Khamenei’s statements while Khatami, who urged cooperation had high 
rationalist values. While when the nuclear program was being negotiated from 2013 to 2015 
significantly high values of rationalism can be observed in both Khamenei’s and Rouhani’s 
statements. With the values in the quantitative, correlations can be drawn according to the 
context marking another consistent aspect in Iran’s foreign policy 
Iran’s foreign policy is fundamentally realist  
All statesmen spoke of the United States and the West as a threat, although some were more 
constructive than others. They called attention to the military might of the U.S. and its control 
over the international system painting a realist portrait of Washington and its allies.  Such a 
threat puts Iran’s survival as a nation-state at risk and Iranian statesmen have learned a bitter 
lesson on world anarchy from the eight-year war with Iraq where the Islamic Republic had to 
fight for its existence. Iran fought alone while Iraq had the support of the Arab countries in the 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
244 
 
region. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic following the revolution of 1979, and 
the hostage-taking crisis at the former U.S. embassy in Tehran, relations between Iran and the 
United States have been severed. Washington sided with Iraq in the war with Iran and remained 
distant from Tehran since then accusing the Islamic Republic of sponsoring terrorism. Despite 
the absence of official relations, the United States plays a significant role in Iran’s foreign 
policy. The U.S. government is consistently depicted as aggressor and demonized accordingly 
together with their Western allies.  
The military presence of the United States in the region under the pretext of the ‘war on terror’ 
makes Iran uneasy about its survival for three reasons. First, their experience from the Iran-Iraq 
war made Tehran realize their regime is unpopular in Tehran’s neighbourhood. Second, Iran is 
being accused of supporting terrorists and were dubbed to be part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ where 
the regimes of these countries face the threat of elimination as seen in the case of Iraq and the 
conflict in Syria. Third, the Bush Jr. administration funded plans to bring about a regime change 
in Iran by supporting internal opposition group. With the imminent threat facing the regime, it 
makes sense for Tehran to actively depict the United States as a dangerous yet powerful state 
capable of inflicting immense suffering on the entire Muslim world. By characterizing the U.S. 
and its allies as atrocious forces meddling in Middle East affairs, Iranian statesmen affirm the 
power of the West and thereby, the threat they pose to Iran. This serves as a justification for 
them to pursue purely realist goals of survival and security, involving the penetration of other 
countries in the region to keep the threat far from Iran’s borders. For instance, Tehran’s 
intervention in Iraq is meant to create a ‘250-kilometer security [buffer zone] for Iran’, which 
can only be possible through a victory in Mosul according to one of the senior officials of the 
Quds force.741 Iran is careful, however, not to admit that such a threat to its own survival and 
security exists. Rather, the political elites, especially Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, phrase the 
threat of the United States and its Western allies to be on a regional scale.  
Creating a common threat in the presence of the West led by the United States in the Middle 
East is useful to justify the consolidation of the Islamic Ummah, serving Iran’s realist goal of 
survival and security. If Iran is accepted by the wider Muslim world as a leader instead of a 
rival, it can gain power to secure its own survival by effectively dominating over other countries 
in the Middle East turning Iran into a regional hegemon, just as it used to be at the height of the 
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Persian Empire. The problem is that countries in the Middle East are aware of this and trust 
Washington more than they trust Tehran. Enter the revolutionist vision. 
Iran’s foreign policy has a revolutionist vision 
The revolutionist vision in Iran’s foreign policy takes on two forms, Islamic cosmopolitanism 
and global cosmopolitanism, which is based on the division of the approaches of the Iranian 
statesmen. On the one hand, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad promote the Islamic cosmopolitanist 
revolutionist vision mainly constituted by the unification of the Islamic Ummah. On the other 
hand, Khatami and Rouhani advocate a global cosmopolitanist revolutionist vision where Iran 
becomes integrated in the ‘federation of peoples’, Kant’s world society. 
For the Islamic cosmopolitanists advertising Iran’s religious anti-imperialist project is 
necessary to earn the trust of the Muslim world since this revolutionist vision is based on Islamic 
moral values for the betterment of mankind. They neatly divide the world into two binary 
oppositions of good and evil or faithful and heretics. Iran is on the good faithful side, fighting 
for the oppressed and resisting the oppressors, while the United States and the West are on the 
evil heretic side causing widespread suffering for the Muslims. Khomeini made sure the 
religious revolutionist element became part of Iran’s foreign policy enshrining it in the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic. The Palestinians are regarded in Iran’s foreign policy 
discourse the most oppressed who need to be liberated from the oppressors making the 
‘Palestinian issue’ inherently Iranian since for the Islamic cosmopolitanists, there is only one 
Islamic nation and Iran is just a part of it. The ‘war on terror’, which began in 2001, served to 
strengthen Iran’s argument of the United States being the oppressor since the military 
intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq together with the Syrian conflict have caused enormous 
amounts of unjust suffering for the Muslims in the region. Those oppressed and suffering from 
the consequences of military intervention have multiplied making the case stronger for uniting 
the Islamic Ummah to rectify the dreadful situation in the Muslim world. Iran wants to appeal 
to Muslims of all denominations by showing its solidarity with the oppressed and fighting for 
them as they uphold the banner of Islamic righteousness and moral values. The supreme leader 
spreads the Islamic cosmopolitan revolutionist vision across the region through supporting 
Islamic groups struggling against the evil heretics, the United States and its allies. Religious 
propaganda is spread by the supreme leader’s followers such as the IRGC or the Hezbollah 
regarding the suffering of the Imams such as Imam Hussein to show that this fight against the 
evil heretics is nothing new. The Islamic cosmopolitanists claim the fight against the evil 
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heretics has never ended and thus the Islamic Ummah must unite to re-establish the unitary 
Islamic Civilization, which was lost to the West although historically this may have never 
existed since clashes between the Sunni and Shi’a were common and the Islamic Civilization 
was divided between the Ottoman and the Persian Empires. Nonetheless, the potential of the 
Islamic Ummah is exhibited each year when millions of Muslims regardless of their sect gather 
for religious events such as the Arba’een and the Hajj and the supreme leader is aware of this. 
Thus, Khamenei is relentless in his pursuit of unifying the Islamic Ummah to ‘restore’ the 
Islamic Civilization through his Islamic cosmopolitanist vision. However, he insists the main 
instrument to achieve this is to engage in a missionary war with the West, indicating the realist 
goal of Iran’s foreign policy. To win the battle, though, Iran should present a rationalist 
approach as a façade to gain allies for the war. 
For the global cosmopolitanists like Khatami and Rouhani, the issues facing the Middle East is 
not unique in the region but a worldwide problem, which should be solved by all nation-states 
to improve conditions for all mankind. During Khatami’s presidency, the problem was rooted 
in a lack of understanding between Islam and the West. Hence, he conceived the DAC initiative 
for the world to come together and engage in dialogue to promote better understanding among 
all nations. Better understanding means peaceful solutions could be drawn to solve the common 
problems of the human society for these issues are not tied to a specific country. By regarding 
the nations of the world as a ‘human society’, Khatami exhibits his global cosmopolitanist 
vision parallel to Kant’s world society. When Rouhani came to power, the world was facing a 
new threat – terrorism – and like Khatami, Rouhani presented the WAVE initiative to tackle 
the problem. Rouhani likewise argued the threat of terrorism to be a problem of the entire world 
and not only in the West, suggesting an approach engaging all nation-states. Both leaders, in 
their own way, have promoted a global cosmopolitan vision distinct from the Islamic 
cosmopolitan vision of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. Khatami and Rouhani see the 
improvement of mankind through the cooperation of all nation-states regardless of religious 
denomination and nationality. They project a revolutionist vision identical to Kant’s world 
society with global cosmopolitanism as the ultimate goal instead of reverting to realism by 
establishing an empire. 
Iran’s foreign policy uses rationalism as a ‘means’ to achieve its goals 
Trade is an important international activity in the rationalist tradition helping the local economy 
of the country engaged in trade. In Iran’s constitution, the economy is seen as a ‘means’ to 
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achieve an objective affirming that this aspect of the rationalist tradition is seen as a method.742 
For this reason, I argue that the institutions of international society such as diplomacy and 
international law are used in the same way. For Iran to achieve its goals of survival and security, 
rationalism is instrumentalized by the statesmen. 
Before Khatami was elected, the former government had already began working on its 
international relations to help reconstruct the local economy devastated by the Iran-Iraq war but 
Rafsanjani’s efforts were limited. Iran was still isolated, especially from the West and Khatami 
had the mandate of opening Iran up to the world. Khatami’s administration actively engaged in 
the rationalist institution of diplomacy at all levels. His government’s political discourse was 
significantly rationalist, with hints of a global cosmopolitanist vision rooted in the revolutionist 
tradition. Improvement of ties with the world through the DAC was relatively successful and 
for a moment, the possibility of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement was in sight. Iran’s relations with 
the world was slightly upgraded and Tehran started coming out of isolation, with the Gulf states 
being more accommodating to the Iran than the United States. With diplomacy came economic 
cooperation with various countries, prompting the former president to embark on numerous 
state visits, which in some occasions were a ‘first’ in the history of the Islamic Republic. When 
the 9/11 attacks occurred, Iran was among the countries who cooperated with the West, 
particularly in the case of Afghanistan, proving Iran meant what it said about cooperating with 
the world. Khatami’s government were more open to negotiating the nuclear program but were 
cut short as his presidency ended sending Iran into years of failed talks under the Ahmadinejad 
administration. 
Iran’s economy suffered greatly from the sanctions it received from the UN and the West related 
to the nuclear program. Tensions were high within the country, culminating in the 2009 Green 
Revolution. Ahmadinejad’s religious revolutionist discourse were translated into confrontative 
actions against the United States at the international level, although the former president insisted 
on Iran’s ‘inalienable rights’ to have a civilian nuclear facility to generate energy, a demand 
exhibiting the rationalist institution of international law in his discourse. It is at this point we 
see how rationalism is used as a means in Iran’s foreign policy in the Ahmadinejad period. His 
administration continued talks on the nuclear program but refused to settle the issue showing 
how rationalism was trumped by the revolutionist tradition. Rationalism was confined to Iran’s 
                                                 
742 Islamic Consultative Assembly, “The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, last amended in 
1989,”, http://en.parliran.ir/UploadedData/previmages/iran-parliament_English_SHR01.pdf (accessed September 
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trade relations with those countries willing to continue their economic intercourse with Tehran 
amidst the heavy sanctions. Tehran was once again facing the threat of isolation from the West 
and the world for its refusal to negotiate the nuclear program, ending in a deadlock towards the 
end of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. 
Rouhani was elected in 2013 to alleviate the situation. He reflected Khatami’s rationalist 
discourse and policies. Surprisingly, at least according to the data from the quantitative phase 
of analysis, Khamenei’s discourse likewise reflected a significant increase in rationalist words 
and phrases, indicating a shift in policies. Rationalism navigated the Rouhani administration in 
the same manner as the Khatami period. Diplomacy and cooperation were encouraged to find 
peaceful solutions to conflict. The successful agreement on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) is the epitome of Iran’s rationalist foreign policy since the nuclear program was finally 
negotiated. Rouhani’s introduction of the WAVE was yet another rationalist move from his 
administration, welcomed by the UN. Circumstances were not easy though since the political 
landscape in the Middle East has been changing and Iran has been engaged in proxy wars in 
Iraq and Syria demonstrating Tehran’s realist ambitions of obtaining power, a fact Rouhani 
acknowledged when he referred to Iran as a regional power in one of his statements. 
Rationalism as a means is likewise present in the Iran’s attempts to export the revolution. Since 
a direct export has proved to be rejected by most of the states in the region, a modified version 
had to be designed by setting the Islamic Republic as ‘an alternative to existing Arab/Islamic 
regimes’.743 This modified version greatly relies on rationalism with diplomatic relations, 
cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution being the hallmark features endorsed by Iranian 
statesmen as reflected in their foreign policy. Through such methods, engaging with Tehran is 
advertised to be straightforward but states in the region, like its main rival, Saudi Arabia, is 
aware how complicated Iran’s foreign policy goals are since it is rooted in realism. Despite all 
the niceties, the underlying goals of the Islamic Republic are fundamentally realist. Iran wants 
to survive and be more secure. Reviving the Persian empire in the name of an Islamic 
civilization seems to be the only way to achieve those realist goals. 
10.2 Avenues for future research 
A dissertation is never a complete scholarly work and should ideally lead to new research 
avenues to enrich the subject matter it relates to and I am hoping that my study on Iran’s foreign 
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policy could lead to more possibilities of understanding Iran’s foreign policy as well as 
international relations. One way my dissertation can lead to further research is that the speeches 
targeting domestic audiences can be analysed qualitatively to compare it with the results here. 
Identifying similarities and differences in the themes, argumentations and discourses between 
the political rhetoric meant for the local population and the international audience. If they are 
similar, then perhaps international political elites must likewise tune in to the local political 
speeches of Iran’s statesmen to perhaps gather more minute details on how to understand their 
foreign policies. If the results differ, it could be assumed that there is little relationship between 
them and that domestic topics are exclusively for local consumption while the topics of those 
speeches targeting an international audience are tailored for a different purpose as if showing a 
different face internationally while keeping the internal issues within the country. This 
comparative method can also be used to explore how domestic and international issues form 
Iran’s foreign policy as all speeches are available and can be analysed. 
Another and more exciting way this research can evolve into a new study begins from the 
quantitative segment of the dissertation. First, the results in the form of charts and figures can 
be studied in a more detailed manner to see whether certain patterns can be formed. Apart from 
underpinning the dominant tradition, it can be useful to identify the tradition which follows the 
dominant one as well as the dormant tradition within in the speeches. Such an approach to the 
quantitative data can organize the results better as well as be used to examine whether there is 
a connection between the order of the traditions and the argumentations. This type of approach 
can present a picture of how the three traditions are arranged, demonstrating their interplay 
through the differences in each document allowing for more contrast and comparison of the 
traditions across different contexts and time periods using the data already gathered from 
running the software through the speeches. I have taken some steps in this direction regarding 
my dissertation and concluded that there are thirteen different ‘configurations’ or patterns that 
all the speeches follow.744 The recurrence of certain configurations are more than the others and 
that the recurrence differs from speaker to speaker. Here is the list of the configurations: 
C1: revolutionism > rationalism > realism 
C2: revolutionism > realism > rationalism 
C3: rationalism > revolutionism > realism 
C4: rationalism > realism > revolutionism 
C5: realism > revolutionism > rationalism 
                                                 
744 By configurations I mean the order in which the three traditions are ordered based on dominance. By 
dominance I mean the amount of times the keywords of a tradition is mentioned within the text, i.e the more a 
tradition (for example realism) is mentioned, the higher percentage it gets compared to the other two traditions, 
making it the dominant tradition. The dormant tradition is the one gaining the least percentage value. 
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C6: realism > rationalism > revolutionism 
C7: revolutionism = rationalism > realism 
C8: revolutionism = realism > rationalism 
C9: rationalism = realism > revolutionism 
C10: realism > rationalism = revolutionism 
C11: rationalism > realism = revolutionism 
C12: revolutionism > realism = rationalism 
In rare cases, all three are equally dominant: 
C13: realism = rationalism = revolutionism 
 
The letter ‘C’ here stands for Configuration and the numbers refer to the type of configuration. 
The tradition on the leftmost side is the most dominant, the one in the middle is the second most 
dominant and the rightmost indicates the least dominant tradition. In some cases, two traditions 
are equally dominant meaning the difference in the figures is between 0 and 0.10. I have gone 
as far as to determine the configurations within the speeches delivered by Iranian officials at 
controversial international events that somehow involved Iran such as the time frame between 
the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech that explicitly mentioned Iran. 
However, as this diverted away from the scope of my research, I have left it aside. The potential 
of such an approach, nevertheless, cannot be ignored as when the configurations could be 
examined further in many ways.  For instance, in determining whether they represent specific 
themes, arguments and discourses, whether they lead to specific foreign policy actions and if 
these configurations were triggered by an external stimulus such as Bush declaring Iran to be 
part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. If such questions are answered, one could use the configurations as a 
way of predicting foreign policy.  
Second, it does not have to stop with Iran, it can be applied to different countries wherein the 
revolutionist tradition can be adjusted to the country it is applied to as concepts differ from one 
nation-state to the other. In the case of Iran, revolutionism is tied to religion whereas, for 
instance, in Germany, revolutionism has a more bureaucratic expression such as a supra-state 
institution transforming Europe superseding the current function of the European Union. Once 
the application of this approach is successful, predictions of foreign policy of any country can 
be a reality, informing policy-makers on how to approach negotiations, hopefully to avoid 
conflict. 
Third, I have used only the three traditions stemming from the English School theory but it 
could be expanded and involve lists of keywords for all theories of international relations, for 
instance, liberalism, neo-realism, etc. Once all IR theories are encoded into the software, it can 
run through the speeches of Iran’s political elites once again to see whether other concepts than 
those from the English School exist in Iran’s foreign political discourse. This could be taken a 
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step further and applied to all other countries as well, which could be integrated into predicting 
foreign policy. 
10.3 Reflections 
The modern international society of sovereign nation-states generally works within the tenets 
of the rationalist tradition. Depending on the content of the statements of Iran’s statesmen, 
however, this tendency of the rationalist tradition to dominate can be disrupted by either realism 
or revolutionism. What is interesting though is that the more the speeches of Iran’s statesmen 
are dominated by rationalism, the more fluid the country’s interactions becomes with 
international society. Khatami and Rouhani are cases proving this as they both could enhance 
Iran’s foreign relations through diplomacy. It seems conforming to the framework of the 
rationalist tradition allows Iran to be at the same level of interaction with the rest of the world 
as it speaks the international language of rationalism. This makes it easier for both Iran and the 
core of international society to solve conflicts with Iran, such as Iran’s nuclear program. At the 
other end, the farther Iranian statesmen move away from rationalism, the more difficult it is for 
both Iran and the core international society to interact as shown by the Ahmadinejad 
government. Regardless of the direction the traditions pull Iran’s foreign policy, each statesman 
is pursuing an agenda of unity with properties depending on their conviction. This implies that 
Iran proactively wants to work with the international community, to gain allies and to end its 
isolation, although there is a strong case proving Iran’s real intention is to simply secure its 
survival and safety and Tehran is using rationalist means to achieve its fundamentally realist 
goals. 
The only question is whether this realist intent will push Iran to integrate itself in in a global 
cosmopolitan world society based on Kant’s revolutionist vision or it Tehran will continue 
promoting the Islamic cosmopolitanist vision to fight the heretic West. If the latter, then the 
strategy of demonizing the United States serves a realist purpose since winning a battle against 
the West means the revival of the Persian Empire in the name of an Islamic Civilization. To 
improve Iran’s chances in winning the battle, though, Iran should present a rationalist approach 
as a façade to gain allies for the war. But this does not have to be the case since rationalist forces 
within Iran’s political sphere have the capacity to steer their ship into a different direction 
despite their limitations. With the situation in the Middle East getting worse by the day, the 
world can no longer turn a blind eye on Iran’s potential role in the region regardless of the 
tradition they are operating at. Be it through the DAC, WAVE or a ‘New Islamic Civilization’, 
one thing is certain – Iran does not want to stand alone. If the West continues to ignore the 
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potential of the Islamic Republic of being rationalist, then the radical Islamic forces will take 
over, which will perpetuate the conflicts in the Middle East. 
  
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
253 
 
Bibliography 
1TV Staff. “Afghanistan, Iran rail link to be completed by March 2018.” February 26, 2017. 
Accessed September 19, 2017. http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/28077-afghanistan-
iran-rail-link-to-be-completed-by-march-2018. 
Abbas, Mohammed. “Gulf Arab summit lukewarm to Iran charm offensive.” December 4, 
2007. Accessed September 15, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-summit-
iran/gulf-arab-summit-lukewarm-to-iran-charm-offensive-idUSL0465112420071204. 
Abbasov, Shahin. “Iran-Azerbaijan relations: on a better footing after Khatami's Baku visit.” 
August 9, 2004. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav081004a.shtml. 
Abbasov, Shain. “Ahmadinejad visits Baku as Azerbaijan attempts to balance U.S., Iran 
relations.” August 28, 2007. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1069/ahmadinejad-visits-baku-as-
azerbaijan-attempts-to-balance-u-s-iran-relations. 
Abdel-Kader, Nizar. “Saudi decision to confront the Iranian onslaught and disappointment of 
the US position ( رارق يدوعس ةهجاومب ةمجهلا ةّيناريلاا ةبيخو لمأ نم فقوملا يكريملأا ).” November 14, 
2015. Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.addiyar.com/article/887241. 
Abdulrazaq, Tallha. “Iran's 'Shia Liberation Army' is par for the course.” August 21, 2016. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/iran-
shia-liberation-army-par-160821091935110.html. 
Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin. The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural 
Genealogy. Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics 3. London, New York: Routledge, 
2006. 
Afkhamirad, Valiolla. “Iran’s exports to Turkmenistan hits $1bn.” June 21, 2016. Accessed 
September 19, 2017. http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/Iran%E2%80%99s-exports-to-
Turkmenistan-hits-1bn.html. 
AFP. “Millions throng Iraq shrine for Arbaeen pilgrimage climax.” The Daily Mail, 
December 5, 2015. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3344011/Millions-throng-Iraq-shrine-
pilgrimage-climax.html. 
Aghai Diba, Bahman. “Relations of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan: potential friends and 
enemies.” February 18, 2015. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/15/feb/1089.html. 
Ahadi, Afsaneh, and Naser Saghfi Ameri. “Iran and look to the east policy.” Iran Center for 
Strategic Research, 2008.05.25. Accessed June 11, 2012. 
http://irfajournal.csr.ir/WebUsers/irfajournal/UploadFiles/OK/139409081425395000180-
F.pdf. 
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. 
of Iran at the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly (2005).” Accessed October 8, 
2015. http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf. 
———. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran before the 
61st Session of the UN General assembly (2006).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/iran-e.pdf. 
———. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran before the 
62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (2007).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/PV.5. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
254 
 
———. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran before the 
63rd Session of the UN General Assembly (2008).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/PV.6. 
———. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran before the 
64th Session of the UN General Assembly (2009).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/IR_en.pdf. 
———. “Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the I.R. of Iran at the 65th 
Session of the UN General Assembly (2010).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/65/PV.12. 
———. “Address by Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the I.R. of Iran at the 66th 
Sesson of the UN General Assembly (2011).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/PV.15. 
———. “Address by Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the I.R. Iran at the 67th 
Session of the UN General Assembly (2012).” Accessed October 8, 2015. 
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/67/IR_en.pdf. 
Alam, Shah. “Nuclear and foreign policy calculations of Iran.” India Quarterly: A Journal of 
International Affairs 64 (2008): 109–41. Accessed April 29, 2014. 
http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/64/2/109.citation. 
Albawaba Staff. “Kharrazi arrives in Islamabad.” November 29, 2001. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. https://www.albawaba.com/news/kharrazi-arrives-islamabad. 
Albright, Madelaine. “Secretary of State Albright announces easing of U.S. trade ban on Iran 
(speech transcript).” March 17, 2000. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/17/se.01.html. 
Alfoneh, Ali. “The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics.” Middle East Quarterly 
15, no. 4 (2008): 3–14. Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.meforum.org/1979/the-
revolutionary-guards-role-in-iranian-politics. 
Ali Alfoneh. “How intertwined are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran's economy?” American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, no. 3 (October 2007). Accessed April 13, 
2014. http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-
north-africa/how-intertwined-are-the-revolutionary-guards-in-irans-economy/. 
Al-Masri, Abdulrahman. “Syria: Proxy war, not civil war.” March 14, 2015. Accessed 
September 15, 2017. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150314-syria-proxy-war-not-
civil-war/. 
Al-Modarresi, Sayed Mahdi. “World’s biggest pilgrimage now underway, and why you’ve 
never heard of it!” The Huffington Post, November 24, 2014. Accessed September 25, 
2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sayed-mahdi-almodarresi/arbaeen-
pilgrimage_b_6203756.html. 
Alvi, Ahmad Hasan. “Chief Executive calls for stronger defence ties with Iran.” April 27, 
2001. Accessed September 18, 2017. https://asianstudies.github.io/area-
studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/apr2801.html#chie. 
Amanat, Abbas. “Iranian identity boundaries: a historical view.” In Iran Facing Others: 
Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective. Edited by Abbas Amanat and Farzin 
Vejdani, 1–34. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Amir, Samir S., and Zahra Anum. “Islamic Republic of Iran Country Profile.” The Pakistan 
Business Council, 2016.02. http://pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Islamic-
Republic-of-Iran.pdf. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
255 
 
Ansari, Ali M. Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great 
Crisis in the Middle East. New York: Basic Books, 2006. 
———. “Iran under Ahmadinejad: Populism and its malcontents.” International Affairs 84, 
no. 4 (2008): 683–700. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00732.x. 
———, ed. Politics of Modern Iran. 4 vols. Critical Issues in Modern Politics. London: 
Routledge, 2011. 
———. The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran. Cambridge Middle East studies 40. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Anzalone, Christopher. “Zaynab's guardians: the emergence of Shi'a militias in Syria.” 
Accessed September 25, 2017. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/zaynabs-guardians-the-
emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria. 
AP Staff. “Baghdad okays Syria-Iran natural gas pipeline.” February 20, 2013. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. https://www.timesofisrael.com/baghdad-okays-syria-iran-natural-gas-
pipeline/. 
APA. “Iran to increase trade turnover with Azerbaijan.” September 27, 2010. Accessed 
September 18, 2017. http://news.az/articles/economy/23473. 
Arango, Tim. “Iran dominates in Iraq after U.S. 'handed the country over'.” July 15, 2017. 
Accessed September 10, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-
power.html?mcubz=0&_r=0. 
Arjomand, Said Amir. “The state and Khomeini's Islamic order.” Iranian Studies 13, 1/4 
(1980): 147–64. Accessed September 23, 2017. Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310339. 
Arms Control Association Staff. “Timeline of nuclear diplomacy with Iran.” Accessed 
September 20, 2017. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-
Diplomacy-With-Iran. 
Assadi, Ali Akbar, and Firoozabadi, Seyed Jalal Dehghani. “Revolution and foreign policy of 
Iran: the first decade (revised).” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 4, no. 1 (2013): 157–84. 
Accessed April 4, 2015. 
Associated Press Staff. “Experts: Iran's Quds force deeply enmeshed in Iraq.” February 16, 
2007. Accessed June 17, 2014. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/02/16/experts-iran-
quds-force-deeply-enmeshed-in-iraq.html. 
———. “Millions of Shiites gather in Iraq's Karbala for Arbaeen.” December 2, 2015. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-
3342596/Millions-Shiites-gather-Iraqs-Karbala-Arbaeen.html. 
Ata, Tarique. “India and Iran sign 'historic' Chabahar port deal.” May 23, 2016. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36356163. 
Baer, Robert. The Devil we Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower. New York: 
Three Rivers Press, 2008. 
Barfi, Barak. “The real reason why Iran backs Syria.” January 24, 2016. Accessed 
September 17, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-why-iran-backs-
syria-14999. 
Barzegar, Kayhan. “The Shia factor in Iran's foreign policy.” 2008. Accessed December 3, 
2012. http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=en&abtid=07&&depid=74&semid=1421. 
Bassem, Wassim. “Iraq's Arbaeen pilgrims walk new, safer path.” November 18, 2014. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iraq-
holy-city-karbala-religious-road.html. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
256 
 
BBC News Staff. “Iranian media reports on new gas pipeline.” December 29, 1997. Accessed 
September 19, 2017. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/43226.stm. 
———. “Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline defies US.” March 11, 2013. Accessed September 18, 
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21736725. 
———. “Hajj stampede: Iran death toll rises to 464.” October 1, 2015. Accessed 
September 15, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34410484. 
Berger, Thomas. “Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan.” In The 
culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. Edited by Peter J. 
Katzenstein. New directions in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996. 
Berridge, Geoff, and Alan James. A Dictionary of Diplomacy. 2nd ed. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire [England], New York [N.Y.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Bhalla, Reva. “Making sense of the Syrian crisis.” Accessed September 15, 2017. 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis. 
Bizaer, Maysam. “Iran’s Rouhani eyes leading role in anti-terror campaign.” December 12, 
2014. Accessed September 26, 2017. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iran-wave-terrorism-isis.html. 
Blanford, Nicholas. “Iran-backed advance in southern Syria rattles Israel.” March 6, 2015. 
Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2015/0306/Iran-backed-advance-in-southern-Syria-rattles-Israel. 
Bloomberg Staff. “Dubai helps Iran evade sanctions as smugglers ignore U.S. laws.” January 
26, 2010. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19568:du
bai-helps-iran-evade-sanctions-as-smugglers-ignore-us-laws&catid=4&Itemid=109. 
Bokhari, Farhan. “Ahmadinejad makes first visit to Pakistan.” April 28, 2008. Accessed 
September 18, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ahmadinejad-makes-first-visit-to-
pakistan/. 
Boone, Jon. “Hamid Karzai admits office gets 'bags of money' from Iran.” October 25, 2010. 
Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/25/hamid-
karzai-office-cash-iran. 
Bozorgmehr, Najmeh, Anna Fifield, and Leslie Hook. “China and Iran plan oil barter.” 
Financial Times, July 24, 2011. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.ft.com/content/2082e954-b604-11e0-8bed-00144feabdc0. 
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 3rd ed. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. 
Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. The expansion of international society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
Butler, Daren. “Ahmadinejad says hopes for Turkey energy deals soon.” August 15, 2008. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-iran-
energy/ahmadinejad-says-hopes-for-turkey-energy-deals-soon-idUSLF68623520080815. 
Buzan, Barry. “The English School as a research program: An overview, and a proposal for 
reconvening.” Unpublished manuscript, 1999. 
———. “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR.” Review of International 
Studies 27, no. 3 (2001): 471–88. Accessed May 12, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097749 . 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
257 
 
———. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge studies in international relations 95. Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
———. “Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society.” In The 
anarchical society in a globalized world. Edited by Richard Little and John Williams, 75–
96. Basingstoke [England], New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
———. An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal 
Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014. 
Cavallar, Georg. “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant's philosophy.” Ethics and Global Politics, no. 5 
(2012): 95–118. Accessed July 19, 2016. 
Chami, Hanadi. “$450 million in soft loans.” April 20, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://www.businessnews.com.lb/cms/Story/StoryDetails.aspx?ItemID=1582. 
Chehabi, H. E., and Rula Jurdi Abisaab. Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 
Years. Oxford, London, New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies; In association with I.B. 
Tauris; Distributed by St. Martin's Press, op. 2006. 
CNN Staff. “Iranian leader attends Hajj ritual.” December 17, 2007. Accessed September 15, 
2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/ahmadinejad.hajj/. 
CNN Staff, and Deborah Feyerick. “New York: Iran's leader can't visit ground zero.” 
September 20, 2007. Accessed September 10, 2017. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/19/ahmadinejad.ground.zero/. 
Dadandish, Parvin. Shia Geopolitics in the Middle East: Grounds for the Proposition of a 
Shia Crescent. Center for Strategic Research, 2007. Accessed November 11, 2013. 
Dailey, Kristin. “Iran has more volunteers for the Syrian War than it knows what to do with.” 
May 12, 2016. Accessed September 25, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/12/iran-
suleimani-basij-irgc-assad-syria/. 
Danielyan, Emil. “Armenia deepens ties with embattled Iran.” Accessed September 18, 2017. 
European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center. 
Darwin, Charles, and Michael T. Ghiselin. The Descent of Man. Abr. version of the work 
publ. by J. Murray Publ., London, in 1871. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2010. 
Dawn Staff. “Khatami visit a turning point.” December 23, 2003. Accessed September 18, 
2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/74356. 
Dearden, Lizzie. “One of the world's biggest and most dangerous pilgrimages is underway.” 
The Independent, November 25, 2014. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/one-of-the-worlds-biggest-and-
most-dangerous-pilgrimages-is-underway-9882702.html. 
Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. “Iran and Iraq: a history of tension and conflict.” The Guardian, July 
28, 2011. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/28/iran-and-iraq-tension-conflict. 
Dinmore, Guy. “Bush seeks funds to weaken Iran from within.” February 16, 2006. Accessed 
October 8, 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6bab2414-9e90-11da-b641-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4hWDYEmx8. 
Dunne, Timothy. “The English School.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. 
Edited by Christian Reus-Smit. 1. publ. in pbk, 267–85. The Oxford handbooks of political 
science [5]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Dunne, Timothy, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline 
and Diversity. 2nd ed. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
258 
 
Economic Cooperation Organization. “History of the Economic Cooperation Organization.” 
Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.eco.int/general_content/86055-
History.html?t=General-content. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic. London, New 
York: Routledge, 1995. 
———. “The foreign policy of Iran.” In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States: Between 
Agency and Structure. Edited by Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 283–309. The Middle East in 
the international system. Boulder [u.a.]: Rienner, 2002. 
———. “Iranian foreign policy after the election of Hassan Rouhani.” Wolfson Theatre, LSE, 
London, November 27, 2013. Accessed February 7, 2015. http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?i
d=2150. 
Eltahawy, Mona. “Khatami takes olive branch to Arab neighbours.” May 17, 1999. Accessed 
September 15, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/17/iran. 
Erdbrink, Thomas. “For China’s global ambitions, ‘Iran is at the center of everything'.” New 
York Times, July 25, 2017. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/middleeast/iran-china-business-
ties.html?mcubz=0. 
Esposito, John L., and Rouhollah K. Ramazani. Iran at the Crossroads. 1st ed. New York: 
Palgrave, 2001. 
Estrin, Miriam, and Jeremy Shapiro. “The proxy war problem in Syria.” Accessed 
September 15, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/04/the-proxy-war-problem-in-
syria/. 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. “ECHO fact sheet - Iran.” 
Accessed September 19, 2017. 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/iran_en.pdf. 
European Commission. “Iran.” 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111518.pdf. 
Evans, Dominic. “Ahmadinejad trip highlights Iranian sway in Lebanon.” October 11, 2010. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-
iran/ahmadinejad-trip-highlights-iranian-sway-in-lebanon-idUSTRE69A1KC20101011. 
Farhi, Farideh, and Saideh Lotfian. “Iran's post-revolution foreign policy puzzle.” In 
Worldviews of aspiring powers: Domestic foreign policy debates in China, India, Iran, 
Japan, and Russia. Edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, 114–45. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Fathollah-Nejad, A. “Why sanctions against Iran are counterproductive: Conflict resolution 
and state-society relations.” International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy 
Analysis 69, no. 1 (2014): 48–65. Accessed April 6, 2014. 
doi:10.1177/0020702014521561. 
Financial Tribune Staff. “Upward trend in Iran-UAE trade transactions.” May 24, 2017. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-
markets/65083/upward-trend-in-iran-uae-trade-transactions. 
Firoozabadi, Seyed Jalal Dehghani. “Ontological security and the foreign policy analysis of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Institute for Strategic Research Journal 2, no. 2 (2011): 31–
60. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.isrjournals.ir/en/iran-foreign-policy/244-
ontological-security-and-the-foreign-policy-analysis-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
259 
 
Fisher, Max. “How the Iranian-Saudi proxy struggle tore apart the Middle East.” November 
19, 2016. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-
war.html?mcubz=0. 
Fotini Christia, Elizabeth Dekeyser, Dean Knox. To Karbala: Surveying Religious Shi’a from 
Iran and Iraq. Cambridge, Mass, 2016. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/Shia_Pilgrims_Survey.pdf. 
Freedman, Robert Owen. “Russia and Iran: A tactical alliance.” SAIS Review 17, no. 2 (1997): 
93–109. Accessed April 3, 2014. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/sais_review/v017/17.2fre
edman.html. 
Fürtig, Henner. “Universalist counter-projections: Iranian postrevolutionary foreign policy 
and globalisation.” In Ansari, Politics of Modern Iran, 110–30. 
Gardiner, Sam. “Russia and Iran Get Strategic.” Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://fpif.org/russia_and_iran_get_strategic/. 
German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce Staff. “Tehran welcomes ECO train.” 
Accessed September 18, 2017. http://iran.ahk.de/news/details/artikel/tehran-welcomes-eco-
train/?cHash=1df51d5ae59ad91ec76f82740d42857b. 
Ghattas, Kim. “Iran-Saudi tensions simmer in Lebanon.” May 20, 2016. Accessed 
September 17, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36335163. 
Ghorbial, Malak, and Saif Eldin Hamdan. “Saudi foreign minister: 'Iran is taking over' Iraq.” 
March 11, 2015. Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-iraqi-
foreign-minister-dismisses-saudi-worries-about-iranian-control-2015-3?IR=T. 
Giddens, Anthony. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Polity Press, 1984. 
Golkar, S. “Paramilitarization of the economy: The case of Iran's basij militia.” Armed Forces 
& Society 38, no. 4 (2012): 625–48. Accessed December 3, 2012. 
doi:10.1177/0095327X12437687. 
Gomari-Luksch, Laleh. “The Great Satan and the Axis of Evil: The politics of demonization 
in Iran and the United States.” In Iran and the West: Cultural Perceptions from the 
Sasanian Empire to the Islamic Republic. Edited by Margaux Whiskin. I.B. Tauris, 2018. 
Gulf News. “UAE and Iran cement ties.” May 14, 2007. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-and-iran-cement-ties-1.178380. 
Habibi, Nader. “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions.” 
Middle East Brief 62, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brandeis University, 2016.05. 
https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB62.pdf. 
Hadian, Nasser. “Iran's nuclear program: contexts and debates.” In Iran's Bomb: American 
and Iranian Perspectives. Edited by Geoffrey Kemp. Washington, D.C: The Nixon Center, 
2004. 
———. “Iran's Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates.” Accessed November 11, 2012. 
Haji-Yousefi, Amir M. “Iran's foreign policy during Ahmadinejad: From confrontation to 
accommodation.” Accessed November 11, 2012. 
Halliday, Fred. “The Middle East and Conceptions of ‘International Society’.” In 
International society and the Middle East: English school theory at the regional level. 
Edited by Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 1–23. Palgrave studies in international 
relations series. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
260 
 
Harding, Luke. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad packs up his troubles.” The Guardian, June 16, 
2009. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/16/iran-ahmadinejad-russia-summit. 
Harik, Judith Palmer. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London, New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007. 
Hashim, Ahmed. “The Iranian military in politics: Revolution and war (part two).” Middle 
East Policy Council XIX, no. 3 (2012). Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iranian-military-politics-revolution-
and-war-part-two. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond A., ed. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States: Between Agency 
and Structure. The Middle East in the international system. Boulder [u.a.]: Rienner, 2002. 
Hinsley, F. H. Sovereignty. 2nd ed. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. 
Hiro, Dilip. Iran under the Ayatollahs. Routledge revivals. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Reiss. as paperback, [Nachdr.]. Edited by John C. A. Gaskin. 
Oxfords world's classics. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998 [erschienen ca. 2008]. 
Hokayem, Emile. “Iran and Lebanon.” Accessed September 17, 2017. 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-lebanon. 
Holliday, Shabnam J. Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance. Farnham, Surrey, England, 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011. 
Howell, Kellan. “Iran spending billions on terrorists’ salaries: report.” September 5, 2015. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/5/iran-
spending-billions-on-terrorists-salaries-repo/. 
Hunter, Shireen. Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International 
Order. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010. 
Husain, Javid. “Iranian President’s visit to Pakistan.” The Nation, March 29, 2016. Accessed 
2017.09.18. http://nation.com.pk/columns/29-Mar-2016/iranian-president-s-visit-to-
pakistan. 
IAEA Staff. “IAEA Director General and US Secretary of State John Kerry meet on Iran 
negotiations.” Accessed September 20, 2017. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-
director-general-and-us-secretary-state-john-kerry-meet-iran-negotiations. 
Independent News Pakistan. “Iran issues ultimatum to Pakistan on IP gas pipeline.” Pakistan 
Today, January 17, 2015. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/01/17/iran-issues-ultimatum-to-pakistan-on-ip-
gas-pipeline/. 
Iran Daily Staff. “Number of Iranian pilgrims to Iraq to hit 1.5m.” June 29, 2016. Accessed 
September 25, 2017. http://www.iran-daily.com/News/154124.html. 
Iranian Diplomacy Staff. “Khatami speaks of Dialogue Among Civilizations.” Accessed 
September 26, 2017. 
http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/8798/Khatami+Speaks+of+Dialogue+among+Civilizati
ons.html. 
Irfani, Suroosh. Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? 
Third World Studies. London, Totowa, N.J.: Zed Books, 1983. 
The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, last amended in 1989. Islamic 
Parliament of Iran. 1989. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://en.parliran.ir/UploadedData/previmages/iran-parliament_English_SHR01.pdf. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
261 
 
Statute of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Islamic Revolution, ratified September 6, 1982, 
article 1. Islamic Parliament Research Center. Accessed September 24, 2017. 
http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90595. 
Ismayilov, E. “Azerbaijan, Iran to restore sea transport communication.” October 12, 2009. 
Accessed September 18, 2017. https://en.trend.az/business/economy/1557144.html. 
ISNA. “Iran, Azerbaijan trade turnover increases by 75%.” May 24, 2017. Accessed 
September 18, 2017. http://en.isna.ir/news/96030301900/Iran-Azerbaijan-trade-turnover-
increases-by-75. 
Jackson, Robert H. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Juneau, Thomas, and Sam Razavi. Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. 
Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics 55. Routledge, 2013. 
Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd [fully rev. and 
updated] ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2012. 
Kant, Immanuel. Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and 
History. Rethinking the Western Tradition. Yale University Press, 2008. 
Kant, Immanuel, Allen W. Wood, and George Di Giovanni. Religion and rational theology. 
1st pbk. ed. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge, New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
———. Religion and Rational Theology. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel 
Kant (1st pbk. ed.). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Karon, Tony. “The point of Putin's Tehran trip.” Time, October 15, 2007. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1671951,00.html. 
Kasten, Lukas, and Laleh Gomari-Luksch. “An eye for an eye: bargaining theory, mistrust, 
and the Iranian nuclear crisis.” In:  Andreas M. Bock, Ingo Henneberg [eds.] Iran, die 
Bombe und das Streben nach Sicherheit Strukturierte Konfliktanalysen, pp. 225-248 1. 
Edition 2014 
Katz, Mark. “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era.” The Middle East Journal 
62, no. 2 (2008): 202–16. doi:10.3751/62.2.11. 
Kemp, Geoffrey, ed. Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives. Washington, D.C: The 
Nixon Center, 2004. 
Keohane, Robert O. “International institutions: Two approaches.” International Studies 
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96. doi:10.2307/2600589. 
Khamenei, Ali. “Imam Khamene'i 's message on the occasion of Hajj (1997).” Accessed 
May 23, 2015. http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech1997.htm#08.04.1997. 
———. “Message of Ayatollah al-Odhma Khamenei on the auspicious occasion of Hajj 
(1998).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech1998.htm#01.04.1998. 
———. “Full text of leader's message to this year's hajj (1999).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech1999_1.htm#26.03.1999. 
———. “Message to the Hajj prigrims of the Muslim Ummah (2000).” Accessed May 23, 
2015. http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech2000.htm#15.3.2000. 
———. “Leader's Hajj Message (2001).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/news/news2001/mar2001.htm#LeaderHajjMessage030
32001. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
262 
 
———. “Message of His Eminence Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Addressed to the Haj 
Pilgrims of the Holy Mecca (2002).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech2002.htm#31012002. 
———. “Leader's message to this year's Haj pilgrims (2003).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech2003.htm#090203a. 
———. “Leader's Hajj Message (2004).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/pdf/hadsch1424.pdf. 
———. “The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole world 
(2005).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.khamenei.de/imam_gb/speeches/speech2005.htm#18012005. 
———. “Leader's Hajj Message (2006.01).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://leader.ir/en/content/3586/Ayatollah-Khamenei:the-cardinal-purpose-of-hajj-is-to-
show-the-united-identity-of-the-Muslim-ummah. 
———. “The Message of H. E. Imam Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole world 
(2006.12).” Accessed May 23, 2015. http://leader.ir/en/content/3491/The-message-of-H.-
E.-Ayatullah-Khamenei-to-the-Hajj-pilgrims-from-the-whole-world. 
———. “The message of H. E. Ayatullah Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole 
world (2007).” Accessed May 23, 2015. http://leader.ir/en/content/3657/The-message-of-
H.-E.-Ayatullah-Khamenei-to-the-Hajj-pilgrims-from-the-whole-world. 
———. “The message of H.E. Ayatullah Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims from the whole 
world (2008).” Accessed May 23, 2015. http://leader.ir/en/content/4460/The-message-of-
H.-E.-Ayatullah-Khamenei-to-the-Hajj-pilgrims-from-the-whole-world-. 
———. “Islamic Revolution Leader Ayatullah Khamenei to the Hajj pilgrims (2009).” 
Accessed May 23, 2015. http://leader.ir/en/content/6135/The-message-of-H.-E.-Ayatullah-
Khamenei-to-the-Hajj-pilgrims-. 
———. “Imam Khamenei's Message to Hajj Pilgrims (2010).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://leader.ir/en/content/7577/Imam-Khamenei's-Message-to-Hajj-Pilgrims-(1431-A.H.). 
———. “Ayatollah Khamenei’s Message to Hajj Pilgrims (2011).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://leader.ir/en/content/8862/AYATOLLAH-KHAMENEI%E2%80%99S-MESSAGE-
TO-HAJJ-PILGRIMS-2011. 
———. “Leader's Hajj Message (2012).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1709/Leader-s-Hajj-Message-2012. 
———. “Supreme Leader's Hajj Message (2013).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.leader.ir/en/content/11187/Supreme-Leader's-Hajj-Message. 
———. “Supreme Leader’s Hajj Message (2014).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://leader.ir/en/content/12465/Supreme-Leader%E2%80%99s-Hajj-Message-2014. 
———. “Supreme Leader’s Hajj Message (2015).” Accessed January 10, 2016. 
http://leader.ir/en/content/13647/Supreme-Leader%E2%80%99s-Hajj-Message-2015. 
———. “Imam Khamenei's Hajj Message (2016).” Accessed December 17, 2016. 
http://english.khamenei.ir/print/4121/Hajj-hijacked-by-oppressors-Muslims-should-
reconsider-management. 
Kharrazi, Kamal. “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran 
before the 52nd Session of The UN General Assembly (1997).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/52/PV.6. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 
54th Session of the UN General Assembly (1999).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/PV.12. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
263 
 
———. “Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister for Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of 
Iran before the 55th Session of UN General Assembly (2000).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 
57th Session of the UN General Assembly (2002).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/57/PV.9. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 
58th Session of the UN General Assembly (2003).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/58/PV.12. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran before the 
59th Session of the UN General Assembly (2004).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/iraneng040924.pdf. 
Khatami, Mohammad. “H.E. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, President of the I.R. of Iran before the 
53rd Session of the UN General Assembly (1998).” Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/53/PV.8. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, President of the I.R. of Iran before the Millenium 
Assembly (2000).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/PV.3. 
———. “H.E. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, President of the I.R. of Iran before the 56th Session 
of the UN General Assembly (2001).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/56/PV.44. 
Kleingeld, Pauline. “Kant's moral and political cosmopolitanism.” Philosophy Compass, 
no. 11 (2016): 14–23. Accessed July 19, 2016. 
Lafraie, Najibullah. Revolutionary Ideology and Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution 
and Interpretations of the Quran. International library of Iranian studies 13. London, New 
York, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009. 
Lalevée, Thierry. “The Hezbollahi: Iran's apparatus abroad.” Executive Intelligence Review 
News Service 14, no. 7 (1987). Accessed September 17, 2017. 
http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1987/eirv14n07-19870213/eirv14n07-
19870213_042-the_hezbollahi_irans_apparatus_a.pdf. 
Louër, Laurence. Transnational Shia politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. 
Series in comparative politics and international studies. New York: Columbia University 
Press in association with the Centre d'études et de recherches internationales, 2012, cop. 
2008. 
Lyons, Kate. “Iran nuclear talks: timeline.” July 14, 2015. Accessed September 19, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-talks-timeline. 
MacAskill, Ewan, and Julian Borger. “Bush plans huge propaganda campaign in Iran.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/feb/16/usnews.iran. 
MacAskill, Ewen, and Julian Borger. “Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says 
Annan.” Accessed March 3, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq. 
Macleod, Hugh, and Ian Black. “Beirut gives Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a warm welcome.” 
October 13, 2010. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/13/beirut-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-lebanon. 
Majidyar, Ahmad. “Senior Quds force official admits Iran's military role in Iraq and Syria.” 
Accessed September 25, 2017. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
264 
 
Maloney, Suzanne. “Tehran and Washington: a motionless relationship?” Accessed 
September 10, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/11_iran_maloney.pdf. 
Manor, James. Rethinking Third World Politics. London, New York: Longman, 1991. 
Martin, Vanessa. Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran. New 
ed. London, New York, New York: I.B. Tauris; In U.S. distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003. 
Mason, Jeff, and Louis Charbonneau. “Obama, Iran's Rouhani hold historic phone call.” 
September 28, 2013. Accessed September 20, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-
assembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-call-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928. 
Mayall, James. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge studies in international 
relations no. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
McDowall, Angus. “Saudi king sits next to Iran's Ahmadinejad in goodwill gesture.” August 
15, 2012. Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-iran-
syria-summit/saudi-king-sits-next-to-irans-ahmadinejad-in-goodwill-gesture-
idUSBRE87D14H20120814. 
Middle East Monitor. “Sanaa is the fourth Arab capital to join the Iranian revolution.” 
Accessed September 25, 2017. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140927-sanaa-is-
the-fourth-arab-capital-to-join-the-iranian-revolution/. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. “The Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC).” Accessed March 3, 2017. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/dqzzywt_665451/2633_665453/2634_6
65455/t15538.shtml. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. “Bilateral relations, Islamic Republic 
of Iran.” Accessed September 18, 2017. http://mfa.am/en/country-by-country/ir/. 
MNA Staff. “Khatami visit to Turkey postponed.” September 26, 2004. Accessed 
September 18, 2017. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/8075/Khatami-visit-to-Turkey-
postponed. 
———. “Iran, Azerbaijan economic ties to speed up.” December 22, 2015. Accessed 
September 18, 2017. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/113047/Iran-Azerbaijan-economic-
ties-to-speed-up. 
———. “Iran-Afghanistan rail corridor under construction.” September 9, 2016. Accessed 
September 19, 2017. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/119588/Iran-Afghanistan-rail-corridor-
under-construction. 
Mohammadi, Ali. Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects. London, New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
Moniquet, Claude, and William Racimora. “The Armenia-Iran relationship: Stretegic 
implication for security in the south caucasus region.” Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-armenian-iran-
relationship/Armenian-Iran%20relationship.pdf. 
Moore, Malcolm. “China to build $2bn railway for Iran.” The Telegraph, September 7, 2010. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-
business/7985812/China-to-build-2bn-railway-for-Iran.html. 
Moshirzadeh, Homeira. “Discursive foundations of Iran's nuclear policy.” Security Dialogue 
38, no. 4 (2007): 521–43. Accessed November 11, 2012. doi:10.1177/0967010607084999. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
265 
 
———. “Domestic ideational sources of Iran's foreign policy.” Iranian Review of Foreign 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (2010). Accessed November 11, 2012. http://www.isrjournals.ir/en/iran-
foreign-policy/28-domestic-ideational-sources-of-irans-foreign-policy.html. 
Motadel, D. “Qajar Shahs in Imperial Germany*.” Past & Present 213, no. 1 (2011): 191–
235. doi:10.1093/pastj/gtr013. 
Nader, Alireza. “The Revolutionary Guards.” Accessed September 17, 2017. 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards. 
Nader, Alireza, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad. 
Iran's Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown. Santa Monica, 
California: RAND, 2014. 
Nadimi, Farzin. “Iran's Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?” Policy Watch, 
no. 2677 (2016). Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-
proxies-in-syria-and-beyond. 
Naji, Kasra. “What is Iran's game plan in Iraq?” June 16, 2015. Accessed September 10, 
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33075894. 
Nakhoul, Samia. “Iran expands regional 'empire' ahead of nuclear deal.” March 23, 2015. 
Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-region-
insight/iran-expands-regional-empire-ahead-of-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN0MJ1G520150323. 
Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future. 
[Paperback ed.]. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007. 
Nassibli, Nasib L. “Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects.” Harvard Kennedy 
School, November 30, 1999. http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/azerbaijan-iran-
relations-challenges-and-prospects-event-summary. 
NCSSEJ Staff. “Republic of Azerbaijan country report 2014.” National Coalition Supporting 
Eurasian Jewry, 2014. http://ncsej.org/media/5446c0ebc59df.pdf. 
Nejad-Hosseinian, Hadi. “Letter Dated 31 August 1999 from the permament representative of 
the I.R. of Iran to the United Nations address to the Secretary-General.” Accessed 
September 26, 2017. http://www.un.org/documents/a54-291.pdf. 
News Network International. “Zardari, Ahmedinijad inaugurate Pak-Iran gas pipeline 
project.” The Nation, March 11, 2013. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://nation.com.pk/national/11-Mar-2013/zardari-ahmedinijad-inaugurate-pak-iran-gas-
pipeline-project. 
Nia, Mahdi Mohammad. “A holistic constructivist approach to Iran's foreign policy.” 
Accessed November 11, 2012. 
http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf. 
Nikou, Semira N. “Timeline of Iran's foreign relations.” 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-foreign-relations#. 
Notezai, Muhammad Akbar. “Iran-Pakistan at the crossroads?” Accessed September 18, 
2017. http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/iran-pakistan-at-the-crossroads. 
Nourian, Shabnam. “Iran's support for Bahrain protesters fuels regional tensions.” April 15, 
2011. Accessed September 21, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/irans-support-for-bahrain-
protesters-fuels-regional-tensions/a-6504403-1. 
Nuruzzaman, Mohammed. “Iran's unstoppable march toward dominance.” May 12, 2016 
May. Accessed September 12, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-unstoppable-
march-toward-dominance-16182. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
266 
 
———. “The rise and rise of Iran: How Tehran has become pivotal to the future of the 
Middle East.” September 1, 2017. Accessed September 10, 2017. 
http://theconversation.com/the-rise-and-rise-of-iran-how-tehran-has-become-pivotal-to-
the-future-of-the-middle-east-83160. 
Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. “President Rouhani arrives in 
Ankara.” Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.president.ir/en/92970. 
Olimat, Muhamad S. China and the middle east since world war ii: A bilateral approach. 
[Place of publication not identified]: Lexington Books, 2016. 
OPEC. “OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2016.” Accessed September 21, 2017. 
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB20
16.pdf. 
Panda, Ankit. “Long overdue: India's Modi visits Iran, signing key agreements, setting broad 
agenda.” May 24, 2016. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/long-overdue-indias-modi-visits-iran-signing-key-
agreements-setting-broad-agenda/. 
Pannier, Bruce. “Turkmen Gas Exports To Iran A Boon For Both Countries.” January 6, 
2010. Accessed September 19, 2017. http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jan/1056.html. 
Parent, Valerie, and Parisa Hafezi. “Iran turns to barter for food as sanctions cripple imports.” 
February 9, 2012. Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
wheat/iran-turns-to-barter-for-food-as-sanctions-cripple-imports-
idUSTRE8180SF20120209. 
Payvand News Staff. “Khatami calls for expansion of all-out ties with Baku.” May 19, 2002. 
Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.payvand.com/news/02/may/1086.html. 
———. “Iran-Turkmenistan ties good model for regional states: Khatami.” October 3, 2003. 
Accessed September 19, 2017. http://www.payvand.com/news/03/mar/1051.html. 
———. “Khatami: Friendship dam manifestation of solidarity between Iran, Turkmenistan.” 
April 12, 2005. Accessed September 19, 2017. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/05/apr/1077.html. 
———. “Iranian, Afghan officials to inaugurate Herat-Meymaneh link today.” August 26, 
2006. Accessed September 19, 2017. http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/125999/Iranian-
Afghan-officials-to-inaugurate-Herat-Meymaneh-link-today. 
Pew Research Center. “Mapping the global Muslim population.” Pew Research Center’s 
Forum on Religion & Public Life, Washington, D.C, 2009.10. 
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/. 
Posch, Walter. “Mäßigung statt Neuanfang: Iran nach den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2013.” 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013. Accessed June 2, 2017. https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2013A39_poc.pdf. 
Presidential Executive Office Staff. “Russian-Iranian talks.” Vladimir Putin had talks with 
President of Iran Hassan Rouhani in Tehran. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50770. 
Rafizadeh, Majid. “Iran’s economic stake in Syria.” January 4, 2013. Accessed September 20, 
2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/04/irans-economic-stake-in-syria/. 
Railway Gazette Staff. “Opening up Afghan trade route to Iran.” January 29, 2008. Accessed 
September 19, 2017. http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/opening-up-
afghan-trade-route-to-iran.html. 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Independence Without Freedom: Iran's Foreign Policy. University 
of Virginia Press, 2013. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
267 
 
Ramazani, Ruhollah K. “Understaning iranian foreign policy (Dark-e siyasat-e khareji-ye 
Iran).” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 1, no. 1 (2009). Accessed August 15, 2013. 
Rengger, N. J. International relations, political theory, and the problem of order: Beyond 
international relations theory? The new international relations. London, New York: 
Routledge, 2000. 
Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Azerbaijan - Iran relations.” Accessed 
September 18, 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/Azerbaijan_-
_Iran_relations_18.09.2014.pdf. 
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkey-Iran economic and commercial 
relations.” Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/economic-and-
commercial-relations-with-iran.en.mfa. 
Reuters Staff. “Saudi King invites Ahmadinejad for Haj, say media.” December 13, 2007. 
Accessed September 15, 2017. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-king-
invites-ahmadinejad-for-haj-say-media-1.218058. 
———. “Russia eyes gas swaps with Iran, says Tehran.” November 2, 2008. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=26726&t=1. 
———. “Russia, Iran discuss gas storage project -Gazprom.” March 14, 2012. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-iran-energy/russia-iran-discuss-
gas-storage-project-gazprom-idUSL5E8EE2PO20120314. 
———. “Iran's foreign minister is first to meet Lebanon's new president.” November 7, 2016. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-iran/irans-
foreign-minister-is-first-to-meet-lebanons-new-president-idUSKBN13223Q. 
Rosenfeld, Jesse. “Are Israel and Hezbollah preparing for war?” March 23, 2017. Accessed 
September 17, 2017. https://www.thenation.com/article/are-israel-and-hezbollah-
preparing-for-war/. 
Rouhani, Hassan. “Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the 
General Debate of the General Assembly of the UN (2013).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/IR_en.pdf. 
———. “Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the General 
Debate of the General Assembly of the UN (2014).” Accessed May 23, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IR_en.pdf. 
———. “Address by Mr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the General Debate 
of the General Assembly of the UN (2015).” Accessed December 17, 2016. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/70/pv.13. 
———. “Statement by H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, President of the I.R. of Iran at the General 
Debate of the General Assembly of the UN (2016).” Accessed February 2, 2017. 
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/71/71_IR_en.pdf. 
RT Staff. “Tehran hosts Non-Aligned Movement summit with focus on Syria.” August 26, 
2012. Accessed September 20, 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/non-aligned-movement-
summit-tehran-583/. 
Sadat, Mir H., and James P. Hughes. “U.S.-Iran engagement through Afghanistan.” Middle 
East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 31–51. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00424.x. 
Sadjadpour, Karim. Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader. 
Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009. 
Salisbury, Peter. “Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War'.” Accessed September 15, 2017. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150218Y
emenIranSaudi.pdf. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
268 
 
Scott, Emma. “Defying expectations: China’s Iran trade and investments.” April 16, 2016. 
Accessed September 16, 2017. https://www.mei.edu/content/map/defying-expectations-
china%E2%80%99s-iran-trade-investments. 
Shaffer, Brenda, ed. The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy. BCSIA studies in 
international security. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006. 
Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr. “General Qasem Soleimani: Iran’s rising star.” March 6, 2015. 
Accessed September 11, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27883162. 
Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr, and Ellen Francis. “Iran's Revolutionary Guards reaps economic 
rewards in Syria.” January 19, 2017. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/irans-revolutionary-guards-
reaps-economic-rewards-in-syria-idUSKBN1531TO. 
Sick, Gary. “Iran’s foreign policy: A revolution in transition.” In Ansari, Politics of Modern 
Iran, 131–48. 
Sim, David. “Arbaeen: World's largest annual pilgrimage as millions of Shia Muslims gather 
in Karbala.” November 21, 2016. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/arbaeen-worlds-largest-annual-pilgrimage-millions-shia-
muslims-gather-karbala-1531726. 
Sims, Alexandra. “Millions of Muslims take part in mass pilgrimage of Arbaeen.” November 
24, 2016. Accessed September 25, 2017. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/20-million-muslims-march-against-
isis-arbaeen-pilgrimage-iraq-karbala-a7436561.html. 
Slavin, Barbara. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to 
Confrontation. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007. 
———. “Ahmadinejad congratulates Obama.” November 6, 2008. Accessed September 10, 
2017. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/6/letter-ahmadinejad-
congratulates-obama/. 
———. “Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions.” The Atlantic Council, The South 
Asia Center, 2011.11. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137386/111011_ACUS_IranChina.pdf. 
Smith, Craig S. “After effects: Iran's influence; cleric in Iran says Shiites must act.” April 26, 
2003. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/26/world/aftereffects-iran-s-influence-cleric-in-iran-
says-shiites-must-act.html. 
Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah's men.” September 18, 2014. Accessed September 25, 
2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/all-the-ayatollahs-men/. 
Stratfor Staff. “Special Series: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation.” June 22, 2010. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/special-series-iranian-
intelligence-and-regime-preservation. 
Syria Direct Staff. “Hama Media Office: IRGC presence ‘noticable’.” February 16, 2015. 
Accessed September 25, 2017. http://syriadirect.org/news/hama-media-office-irgc-
presence-%E2%80%98noticable%E2%80%99/. 
Taheri, Amir. “Who are Iran's Revolutionary Guards?” November 15, 2007. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119509278241693687.html#printMode. 
Takeyh, Ray. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
269 
 
Tavassoli, Sasan. Christian Encounters with Iran: Engaging Muslim Thinkers after the 
Revolution. International library of Iranian studies 19. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2011. 
Tazmini, Ghoncheh. Khatami's Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform. 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009. 
Tehran Times Staff. “Tehran, Baku to finalize gas deal in three months.” January 21, 2010. 
Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/212732/Tehran-Baku-to-
finalize-gas-deal-in-three-months. 
Telhami, Shibley, and Michael N. Barnett. Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
Tengri News Staff. “Railway link from Kazakhstan to Iran across Turkmenistan to be 
inaugurated today.” December 3, 2014. Accessed September 19, 2017. 
https://en.tengrinews.kz/markets/Railway-link-from-Kazakhstan-to-Iran-across-
Turkmenistan-to-257759/. 
The Daily Star Staff. “Lebanon and Iran ink 17 trade agreements.” October 14, 2010. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2010/Oct-
14/59645-lebanon-and-iran-ink-17-trade-agreements.ashx. 
———. “Iran offers Lebanon expertise in gas exploration endeavors.” August 3, 2011. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2011/Aug-
03/145272-iran-offers-lebanon-expertise-in-gas-exploration-endeavors.ashx. 
———. “Lebanon and Iran approved on MoU to assist with the electricity sector.” March 8, 
2012. Accessed September 20, 2017. https://www.albawaba.com/business/lebanon-and-
iran-approved-mou-assist-electricity-sector-416129. 
The Economist Staff. “Iran shores up Assad's home front.” May 21, 2015. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1593186743&Country=Syria&topic=Politics_
1. 
The Wilson Center. “Timeline of Iran-Saudi relations.” January 5, 2016. 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-iran-saudi-relations. 
Trade Promotion Organization of Iran. “Report of the senior managers 2008 ( شرازگ ناريدم  
دشرا 1387 ).” News release. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://www.tpo.ir/uploads/modiran_arshad_87_5122.pdf. 
———. “Report of the senior managers 2012 ( شرازگ ناريدم دشرا 1391 ).” News release. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://farsi.tpo.ir/uploads/modiran_arshad_91_5118.pdf. 
———. “Report of the senior managers 2015 ( شرازگ ناريدم دشرا 1394 ).” News release. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.tpo.ir/uploads/amalkarde-tejarat-khareji-
12mahe94_16341.pdf. 
U.S. Department of State Staff. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” U.S. State 
Department. https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/. 
———. “The Iranian Hostage Crisis.” United States of America Department of State, Office 
of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises. 
UIA. “International Institute for Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations (IIDACC).” 
Accessed September 27, 2017. https://www.uia.org/s/or/en/1100029527. 
UNHCR. “UNHCR portfolio of projects 2015-2016 Islamic Republic of Iran.” News release. 
2015. Accessed September 19, 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/539ab62a9.pdf. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
270 
 
———. “Iran Factsheet.” News release. 2016.05. Accessed September 19, 2017. 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Iran%20Factsheet%20-
%20MAY16.pdf. 
Charter of the United Nations Preamble. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/preamble/. 
———. “Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.” 
Accessed May 2, 2015. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf. 
United Press International Staff. “Khatami on landmark visit to Russia.” March 12, 2001. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.upi.com/Archives/2001/03/12/Khatami-on-
landmark-visit-to-Russia/5733984373200/. 
UNODC. “Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan strengthen anti-drug trafficking initiative.” News 
release. November 25, 2010. Accessed September 19, 2017. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/November/afghanistan-iran-and-pakistan-
strengthen-unodc-brokered-anti-drug-trafficking-initiative.html. 
Vakil, Sanam. “Iran: Balancing east against west.” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 
(2006): 51–65. 
https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/washington_quarterly/v
029/29.4vakil.html. 
Varzi, R. “Iran's French Revolution: Religion, philosophy, and crowds.” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 637, no. 1 (2011): 53–63. Accessed 
May 7, 2014. doi:10.1177/0002716211404362. 
Vincent, R. J. Nonintervention and international order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1974. 
Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance formation and the balance of world power.” International 
Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. doi:10.2307/2538540. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540. 
———. The Origins of Alliances. 3. print. Cornell studies in security affairs. Ithaca [u.a.]: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 1994. 
———. “Alliances in a unipolar world.” World Politics 61, no. 01 (2009): 86–120. 
doi:10.1017/S0043887109000045. 
Watson, Adam. The evolution of international society: A comparative historical analysis. 
London, New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Werth, Paul. “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Abridged English Translation).” 
Accessed April 15, 2015. https://faculty.unlv.edu/pwerth/Const-Iran(abridge).pdf. 
Wight, Martin. International Theory: The Three Traditions. With the assistance of Gabriele 
Wight and Brian Porter. Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1991. 
Winesmarch, Michael. “Iran and Russia sign oil and weapons pact.” March 12, 2001. 
Accessed September 20, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/12/world/iran-and-russia-
sign-oil-and-weapons-pact.html?mcubz=0. 
Yalibnan Staff. “Lebanon, Iran sign a $50 energy MOU.” July 20, 2011. Accessed 
September 20, 2017. http://yalibnan.com/2011/07/20/lebanon-iran-sign-a-50-energy-mou/. 
Yazdani, E. “United States' policy towards Iran after the Islamic Revolution: An Iranian 
perspective.” International Studies 43, no. 3 (2006): 267–89. 
doi:10.1177/002088170604300302. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
271 
 
Zahra-Malik, Mehreen. “Pakistan, Iran aim to boost trade to $5 billion.” March 26, 2016. 
Accessed September 18, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran/pakistan-
iran-aim-to-boost-trade-to-5-billion-idUSKCN0WS0F5. 
Ziade, Mona. “Thousands cheer Khatami on Beirut visit.” Accessed September 20, 2017. 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
272 
 
Appendix 1: 
Keywords - Realism 
aggression 
aggressive intent 
all against all 
alliance 
alone 
anarchy 
annihilate 
arena 
arms 
arms race 
assert 
bandwagon 
bargaining position 
battle 
be ahead 
be independent 
be self sufficient 
be self-sufficient 
belligerence 
bribe 
brinkmanship 
broaden influence 
bully 
carrots and sticks 
clash 
coerce 
coerce state 
combat 
conditional adherence 
conditional observance 
conditionally adhere 
conflict 
conflict of interest 
conflicting interests 
conquer another 
control 
control the system 
control the world 
convention is insignificant 
convention is not 
important 
convention is unimportant 
corrupt 
deceit 
deceive 
defence 
derail 
deter 
diplomacy for powerful 
diplomacy of power 
disorder 
disregard norm 
distrust 
disturb 
dominance 
dominance in the world 
dominant in the world 
dominate 
dominate the world 
dominate the world 
do not trust 
economic bribe 
empire 
enemy 
evil 
evil intention 
expand 
expand influence 
expansion 
exploit 
foe 
force 
forestall 
freedom of decision 
freedom to act 
hegemon 
history taught 
history is a lesson 
history is lesson 
increase military 
increase military power 
increase power 
increase strength 
independence 
independence of Iran 
insecure 
insignificance of 
convention 
insignificance of 
international law 
insignificance of treaty 
international law is 
insignificant 
international law is not 
important 
international law is 
unimportant 
invade a state 
Iran is power 
Iran's independence 
lesson from history 
let us invade 
limited adeherence 
material capability 
military base 
military bribe 
military capability 
military command 
military power 
military strength 
mistrust 
mutual insecurity 
need to survive 
negotiate from strength 
negotiate with force 
one power 
our domination 
our survival 
overpower 
override 
overturn 
own duties 
policy of war 
political bribe 
politics for politics sake 
position of power 
power 
power alliance 
power struggle 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
273 
 
powerful alliances 
powerful country 
powerful influence 
powerful position 
preponderance 
preponderant power 
preponderant state 
pressure 
pressure of conflict 
rival 
ruin 
sanction 
self determined duty 
self sufficient 
self-determined duty 
self-interest 
self-justifying power 
self-sufficient 
state 
state invasion 
state of nature 
sticks 
strength 
strength in negotiations 
struggle 
survive 
system 
tension 
tentative adherence 
treaties are temporary 
treaty is insignificant 
treaty is not important 
treaty is unimportant 
unimportance of 
convention 
unimportance of 
international law 
unimportance of treaty 
unipolar 
upset 
war as policy 
war is policy 
war of all 
war of all against all 
war of power 
we are powerful 
we guide 
we have to dominate 
we invade 
we lead 
weapon 
weaponry 
world dominance 
world of anarchy 
 
  
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
274 
 
Appendix 2: 
Keywords - 
Rationalism 
abide 
abide by the law 
abide by the rule 
accord 
act responsibly 
adhere 
adhere to the law 
adhere to the rule 
adhere to treaty 
adherence to the treaty 
adjust 
adjustment 
agree 
agreement 
amend 
arrange 
arrangement 
avoid crises 
bind 
breakdown of policy 
breakdown of system 
calm 
cannot be subject to other 
chaos of war 
codify the law 
codify the rule 
commit 
compliance to convention 
compliance to treaty 
compliance with the rule 
complies with the rule 
comply 
comply with the rule 
comprehend 
compromise 
concert 
concert of great powers 
confidence 
constitute 
contain war 
control crises 
convention 
conventions are binding 
cooperation 
cooperation policy 
coordination 
countries are equal 
court 
convention is binding 
cultural link 
custom 
deal 
deal on equal terms 
decisive rules 
defensive alliance 
discuss 
discussion 
disorder of war 
disruptive war 
dominant in the region 
duty to protect 
economic 
interdependence 
economy 
equal power 
equal strength 
equal term 
equal terms 
equality among countries 
equality among nations 
equality among states 
equilibrium 
establish the rule 
establish the treaty 
fair 
follow the law 
follow the rule 
formulate 
fundamental norm 
fundamental norm 
fundamental standard 
goodwill 
great power concert 
harmony 
honor 
humanitarian duties 
humanitarian duty 
impartial 
implement 
implement the law 
implement the rule 
implement the treaty 
influence 
institution 
integrity 
interdependent 
international community 
international society 
investment 
law 
law abiding 
law adherence 
law codification 
law enforcement 
law is binding 
law obliges 
law-abiding 
laws are binding 
legal 
legal obligation 
legitimate 
let us cooperate 
limit war 
local dominance 
local preponderance 
logic 
maintain peace 
method 
mindful action 
mindful actions 
moral law 
multipolar 
multipolarity 
mutual assistance 
mutual benefit 
mutual confidence 
mutual preservation 
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
275 
 
nations are equal 
negotiate 
no war 
norm 
not one power 
obligatory by law 
order 
organization 
our cooperation  
pact 
partner 
peace 
peaceful negotiations 
peaceful talk 
peacefully negotiate 
plan for the future 
policy 
policy of cooperation 
policy-making 
powerful countries 
powerful nations 
practice 
preserve 
preserve the balance 
protocol 
rational 
reason 
reciprocity 
recognise 
recognize 
regional dominance 
regionally dominant 
regulate 
relative security 
respect 
responsible 
responsible action 
responsible actions 
responsible decision 
responsible decisions 
restore 
restrict war 
restriction 
rule 
rule adherence 
rule codification 
rule compliance 
rule establishment 
rule implementation 
rule is binding 
rule of law 
rule setting 
rules are binding 
self determination 
self-determination 
set the law 
set the rule 
several powers 
skill 
social arrangement 
social contract 
society 
sovereignty 
special duties 
sphere of influence 
sphere of interest 
sphere of responsibility 
spheres of interest 
spheres of responsibility 
stage 
standard 
standard of behavior 
state law 
state practice 
statehood 
states are equal 
subservient 
take thought for tomorrow 
territory 
ties 
transparency 
transparent 
treaty 
treaty enforcement 
treaty implementation 
trust 
trusteeship 
two powers 
understand 
unite 
unity 
war as emergency 
war is disorder 
we are cooperating 
we cooperate 
we have a legal obligation 
we have legal obligations 
  
Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
276 
 
Appendix 3: 
Keywords – 
Revolutionism 
abolish diplomacy 
adherence to morals 
against hypocrisy 
against hypocrite 
against tyranny 
all humans are equal 
amoral 
assimilate 
balance of power is non-
existent 
balance of power is 
unmanageable 
balance of power is 
unreliable 
believer 
brother 
brothers and sisters 
charity 
civil rights 
collective 
collective interest 
community of mankind 
companionship 
compassion 
cosmopolitan 
decency 
defend religion 
defend the oppressed 
defense of oppressed 
defense of religion 
defense of religion 
democracy 
destroy tyranny 
devotion 
dignity 
diplomacy doesn't work 
diplomacy is nonsense 
diplomacy is not an 
option 
diplomacy is not useful 
diplomacy is of no use 
diplomacy is useless 
diplomacy must be 
abolished 
diplomacy must be 
eliminated 
divine  
divine authority 
divine law 
doctrine 
duty 
duty of action 
equality 
ethic 
ethical behavior 
ethical question 
faith 
fight against oppression 
fight against tyranny 
fight for equality 
fight for justice 
fight the oppressors 
follow moral 
fraternity 
fraternity of mankind 
freedom 
generous 
gesture 
God 
God's war 
good deed 
great powers are evil 
great powers are non-
existent 
great powers should not 
exist 
great society 
holy war 
human 
human beings 
human equality 
human goals 
human law 
human obligation 
human rights 
humility 
ideology 
individual rights 
individual 
insurrection 
islamic community 
Islamic ideology 
islamic internationalism 
Islamic law 
Islamic principles 
Islamic society 
Islamic values 
jihad 
just principle 
just society 
justness 
law for humanity 
law of God 
less tension  
liberty 
mankind 
men are equal 
messianic duty 
mission 
missionary war 
moral 
moral ethics 
moral judgement 
moral law 
moral obligation 
moral principle 
moral responsibilities 
no balance of power 
no borders 
not worth diplomacy 
one organism 
pan Islam 
pan-Islam 
people are equal 
peoples rights 
piety 
power is an obstacle 
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principle of justice 
principle of morality 
principles of Islam 
probity 
protect the oppressed 
protect the weak 
pure religion 
rectitude 
reform 
reformation 
religion 
religious defense 
revolt 
revolution 
revolutionary action 
revolutionary aim 
revolutionary goal 
revolutionary path 
revolutionary patience 
revolutionary state 
revolutionary struggle 
right path 
righteous deeds 
righteousness  
rights of citizens 
sacrifice 
salvation 
self restraint 
self sacrifice 
self-restraint 
Sharia 
Shari'a 
Sharia law 
sharing 
sister 
social 
social equality 
social justice 
social responsibility 
social solidarity 
social values 
society of the faithful 
solidarity 
solidarity of interest 
spirit 
spirit of Islam 
spirituality 
steadfast 
strong faith 
struggle against 
oppression 
super state 
supra state 
tawhid 
the faithful 
there is no great power 
touhid 
transcendence 
transform 
true faith 
truth 
umma 
unity of man 
unity of men 
universal 
unreliability of balance of 
power 
unreliability of power 
balancing 
upright 
uprising 
useless diplomacy 
value 
values of Islam 
virtue 
war against infidels 
we are all equal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
